Mr. Sheta

Made in Zambia 🇿🇲. Packaged in Australia 🇦🇺. (Retweets ❌= endorsements) - Hande-nde mutu ya buza unani ngana-

[Mr. Sheta @ChiefMMN]

Me listening to this ka playlist.. 🎶

[Sampa The Great @Sampa_The_Great]

Welcome to Zamrock 🇿🇲 (Moōdboard)

I decided to create a tribute 2 a musical phenomenon that is known globally yet not really fully celebrated in Zambia today. Something that I resonate with!

Get acquainted with the music via my Zamrock playlist 🎶

https://t.co/9fWVZev7ag

[Andreas Huebner @_AndreasHuebner]

The storm came AFTER Jesus said, “Let us go to the other side.”

Resistance does not always mean you missed God.

Sometimes resistance is proof that you are moving somewhere.

Keep going.

Type: “I am crossing over.”

In the Name of Jesus.

[PhoenixFMZambia @phoenixfmzambia]

CSPR SAYS BENEFITS OF RECENT ECONOMIC IMPROVEMENTS NOT FELT BY AVERAGE ZAMBIAN DUE TO STAGNANT WAGES

By Elesani Phiri

The Civil Society for Poverty Reduction -CSPR- says while the kwacha has appreciated and inflation has declined, the benefits of these improvements have not been felt by the average Zambian due to wages that have largely remained unchanged.

CSPR Executive Director Isabel Mukelabai tells Phoenix News that low salaries remain one of the major drivers of poverty in Zambia despite recent positive economic indicators.

Ms. Mukelabai says current economic policies have not yet succeeded in redistributing wealth in a way that promotes equity and improves the living standards of poorer households.

She explains that reducing poverty is a long-term process that requires consistent and coherent policies whose impact can be measured through improvements in household welfare.

Speaking to Phoenix News in an interview, Ms. Mukelabai explains that while the free education policy has improved access to schooling, many households still struggle to meet other education-related costs, limiting the full benefits of the programme.

She has therefore urged government to complement macroeconomic gains with policies that increase workers' incomes and strengthen social protection measures to ensure economic growth translates into improved living standards for ordinary Zambians.

PHOENIX NEWS

[Mr. Sheta @ChiefMMN]

@SeverinoTheWolf https://t.co/dAnJqIgszt

[Fabrizio Romano @FabrizioRomano]

🚨🇧🇪 Youri Tielemans has completed his medical and signs today at Man United.

Understand the agreement will be valid until June 2031, five years.

Done and sealed.

[Jefe!! @kuxthedon]

the tantama culture PF brought into this country will take years to undo

[mwiya @mwiyas]

Zambia’s power problems were a direct consequence of

1) ZESCO’s severely vandalized balance sheet; leveraged to the hilt on uneconomic terms with projects severely delayed. The historic vandalism of 2011-2021 nearly destroyed ZESCO. The turnaround there has been one of the most unsung patriotic acts in Zambia’s history.

2) Droughts that compounded the problems in 2016 and again in 2023

3) The worst El Niño on record (globally) is expected this year and next; the rain cycle will almost certainly be worst on record; regardless who wins that’s a headwind. The thing Zambia has going for it at the moment is a record amount of coal and solar power plants being developed; that should provide respite.

Other than the above, people need to read more. All of this is in the public domain. If we have enough literacy to use Twitter then we have enough literacy to use it to be factual.

[Mr. Sheta @ChiefMMN]

@briansimasiku Jokers..

[Mr. Sheta @ChiefMMN]

Is the concern over alleged UPND vote-rigging in Zambia driven by genuine fear of domestic electoral fraud and violence? Or does it echo the same destabilisation playbook David Hundeyin exposed in Tanzania’s 2025 “colour revolution” attempt?

[Sishuwa Sishuwa @ssishuwa]

Do people have to die for Hichilema to remain in power? The scale of vote-rigging that the president is preparing, if successfully implemented, may make the bonfire that happened in Tanzania, whose sham election he endorsed, look like a picnic. With politicised security forces and the volatile conditions discussed in this article, Zambia may burn.

[Mr. Sheta @ChiefMMN]

@mwiyas @InfinitelyDean PsyOps is about right. Im seeing a lot of “Bandwagon propaganda” with opposition surrogates presenting a Mundubile win as likely or inevitable to influence others to support their candidate, or otherwise demotivate supporters of the incumbent.

[mwiya @mwiyas]

Agreed. Re the incumbent’s risk of dipping below 50 plus 1; the real threat in that regard imo is apathy. If it’s high, then a runoff is likely. If it’s low then it’s unlikely to happen.

The challenge for Tonse re a first round win is very real logistical constraints. They’d need to win without any real movement in the UPND strongholds whilst totally wiping out any gains UPND built in PF strongholds from 2016 through to 2025. The demographics don’t support such an outcome.

Which means imo apathy is the real terminal risk for the incumbent and the thing the opposition will attempt to motivate using psyOps—which is what we’ve been seeing on X via surrogates and bots.

[Dean N Onyambu @InfinitelyDean]

I largely agree with this, particularly on voter apathy and the potential consequences in areas where the opposition is underrepresented. That is a structural vulnerability, especially given that Southern and North-Western have been the UPND's most reliable electoral strongholds, with consistently high turnout over the past two decades.

The main electoral risk I see for UPND is falling below the 50%+1 threshold and triggering a runoff. A runoff would likely present a more challenging electoral environment for an incumbent than securing victory in the first round.

That is also why I did not understand the argument that NRPUP was a genuinely "new" party. Legally it is a different political party, but politically it is the principal vehicle for much of the former PF after the PF's [internal and externally influenced] legal and organisational disputes. Even if it has not inherited every PF structure on the ground, treating it as if it emerged without that political base ignores the reality of where much of its leadership and support originated.

[mwiya @mwiyas]

Is there room for surprise and could the data be seen differently? Of course.

But that’s not what this exercise is. This is about looking at previous behavior to model out what might happen given behavioral constraints and campaign dynamics re on the ground infrastructure that converts apathy or frustration or support or energy into votes. Given those dynamics; what I’ve laid out is what the probable median outcomes would look like. That’s imo the probable baseline.

There is a strange irony in all this that an energized opposition likely also reduces apathy within the incumbents core by motivating them to act.

With a month to go it will be interesting to see what happens between now and Election Day.

[mwiya @mwiyas]

The key things that may shift things:

It’s possible that UPND surprises in the heartland of PF by taking a larger % of rural votes than I’ve intuited. There’s some quantitative basis for this in by-election performance where the vector was aligned to this. However that was pre-general election and the dynamics on the opposition have changed; SP vs Tonse is a genuinely more contested context than was the case during by-elections in those regions.

Apathy is the real problem for all parties; but UPND would be more affected than others by it should it manifest in their core heartland. Their performance is predicated on being able to mobilize the base with the same vigor as 2021 and 2016; any less and they trigger a runoff.

The cost of living situation is very real and especially so for urban voters. How this affects voters is less certain. 2015-2016 the country faced a similar crisis and the incumbent won; yes by the smallest of margins; but they were facing a more experienced opposition with presence across the entire country and all constituencies filled. Voters decided to give the incumbent a second chance—fraught as it was. Is this special pleading? I don’t think so. It’s a data point.

[mwiya @mwiyas]

One last point and I think it’s possibly the most relevant one for online communities.

In my observation a lot of the positioning of surrogates and bots on X is focused on outlining the social impact of the incumbent and communicating the platform as being about building on economic growth towards household benefits in this next cycle.

On the opposition side it’s building the appearance of momentum and coalescing around the candidate to secure the core PF base support and rally/energize it whilst using language that attempts to dishearten incumbent supporters and create apathy. Both sides are speaking to what their groups need to secure their goals.

The role of fair minded people is to discern narrative from fact and evaluate everything in its context so as to form a view as grounded in reality as possible.

[mwiya @mwiyas]

My assessment of the Zambian political landscape:

In 2021 ECL lost but his total vote was still large. He was a popular candidate who happened to lose to a better organized candidate that had a <50,000 vote gap to him in the prior election.

Mundubile has inherited most of ECL’s base; and the crowds seen aren’t his—>they are PF coalescing around him. In that context he’s gained popularity but only in the sense that he’s energized an existing base that was looking for a candidate and was never going to vote for HH in any case.

So going back to 2016; that’s HH’s floor. However this time around PF v2 (Tonse) has not fielded candidates in 1/3 of parliamentary seats, even when you account for their alliance partners that are much smaller parties that almost never field candidates in all those seats anyways—>he has a handicap ECL didn’t have in 2016 and 2021. No one is campaigning for him in Tonse places. They constitute some 70 seats that equal ~2.5 million votes. Most of them in Western, Southern, N-Western, Central and Lusaka Provinces; as well as a few seats in the CB. In essence, UPND strongholds.

It appears that the Tonse strategy is to motivate voters in the core PF heartland to go out and vote. UPND has a similar foundational position but is also looking to motivate a marginal change in the PF heartland; hence the VP campaigning there; building on CDF, agriculture, free education and school feeding plus agricultural reforms; as well as recruitments of teachers, nurses etc.

The cost of living crisis has been real; and a lot of it a consequence of the 2023 drought and its impact on food prices, electricity availability; as well as the macroeconomic impacts of debt distress that were inherited. These issues will affect the urban voter. Whether they give the UPND another chance or switch to Tonse is what we will all be waiting to see. The rural voter has other considerations. Large households dependent on agricultural inputs, social cash transfers, and free education and feeding—but also affected by cost of living pass through via commodity prices. In my assessment, UPND has a higher probability of doing well with the rural voter than not; whereas the urban voter has higher chances of apathy. Households with children will see the benefits of free education and school feeding as they have 4-5 kids on average. They’ll be more patient than young voters with no kids or few kids who may want more immediate changes; that’s the swing voter.

On the balance of things with 2016 as baseline; the reality is that to win Tonse/PF need to go from the 38.71% of votes received in 2021 to 50%+1; an 11.3% movement. They have to do this while largely not moving at all in UPND heartlands where their support remains durable; and they lack candidates campaigning for them. Achieving that would require 1) a total white wash in their own heartland 2) a similar white wash in urban Lusaka and CB 3) massive voter turnout for them beyond what ECL was able to achieve with full benefit of incumbency. Is this impossible? No. Is it unlikely? Yes. Why?

UPND has likely grown its support in PF heartlands like Northern, Eastern, the northern part of Central and Muchinga Provinces. UPND don’t have to win those provinces they need to come a strong second there by improving their margins. The margins there will be underwritten by the social policies I mentioned already. A household with 4-5 kids being fed daily by the government is more willing to be patient than not if those kids were previously hungry. The Copperbelt and Lusaka will be competitive; and that where the swing vote represents a definite unknown. In my view what you are likely to see there is margin compression for UPND but not support growth for Tonse/PF. More likely there that ECL’s performance holds steady but doesn’t grow; what grows is apathy.

Overall my view is that incumbent wins but instead of almost 60% in 2021; they get 51-55%.

[Yande ♎️🇫🇷 @Yande____]

Votes should not be a secret, I need to know who will vote for Mundubile because you’re a threat to human existence.

[Wimbzy @MwimbuZ]

The more Mundubile speaks, the more he reminds us of why he shouldn’t and probably won’t be president. It feels like going back to what people voted against in 2021
If Bally is the question that needs solving, Mundubile is not the correct answer.

[Mia Amor Mottley @miaamormottley]

In 2026, I cannot believe we are being asked to respond to the suggestion that the descendants of the enslaved should pay for the machinery that oppressed them.

The Caribbean does not owe Britain for slavery, for colonial extraction, or for laws that treated African people as chattel. We are not asking for charity. We are asking for justice, and history itself has already told the truth.

Those who wish to speak on this matter should first take the time to read enough history to understand it. The Caribbean will not be used as a prop for anyone’s politics. We know who we are, we know what was done, and we will continue to speak for repair with clarity and dignity.

[Hamza K @afro_hamza]

When British explorer Hugh Clapperton visited Sultan Muhammad Bello of the Sokoto caliphate in the 1820s Clapperton brought a copy of Euclid’s *Elements* as a prestigious gift, intending to impress the Sultan with Western knowledge.

To Clapperton’s shock, the Sultan didn’t just recognize the book he pointed out that he already owned a copy and had studied it extensively. Bello, like many West African intellectuals of the time, had access to the vast libraries of Timbuktu and the wider Islamic world with works that had been translated by sheikhs who were incredibly well travelled