A $30,000 robotaxi pays for itself in 17 months, then prints about $17,000 a year.
That kind of payoff is what will make it irresistible to everyone, until you hit the real challenge: finding enough riders who actually need the ride.
You're looking at three of the cheapest robotaxis on earth. Everyone compares their specs, but those will blur together, and that wonβt be the real separator.
https://t.co/JvXVJPgeIU's Gen-7 seats 5, Baidu's Apollo RT6 seats 3, and the Cybercab seats 2, so they can pool more riders. Baidu swaps its battery instead of plugging in, which cuts charging downtime. Tesla wins the technical column: Starlink backup where cellular drops, the best efficiency at 165 Wh/mi versus ~280 for Pony, its own service network, and no pre-mapped roads.
All real. But hold the cost at $0.30 a mile and all three land within a few points of the same return: 57%, 57%, 51%. Robotaxis are becoming a commodity.
Here's the math that makes it one.
A $30,000 car drives 110 paid miles a day at $1 a mile, below what Uber, Lyft, and Waymo charge today, so it stays busy. After a 15% platform cut, that's about $32,700 a year. Running it all-in costs about $15,700. It nets ~$17,000 on a $30,000 car, a 57% return.
A 57% return on a commodity is a flashing green light. Every automaker and fleet on earth is going to build these, and supply floods in.
When supply floods a market, price falls. Fares drop toward the $0.50 a mile where these cars break even, and the 57% gets competed away ride by ride.
So the car doesn't stay a great business for long. The scarce thing isn't the vehicle; it's the rider.
Whoever owns the demand keeps the margin, and that's Uber.
Uber has 208 million riders and did $58 billion of bookings last quarter, up 24%.
It builds none of the self-driving tech and owns almost none of the cars. It has signed more than 30 AV partners, including https://t.co/JvXVJPgeIU and Baidu from this very chart, and allocated $10 billion for investments.
When the cars are identical, and fares hit the floor, Uber routes every trip to whoever's cheapest that second and takes its cut on all of it.
This is the landlord move. Give the operators the customers, let them fight each other down to the breakeven fare, and collect rent on the demand.
The real risk is that Tesla and Waymo keep their own riders and route around Uber. And they will, in their own cities. Waymo is already trying to leave.
But Tesla and Waymo will cover a handful of metros. The other 30-plus AV makers have no riders and no brand, and they'll plug into the largest demand network on earth to survive. Uber doesn't need to win self-driving.
Uber needs a crowded field that turns robotaxis into interchangeable utilities, aka commodities. That future looks more likely every day, and in that world $UBER is going to explode.
Follow @m0xt_ for more takes or updates about Uber. You can also join Milk Road PRO to see my real-time portfolio: https://t.co/Xgv22HRIKN
This chart is the entire $UBER ridesharing thesis in one image, showing why AVs make Uber stronger, not weaker. (Save this)
Rideshare demand is brutally spiky. In Austin, a typical Monday runs at 45% of a Saturday, and the overnight trough is just 5% of the weekly peak.
That's a 20x swing every single week, before seasonality and special events pile on top.
The market still sees AVs as the technology that will kill Uber, but AVs mainly change what supply costs.
They don't change the shape of demand. The week stays just as spiky. What they change is its size: cheaper rides and faster pickups pull in trips that never happened before.
Uber reports that in Austin and Atlanta, overall trip growth accelerated after AVs launched, driven by new riders trying Uber for the first time and existing riders taking more trips.
So AVs expand the TAM for Uber's core business, but volatility remains exactly where it was. And the volatility is the moat: a bigger market still swings 20x a week, and only one network can serve those swings economically.
A fixed fleet has to pick a size. Size it for Saturday night, and your capital sits parked most of the week. Size it for the Tuesday average, and you fail every peak, which is exactly when riders decide if your app is reliable. Uber says, flat out, on the slide: an AV-only competitor either holds significant underutilized supply or leaves demand on the table. Read: unhappy customers.
Even in SF, the friendliest AV market on earth, standalone robotaxis run peak ETAs at least 25% higher than Uber's while starving for demand during lean hours (promo spend rose all year to fill seats).
Human drivers are the elastic supply. When a concert lets out, a peak hits, or an area goes uncovered, Uber pulls drivers in with bonuses and surge. They log on when it's worth their time, log off when it isn't, and an idle driver costs the network exactly nothing. A robotaxi is the reverse: the capital is fixed, the depreciation runs 24/7, and it earns nothing sitting in a depot.
And it's not just the driver base. Uber has over a decade of data on exactly how demand swings, city by city, hour by hour. That's not something a fleet operator can replicate by buying more cars.
That's why the hybrid model wins, and why Uber is the only company positioned to run it.
AVs take the base load, the flat bottom layer of the chart, where they stay nearly fully utilized all week and their cost per trip is lowest. Human drivers take the volatile top, the layer no fixed fleet can serve economically. Each supply type does what it's best at, on a single network that allocates 300 million weekly trips between them.
So every AV that enters the market faces a choice: plug into the network that keeps it busy, or burn capital fighting the demand curve alone. Uber has committed $10 billion across AV partners, scaling from 7 live cities to 15 by year-end, and all of it routes through one network.
AVs are a tailwind priced as an existential threat. My model gets to about $160/sh by EOY 2028.
UBER is my fourth biggest position on Milk Road PRO; you can join for just $1 to see the rest of my book (link in bio). Follow me @m0xt_ for more takes and updates related to Uber.
$UBER is now the cheapest it's ever been.
The market is afraid that robotaxis will disrupt it; however, it's actually the best-positioned company to benefit from autonomous driving.
Here is my $UBER investment thesis: π§΅
@Love4zGame@praveenTweets@_balaji_km@Uber@sachinkansal so you would rather have uber buyback shares instead of investing for the future and building an AV fleet that will only help their business for the future and also give them even a greater moat
@TheRideshareGuy@_balaji_km do you ever think these ride sharing apps like waymo, uber and lyft get so cheap to a point where people just stop buying cars and people just start ubering around instead?
OH. MY. GOODNESS.
CITADEL HAS BOUGHT A MAJORITY OF THE PUBLIC ASSETS FROM LEOPOLD'S SITUATIONAL AWARENESS FUND.
So...Citadel scares everyone on Tuesday about a surprise rate hike during FOMC that WE ALL KNEW was not going to happen...
On Wednesday, the entire market freaks out about the rate hike which causes the selling to compound on itself creating 50-70% drawdowns across the board in high beta semicondcutor names...
Which means Leopold who we now know had $45B of assets and was 400% LEVERED ends up being the sacrifice as he gets liquidated at what theoretically could be the bottom due to not having the margin requirements to keep solvent...
AND THE PERSON WHO CAUSED THE SELLOFF WITH THE RATE HIKE FEARS ENDS UP COMING IN TO BUY HIS ASSETS FOR 40 TO 50 CENTS ON THE DOLLAR.
By the way, Leopold is getting married this weekend. I think he wanted to make sure he wasn't getting margin called during his wedding.
A vet on wall street in Ken Griffin takes out the young new kid.
ABSOLUTE. CINEMA.