Information Elicitation by Ordinal Agreement
Yiling Chen, Shi Feng, Grant Schoenebeck, Fang-Yi Yu
https://t.co/z8qe35HyJZ [๐๐.๐ถ๐]
๐ฌAccepted to the 22nd Conference on Web and Internet Economics (WINE 2026)
Regret Bounds for Profit Maximization in Bilateral Trade: Learning the Best Posted-Price Mechanism
Johannes Brรผstle, Simone Di Gregorio, Federico Fusco, Stefano Leonardi
https://t.co/sDeoTDuUtR [๐๐.๐ถ๐ ๐๐.๐ณ๐ ๐๐.๐ป๐ถ]
Transparency in Team Contracts
Paul Dรผtting, Yingkai Li, Inbal Talgam-Cohen, Jinzhao Wu
https://t.co/lTpjNXKp01 [๐๐.๐ถ๐ ๐๐๐๐.๐๐ท]
Polynomial-Time Computation of Extensive-Form Proper Equilibria in Two-Player Zero-Sum Games
Sam Ganzfried
https://t.co/fVBh1iPJ1I [๐๐.๐ถ๐ ๐๐.๐ฐ๐ธ ๐๐.๐ผ๐ฐ ๐๐๐๐.๐๐ท]
Stability and Perfection in Constrained Weighted Network Games
Julien Fixary, Rรฉmi Castera, Rida Laraki
https://t.co/Iipz5x4uol [๐๏ฟฝ๏ฟฝ๏ฟฝ.๐ถ๐ ๐๐๐๐.๐๐ท]
Tight bounds for fractional and randomized truthful scheduling
Georgios Anastasiadis, George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, Annamaria Kovacs, Conrad Schecker
https://t.co/NJaKEntVzU [๐๐.๐ถ๐]
On Existence and Computational Complexity of Quasi-strict Equilibria
Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Xinhao Nie
https://t.co/aNOWbqIu5M [๐๐.๐ถ๐]