So-called age verification for social media is spreading across the world, framed as an effort to create a safer internet for children. In reality, age verification lays the foundation for a fully controlled internet.
The age verification rush must be slowed down, and politicians need to recognize the consequences of different types of legislation and systems.
Age verification is the wrong approach to fix “the social media problem”
The big tech social media companies are bad. Their business model is bad; it is based on mass surveillance and manipulation, and they cooperate with governments in mapping entire populations. But age verification is fundamentally the wrong approach to preventing children from using big tech social media platforms. Introducing age verification is based on coercion; the state forces social media companies to verify their users’ identities. But the big tech social media platforms already know which of their users are children. Their business model depends on knowing this. They know how old users are, and they know exactly what type of person they are. As age verification is based on coercion, politicians could instead force platforms to stop doing the things politicians consider harmful to children, or force them to block children (again, they know who they are) from using their services. But instead, politicians seek to massively invade everyone’s privacy and undermine democratic rights on a global scale. In other words, the latter is the real objective – they do not want to protect children; they want to impose control.
Slippery slope of age verification
It is undeniable that age verification threatens freedom of expression, risks increasing mass surveillance, and is likely to lead to censorship. It will not only shrink the online world and reduce young people’s right to privacy (for example, if VPN services were to be restricted); but also risks becoming a significant step toward a controlled internet for everyone.
Most age verification is identity verification
Most countries are now considering introducing age verification systems, meaning that everyone would have to identify themselves either to the service/website they want to use or to a third party capable of linking them to their activity on that service or website. This is not age verification but identity verification, and the consequence is therefore that freedom of information is restricted (you can no longer visit regulated websites anonymously) and that you can no longer post anonymously on social media. This is a major problem in countries like the UK and Germany where the police conduct raids on people’s homes for posting content on social media that the authorities dislike. Or in the United States, where authorities are trying to pressure tech companies into revealing the identities behind accounts protesting ICE. Social media identity verification removes important tools for activists in countries where criticizing those in power is dangerous.
Restrictions on app store or operating system level
Some countries are looking to impose identity verification at the app store level or even within the operating system itself. This is an exciting experiment, since this is possible to circumvent using open-source operating systems. Some countries are already looking to include open-source systems. Since open-source systems cannot be controlled, politicians would ultimately need to ban devices that are not controlled by the state. The end point: telescreens like those in Orwell’s 1984, devices that both monitor you and broadcast only the information approved by the state.
The Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) alternative and the EU
The EU has presented its own age verification app as “completely anonymous”. The idea is to use Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) cryptography to break the link between the age credential issuer (EU governments) and the regulated services/sites. Currently, the EU app does not have ZKP functionality, contrasting Ursula von der Leyen’s claim that the app ”is technically ready to be used”. But more importantly, the app is currently designed to always function without ZKP technology; if ZKP is unavailable, the app falls back to a non-ZKP model. Even if fully developed ZKP technology could be implemented in the future, it would remain an optional extra feature that countries may choose to disable and that the EU could remove at any time.
Read more on our site.
https://t.co/wTVKHMS1zg
The EU age verification app is presented as “completely anonymous”. But the risk is that member states (the countries are supposed to create their own versions of the open-source EU app) use it to introduce identity verification that makes it impossible to post anonymously on social media.
The idea behind “completely anonymous” is to use Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) cryptography to break the link between the age credential issuer (EU governments) and the regulated services/sites. Currently, the EU app does not have ZKP functionality, contrasting Ursula von der Leyen’s claim that the app ”is technically ready to be used”. But more importantly, the app is designed to always function without ZKP technology; if ZKP is unavailable, the app falls back to a non-ZKP model. Even if fully developed ZKP technology could be implemented in the future, it would remain an optional extra feature that countries may choose to disable and that the EU could remove at any time.
This means that the EU could decide at any time that ZKP may no longer be used, and in one stroke the app would fall back to its default mode, meaning that every post on social media carries an ID tag. By that point, an infrastructure will already have been rolled out; people will have gotten used to it, and it will be harder to roll it back.
More details on https://t.co/wTVKHMS1zg
Our Android app has for the second time passed MASA, a standardized security assessment, conducted by Leviathan Security Group.
Read more: https://t.co/4v8Zo4gq0R
On Friday the 15th of May, we became aware of a fingerprinting issue affecting Mullvad users.
We have a method which changes this behaviour currently being tested, with plans to begin rolling it out to our VPN servers in the coming weeks.
Read more here: https://t.co/MH32Odwrj0
A new VPN leak that allows any app to leak traffic outside the VPN tunnel has recently been discovered by @cybaqkebm
Read more here: https://t.co/K9bxtiGHbw
It’s absurd that American authorities can purchase personal data – that they’re not allowed to gather themselves without a warrant – directly from data brokers. This violates the Fourth Amendment, and it’s time to close the data broker loophole.
Today, @RepThomasMassie, @RepBoebert and @naomibrockwell at the @LudlowInstitute introduced the Surveillance Accountability Act. It requires warrants based on probable cause for all government surveillance and data access. You can read more about it at https://t.co/iFX17ELSLA
Apple's networking stack is preventing the iOS app from being as secure as possible, we have now secured our app to mitigate this despite the rough edges around the update procedure.
Read more here: https://t.co/sbX72s2O7m
This is Senate House in London. When George Orwell wrote 1984, the building served as the model for the headquarters of the Ministry of Truth (the propaganda ministry). The Ministry of Truth decided what was true, for example that 2+2=5. It was responsible for censorship and rewriting history, and it banned the word “free” in the sense of freedom.
When we projected our banned TV ads onto buildings in London, we thought this would be a fitting location. Nineteen Eighty-Four was supposed to be a warning, not an instruction manual.
Starting with 16.0a1 alpha release, Mullvad Browser Alpha is based on the Firefox Rapid Release channel rather than the Extended Support Release (ESR). The alpha release is now available on Linux ARM.
Read more here: https://t.co/ngaSJScRIe
The only way we want our ads to come down. When people take them home.
a) Keep them.
b) Send them to Ashton Kutcher.
c) Put them outside 10 Downing Street.
@mullvadnet Dear Mullvad,
I was drunk a few nights ago and on the tube with some friends, I noticed your ads and me and a friend looked at each other and started noticing it was coming off a bit next thing you know we took them home, if you want it back let me know.
Thanks
Our TV ads – under the concept And Then? – were banned in the UK, by Clearcast (an organization formed by the major TV channels in the UK which, on behalf of the authorities, must approve all TV advertising in the UK). Their arguments included:
· “The overall concept lacks clarity.”
· “It is unclear why certain examples are included, who the ‘speaker’ represents, and the role of individuals depicted in the car.”
· “Several examples (e.g., paedophiles, rapists, murderers) risk causing serious offence and could imply that the VPN facilitates criminal activity.”
· “Referencing topics such as: Paedophiles, Rapists, Murderers, Enemies of the state, Journalists, Refugees, Controversial opinions, People’s bedrooms, Police officers, Children’s headsets … is inappropriate and irrelevant to the average consumer’s experience with a VPN.”
We think their arguments are nonsense. On the one hand, censorship and mass surveillance are escalating in the UK, through new laws, government pressure and proposed legislation. On the other hand, criticism of censorship and mass surveillance is being blocked through processes that are arbitrary and – to use their own words – unclear. When we tried to criticize the TV ads ban through outdoor ads, they were also banned by government bodies. We believe the situation is both Orwellian and Kafkaesque.
You can watch all the banned ads and read more about escalating mass surveillance and censorship in the UK on our site: https://t.co/PWh2I5LQmb
And then? When our ads were banned on British TV, we took them to the streets instead and projected them onto walls in London.
Mass surveillance and censorship are escalating in many countries right now. There is a global attack on secure encrypted communication. Often, authorities, politicians, and tech companies work together to push for new laws. One example: when Ashton Kutcher (yes, the actor), through his tech company Thorn, tried to introduce total surveillance of all EU citizens through undemocratic and corrupt methods.
First, Ashton Kutcher convinced the EU Commission that they could scan everything on an EU citizen’s phone or computer (messages, photos, emails, phone calls, all of it) for child sexual abuse material without, at the same time, looking at the content of other types of communication.
And then?
And then EU Commissioner Ylva Johansson presented the legislative proposal called Chat Control, which aimed to scan everything on all EU citizens' phones and computers (including conversations in end-to-end-encrypted messaging services). The message from the Commission was: we will only search for child sexual abuse material (CSAM).
And then?
And then experts from all over the world explained to her that the kind of scanning she was talking about (as Ylva described it: a drug-sniffing dog that can detect illegal content in a message without reading the message) simply cannot be done safely, and that Chat Control would mean the end of privacy and pose a security threat to all Europeans. Ylva responded with: “what about the children?”
And then?
And then it was revealed that Thorn, the organization founded by Ashton Kutcher and which had been lobbying for Chat Control from the beginning, was selling the kind of scanning technology that could be used for Chat Control – despite being registered as a charity organization in the EU’s lobbying registry.
And then?
And then it was revealed that Thorn, together with the EU Commission, had also started and funded “children’s rights organizations” that had supported the proposal. What appeared publicly to be charitable organizations were in fact lobby groups.
And then?
And then it was revealed that Europol wanted unlimited access and wanted to use the scanning for more than just child abuse crimes, saying that all data – also unfiltered and innocent material – should be stored because it “could at some point be useful to law enforcement”.
And then?
And then it was revealed that employees at Europol had joined Thorn, to lobby their old colleagues.
And then?
And then politicians in Brussels wanted to exempt themselves from the scanning.
And then?
And then the European Parliament, in an almost historic consensus, voted against the proposal and called Chat Control nothing but mass surveillance. As one of the members of the parliament said: “The Commission wasn’t focusing on protecting children but wanted mass surveillance.”
And then?
And then The Council of the EU (law proposals must go through both the Parliament and the Council), after three years of negotiation, finally reached a common position on Chat Control. The requirement for mandatory scanning (including end-to-end encrypted messaging services) was removed, which is a major victory, but several problematic elements remain in the Council's position. For instance, the Council wants to demand ID Control to use messaging services (including end-to-end encrypted).
And then?
And then, in 2026 the final negotiations began, between the European Commission, the European Parliament, and the Council of the EU. At the same time, the European Commission is working on a Plan B, through the initiative Going Dark/ProtectEU, where they once again try to force total surveillance (this time organized crime is the excuse) on the citizens of the EU.
And then?
https://t.co/2uxBeeNr3p
Our WireGuard implementation, GotaTun was recently audited by Assured Security Consultants. Two identified low severity issues were fixed prior to the completion of the audit.
No major vulnerabilities were found.
Read more here: https://t.co/ouHlGhr8Jg