The U.S. Department of the Treasury has announced the launch of the Quantum-Readiness Task Force in accordance with President Donald J. Trump's Executive Order 14412.
The Task Force will bring together the public and the private sector to prepare for quantum-related cyber risks.
βQuantum computing holds significant promise, but it also presents a serious long-term challenge to the cryptographic tools that underpin the U.S. financial system,β said Treasury Assistant Secretary for Financial Institutions Luke Pettit.
[NOTICE] Termination of QANX Trading on BingX
Trading of the QANX token on BingX will be terminated this week. This decision follows new requirements that are not aligned with the current strategic focus and state of the project.
Moving forward, we are concentrating our efforts on partnering with exchanges that have a wide regional presence while ensuring compliance with all local regulatory requirements to facilitate a seamless MainNet launch.
If you hold QANX tokens on BingX, please take the following actions:
- Cancel Open Orders: Please cancel any active orders immediately. If no action is taken, the system will automatically cancel them.
- Withdrawal Deadline: You must withdraw your tokens by 2026-11-13 16:00:00 (UTC).
July Milestone: Successful completion of the TestNet migration to the official Ethereum execution client
Our primary objective this month was clear: migrate the QAN TestNet to the official industry-standard Ethereum execution client while remaining compatible with our previous implementation without compromising our unique quantum-secure features.
The engineering team has not only completed the migration to the official Ethereum client but has also proven that QANplatform can operate seamlessly on a standard Ethereum infrastructure while retaining the full power of the QAN Virtual Machine (QVM) and QAN XLINK.
Read the full technical deep dive on our blog (link in comments) ππ
Picture PQC key rotation that runs like cert renewal already does: scheduled, automatic, nobody paging on-call.
That exists for TLS today, and has for over a decade. For post-quantum keys, it exists only in pockets, a validator set here, a keyset-management library there, never yet as the default anyone can assume.
That's the bar worth aiming for: rotation as unremarkable as a Let's Encrypt renewal.
In 2022, a signature was proof. In 2030, it's a question mark.
It is a Wednesday morning in 2030.
Maria underwrites title insurance for real estate transactions. Her firm started backing blockchain-recorded property titles in 2021, chasing the story every county recorder loved: no more lost deeds, no more forged paperwork, a permanent chain of ownership nobody could dispute.
She is reviewing a claim on a commercial property in Ohio.
The current owner bought it in 2022. The title transfer was signed on-chain, ECDSA, standard for the time. Nothing unusual. The chain of custody traces back nine sales, all the way to 1987, then digitized and anchored in 2021 as a single cryptographic root.
The claim isn't about a lien anyone missed. It's about a signature.
A forensic cryptographer flagged the 2022 transfer. The public key was exposed the moment the transaction posted. Someone with enough quantum compute could now produce a second signature for the same private key, mathematically valid, pointing to a different buyer.
Not a hack. Not fraud in the traditional sense. A second, equally provable version of the truth.
Maria's entire underwriting model assumes one signature means one fact. It was never built for a world with two.
She adds a line to the claim file: "Pre-2024 on-chain signature. Cryptographic non-repudiation no longer assured. Escalate to legal."
She has three more files on her desk with the same date range.
Most chains signed their first block assuming ECDSA would hold for its lifetime. We signed ours assuming it wouldn't.
Title insurers underwriting on-chain property records are now finding out which assumption their claims file depends on.
Validators across most major chains are upgrading their hardware, faster CPUs, more bandwidth, better cooling. Ask any of them why, and you'll get an answer about transaction throughput.
Nobody's upgrading for signature size. ML-DSA signatures run roughly 37x larger than ECDSA. That number doesn't fit in the mempool assumptions, block layout, or fee market any of these upgrades were designed around.
So the industry is buying faster hardware to solve a problem it hasn't diagnosed yet, and calling it optimization.
8/π§΅
So here's the actual audit most holders have never run: pull up your wallet's derivation path. Check which addresses were derived from a parent that already signed a transaction.
That's not a hypothetical exercise. That's homework you can do this week.
What does your tree look like?
Your cold wallet might already be compromised, and no breach has happened yet. It's sitting in your derivation tree.
1/π§΅
Every Bitcoin address you've never spent from is quantum-safe.
That's not a design win. It's an accident of how P2PKH works. Your address is a hash of your public key. The key stays hidden until the moment you sign.
Then you spend. And the accident ends.
7/π§΅
This is why "quantum-safe by design" actually means something specific.
It means the derivation tree itself assumes public keys will eventually be computationally reversible, and the signature scheme, the address format, and the wallet hierarchy are built around that assumption from the first block.
Not retrofitted after 7 million BTC already have exposed keys.
65%.
That is the estimated share of Ether held in quantum-exposed addresses making them potentially vulnerable to a quantum attack the moment sufficiently powerful hardware arrives.
No warning. No opt-in.
With QANplatform, your address is never the weak link, it's secure by design from genesis.
Read the blog: https://t.co/2UyEeE5aEr
And if you have missed the open letter of our Co-Founder & CTO tackling community questions and reinforcing our commitment to the MainNet launch this year, read it here: https://t.co/kISP5bG0D9
June Milestone: Executing the Ethereum Rebase
Following our strategic shift, June was all about deep engineering execution. We've successfully ported QVM core logic, overhauled our networking layer, and resolved critical runtime issues.
β Core rebase is now 70% complete.
The final 30% focuses on ecosystem sync and rigorous testing. Weβre one step closer to the worldβs first quantum-secure network built natively on Ethereum, giving developers the freedom to build in any programming language.
Read the full technical recap on our blog (link in comments) ππ
The architects of the most secure identity system ever built have never modeled for Q-Day.
Governments, banks, and hospitals are building the next generation of digital identity on blockchain.
The promise is compelling. No more centralized password databases as the single point of breach. Your identity credential is yours. Cryptographically signed. Anchored to a distributed ledger. Verifiable anywhere, by anyone, without asking a central authority for permission.
It is a genuinely elegant solution to a genuinely broken system.
Here is the flaw nobody is writing about.
The architecture of Decentralized Identifiers, DIDs, the technical standard that underpins most enterprise blockchain identity systems, is built on the same cryptographic primitives as every wallet you already know is vulnerable.
Your identity credential is issued by a signing authority. That authority uses a private key. The corresponding public key is written to the ledger. Anyone can verify your credential by checking the signature against the public key on-chain.
It is clean. It is trustless. And in public ledger-anchored DID systems, the dominant deployment pattern in enterprise and government identity infrastructure, it exposes the public key. Permanently.
Now add one more layer that most commentary skips entirely.
Your credential itself, your digital passport, your KYC record, your professional license, your healthcare authorization, carries a timestamp. It was signed at a specific moment. That signature, and the public key used to verify it, lives on a public ledger indefinitely.
Adversaries are already collecting this data today. Not to use now. To use later, once quantum capability arrives. Researchers call this Harvest Now, Decrypt Later archiving encrypted data today with the intent to break its confidentiality once quantum hardware matures.
But there is a second quantum threat model that is less discussed and more directly dangerous for identity systems.
It is called Trust Now, Forge Later.
In the TNFL model, the adversary does not target the contents of a credential. They target the signing key itself. A quantum computer running Shor's algorithm can derive a signing authority's private key directly from its public key which is already permanently on-chain. Once they hold the private key, they can issue entirely new credentials that carry a cryptographically valid signature, indistinguishable from legitimate ones.
The attacker does not rewrite the ledger. The ledger is immutable that does not change. What changes is your ability to trust what is on it.
Every credential issued under the compromised signing scheme, every digital passport, every KYC attestation, every healthcare authorization, now exists alongside forgeries that the verification system cannot tell apart. The identity infrastructure designed to eliminate fraud becomes the mechanism that enables it at a scale no centralized breach ever could.
Because a centralized breach steals records from one database. A Trust Now, Forge Later attack on a public identity ledger collapses the trust model for every credential ever issued under that signing authority. Not by altering what was written. By making it impossible to distinguish the real from the fabricated.
The enterprise blockchain identity infrastructure being built right now is the most comprehensive, most permanently exposed, most difficult-to-patch identity system ever designed.
And most of its architects have never modeled for Q-Day.