$GLND With more eyes on this because of the merger, there's going to be more volume and price action towards the end of this month and once the deal finally closes.
Having 100% owned license after having a 70% work in agreement in the Jameson Land Basin should add tremendous value alone. Disko could be very large as well, not to mention there are other valuable licenses...
For those that are new to $GLND this was the insanely massive potential before thr merge with 80 Mile. Look below.
(I'll have to adjust the valuation since we're getting 100% of the Jameson Land Basin now with an increased share structure)
Tomorrow, we’re heading out into Nuuk Fjord. Today, I stopped by the local store and bought some chocolate imported from Canada for the trip — just a small personal gesture to show my support and solidarity with our good neighbours in Canada. 🇨🇦🇬🇱
BREAKING: Greenland Energy $GLND has agreed indicative terms to acquire 80 Mile in a £61.5M all-share deal
$GLND already owns 4.42% + if completed, the deal would consolidate 100% of the Jameson Land licences under one Nasdaq-listed company
Trump is talking about Greenland again while Brent is back near $100
timing is pretty insane
Greenland Energy Company and 80 Mile Agree Indicative Merger Terms.
Larry Swets, Executive Chairman: “Recent developments have reinforced the logic for bringing these two companies together and the time to pursue it in earnest. We’re excited to have agreed terms that we believe will benefit all of our stakeholders and, in particular, Greenland itself.”
https://t.co/jliXMKt1uE
Greenland Energy Company and 80 Mile Agree Indicative Merger Terms.
Larry Swets, Executive Chairman: “Recent developments have reinforced the logic for bringing these two companies together and the time to pursue it in earnest. We’re excited to have agreed terms that we believe will benefit all of our stakeholders and, in particular, Greenland itself.”
https://t.co/jliXMKt1uE
Hearing from many "crypto degens" that want to buy tokenized oil and mineral royalties
solana:6dX5M8DY6VTFtVRX5yzWn9RE4MkJTyoAVbAodk6cpump will be your home!
Starlink is illegal in Greenland, so instead they have to use Eutelsat through Tusass (the state sanctioned monopoly).
15% of starlinks performance at 200% of the cost.
Starlink is illegal in Greenland, so instead they have to use Eutelsat through Tusass (the state sanctioned monopoly).
15% of starlinks performance at 200% of the cost.
As an American that has family and friends in Canada, recent events have been tough. I've done many deals in Canada and really enjoy doing business there.
This perspective, from a Canadian, is probably the most thoughtful and rhetoric free I've read. Not an endorsement of everything said, but I thought a convincing contribution to the dialog.
Canada is having a difficult conversation with itself about its economic relationship with the United States.
Much of the current Canadian political narrative treats access to the American market almost as an acquired right. When an American administration talks about reshoring manufacturing, imposing tariffs or favouring American production, Canadians often frame the issue as an affront to Canadian sovereignty.
I think that fundamentally misunderstands how our industrial economy developed.
For much of the post-war period, Canada prospered by becoming an extraordinarily effective extension of the American industrial economy.
Southern Ontario did not independently develop an automotive ecosystem disconnected from Detroit. Windsor, Oshawa, Oakville, St. Thomas and communities throughout Southwestern Ontario became deeply integrated into an industrial machine whose centre of gravity was across the border in Michigan, Ohio and the broader American Midwest.
American manufacturers established Canadian factories and supply chains for many reasons: access to the Canadian market, tariff and content rules, exchange rates, labour economics, geographic proximity and, eventually, increasingly integrated North American trade.
Canada became exceptionally good at this.
We built cars, stamped metal, machined components, produced chemicals, assembled machinery and supplied American factories. Canadian companies also became enormously successful suppliers to that system. Magna is perhaps the greatest example of what could be built from Canada's position inside the North American automotive supply chain.
The 1965 Auto Pact accelerated that integration. Free trade in 1989 and NAFTA in 1994 took it much further.
But then something else happened.
Beginning in the late twentieth century and accelerating dramatically after 2000, North American manufacturing capacity increasingly moved offshore. China became a manufacturing superpower. Global supply chains replaced many domestic ones. American industrial communities lost factories and employment, while corporations discovered that enormous amounts of production could be sourced from lower-cost jurisdictions.
For decades, Canada operated within that globalization model while retaining extraordinarily favourable access to the world's largest consumer economy.
Now the United States is reconsidering the model.
Washington increasingly views industrial capacity as more than an economic issue. Semiconductors, steel, aluminum, automobiles, energy, pharmaceuticals, chemicals and critical minerals are being treated as matters of national security and strategic resilience.
That creates an uncomfortable question for Canada:
If the United States wants its industrial production back, on what basis does Canada believe that production belongs to us?
Imagine a manufacturer that has outsourced substantial production to a subcontractor for decades. The subcontractor builds its business around that work, invests in equipment, hires employees and becomes highly successful.
Then circumstances change. The manufacturer's own facilities have unused capacity and its own employees need work.
The subcontractor may understandably be unhappy when the manufacturer brings some of that production home. But the subcontractor cannot reasonably argue that decades of receiving the work created a permanent entitlement to it.
That, in simplified form, is the uncomfortable position Canada now faces.
This does not mean Canada lacks sovereignty. Quite the opposite. Canada is completely sovereign and has every right to establish whatever trade, industrial, environmental and foreign policies Canadians choose.
But sovereignty works both ways.
Canada has the sovereign right to determine its economic policy. The United States has the sovereign right to determine how much access foreign producers receive to the American market.
Those are two different questions.
Canada has also spent decades diversifying its trading relationships, including developing a substantial economic relationship with China. There are legitimate American concerns about transshipment, rules of origin, Chinese overcapacity and goods entering the United States through third countries. Canada should take those concerns seriously rather than simply assuming that our historical relationship exempts us from American scrutiny.
That does not mean every American tariff is justified, nor does it mean Canada should simply accept whatever Washington demands.
It means Canada needs to understand the leverage in the relationship.
Nearly 40 million Canadians live beside an economy of roughly 350 million people. Geography gave us extraordinary access to that market. Generations of Canadian workers and entrepreneurs then turned that geographical advantage into one of the world's most integrated cross-border industrial relationships.
But proximity is not ownership.
Our automotive plants, stamping companies, machine shops and parts manufacturers have succeeded because they are very good at what they do. They should compete aggressively to retain that business. Canada should make itself the most compelling place in North America to manufacture.
What we should not do is confuse historical integration with entitlement.
Instead of asking, "How can the Americans do this to us?" Canada should be asking a much harder question:
Why should an American manufacturer choose to put its next factory in Ontario rather than Michigan, Ohio, Indiana or Tennessee?
If our answer is productivity, engineering talent, energy, logistics, taxation, regulatory efficiency, currency advantage and a highly capable workforce, then Canada has a compelling case.
If our answer is simply that American companies have manufactured here for the last 70 years and therefore should continue doing so, we have a problem.
The old Canadian model depended heavily on being an exceptionally attractive extension of American industrial capacity.
America is now rebuilding that capacity at home.
Canada's challenge is not to demand that history stand still.
It is to make ourselves indispensable enough that, even when America has the choice to bring the work home, American companies still choose Canada.
@ronmortgageguy@StephenPunwasi@FoodProfessor