Dmytro Kuleba

Talks - contact

[Dmytro Kuleba @DmytroKuleba]

250,000 books. That is how many my Ukrainian publisher, Knygolove https://t.co/iqJ8bfloG4 lost on 19 July after three Russian Iskander missiles struck the warehouse outside Kyiv. Among them were my books, too.

This is war, and war inevitably brings human and material losses.

But when books burn, it is not just paper that burns. Culture, memory, and identity burn with them. So does a nation’s right to grow and shape its own future. That is why burning books has always meant far more than destroying merchandise.

I have waived my royalties for the next year to help support my publisher. I encourage you to buy Ukrainian books—as a gesture of solidarity with Ukrainians fighting, among other things, for the right to read books in their own language.

Books survive as long as there are people to print them and people to read them.

[Dmytro Kuleba @DmytroKuleba]

With its strikes on Moscow, Ukraine is taking disruption to a new level.

The success of a long-range strike is not measured by impact alone. Even an intercepted attack closes airspace, disrupts flights and logistics, and erodes the sense of security.

Russia cannot protect everything. It has more targets than air defences. Hitting the target magnifies the effect, but disruption begins before destruction.

Yes, Russia will continue firing ballistic missiles at Ukrainian cities. But Putin’s problem is that Ukrainian suffering will no longer compensate Russians for disruption at home.

As that disruption spreads, Russians will increasingly blame Putin and his corrupt regime for breaking the central bargain underpinning his rule since 2022: war was supposed to be something Ukrainians suffer, not them.

The choice is Putin’s: wind down the war to preserve control, or tighten control at home to keep the war going.

I would love to be wrong, but everything we know about him suggests he will choose the latter.

[Dmytro Kuleba @DmytroKuleba]

Today, Zelenskyy, Starmer, Macron, and Merz meet in London. The format itself is worth welcoming, even if the EU has once again been left on the sidelines.

The real question is what mindset the E3 brings to the table.

Zelenskyy set the tone with his open letter to Putin. While his European partners likely share its substance, they are unlikely to be ready to openly put their signatures beneath it.

But they do see that Russia is not looking for middle ground. It is set on war. Seeking a balanced compromise with an aggressor committed to conquest is not diplomacy. It is self-deception.

The predecessors of today’s leaders understood this well.

Symbolically, eighty-five years ago, London hosted another gathering. In June 1941, representatives of fourteen Allied governments and liberation movements met there to unite against Nazism.

The final London Declaration was not about ending a war. It was about uniting those willing to win it and shape the peace that followed.

One can only hope today’s meeting is guided by the same logic.

Europe’s prosperity depends on its security. Europe’s security depends on Ukraine. It is time to turn that truth into effective policy. And fast.

[Dmytro Kuleba @DmytroKuleba]

Putin will wage war until the end of his days. The wars may differ. Their intensity may rise and fall, with pauses and renewed fighting. But the logic behind them will remain the same: his place in history, not politics or economics.

[Dmytro Kuleba @DmytroKuleba]

Another negotiation wave is unfolding. This time, the UK, France and Germany, the E3, are looking for a formula to design talks.

There is no need to overstate Putin’s interest in negotiations. Today, he appears to be looking for a way to change the dynamics of the war, not a way out of it. But let us assume for a moment that Moscow is genuinely interested in exploring a pause.

In a potential Ukraine–E3–Russia format, there are three problems that need to be addressed before taking the plunge.

1. E3 has agency in Ukraine’s eyes. It does not have agency in Russia’s.

Moscow no longer sees Europe as an independent center of power. It despises Europe only slightly less than it despises Ukraine. For the Kremlin, Europe is not a negotiating party but a space of influence.

2. E3 has decisive leverage over Ukraine. It does not have decisive leverage over Russia.

Through bilateral and EU mechanisms, Europe can influence Kyiv through financial and military support, and the prospect of EU membership.

But Europe’s main instrument vis-à-vis Moscow, sanctions, suffers from a credibility gap. The Kremlin no longer believes they would be genuinely lifted even if an agreement were reached.

The same applies to the idea, floated by some, that Europe should resume purchases of Russian gas in order to regain leverage. In Moscow, this would be read not as Europe gaining leverage, but as Europe looking for an off-ramp back to business as usual.

A lever the other side does not believe in ceases to be a lever.

3. The format itself creates the wrong incentives.

Moscow would inevitably seek to turn E3 into a channel for Russian proposals, encouraging Europeans to persuade Kyiv to accept arrangements it would otherwise reject. This would create friction between Ukraine and its European partners precisely where unity matters most.

And when talks once again reach the question of territory, E3 will not be able to side with Russia without undermining its own principles. The process would likely run into the same wall.

The key to a breakthrough lies elsewhere: in Moscow abandoning its claims to the rest of Donbas and in Kyiv refraining from expanding its military gains in the air and on the ground. The obstacle is not the format. It is the substance.

A Ukraine–E3–Russia format may be useful if it helps clarify and expand support for Ukraine and test Moscow’s room for compromise.

As a pathway to a political settlement, however, it is difficult to see how it produces a fundamentally different outcome.

The juice may not be worth the squeeze.

Then again, diplomacy sometimes consists precisely of trying to squeeze juice from fruit that is clearly not yet ripe.

[Dmytro Kuleba @DmytroKuleba]

News of the Gripen deal for Ukraine is another major achievement by Zelenskyy in strengthening the country’s defense. And another step in deepening Ukraine’s special relationship with Sweden.

But the bigger question is this: is Ukraine becoming a Nordic country?

Not geographically. Strategically.

For decades, Ukrainians thought of their place in Europe through the lens of Central and Eastern Europe. Some dreamed of an arc from the Baltic to the Black Sea.

After 2022, reality began to change doctrine. A renaissance in Ukraine’s relations with Northern Europe began.

It was driven by three forces: the North’s leadership in supporting Ukraine, backed by resources; frictions with partners in Central Europe; and Ukraine’s search for more strategic anchors in Europe.

For Ukrainians, this movement makes sense. More than a thousand years ago, the Varangians were an important part of the rise of Rus. In the early 18th century, Sweden was already an ally of Ukraine’s attempt to break free from Moscow’s rule.

But this is not only about history.

Ukrainians are drawn to the Nordic world, where strength does not contradict democracy, defense does not contradict prosperity, technology reinforces resilience, and cool-headedness serves freedom and dignity.

Kyiv will not change its geography. But its center of gravity is changing.

The Vikings are returning to Ukraine. And Ukrainians are charting their country’s path to the North.

It is still unclear where this will lead. But it is already a fascinating turn of history.

[Dmytro Kuleba @DmytroKuleba]

It is fair to say that neither Ukraine nor Russia is winning the war.

For Zelenskyy, this is good news: only yesterday, many were predicting his defeat. For Putin, it is bad news: no one seriously believes anymore that he is winning.

Yet Putin does not want to end the war. He seems to have five basic choices, but after four years of full-scale war, his core problem is clear: none of them gives him a guaranteed result.

A technological breakthrough? It takes time and offers no guarantee of a success.

A tactical breakthrough? Ukraine may adapt faster than Russia can turn it into strategic gain.

Mobilization? The Kremlin’s cheapest instrument, but one that raises the domestic cost of war.

A new theater of war? It may shift attention, but it does not guarantee a quick victory.

Nuclear weapons? Shock effect, but with uncontrollable consequences for Moscow itself.

So he will most likely do what he does best: buy time. He will move, in fragments, along the first four tracks and keep threatening the fifth.

Ukraine’s options remain unchanged: strike deeper, defend the sky, and strengthen resilience at home — politically, financially, and militarily. This has worked so far. It can keep working.

[Dmytro Kuleba @DmytroKuleba]

For 30 years, Russia pushed the narrative that Ukraine’s aspiration to join the EU would reduce it to Europe’s raw-material appendage and degrade the country.

History has turned the story upside down.

Ukraine is becoming a backbone of high-tech security solutions for Europe and beyond. Russia is sliding into the role it once assigned to us: a raw-material appendage to China.

I suspect Putin understands the indignity of this reversal. But his obsession with Ukraine is now stronger than his instinct for national pride.

His visit to China only confirmed it. Strip away the rhetoric, and the main project is gas supplies — a symbol of Russia’s broader drift into feeding China’s economy with energy and raw materials.

Putin wants to sell. Xi is in no rush. He wants the best terms from a weakened partner.

China does not embrace Putin. It extracts value from him.

The good news is that Xi needs Putin weak. The bad news is that he still needs him.

[Dmytro Kuleba @DmytroKuleba]

Bottom line: this spring showed that Ukrainians did not break. And for the first time since 2023, Ukraine has been better than Russia at fixing the problems of its war machine.

Together, these factors produced a cumulative effect. And its consequences eventually became visible to everyone at the same time, in the same place: on May 9, at the parade in Moscow.

The shift is real. Ukraine has not yet seized the strategic initiative from Russia. But Putin can no longer pretend that his current model is working. He is definitely not ready to give up though. The battle of national effectiveness continues.

[Dmytro Kuleba @DmytroKuleba]

A German friend told me today he was struck by how Ukraine seemed to be regaining control over the dynamics of the war. I would not call it a strategic turn yet. But the shift is real. Here are three reasons why👇

[Dmytro Kuleba @DmytroKuleba]

3. Ukrainian society did not break.

Russia tried to break Ukrainians from the outside. Hardship tested them from within. Bombings. Rising fuel and living costs. Mobilisation problems. Corruption scandals. The most brutal winter yet due to attacks on civilian infrastructure.

And yet Ukrainians understand the price of defeat. That is why they continue, almost miraculously, to endure. Once again, they proved too hard for Putin to break.

[Dmytro Kuleba @DmytroKuleba]

Kyiv drew its own long-range map — and threw it on the table. A great achievement for Ukraine. A lesson for others.

For years, Ukraine asked its partners for long-range weapons to strike deep inside Russia.

Guided by escalation concerns, some refused outright (Germany and Taurus); some provided them only in very limited quantities and long barred strikes against targets inside Russia (the US and ATACMS); while others agreed but supplied them in limited batches and imposed restrictions on their employment (the UK with Storm Shadow and France with SCALP).

It was a hard fight with friends.

Meanwhile, Ukraine did not sit still. It spent these years developing its own capabilities. Today, Kyiv produces enough long-range drones and missiles of sufficient quality to strike Russia regularly and deep behind the front lines.

This is not a turning point in the war. But it is a qualitatively new instrument of pressure on Putin at a time when Trump is unwilling to bear down on him and Europeans lack the ability to do so.

Most importantly, it is a powerful example of how a nation builds its own capabilities and reduces critical dependence on partners.

[Dmytro Kuleba @DmytroKuleba]

A year and a half ago, my conversation with @gideonrachman for the @FT was rather sombre. This time, despite all the problems that remain, it felt lighter. What hasn’t changed is that a conversation with him is always substantive and engaging. Hope you’ll enjoy it too.

[Gideon Rachman @gideonrachman]

Fascinating interview with @DmytroKuleba ex foreign minister of Ukraine on why he’s optimistic about the course of the war, impact of Iran conflict, drone warfare and how to deal with catastrophe” of mass emigration of Ukrainians. And much else https://t.co/9Yh3L4I08m

[Biteback Publishing @BitebackPub]

Words of Defiance: Wartime Speeches by Ukraine's Foreign Minister @DmytroKuleba, is out now.

Containing valuable insights into why the Kremlin chose invasion and how previous mistakes have come back to haunt Ukraine, @DSGBjornBerge also traces the complex, contested path toward a just and lasting peace.

Pick up a copy today: https://t.co/ppzWatPFKG

[Dmytro Kuleba @DmytroKuleba]

Whether you believe Russia is capable of attacking an EU country or not, Putin’s desire to do so is real.

European security therefore faces a hard dilemma.

An aggressor usually attacks when the victim is weak. It has no reason to wait until the victim grows stronger.

So refusing to accelerate Europe’s rearmament keeps Europe weak and tempts Russia to strike.

But accelerating rearmament also creates risk: Russia may decide it must strike before Europe becomes strong enough to defend itself.

In my view, the real danger is rearmament that is too slow to deter, but visible enough to make Moscow think it should act before the window closes.

Which course do you think is safer for deterring aggression?