@aniiland@TheSynapseX This is a complex problem, that no messaging app has solved without compromising users' security or privacy.
We understand that it is important for the users, and has to be provided at some future point, to improve usability.
We commented more here: https://t.co/uA3nt8PFK9
Most private messengers encrypt the message.
@SimpleXChat hides the identity, the graph, and — with Tor — the route.
No phone number.
No username.
No user ID.
No central social graph.
Optional Tor/Orbot routing.
That’s why SimpleX is different.
Signal protects your chats.
Telegram hides only Secret Chats by default.
XChat encrypts content but still leaves metadata visible to X.
SimpleX goes deeper:
The server doesn’t know who you are.
The network doesn’t need your phone number.
And with Tor, even the route can be harder to trace.
Encryption protects the message.
SimpleX protects the map.
We just created the page with the links to 240+ community articles, posts, videos, podcasts, guides in 20+ languages about SimpleX Chat: https://t.co/vblbp0L4zD
Big thank you to everybody who promoted what we build. It would not have happened without you.
Decentralized architectures, like Session or Tor, cannot guarantee via technology alone that different nodes are run by different entities, and that they don't collude and don't sell or exchange metadata. As Eric Hughes put it - "code alone doesn't cut it".
As clients decide which nodes to route traffic through, they need to know which node is owned by which entity. Simply selecting random nodes is insufficient even if one operator runs 2-3% of nodes, and the real concentration in decentralized networks is much higher than that.
If you know a technical design that can enforce node independence and prevent metadata sharing - please explain. We don't think it's possible.
We updated SimpleX Chat Privacy Policy and Conditions:
- Stronger privacy commitments from operators and apps.
- New one-time links and public addresses.
- Public channels released in v6.5 (beta).
See all changes via the link in the comment 👇
Our support contact in the app (Ask SimpleX team) switched to the new support bot 🤖🚀
It lets users send questions about SimpleX Chat to @grok (opt-in), or to connect to the team.
We will publish the guide how anybody can use this bot for customer support later this month.
It is a one-sided view of the problem.
The choice between guarantee via architecture and guarantee via policy is a false binary - both are necessary, as neither alone is sufficient.
The core security assumption of many decentralized networks is that participating nodes do not collude and that they are run by independent parties.
And unless this assumption is supported by policies or contracts, it doesn't hold as the network grows - there is no architecture that can enforce non-collusion and independence, it can only be enforced via policy.
As Eric Hughes wrote (though in a different context) - "code alone doesn't cut it".
Freedom of speech needs infrastructure that protects it by design — protocols, governance and funding.
v6.5 release brings SimpleX Channels: a new model for online publishing built for participation privacy.👇
v6.5 is the first beta release of channels:
- channel owners hold their own channel keys,
- each channel uses multiple relays for reliability,
- publishers can run their own chat relays,
- channels can be added to our SimpleX Directory.
Read more at https://t.co/Sa0VTmNjb4
https://t.co/ImfNCOQt2S: "In the long run, we believe that this will not only speed up the development of our software but also result in higher quality software."
This reads like they are accepting security regressions for the sake of faster development.
Why not use C Tor that is at least battle tested and not an experimental Rust code?
@SecureLegion@jim_havrilla Tor is a choice, and it has its own upsides and downsides. It's still somebody else's servers, so it's wrong to call Tor-based network "serverless".
In case of Tor you don't know who runs the relays, and it may be equally good and bad for security.
@SecureLegion@jim_havrilla The problem with "serverless" is that it's a bit of a lie - there are always some servers that are used for mobile devices to communicate.
@SecureLegion@jim_havrilla And how would you avoid using servers, technically?
The app chooses servers operated by different parties to deliver messages. By default, it's two independent operators that do not share any metadata - SimpleX Chat and Flux. Neither can see which IP addresses communicate.
It's not that simple. For example, operators may log IP addresses - no protocol design can stop it. Privacy policy does. Same about not sharing any metadata. Etc.
That's wrong to think that tech alone can make policy redundant. Protocol design eliminates attacks on encryption, but it cannot eliminate all attacks even theoretically, such as statistical/timing correlation, analysing metadata across multiple nodes, etc.
So policy improves threat model in these areas. But it doesn't replace secure protocol design of course - it complements it.
This binary thinking - protocol vs policy - is just wrong, because neither alone is sufficient. A secure system must have both.