🧵Thread Series (1/3): STEEL at Ethereum Foundation
1/ This last summer I worked at Ethereum Foundation (@ethereumfndn) as one of their first official interns. My work was with the STEEL team, specifically on the EELS side of things.
What does that mean? Lets unpack...
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I unfortunately can’t make it to Devcon this year, but @0xlouistsai is going to talk about the research work we have been doing together on EIP-7702 for about the last several months.
Block your time for it!
https://t.co/cevv7mnkxB
@rambo_xbt Because the attack tx was about setting the delegation. There were no assets involved. And once that's done its already out of the exchange's control.
Mostly always its pretty hard to estimate the financial impact of a transaction (beyond usual transfers).
7/ Does that mean EIP-7702 is to blame?
No, but it could be that without EIP-7702 this attack wouldn't have happened.
So, should EIP-7702 not have existed?
No, that would be like saying "we don't want internet because it entails cyber attacks"
I'm still a big fan of EIP-7702!
1/ I'm seeing a lot of content saying EIP-7702 wasn't responsible, and that this hack could have been carried out irrespective of its existence.
I disagree with that. Because, we don't know yet.
6/ It could be that 7702 was used primarily to make the sweeps faster. But it also just could be that the authorizations signed (by potentially) exploiting this hot wallet signing infrastructure was the only way the attack could have been carried out.
EIP-7702 authorization transactions can be literal Trojan horses. Signing systems/tools today just aren’t equipped to deal with them effectively.
Whatever happened today has happened before.
THIS NEEDS TO CHANGE!!