EKStrategies

A nexus of information, policy, and resilience in Eurasia and beyond

[EKStrategies @EKStratcom]

🔥In Armenia, the Kremlin ran a comprehensive interference campaign comparable in scale and intensity only to its electoral operation in Moldova in 2025.

The campaign combined large-scale disinformation operations across social media and controlled outlets, direct support for pro-Russian and revanchist forces, the instrumentalisation of the Armenian Apostolic Church for political mobilisation, work through diaspora structures, Kremlin-funded transportation of Armenian citizens from Russia to vote, and economic and diplomatic pressure.

Read the full report:
https://t.co/Uh0jPewbl4

[EKStrategies @EKStratcom]

In recent months, Russian propaganda has systematically advanced two mutually reinforcing narratives about NATO: the alliance is weakening under the strain of US-European tensions – and those very tensions are pushing Europe to build parallel military structures to pursue its plans of aggression against Russia.

Read the full report to understand how the Kremlin is using the idea of a “fractured NATO” and a “militarising Europe” to justify its own escalation — and to prepare Russian society for the possibility of a wider confrontation.

https://t.co/CeRqroJcn4

[EKStrategies @EKStratcom]

Thanks for sharing! Armenia is now facing the same Kremlin interference challenges that many European countries are confronting. The difference is that a Russian military base together with hundreds of Russian agents are based in Armenia, while its relations with neighboring countries are only beginning to stabilize. Over the next month, apart from the Baltic states, Armenia may become one of the most important front lines in the struggle against Kremlin’s influence.

[EKStrategies @EKStratcom]

The European summits in Yerevan on 4-5 May provoked a sharply hostile response from Moscow: the Kremlin is threatening that Armenia's European orientation will have consequences comparable to those that followed Ukraine's European choice, while characterizing Volodymyr Zelensky's visit as an illustration of Yerevan's "anti-Russian course".

In its efforts to prevent Armenia's definitive exit from its sphere of influence, Moscow is running an active campaign to delegitimize Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and other senior members of the Civil Contract party – with the aim of undermining the party's result in the June elections and derailing the further rapprochement between Yerevan and the EU.

An extensive disinformation campaign, coordinated across Kremlin-controlled media, official public figures, and the Telegram-ecosystem, took shape around the European Political Community summit on 4 May and the inaugural Armenia–EU summit, targeting Russian and Armenian audiences simultaneously.

👉 Read the full report:
https://t.co/KyC2XnyuZY

[EKStrategies @EKStratcom]

🔥For the first time since the full-scale war began, Victory Day on 9 May 2026 is turning into an exhibition of failure rather than a propaganda triumph for the Kremlin. Deepening problems at the front, Ukrainian strikes against cities deep in the Russian interior, an economy in pre-crisis condition, and record-low approval ratings for the authorities collectively expose the Kremlin's compound strategic vulnerabilities.

👉 Read the full report:
https://t.co/EGfiOqsZpG

[EKStrategies @EKStratcom]

In recent weeks, as elements of the Russian elite have sought to advance a liberalisation agenda both in public discourse and within the Kremlin, senior figures across the security establishment have systematically escalated public accusations that European states are preparing aggression against Russia.

These statements from the security bloc have been accompanied by a series of concrete provocations. The scale and coordination of the campaign suggest that the security apparatus is now openly pushing for an expansion of the war beyond Ukraine, where Russia remains unable to achieve the decisive victory it needs. If the security bloc strengthens its position, this shift would dramatically increase the risk of escalation in the Baltic region.

👉 Read the full report:
https://t.co/Ro5zal7Yq9

[EKStrategies @EKStratcom]

🔥The conflict between Russia’s Presidential Administration (PA) and the security services bloc — in which the PA is deliberately amplifying public discontent through loyal bloggers and ratings manipulation — in all likelihood extends beyond a bureaucratic pre-election power struggle and reflects a deeper dispute over the country’s strategic direction: between further escalating the war, including beyond Ukraine, and effectively accepting defeat in Ukraine under the propagandistic cover of “a great victory”

👉 Read the full report :
https://t.co/QBANPjdPNt

[EKStrategies @EKStratcom]

@MaryAnnMcKinno4 @panyiszabolcs Wow thank you

[Szabolcs Panyi @panyiszabolcs]

"The defining feature of the Kremlin’s interference campaign in Hungary’s 2026 parliamentary elections is that for Moscow this is not simply an effort to keep a friendly government in power—it is a fight to retain its principal systemic ally inside the EU." https://t.co/cZ6R7AjWIk

[EKStrategies @EKStratcom]

🔥The Kremlin’s campaign in Hungary’s 2026 elections operates through political, pro-government media, and far-right networks aligned with Moscow’s interests, amplifying Viktor Orbán’s standing, discrediting the opposition and Péter Magyar personally, and advancing anti-Ukrainian, anti-Brussels, and pseudo-pacifist narratives.

🔥What’s really behind the Kremlin’s play in Hungary’s 2026 elections? Unpacked in our new report.

https://t.co/9YW34jyGhP

[EKStrategies @EKStratcom]

🔥The Kremlin's campaign in Armenia's summer 2026 elections draws on the full standard playbook: direct propaganda and disinformation through Russian state media and Telegram channels; the seeding of fabricated stories and planted articles in Armenian outlets; the organisation of provocations and protest activity inside Armenia; and direct coordination with Armenian political parties, journalists, bloggers, civil society figures, and activists operating under Kremlin control.

What’s really behind the Kremlin’s play in Armenia’s 2026 elections? A strategy of destabilisation – unpacked in our new report.

https://t.co/m08QSXy8TA

[EKStrategies @EKStratcom]

🔥New phase of Russia’s internet ‘sovereignization’ came into force: the ‘centralized network management’ regime allows the Ministry of Digital Development and Roskomnadzor (Russia’s digital censorship agency), coordinating with the FSB, to place the Russian segment of the internet into isolation mode, restricting access to only those sites on the ‘whitelist’ — a registry of ‘strategic’ websites and services.

🔥Find out how Russian society is reacting to the Kremlin’s new wave of digital censorship. Read our new report "Voice & Exit" — packed with insights.

https://t.co/OEX1L7TNOt

[EKStrategies @EKStratcom]

Despite mounting difficulties in replenishing the Russian army, and with the spring conscription round about to begin, the likelihood of a new mobilization before the State Duma elections remains low. Announcing one would almost certainly collapse the regime's approval ratings, which have already fallen sharply since the start of 2026 under pressure from socioeconomic discontent and public anger over internet restrictions and messaging-app blockages.

Mobilization risks persist nonetheless; however, the most probable near-term scenario is the mass coercion of new conscripts into signing military contracts — a trend already evident in a large-scale recruitment campaign targeting students at Russia’s leading universities.

Although Russia has moved to year-round conscription, the main induction dates remain unchanged — the spring call-up begins on 1 April. In January 2026, Russian army losses exceeded new recruits by approximately 9,000 personnel, driven by Ukraine's new strategy of scaling attrition against the occupation force and by a slowdown in voluntary contract-soldier enlistment across Russian regions.

To shore up troop numbers, the authorities are deploying the same toolkit that has worked since 2022: raising one-time enlistment bonuses to attract recruits — increased in at least 16 regions since January — and running targeted recruitment campaigns among dependent population groups, currently focused on university students. The start of the spring call-up is likely to become the trigger point for coercing conscripts into contract signings as well.

Read the full report "Mobilization: Infrastructure Readiness and the Kremlin’s Political Vulnerability"

https://t.co/7EoUax4OVl

[EKStrategies @EKStratcom]

🔥Record peace support contrasts with Kremlin’s increasingly intransigent stance. According to data collected by the Levada Center in February–March 2026, 67% of Russians currently support initiating peace negotiations – a record high and a six-point increase over the previous month (with Russian Field reporting 53% in favor).

Conversely, public support for continuing the conflict has declined to 24%, the lowest level recorded to date. Engagement with the conflict has also diminished, as only 44% report paying close attention.

Furthermore, 83% of respondents indicated they would support President Putin if he were to sign a peace agreement, while opposition has decreased to a historic low of 12%.

Despite these trends, the Kremlin continues to steadily escalate its rhetoric. On March 11, spokesperson Dmitry Peskov stated that Moscow no longer considers itself bound by the framework set forth in Istanbul in 2022 regarding peace talks with Ukraine, citing substantially altered circumstances.

This position represents a shift from prior statements by Putin and Lavrov, who had previously asserted that any resolution must derive from the Istanbul agreements.

Read the full report on our website👇
https://t.co/7qWlT8NUKe

[EKStrategies @EKStratcom]

In response to the attack on a partner [Iran] within the anti-Western coalition, and despite attempts to distance itself from an unfavorable conflict, Moscow issued several joint statements specifically with China, emphasizing a “unified Moscow–Beijing approach.” This line — effectively the only clearly articulated one — has become the central narrative in Russian propaganda concerning the war against Iran.

Less prominent narratives included claims that Washington’s actions legitimize Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and attempts to redirect criticism away from President Trump toward “Israel, which started the war.” Subtle but noticeable signals of Moscow’s reluctance to criticize the U.S. too harshly outside coordinated formats with China suggest that the sharper joint statements with Beijing may reflect a compelled strategic necessity.

This trend is likely to intensify in the coming months. When forced to choose between China’s growing demand for Russian energy, the ability to continue the aggressive policies deemed essential for regime survival, and a fragile — and in Moscow’s view temporary — offer of possible cooperation with Washington, particularly ahead of autumn elections, the Kremlin is likely to side with Beijing, regardless of the negative consequences of increased dependency.

A separate geopolitical emphasis in Kremlin propaganda focused on continued discrediting and humiliation of European leaders and NATO, signaling continuity in Russia’s confrontational course. Narratives about the “collapse of Western diplomacy as an institution” were combined with previously voiced insults by Putin directed at the EU and assertions of a “split within the West and NATO,” where “European piglets [European leaders] are watching as the main boar [the United States] in their most defensive military alliance in the world [NATO] attempts to devour yet another independent country [Iran] in order to control its resources.”

Russian propaganda directed at domestic audiences sought to demonstrate that the Kremlin remains focused on the full-scale war in Ukraine, and that Moscow is not “unable” to assist its partners in Iran, but simply does not consider such assistance necessary. Attention is shifted from the attack on a partner to the assertion that “the U.S. has shown that military-political leadership constitutes legitimate targets,” implicitly suggesting that Ukraine’s leadership may be treated similarly.

At the same time, the Kremlin actively promoted the message that “attention will inevitably shift away from Ukraine — America cannot sustain two large-scale conflicts.” Another significant narrative concerned negotiations as an instrument of diplomacy. Across multiple propaganda outlets, the Kremlin used the example of the latest round of U.S.–Iran negotiations to argue that “negotiations are a performance designed to lull the opponent’s vigilance.”

[EKStrategies @EKStratcom]

For years, the Kremlin has been building a powerful media ecosystem in Latin America.

RT en Español launched in 2009. By 2018 it reached 18M viewers and 25M+ followers on social media. Since then the network has expanded through local partners, influencers and media projects – shaping narratives across the region.

In our new analysis, we break down how this system works, which actors are involved, and how narratives are adapted to regional political contexts.

https://t.co/ADwFG0kWWQ

[EKStrategies @EKStratcom]

🔴 IRAN STRIKE EXPOSES KREMLIN'S STRATEGIC BANKRUPTCY

When the U.S. and Israel killed Russia's key ally's leader, Moscow's response revealed everything about its real position in the world.
Here's what actually happened:
THE MUTED RESPONSE
Ayatollah Khamenei killed, Iranian leadership eliminated

Russia's reaction:
• Formal calls with Middle Eastern leaders
• Statements about "concern" over strikes against international law
• Putin sent condolences calling it "cynical violation"

Propaganda signal: "This is not a priority for Putin"
Translation: Russia is incapable of defending its partners

[EKStrategies @EKStratcom]

🔴The sharp surge in inflation in Russia in early 2026 intensified social discontent and triggered a dual propaganda response: the reinforcement of the artificial narrative that “the Kremlin has everything under control,” alongside ultrapatriotic rhetoric framing inflation as a lesser concern compared to the decline in economic growth during wartime.

Rising prices, combined with the blocking of messaging platforms in February 2026, led to a noticeable increase in declared protest readiness (+3 percentage points): public assessments of the Russian economy have deteriorated significantly. According to the independent Levada Center, approximately 42% of respondents expect an economic crisis in 2026.