Leading voice on Asia, experienced across government, think tanks and markets. Advisor to two Secretaries of State, a former Treasury Secretary and global CEOs.
In Asia, the United States is long on attitude, short on strategy. Re-upping this podcast deep dive I did last year into America's gathering policy failures in Asia. I pull the thread on several themes:
1. America's oversecuritization of its approach to Asia - to borrow the same metaphor, Washington is long on security and short on just about everything else. As I sometimes tartly put it, the United States is in serious danger of becoming "the Hessians of Asia."
2. Washington's strategic narcissism in filtering its entire Asia strategy through the prism of American competition with China. In other words, rather than trying to "get China right by getting Asia right," we are instead making every policy, initiative, and relationship derivative of America's own focus on Beijing.
3. Our collective national failure to adapt to an integrating Asia - one that is more "Asian" and less "Pacific" and more closely resembles its historical norm rather than the Cold War anomaly.
4. Our persistent inability to understand that Asian countries have domestic politics too - and how that, in turn, sometimes leads American policymakers both to misread Asian countries' interests and overestimate American leverage.
5. Why the United States isn't getting enough strategic traction EVEN in the Asian countries that are most ambivalent about the rise of Chinese power. When the mathematical operations that matter in Asia (and elsewhere) are addition and multiplication, it is strategically nonsensical to go long on subtraction and division.
6. What the Trump team gets right - for instance, about why Asian governments aren't attracted to a highly ideological American approach to their region - but then gets wrong in the execution and thus risks losing the strategic plot.
7. Why Washington won't be able to successfully ring-fence security cooperation by invoking shared fears of China while simultaneously coercing its allies and partners in the economic and technology domains.
8. Why China is more resilient than the United States thinks - but why Beijing, for all its strategic, political, ideological, and systematic differences from Washington, often shares American strategic narcissism.
9. How Beijing went from loathing sanctions to using them, copycatting the American architecture and, as I bluntly put it here, "learning from the best" - namely, Americans.
Give the podcast a listen. The United States needs to approach Asia as it is, not the region of its wishes, dreams, and fantasies.
https://t.co/vryKTzmmHC
Setelah lebih dari 10 tahun negosiasi, tarif ekspor Indonesia ke Uni Eropa turun hingga 0 persen!
Hari ini menjadi momentum bersejarah bagi hubungan ekonomi Indonesia dan Uni Eropa. Pemerintah Indonesia dan Uni Eropa resmi menandatangani perjanjian kerja sama ekonomi komprehensif Indonesia-European Union Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (IEU-CEPA) dan Investment Protection Agreement (IPA) di Kantor Pusat Komisi Eropa, Brussels, Belgia.
Sebelum penandatanganan, Presiden Prabowo Subianto terlebih dahulu melakukan konferensi video (video conference) dengan Presiden Komisi Eropa Ursula von der Leyen. Pertemuan tersebut menjadi bagian dari rangkaian penguatan hubungan dan kemitraan strategis Indonesia-Uni Eropa.
Penandatanganan ini merupakan hasil perjalanan panjang negosiasi selama lebih dari 10 tahun. Penguatan kemitraan strategis kedua pihak turut ditandai dengan kunjungan Presiden Prabowo Subianto ke Brussels, Belgia, pada 12–13 Juli 2025.
Uni Eropa merupakan mitra strategis Indonesia yang terdiri atas 27 negara anggota, dengan populasi sekitar 450 juta penduduk, pendapatan per kapita 43.350 dolar AS, dan total GDP mencapai 19,4 triliun dolar AS. Nilai perdagangan Uni Eropa dengan Indonesia tercatat mencapai sekitar 32 miliar dolar AS.
Sejumlah poin penting dari kesepakatan bersejarah ini:
1. Peluang Perdagangan dan Investasi
• IEU-CEPA membuka akses pasar yang lebih luas bagi produk-produk Indonesia di kawasan Uni Eropa.
• Membuka peluang investasi di berbagai sektor padat karya dan strategis, antara lain elektronik, sportswear, alas kaki, kendaraan listrik (electric vehicle), energi terbarukan (renewable energy), serta produk hilirisasi kelapa sawit.
2. Penurunan Tarif Perdagangan
• Sebanyak 90,4 persen pos tarif akan mendapatkan penghapusan tarif sejak hari pertama implementasi perjanjian.
• Sebanyak 8,37 persen lainnya akan mendapatkan penurunan tarif secara bertahap dalam kurun waktu 3–15 tahun melalui mekanisme Tariff Rate Quotas.
3. Produk Unggulan Indonesia Berpeluang Menikmati Tarif 0 Persen
• Minyak kelapa sawit dan produk turunannya.
• Tekstil dan produk tekstil.
• Sepatu kulit.
• Sneakers dan sepatu olahraga (sports shoes).
• Berbagai komoditas unggulan Indonesia lainnya.
4. Investasi Uni Eropa di Indonesia
• Investasi Uni Eropa di Indonesia sepanjang 2021–2026 mencapai 14,8 miliar dolar AS.
• Investasi tersebut mencakup sektor kimia, farmasi, makanan dan minuman, serta pembangkit tenaga listrik.
• IEU-CEPA dan IPA diharapkan semakin memperkuat arus investasi, transfer teknologi, serta penciptaan lapangan kerja di Indonesia.
Kesepakatan ini menjadi langkah strategis untuk memperluas pasar produk nasional, meningkatkan daya saing industri, memperkuat investasi, dan membuka peluang ekonomi yang lebih besar bagi Indonesia.
As part of our #ChinaLocalGlobal initiative, was proud to have brought @CarnegieEndow to Central Asia last month for two days of fantastic events we put on in Kazakhstan alongside colleagues from Almaty-based @capsunlock_org.
This video of the half-day public event in Almaty, a companion to an event we put on last year in Lima, Peru, interrogates a key issue: Central Asia has long been viewed as a testing ground for China’s overseas ambitions and a conventional narrative often portrays the region as a passive object of Beijing’s economic and political gravity. But what is happening on the ground reveals a more complex and dynamic interaction, where local regulations, public sentiment, and state bargaining power sometimes compel Chinese state-owned enterprises, private investors, and diplomats to adapt to local forms, norms, and practices.
Joined by scholars, practitioners, a former Kyrgyz prime minister, and a former Uzbek foreign minister, the video highlights the questions of how unique is Central Asia’s experience with localization and Chinese adaptation and what the region might learn from China’s local adaptation strategies elsewhere. And we were especially pleased to bring to Kazakhstan (all of them, for the first time) participants in our #ChinaLocalGlobal initiatives from places as far afield as Brunei, Ecuador, Indonesia, and Saudi Arabia, to share comparative experiences with China and localization.
Watch the video here: https://t.co/eRa9RLNCjP
It is always a blast to do the @SinicaPodcast with @KaiserKuo. And over many years, we have had some fantastic conversations about China, the U.S., Asia, and the world. So I’m thrilled that Kaiser decided to devote the latest episode of Sinica to a keynote speech I delivered last month in Ottawa at a time when many countries, including but not limited to Canada, are trying to navigate the world that Washington and Beijing are trying to shape for them and then leverage in an effort to constrain them.
From Kaiser, followed by the podcast link:
“This week on Sinica, something special: a keynote from my friend Evan Feigenbaum, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, delivered on October 5 in Ottawa at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada’s 2026 Indo-Pacific Forum. Four years ago I ran Evan’s talk from the same city, and it proved awfully prescient. This time he argues that Asia is headed not for American or Chinese hegemony, nor for Cold War bipolarity, but for fragmentation, and that with Washington and Beijing both behaving as “strategic narcissists,” fragmentation hands middle powers like Canada openings they wouldn’t otherwise have. My thanks to Evan and to Jeff Nankivell of APF Canada, who introduces him.
07:13 – Evan looks back on his “somewhat dark” 2022 keynote and lays out the talk in three bites.
10:38 – America’s two speeds, hegemony or bipolarity: Obama’s “write the rules” line, primacy in Trump’s national security strategy, spheres of influence, and G2 fretting after Xi’s U.S. visit.
15:19 – What actually happened to TPP after the U.S. walked away, and Asia’s history of first movers not named the United States or China.
16:22 – Why fragmentation isn’t the same as disorder.
18:29 – The U.S. and China as “strategic narcissists.”
20:13 – How Washington “securitized” its approach to China and “China-fied” its approach to Asia, and why dual-use technology makes that so hard to reverse.
24:14 – Turning Richard Armitage’s aphorism upside down: Taiwan contingency planning and the changing U.S. conversations with Korea and Australia.
28:28 – “Long on attitude, short on strategy”: picking fights with partners, the U.S.-India trade standoff, and asserting primacy while withdrawing public goods.
31:14 – China’s evolving offer in Central Asia and beyond, and what Beijing has learned from the “world champion of economic coercion.”
36:05 – Form versus function: the trouble with trilaterals and groups that “grope around for purpose.”
38:24 – DEPA, and how the Quad began with nine days of tsunami relief in 2004.
41:19 – The opening for middle powers, Evan’s advice to Canada, and his caveat on security.”
With huge thanks to Kaiser and Sinica, listen here:
https://t.co/5XBExIrmCs
It "only" took ten years, but still ... After the EU-India FTA, the EU is on a bit of a roll with Asian agreements. Seems notable to me for three reasons:
(1) too many people simply dismiss Europe's role in Asia outright.
(2) turns out some folks are still interested in trade pacts.
(3) the United States hasn't done a proper bilateral trade agreement (not Trump's "deals" but across and behind the border agreements) in a while, much less a proper plurilateral ... and this one reduces tariffs while Trump is, well, still loving them.
It is easy to alternately overstate or dismiss things like this EU-Indonesia agreement. But in an era where the United States isn't interested in this sort of thing, it feels somewhat notable.
After 10 years of negotiations, we did it, @prabowo!
We have signed the EU-Indonesia Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement.
One of the most ambitious deals the EU has concluded in Asia, connecting 730 million people.
Terima kasih 🇪🇺🇮🇩
https://t.co/DyehIS9m7N
Alliances reduced to a protection racket ... If people really think this won't eventually bite the United States in the ass in Asia, they're kidding themselves. Everyone has noticed this persistent behavior from him but you don't usually get to throw the reverse switch just because you change up the person in the Oval Office ... Coerced once this way can mean coerced again this way. And it reverberates beyond just one country.
Buy 100% American or face “problems.”
US President Donald Trump claimed he pressured the Philippines into buying all its agricultural and energy imports exclusively from the US, invoking Washington’s defense commitments and the possibility of a military confrontation with China.
Trump boasted that he used Manila’s reliance on US military protection to secure billions of dollars in agricultural and energy purchases, warning against sourcing supplies from Brazil and the Middle East.
Full story on https://t.co/9R0Mcay5im
READ: https://t.co/G1CTLlHtvX
I have been writing for a long time about how the United States could be more proactive in Asia, not reactive, not least by better leveraging American strengths—energy, technology, innovation ecosystems, STEM education, connections to the global capital markets, best in class services and other firms, and so on. But when an American president talks like this and about Southeast Asians, "America First" just screams "and you in Asia last."
For one, I very much doubt Marcos called him "Sir" and the "Sir" stories are always pretty trying. But more to the point, the United States has struggled in Southeast Asia since the late 1990s when it refused to bail out Thailand in 1997, three years after bailing out Mexico. And to talk to one of just two treaty allies in Southeast Asia as if it is in a relationship of vassalage with the United States is beyond stupid.
Good to meet Premier Li Qiang again in Beijing. Our flagship Government-to-Government projects underpin cooperation in Jing-Jin-Ji and closer western China–Southeast Asia links via the Chongqing Connectivity Initiative, International Land-Sea Trade Corridor and Pinglu Canal.
I watched Secretary of State Marco Rubio's visit to Uzbekistan with considerable interest, especially its ramped-up commercial focus. At a recent public event in Almaty, Kazakhstan, I was asked whether the United States is well-positioned in Central Asia (spoiler alert: it is not) and how Washington and countries in the region could do better (punchline: they can). One issue, as I say in this clip, is to better leverage uniquely American strengths rather than trying to "out China China" by imitating Chinese ways and means of engagement in the region. But another—and this is especially critical for Central Asian countries—is to ensure that the United States and other partners leave more value added in the region to lift local economies and employment. Watch my response here: https://t.co/RSQka1cN5X
I have been writing for a long time about how the United States could be more proactive in Asia, not reactive, not least by better leveraging American strengths—energy, technology, innovation ecosystems, STEM education, connections to the global capital markets, best in class services and other firms, and so on. But when an American president talks like this and about Southeast Asians, "America First" just screams "and you in Asia last."
For one, I very much doubt Marcos called him "Sir" and the "Sir" stories are always pretty trying. But more to the point, the United States has struggled in Southeast Asia since the late 1990s when it refused to bail out Thailand in 1997, three years after bailing out Mexico. And to talk to one of just two treaty allies in Southeast Asia as if it is in a relationship of vassalage with the United States is beyond stupid.
Trump: Prime Minister Marcos. Great family. I said, “where do you buy your energy?” “Sir, we buy it from the Middle East.” I said, “not anymore, you don’t.”
@yarotrof Point taken. But then neither is India, largely because of an ancient membership moratorium … which is kind of nuts, if we think about it, since PNG is in and so are LatAm countries whose main tie to Asia is having a beach on the Pacific.
It is always a blast to do the @SinicaPodcast with @KaiserKuo. And over many years, we have had some fantastic conversations about China, the U.S., Asia, and the world. So I’m thrilled that Kaiser decided to devote the latest episode of Sinica to a keynote speech I delivered last month in Ottawa at a time when many countries, including but not limited to Canada, are trying to navigate the world that Washington and Beijing are trying to shape for them and then leverage in an effort to constrain them.
From Kaiser, followed by the podcast link:
“This week on Sinica, something special: a keynote from my friend Evan Feigenbaum, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, delivered on October 5 in Ottawa at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada’s 2026 Indo-Pacific Forum. Four years ago I ran Evan’s talk from the same city, and it proved awfully prescient. This time he argues that Asia is headed not for American or Chinese hegemony, nor for Cold War bipolarity, but for fragmentation, and that with Washington and Beijing both behaving as “strategic narcissists,” fragmentation hands middle powers like Canada openings they wouldn’t otherwise have. My thanks to Evan and to Jeff Nankivell of APF Canada, who introduces him.
07:13 – Evan looks back on his “somewhat dark” 2022 keynote and lays out the talk in three bites.
10:38 – America’s two speeds, hegemony or bipolarity: Obama’s “write the rules” line, primacy in Trump’s national security strategy, spheres of influence, and G2 fretting after Xi’s U.S. visit.
15:19 – What actually happened to TPP after the U.S. walked away, and Asia’s history of first movers not named the United States or China.
16:22 – Why fragmentation isn’t the same as disorder.
18:29 – The U.S. and China as “strategic narcissists.”
20:13 – How Washington “securitized” its approach to China and “China-fied” its approach to Asia, and why dual-use technology makes that so hard to reverse.
24:14 – Turning Richard Armitage’s aphorism upside down: Taiwan contingency planning and the changing U.S. conversations with Korea and Australia.
28:28 – “Long on attitude, short on strategy”: picking fights with partners, the U.S.-India trade standoff, and asserting primacy while withdrawing public goods.
31:14 – China’s evolving offer in Central Asia and beyond, and what Beijing has learned from the “world champion of economic coercion.”
36:05 – Form versus function: the trouble with trilaterals and groups that “grope around for purpose.”
38:24 – DEPA, and how the Quad began with nine days of tsunami relief in 2004.
41:19 – The opening for middle powers, Evan’s advice to Canada, and his caveat on security.”
With huge thanks to Kaiser and Sinica, listen here:
https://t.co/5XBExIrmCs
This week on @SinicaPodcast: @EvanFeigenbaum’s keynote at APF Canada’s Indo-Pacific Forum in Ottawa. The U.S. and China are both “strategic narcissists,” he argues, and Asia is fragmenting rather than splitting in two. That’s an opening for middle powers. Link below 👇
It is always a blast to do the @SinicaPodcast with @KaiserKuo. And over many years, we have had some fantastic conversations about China, the U.S., Asia, and the world. So I’m thrilled that Kaiser decided to devote the latest episode of Sinica to a keynote speech I delivered last month in Ottawa at a time when many countries, including but not limited to Canada, are trying to navigate the world that Washington and Beijing are trying to shape for them and then leverage in an effort to constrain them.
From Kaiser, followed by the podcast link:
“This week on Sinica, something special: a keynote from my friend Evan Feigenbaum, vice president for studies at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, delivered on October 5 in Ottawa at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada’s 2026 Indo-Pacific Forum. Four years ago I ran Evan’s talk from the same city, and it proved awfully prescient. This time he argues that Asia is headed not for American or Chinese hegemony, nor for Cold War bipolarity, but for fragmentation, and that with Washington and Beijing both behaving as “strategic narcissists,” fragmentation hands middle powers like Canada openings they wouldn’t otherwise have. My thanks to Evan and to Jeff Nankivell of APF Canada, who introduces him.
07:13 – Evan looks back on his “somewhat dark” 2022 keynote and lays out the talk in three bites.
10:38 – America’s two speeds, hegemony or bipolarity: Obama’s “write the rules” line, primacy in Trump’s national security strategy, spheres of influence, and G2 fretting after Xi’s U.S. visit.
15:19 – What actually happened to TPP after the U.S. walked away, and Asia’s history of first movers not named the United States or China.
16:22 – Why fragmentation isn’t the same as disorder.
18:29 – The U.S. and China as “strategic narcissists.”
20:13 – How Washington “securitized” its approach to China and “China-fied” its approach to Asia, and why dual-use technology makes that so hard to reverse.
24:14 – Turning Richard Armitage’s aphorism upside down: Taiwan contingency planning and the changing U.S. conversations with Korea and Australia.
28:28 – “Long on attitude, short on strategy”: picking fights with partners, the U.S.-India trade standoff, and asserting primacy while withdrawing public goods.
31:14 – China’s evolving offer in Central Asia and beyond, and what Beijing has learned from the “world champion of economic coercion.”
36:05 – Form versus function: the trouble with trilaterals and groups that “grope around for purpose.”
38:24 – DEPA, and how the Quad began with nine days of tsunami relief in 2004.
41:19 – The opening for middle powers, Evan’s advice to Canada, and his caveat on security.”
With huge thanks to Kaiser and Sinica, listen here:
https://t.co/AZmTTpcDLa
The front row is heads of state, the second row is heads of government. Prime ministers are in the row behind presidents, whatever the size of the country. There is more than that going on in the placements but that piece of the protocol is pretty standard and it's why Japan is "below" Peru, Mexico, and Brunei.