Ieiʒ .h

sometime medievalist & desultory littérateur • real Gs move in silence like lasagna • pre-X had been tweeting more hingèdly on another, non-pseudonymous account

[Ieiʒ .h @entheticus]

Piers Plowman gang rise up

[Rota @pli_cachete]

If an ‘antimeme’ is an idea that actively resists being understood, what would be an idea that you actually understand *less* the harder you try to understand it?

[Ieiʒ .h @entheticus]

tertiary literature, if you will

[John Attridge @John_Attridge]

Reading secondary literature is dangerous because you might imbibe bad takes on the primary texts. This is why you should start with critical evaluations of the secondary literature

[Ieiʒ .h @entheticus]

@samhaselby Oaf* phenotype?

—
*Has a nice ring to it, but ogre or lout is probably closer to what I mean.

[Ieiʒ .h @entheticus]

@DWillis15769 @DrClaytonForre1 @AmirAminiMD @ChadHyak Err…

https://t.co/BqLVAzhbAQ

[Reza Nasri @RezaNasri1]

Iran’s legal position regarding the Strait of Hormuz rests on a firm and multi-layered foundation in international law that has been consistently articulated, formally recorded, and never relinquished.

First, the applicable treaty framework does not support the imposition of the “transit passage” regime on Iran. The UNCLOS introduced transit passage as a novel legal construct, granting expansive rights—including overflight and submerged navigation—to foreign military assets. However, Iran never ratified UNCLOS and explicitly rejected this regime upon signature. Under general principles of treaty law, a state cannot be bound by provisions of a treaty it has not ratified, particularly where it has expressly objected to those provisions at the time of signature.

This position is reinforced by the doctrine of the persistent objector. Even if one assumes, arguendo, that transit passage has evolved into customary international law, Iran has consistently and openly rejected its applicability. As such, it is not bound by that rule.

Second, in the absence of a universally binding transit passage regime, the governing law reverts to earlier treaty law and customary principles, most notably the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. Both Iran and key user states such as the United States are not parties to UNCLOS, creating a legal vacuum in which reliance on earlier treaty regimes is not only appropriate but necessary.

Under this framework, the right of passage through territorial seas is not unlimited. It is conditioned on innocent passage, a well-established rule allowing coastal states to regulate navigation to protect their security and public order. Crucially, innocent passage excludes activities that threaten the coastal state, including military operations, intelligence gathering, and acts connected to hostile conduct.

Third, the geographic reality of the Strait of Hormuz strengthens Iran’s legal position. The navigable channels lie entirely within the overlapping territorial seas of Iran and Oman. This is not a high seas corridor but a maritime space subject to coastal sovereignty, albeit qualified by navigational rights. That sovereignty carries with it the right to adopt and enforce laws necessary to safeguard national security.

Fourth, even under UNCLOS itself, the regime of non-suspendable innocent passage remains a legally recognized alternative in certain straits. This regime is more restrictive than transit passage and explicitly allows the coastal state to take necessary steps to prevent passage that is not innocent. Iran’s interpretation is therefore not a legal aberration, but a plausible reading grounded in existing law.

Fifth, and most critically in the present context, the law of armed conflict and the UN Charter fundamentally alter the legal landscape. Following an unlawful use of force against it, Iran is entitled to invoke its inherent right of self-defense. In such circumstances, the legal characterization of passage cannot be divorced from the realities of hostilities. Vessels and aircraft associated with belligerent states—or facilitating military operations—cannot claim protected navigational rights while simultaneously contributing to acts of aggression.

International law has never required a state to permit its own territorial sea to be used as a conduit for hostile operations. On the contrary, the right of self-defense permits proportionate measures to prevent such exploitation. Conditioning passage on neutrality and non-hostility is therefore not only lawful but necessary to uphold the integrity of that right.

Finally, the conduct of other states further undermines any claim that Iran’s position is exceptional. The United States itself is not a party to UNCLOS yet selectively invokes its provisions as customary law when convenient.

[William Gerrard @Bill_Gerrard]

#bookcover #coverart

[Ieiʒ .h @entheticus]

@DonMiami3 @Marian_L_Tupy “Note: data for Millennials includes some members of Gen Z.” A few of the wealthier ones, perhaps?

[Jason Hickel @jasonhickel]

What Israel and the US are perpetrating against the Palestinian people, with the support of much of the Western media, is straightforwardly the most evil thing I have ever witnessed in my life. It can never be forgotten or forgiven.

[Ieiʒ .h @entheticus]

@n_hold tag yourself, I’m lovable

[Ieiʒ .h @entheticus]

☕️

[Nate Holdren @n_hold]

resentful self loathing contrarian (lovable) vs resentful self loathing contrarian (hateful), an unbridgable chasm

[Ieiʒ .h @entheticus]

@ae_stallings Best I can do for us is the lore about this sautoir worn by Queen Marie of Romania

https://t.co/0llqplTjAF

[Ieiʒ .h @entheticus]

@alex_shephard The FIFA award for economic sciences wasn’t one of the original prizes

[Ieiʒ .h @entheticus]

@ae_stallings Best I can do for us is the lore about this sautoir worn by Queen Marie of Romania

https://t.co/0llqplTjAF

[Alicia E. Stallings @ae_stallings]

Sad that there is less fabulous jewellery on my feed these days.

[Ieiʒ .h @entheticus]

the Amazon smile has become the Joker’s smile

[Ieiʒ .h @entheticus]

@weiss_hadas Thank goodness I saw the source post for this, but what about y/our biographers?

[Ieiʒ .h @entheticus]

If we’re resolving Lebanon, why not Gaza & WB? https://t.co/yethy2eg0P

[Pope Leo XIV @Pontifex]

I urge everyone to accompany this moment of delicate diplomacy with prayer, in hopes that a willingness to dialogue may become the means to resolve other conflict situations in the world as well. #PrayTogether #Peace

[Ieiʒ .h @entheticus]

@ChrisMurphyCT Chris. https://t.co/BqLVAzhbAQ

[Ieiʒ .h @entheticus]

@ChrisMurphyCT Chris. https://t.co/BqLVAzhbAQ

[Reza Nasri @RezaNasri1]

Iran’s legal position regarding the Strait of Hormuz rests on a firm and multi-layered foundation in international law that has been consistently articulated, formally recorded, and never relinquished.

First, the applicable treaty framework does not support the imposition of the “transit passage” regime on Iran. The UNCLOS introduced transit passage as a novel legal construct, granting expansive rights—including overflight and submerged navigation—to foreign military assets. However, Iran never ratified UNCLOS and explicitly rejected this regime upon signature. Under general principles of treaty law, a state cannot be bound by provisions of a treaty it has not ratified, particularly where it has expressly objected to those provisions at the time of signature.

This position is reinforced by the doctrine of the persistent objector. Even if one assumes, arguendo, that transit passage has evolved into customary international law, Iran has consistently and openly rejected its applicability. As such, it is not bound by that rule.

Second, in the absence of a universally binding transit passage regime, the governing law reverts to earlier treaty law and customary principles, most notably the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. Both Iran and key user states such as the United States are not parties to UNCLOS, creating a legal vacuum in which reliance on earlier treaty regimes is not only appropriate but necessary.

Under this framework, the right of passage through territorial seas is not unlimited. It is conditioned on innocent passage, a well-established rule allowing coastal states to regulate navigation to protect their security and public order. Crucially, innocent passage excludes activities that threaten the coastal state, including military operations, intelligence gathering, and acts connected to hostile conduct.

Third, the geographic reality of the Strait of Hormuz strengthens Iran’s legal position. The navigable channels lie entirely within the overlapping territorial seas of Iran and Oman. This is not a high seas corridor but a maritime space subject to coastal sovereignty, albeit qualified by navigational rights. That sovereignty carries with it the right to adopt and enforce laws necessary to safeguard national security.

Fourth, even under UNCLOS itself, the regime of non-suspendable innocent passage remains a legally recognized alternative in certain straits. This regime is more restrictive than transit passage and explicitly allows the coastal state to take necessary steps to prevent passage that is not innocent. Iran’s interpretation is therefore not a legal aberration, but a plausible reading grounded in existing law.

Fifth, and most critically in the present context, the law of armed conflict and the UN Charter fundamentally alter the legal landscape. Following an unlawful use of force against it, Iran is entitled to invoke its inherent right of self-defense. In such circumstances, the legal characterization of passage cannot be divorced from the realities of hostilities. Vessels and aircraft associated with belligerent states—or facilitating military operations—cannot claim protected navigational rights while simultaneously contributing to acts of aggression.

International law has never required a state to permit its own territorial sea to be used as a conduit for hostile operations. On the contrary, the right of self-defense permits proportionate measures to prevent such exploitation. Conditioning passage on neutrality and non-hostility is therefore not only lawful but necessary to uphold the integrity of that right.

Finally, the conduct of other states further undermines any claim that Iran’s position is exceptional. The United States itself is not a party to UNCLOS yet selectively invokes its provisions as customary law when convenient.

[Reza Nasri @RezaNasri1]

Iran’s legal position regarding the Strait of Hormuz rests on a firm and multi-layered foundation in international law that has been consistently articulated, formally recorded, and never relinquished.

First, the applicable treaty framework does not support the imposition of the “transit passage” regime on Iran. The UNCLOS introduced transit passage as a novel legal construct, granting expansive rights—including overflight and submerged navigation—to foreign military assets. However, Iran never ratified UNCLOS and explicitly rejected this regime upon signature. Under general principles of treaty law, a state cannot be bound by provisions of a treaty it has not ratified, particularly where it has expressly objected to those provisions at the time of signature.

This position is reinforced by the doctrine of the persistent objector. Even if one assumes, arguendo, that transit passage has evolved into customary international law, Iran has consistently and openly rejected its applicability. As such, it is not bound by that rule.

Second, in the absence of a universally binding transit passage regime, the governing law reverts to earlier treaty law and customary principles, most notably the 1958 Geneva Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone. Both Iran and key user states such as the United States are not parties to UNCLOS, creating a legal vacuum in which reliance on earlier treaty regimes is not only appropriate but necessary.

Under this framework, the right of passage through territorial seas is not unlimited. It is conditioned on innocent passage, a well-established rule allowing coastal states to regulate navigation to protect their security and public order. Crucially, innocent passage excludes activities that threaten the coastal state, including military operations, intelligence gathering, and acts connected to hostile conduct.

Third, the geographic reality of the Strait of Hormuz strengthens Iran’s legal position. The navigable channels lie entirely within the overlapping territorial seas of Iran and Oman. This is not a high seas corridor but a maritime space subject to coastal sovereignty, albeit qualified by navigational rights. That sovereignty carries with it the right to adopt and enforce laws necessary to safeguard national security.

Fourth, even under UNCLOS itself, the regime of non-suspendable innocent passage remains a legally recognized alternative in certain straits. This regime is more restrictive than transit passage and explicitly allows the coastal state to take necessary steps to prevent passage that is not innocent. Iran’s interpretation is therefore not a legal aberration, but a plausible reading grounded in existing law.

Fifth, and most critically in the present context, the law of armed conflict and the UN Charter fundamentally alter the legal landscape. Following an unlawful use of force against it, Iran is entitled to invoke its inherent right of self-defense. In such circumstances, the legal characterization of passage cannot be divorced from the realities of hostilities. Vessels and aircraft associated with belligerent states—or facilitating military operations—cannot claim protected navigational rights while simultaneously contributing to acts of aggression.

International law has never required a state to permit its own territorial sea to be used as a conduit for hostile operations. On the contrary, the right of self-defense permits proportionate measures to prevent such exploitation. Conditioning passage on neutrality and non-hostility is therefore not only lawful but necessary to uphold the integrity of that right.

Finally, the conduct of other states further undermines any claim that Iran’s position is exceptional. The United States itself is not a party to UNCLOS yet selectively invokes its provisions as customary law when convenient.

[Ieiʒ .h @entheticus]

Honestly all the work it took to get a medieval studies PhD pays off in my being able to get to the bottom of this tweet

https://t.co/wQMq8LjW2O

[Colin Gorrie @colingorrie]

Written English has barely changed in 300 years. If you can read Harry Potter, you can read Robinson Crusoe (1719).

The Spelling of our Tongue was in the main ſettled ere the eighteenth Century, & the Grammar has ſuffer'd but little Alteration ſince. Yet before this happy Settlement, things were exceeding ſtrange.

In Shakeſpeares dayes, ſpelling was much more variable, & you ſhall finde notable differences in the grammar: "thou" could bee intimate or inſulting, depending vpon whom you ſayd it to; to chooſe amiſse had conſequences.

Wende we now tuo hundred ȝeer bifore, to Chauceres tyme. It seemeth ȝit as Englisshe, but it nis nat esy to reden withouten greet connynge.

Yet tuo hundred wintre er, sone after þat the Normans comen to þis londe, is Englisch on muchel wandlunge. Þe tunges work is tobroken, Frensce wordes comeþ in, and þe writunge is al totwemed.

Þy furðor þu underbæc færst, þy gelicor biþ Englisc gesewen þære Deniscan spræce. Englisce bec þæs m. geare ne mæg nan mann rædan buton he sundorlice geleornad sy.

[Ieiʒ .h @entheticus]

@adamjohnsonCHI Credit to Douthat where due, he was pretty quick out of the gate with his summoned-demon metaphor