@YESBANK I got the payment link to prepay and foreclose the account and I did that. Now I can't even access the account in app or web and can't even download statement.
Kindly share me No due certificate ASAP. @YESBANK
@YESBANK I want to foreclose my car loan and its been 6 days still there is no foreclosure terms shared by your team.
Did we made a wrong choice of taking car loan from Yes Bank?
None of this is "hidden." It's just on page 333 of a 690-page doc nobody finishes.
"Growth IPO" is the story being sold. "Runway IPO" is the one written in the financials.
Read both.
(Not investment advice.)
@ZeptoNow 's IPO draft just dropped. Everyone's quoting the ₹22,624 cr revenue (+104% YoY).
Almost nobody read page 333.
The company's own going-concern note quietly admits it needs fresh capital to pay its bills. 🧵👇Read More⬇︎
To be fair - the FY26 loss of ₹5,905 cr is a REAL operating loss, not an ESOP/accounting illusion. Exceptional items were just ₹7 cr.
But unit economics ARE improving: Adjusted EBITDA margin went -35.6% → -20.3%.
Both things are true. Hold them together.
800 sq ft Mumbai flat bought in 2010 for ₹50L → today ₹2Cr+.
2200 sq ft Ahmedabad home bought in 2010 for ₹50L → today ₹80-90L.
Ahmedabad mein space milta hai, returns nahi.
Mumbai ka 'compromise' aapko crorepati banata hai. Ahmedabad ka 'garden' sirf garden rehta hai.
An 800 sq ft flat in Mumbai costs ₹2Cr.
The same ₹2Cr in Ahmedabad buys a 2,200 sq ft home
with a garden, two parking spots, and a community around it.
One of these is called a good investment.
One is called a compromise.
@ChitrakShivalik 800 sq ft Mumbai flat bought in 2010 for ₹50L → today ₹2Cr+.
2200 sq ft Ahmedabad home bought in 2010 for ₹50L → today ₹80-90L.
Ahmedabad mein space milta hai, returns nahi.
Mumbai ka 'compromise' aapko crorepati banata hai. Ahmedabad ka 'garden' sirf garden rehta hai.
THE VERDICT
Here's the honest summary:
Manipal Health Enterprises is a large, legitimate healthcare company. But this IPO is structured in a way that primarily benefits:
DBS Bank — which gets its ₹5,310 Cr loan repaid using your money
Promoters — who got 2.38 Cr shares for a brand license 11 days before filing
The CEO — who got ₹37.5 Cr bonus 19 days before filing
Selling shareholders — who bought at ₹68–105/share and are exiting at IPO price
You, the retail investor, are being asked to:
• Fund a debt repayment (67% of proceeds)
• Fund an ambiguous ₹2,000 Cr "general purposes" bucket
• Buy into a balance sheet where goodwill exceeds net worth
• Overlook pre-IPO wealth extraction events compressed into 19 days
• Ignore a ₹7,801 Cr off-balance-sheet indemnity
None of this is illegal. All of it is disclosed — buried across 732 pages.
SEBI regulations ensure disclosure. They do not ensure fairness.
Do your own due diligence. Don't rely on subscription figures or GMP to make this decision.
If you're investing: know what you're buying.
If you're a long-term investor in Indian healthcare: the sector is real. This structure deserves scrutiny.
🔚 End of thread.
📌 Save this thread. Share it with anyone subscribing to this IPO without reading the DRHP.
⚠️ This is not investment advice. All data is sourced directly from the DRHP dated March 23, 2026. Read the full document before making any decision.
🚨 THREAD: I spent 8 hours forensically reading the Manipal Health Enterprises DRHP so you don't have to.
732 pages. ₹80,000 Cr IPO. One of India's biggest healthcare listings.
What I found should make every retail investor stop and read before bidding.
Let's go. 🧵👇
WHAT THEY GOT RIGHT (BEING FAIR)
I've been brutal. Let me be balanced.
✅ BSR & Co. LLP (KPMG affiliate) has been the statutory auditor for 3+ years with NO change — that's a positive governance signal.
✅ Revenue growth is real: ₹48,396 Cr → ₹82,422 Cr in 3 years (FY2023–FY2025). Even stripping acquisitions, the underlying business is growing.
✅ EBITDA margins are consistent: 27–29% adjusted EBITDA margin across 3 years — stable, not manipulated seasonally.
✅ The Manipal brand is genuinely premium. The CONGO-R specialties (Cardiac, Oncology, Neuro, Gastro, Ortho, Renal) drive 64% of inpatient revenue — high-value, difficult-to-replace procedures.
✅ The promoter group has NOT pledged any direct equity shares in the listed company as of the DRHP date.
✅ No prior bankruptcies or delistings in the promoter track record.
This is a real business. The red flags are structural and governance-related — not about whether hospitals are operational.