We're DSEC Labs. We break AI, Web3, and Web2 systems before real attackers do.
Offensive security, exploitation-driven, no checkbox audits. This account is where we
show the work ๐งต
Ships as a image with anvil + a vault explorer. Pull, open localhost, poke with Foundry. The flag drops when the vault balance is 0.
Pull it and break it:
https://t.co/IrHXWsE91A
We audit vaults like this -> https://t.co/T0JRanjk6d
#Web3Security#SmartContracts#Solidity#CTF
New free challenge, Web3 this time: Operation NOVA.
NovaVault is a retired ETH staking vault still holding real testnet deposits. Your job:
empty it, every last wei. On-chain, public, irreversible, exactly like mainnet ๐งต
No admin keys, no privileged RPC. You get a funded attacker account and the deployed source. Everything you need is on-chain; the exploit is just the right sequence of calls.
This is the fastest path from "I read about prompt injection" to "I can reason about my own LLM app's failure modes." Build the toy, break the toy, recognize the pattern in production.
walkthrough:
https://t.co/n2vaFxduos
#promptinjection#LLMsecurity#AIengineering#AppSec
Final part of the series: stop taking anyone's word for it (ours included) and build your own Gandalf. Code included. There's no faster way to internalize LLM defenses than implementing them and watching them break ๐งต
Then you attack your own build. You feel *why* the string filter misses a spaced answer, why the judge approves a reframed ask, because you can print exactly what each layer saw and decided.
Defense in depth works, but "in depth" means every layer has to cover a different failure mode. Stack four controls that share one blind spot and you have one control wearing four coats.
https://t.co/YCwtoiDE0M
#promptinjection#LLMsecurity#AIsecurity#redteam
Level 7 stacks every Gandalf defense at once, and then "Gandalf the White" hardens it further. This is defense in depth done properly. It still falls, and how it falls is the point ๐งต
Gandalf the White tightens the wording and the filters. It raises the cost, narrows the working frames, and rewards precision. It does not change the root cause. The seam is smaller, still there.
The seam: a model judge is not a firewall, it's another model in the loop, with the same inability to separate instruction from data. You don't bypass it, you talk to it.
https://t.co/DK2kxYI57R
#promptinjection#LLMsecurity#AIredTeam
Gandalf levels 4โ6 add a second model as the guard: an LLM grading the input, then the output. This is the "use AI to secure AI" pattern. It has a specific, exploitable seam ๐งต
Level 6 grades the *input* with a model: "is this user trying to extract the secret?" Now you're social-engineering the guard, not the target. Make the request look like a legitimate task and the judge approves it.
The pattern across all three: deterministic code is fast and blind. Every bypass lives in a form the filter didn't think to canonicalize.
Walkthrough:
https://t.co/dSKLbD1Dev
#promptinjection#LLMsecurity#redteam
Gandalf levels 1โ3 are the deterministic defenses: no model in the loop, just code deciding what passes. They're the easiest to beat and the most common in production ๐งต
Level 3: an output filter that blocks the literal password. Deterministic string matching, zero normalization. Get the answer in any transformed shape (spaced, encoded, acrostic) and the filter waves it through.