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최태원 회장님, 솔리다임 상장은 절대 일어나선 안 됩니다.
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현재 솔리다임 상장은 확정된 사안이 아닙니다. 하지만 실제 상장 절차에 들어간 뒤에는 이미 늦습니다. 그래서 지금 이야기해야 한다고 생각합니다.

먼저 솔리다임이 어떤 회사인지부터 봐야 합니다.

SK하이닉스는 2020년 인텔의 낸드·SSD 사업을 약 90억달러에 인수하기로 결정했습니다. 이후 2021년 1단계 인수를 마치면서 인텔의 SSD 사업을 넘겨받았고, 이 사업을 운영하기 위해 만든 미국 자회사가 바로 솔리다임입니다.

쉽게 말하면 솔리다임은 SK하이닉스가 인텔의 낸드 사업을 사오면서 함께 만들어낸 회사입니다.

SK하이닉스는 막대한 인수자금을 부담했고, 이후 낸드 업황 부진과 솔리다임의 적자도 감내했습니다. 그 과정의 부담은 결국 SK하이닉스와 그 주주들이 함께 짊어졌습니다.

그런데 이제 AI 데이터센터 투자 확대와 함께 기업용 SSD 시장이 커지고, 솔리다임이 본격적으로 돈을 벌기 시작하는 시점에 별도 상장을 한다면 주주 입장에서는 납득하기 어렵습니다.

적자일 때는 SK하이닉스가 책임지고, 좋아지기 시작하니 따로 떼어 상장한다면 기존 주주들은 무엇을 위해 그동안의 위험을 감수한 것입니까.

더구나 지금 SK하이닉스는 본업에서 막대한 영업현금흐름을 만들어내고 있습니다. 자금이 절박한 회사도 아닌데, 굳이 미래 성장성이 큰 자회사의 지분을 외부에 넘겨가며 상장 자금을 조달해야 하는지도 의문입니다.

정말 자금이 필요하다면 먼저 기존 현금흐름과 재무 여력으로 감당할 수 없는 이유부터 설명해야 합니다. 돈을 잘 벌고 있는 회사가 가장 좋은 자산 중 하나를 떼어 상장하는 것은 주주 입장에서 쉽게 받아들이기 어렵습니다.

특히 SK하이닉스는 대한민국을 대표하는 기업입니다. 이런 회사일수록 자본시장에서도 모범을 보여야 합니다.

SK하이닉스마저 잘되는 자회사를 따로 떼어 상장하는 선례를 만든다면 다른 기업들은 더 거리낌 없이 중복상장에 나설 수 있습니다. 그렇게 되면 한국 증시는 지금보다 더 엉망이 될 수 있습니다.

상장은 공짜로 돈을 조달하는 방법이 아닙니다.

회사의 일부를 새로운 투자자에게 파는 것입니다.

솔리다임이 SK하이닉스의 100% 자회사로 남아 있다면 앞으로 솔리다임이 벌어들이는 이익과 현금흐름은 결국 SK하이닉스 주주들의 몫입니다. 반대로 외부 투자자를 받고 별도로 상장하면 그만큼 미래의 이익을 새로운 주주들과 나눠 가져야 합니다.

여기에 더블리스팅에 따른 모회사 할인까지 생각해야 합니다.

솔리다임의 가치가 커지더라도 그 가치가 SK하이닉스 주가에 온전히 반영된다는 보장은 없습니다. 오히려 시장이 솔리다임을 별도의 상장회사로 평가하기 시작하면 SK하이닉스가 보유한 지분에는 할인율이 붙을 수 있습니다.

결국 기존 주주 입장에서는 솔리다임의 지분을 외부 투자자와 나눠 갖게 되는 데다, SK하이닉스에는 중복상장에 따른 할인까지 붙을 수 있는 것입니다.

물론 상장을 통해 들어온 자금으로 이런 할인과 지분 희석을 넘어서는 더 큰 성장을 만들어낼 수 있다면 이야기는 달라질 수 있습니다.

그렇다면 최소한 왜 솔리다임을 100% 보유하는 것보다 상장하는 것이 기존 SK하이닉스 주주에게 더 이익인지 설명해야 합니다.

상장으로 얼마를 조달하고, 지분을 얼마나 넘기며, 그 돈으로 어떤 수익을 만들어낼 것인지, 그리고 더블리스팅 할인까지 감안해도 기존 주주가 더 큰 이익을 얻을 수 있는지를 숫자로 보여줘야 합니다.

그 답을 보여주지 못한다면 굳이 상장해야 할 이유가 없습니다.

샌디스크 사례를 보면 차이가 더 분명합니다.

웨스턴디지털은 낸드 사업을 샌디스크로 분리하면서 샌디스크 주식을 기존 웨스턴디지털 주주들에게 나눠줬습니다.

사업은 분리했지만 기존 주주들의 권리는 그대로 따라갔습니다.

회사를 나누는 것 자체가 문제가 아니라 그 과정에서 기존 주주의 권리가 어떻게 처리되느냐가 중요한 것입니다.

솔리다임 역시 정말 분리가 필요하다면 샌디스크처럼 기존 SK하이닉스 주주들이 솔리다임의 가치를 직접 가져갈 수 있는 구조부터 고민해야 합니다.

기존 주주에게 아무런 권리도 주지 않은 채 외부 투자자를 받고 상장하는 것은 전혀 다른 문제입니다.

일각에서는 솔리다임을 미국에 상장하면 더 높은 가치를 받을 수 있다고 이야기합니다.

하지만 저는 이 논리가 더 위험하다고 봅니다.

한국 시장에서는 제대로 평가받지 못하니 좋은 사업은 미국 시장에 따로 상장시키겠다는 이야기와 크게 다르지 않기 때문입니다.

좋은 사업이 생길 때마다 자회사를 상장하고, 그때마다 모회사 주주들의 몫이 줄어든다면 투자자들이 처음부터 모회사 주식을 싸게 평가하는 것은 당연합니다.

좋은 자회사가 많을수록 모회사 가치가 올라가는 것이 아니라, 언젠가 그 자회사가 따로 상장될 수 있다는 우려 때문에 오히려 할인을 받는 구조가 되는 것입니다.

결국 해외 중복상장이 코리아 디스카운트를 해결하는 것이 아니라 오히려 코리아 디스카운트를 더 심화시키는 원인이 되는 것입니다.

코리아 디스카운트를 해결하는 방법은 좋은 자산을 미국으로 보내는 것이 아니라 한국 상장사의 주주권과 자본배분을 미국 기업 수준으로 끌어올리는 것이어야 합니다.

버크셔 해서웨이를 보면 SK하이닉스와는 정반대의 사례를 볼 수 있습니다.

버핏이 오랫동안 주주들에게 신뢰받은 이유는 단순히 투자를 잘했기 때문만은 아닙니다.

회사가 번 돈을 어디에 쓰는지, 왜 현금을 들고 있는지, 어떤 기준으로 투자하는지를 계속 설명했습니다.

결국 주주들은 회사가 돈을 가지고 있어도 불안해하지 않았습니다.

경영진이 그 돈을 주주의 이익을 위해 사용할 것이라는 믿음이 있었기 때문입니다.

좋은 거버넌스도 결국 여기서 시작한다고 생각합니다.

경영진이 회사의 돈을 정말 주주의 돈이라고 생각하고 있는가.

솔리다임 상장 역시 같은 문제입니다.

SK그룹 전체에 도움이 되는 거래인지가 아니라 SK하이닉스 주주에게 도움이 되는 거래인지가 중요합니다.

그룹 입장에서 좋은 거래라고 해서 반드시 SK하이닉스 주주에게 좋은 거래인 것은 아닙니다.

저는 이 문제를 단순히 SK하이닉스 주주의 손익 문제로만 보지 않습니다.

더 크게 보면 미래 한국 자본시장의 경쟁력, 나아가 장기적으로는 통화주권과도 연결되는 문제​라고 생각합니다.

미국은 지금 금융시장의 경쟁력을 빠르게 키우고 있습니다.

달러 스테이블코인부터 토큰화 증권, 국채와 펀드의 토큰화까지 금융자산을 인터넷과 블록체인 위에서 더 쉽게 거래할 수 있는 방향으로 가고 있습니다.

결국 전 세계 사람들이 더 쉽게 달러를 보유하고, 더 쉽게 달러 표시 자산에 투자할 수 있게 만드는 것입니다.

앞으로 미국 주식과 미국 금융상품에 투자하는 장벽은 지금보다 더 낮아질 가능성이 큽니다.

그렇다면 한국 증시도 미국 증시와 투자자의 자금을 놓고 경쟁해야 합니다.

미국에서는 회사를 분리하면서 기존 주주에게 신설회사 지분을 나눠주는데, 한국에서는 회사가 잘되면 자회사를 다시 상장하고 기존 주주는 아무것도 받지 못하는 일이 반복된다면 투자자의 선택은 뻔합니다.

굳이 한국 주식을 살 이유가 줄어듭니다.

결국 한국 주식도 투자자가 선택하는 하나의 투자상품입니다.

주주권이 더 강하고, 좋은 사업의 성과를 기존 주주가 더 온전히 가져갈 수 있는 시장이 있다면 자금은 그쪽으로 이동할 수밖에 없습니다.

사람들이 한국 주식을 팔고 미국 주식을 사려면 원화를 팔고 달러를 사야 합니다.

물론 솔리다임 하나를 상장한다고 환율이 폭등하는 것은 아닙니다.

하지만 이런 일이 반복되면서 한국 주식의 투자 매력도가 떨어지고 국내 자금이 계속 해외로 빠져나간다면 이야기는 달라집니다.

한국 자본시장의 경쟁력이 약해질수록 해외자산을 사기 위한 달러 수요는 구조적으로 늘어날 수 있습니다. 결국 자본시장의 경쟁력 약화가 장기적으로는 원화에 대한 수요와 신뢰에도 영향을 줄 수 있다는 이야기입니다.

지금은 반도체 슈퍼사이클 덕분에 삼성전자와 SK하이닉스가 해외에서 막대한 달러를 벌어오고 있습니다.

하지만 반도체 업황이 영원히 좋을 수는 없습니다.

언젠가 반도체 사이클이 꺾여 수출로 들어오는 달러가 줄어드는데 국내 투자자들의 해외투자는 계속 늘어난다면 환율은 지금보다 훨씬 불안정해질 수 있습니다.

환율이 오르면 그 영향은 주식시장에만 머무르지 않습니다.

한국은 에너지와 원자재를 해외에서 많이 수입합니다.

원화 가치가 떨어지면 수입물가가 오르고 결국 생활물가에도 영향을 줍니다.

그래서 저는 솔리다임 상장 문제를 단순히 SK하이닉스 주주의 손익 문제라고 생각하지 않습니다.

한국 자본시장이 미국을 비롯한 선진국 자본시장과 경쟁할 수 있느냐, 더 나아가 앞으로 원화 자산을 사람들이 계속 보유하고 싶어 하는 시장을 만들 수 있느냐의 문제라고 봅니다.

한국 기업이 세계 최고의 반도체를 만들고, 세계 최고의 자동차를 만들고, 세계 최고의 배터리를 만들어도 그 성과를 기존 주주가 제대로 가져갈 수 없다면 한국 주식의 투자 매력도는 떨어질 수밖에 없습니다.

기업의 산업 경쟁력만큼이나 중요한 것이 자본시장의 경쟁력입니다.

솔리다임이 어려울 때 위험을 함께 부담한 사람들이 SK하이닉스 주주들이었다면, 솔리다임이 잘됐을 때 그 과실도 먼저 기존 주주들에게 돌아가야 합니다.

정말 솔리다임을 분리해야 할 이유가 있다면 샌디스크처럼 기존 주주들의 경제적 권리를 보존하는 방법부터 고민해야 합니다.

SK하이닉스는 SK그룹만의 회사가 아닙니다.

수많은 주주들이 돈을 투자해 공동으로 소유하고 있는 대한민국 대표 상장사입니다.

그런 회사일수록 더 높은 기준을 보여줘야 합니다.

SK하이닉스가 모범을 보이면 다른 기업들도 따라갈 수 있습니다. 반대로 SK하이닉스마저 중복상장의 길을 열어버리면 다른 기업들에게도 너무 좋은 핑곗거리가 됩니다.

최태원 회장님, 솔리다임 상장은 절대 일어나선 안 됩니다.

이건 솔리다임 하나의 문제가 아닙니다.

SK하이닉스 주주의 권리와 한국 증시의 투자 매력도, 미래 한국 자본시장의 경쟁력, 그리고 장기적으로는 원화에 대한 신뢰까지 연결되는 문제입니다.

[AlphaBet @Flex_AlphaBet]

Chairman Chey Tae-won, Solidigm must never be listed separately.
*Further Refined Version

[AlphaBet @Flex_AlphaBet]

Chairman Chey Tae-won, Solidigm must never be listed separately.
*Further Refined Version

Solidigm’s listing has not been finalized. But once the listing process actually begins, it may already be too late. That is why I believe this issue needs to be raised now.

First, we need to look at what Solidigm actually is.

In 2020, SK hynix decided to acquire Intel’s NAND and SSD business for approximately $9 billion. After completing the first phase of the acquisition in 2021, SK hynix took over Intel’s SSD business and established Solidigm in the United States to operate it.

Put simply, Solidigm is a company that was created as part of SK hynix’s acquisition of Intel’s NAND business.

SK hynix paid a massive acquisition price and then absorbed the losses that came with the NAND downturn and Solidigm’s weak performance. That burden was ultimately borne by SK hynix and its shareholders.

Now, however, AI data center investment is expanding, the enterprise SSD market is growing, and Solidigm is beginning to generate meaningful profits. If SK hynix were to list Solidigm separately at precisely this point, it would be difficult for existing shareholders to accept.

If SK hynix carried the burden when Solidigm was losing money, but then carves it out and lists it separately just as the business begins to improve, what exactly were existing shareholders taking that risk for?

Moreover, SK hynix is currently generating enormous operating cash flow from its core business. It is not a company in desperate need of capital, so it is difficult to understand why it would need to sell part of a high-growth subsidiary to outside investors simply to raise funds through a listing.

If additional capital is truly necessary, management should first explain why that need cannot be met through existing cash flow and financial capacity. For a highly profitable company to carve out and list one of its most valuable assets is difficult for shareholders to accept.

SK hynix is also one of South Korea’s flagship companies. A company of this stature should set an example in the capital market as well.

If even SK hynix establishes a precedent of separately listing a successful subsidiary, other Korean companies may feel even less hesitation about pursuing similar duplicate listings. The Korean stock market could end up in an even worse state than it is today.

An IPO is not free financing.

It means selling part of a company to new investors.

If Solidigm remains a wholly owned subsidiary of SK hynix, the profits and cash flows it generates in the future will ultimately belong to SK hynix shareholders. On the other hand, if outside investors are brought in and Solidigm is separately listed, those future profits will have to be shared with new shareholders.

On top of that, we also need to consider the parent-company discount that can come with a double listing.

Even if Solidigm’s value rises, there is no guarantee that the full value will be reflected in SK hynix’s share price. In fact, once the market begins valuing Solidigm as a separately listed company, a discount may be applied to the value of SK hynix’s stake in it.

That means existing SK hynix shareholders could face both dilution of their economic interest in Solidigm and an additional valuation discount at the parent-company level.

Of course, the situation could be different if the capital raised through the listing can create enough additional growth to more than offset both the dilution and the valuation discount.

If so, SK hynix should at least explain why listing Solidigm would be more beneficial to existing shareholders than continuing to own 100% of the company.

Management should show, with numbers, how much capital would be raised, how much equity would be sold, what returns that capital is expected to generate, and whether existing shareholders would still come out ahead even after taking the double-listing discount into account.

If that cannot be demonstrated, there is little reason to pursue the listing.

The contrast becomes even clearer when we look at SanDisk.

When Western Digital separated its NAND business into SanDisk, it distributed SanDisk shares to existing Western Digital shareholders.

The business was separated, but the economic rights of existing shareholders followed with it.

The issue is not the separation of a business itself. The issue is how the rights of existing shareholders are treated in the process.

If separating Solidigm is truly necessary, SK hynix should first consider a structure similar to SanDisk, one that allows existing SK hynix shareholders to directly retain the economic value of Solidigm.

Listing Solidigm after bringing in outside investors, while giving existing shareholders no direct rights to the company, would be a completely different matter.

Some argue that Solidigm could receive a much higher valuation if it were listed in the United States.

But I believe that argument is even more dangerous.

It is not very different from saying that because a good business cannot receive a proper valuation in Korea, it should simply be carved out and listed in the United States instead.

If every successful business is separately listed and the economic interests of parent-company shareholders are reduced each time, investors will naturally apply a discount to the parent company from the beginning.

In other words, having strong subsidiaries would no longer necessarily increase the value of the parent company. Instead, investors could apply an additional discount out of concern that those subsidiaries may eventually be carved out and listed separately.

Ultimately, overseas double listings do not solve the Korea Discount. They can actually make the Korea Discount even worse.

The way to address the Korea Discount is not to send attractive assets to the U.S. market. It is to raise shareholder rights and capital allocation standards at Korean listed companies to the level of leading global companies.

Berkshire Hathaway offers a sharp contrast to SK hynix.

Warren Buffett earned the long-term trust of shareholders not simply because he was a successful investor.

He consistently explained how the company used its capital, why it held cash, and what principles guided its investment decisions.

As a result, shareholders were not uncomfortable with Berkshire holding large amounts of cash.

They trusted management to use that capital in the interests of shareholders.

Good governance ultimately begins with a simple question:

Does management truly treat the company’s money as shareholders’ money?

The same question applies to Solidigm.

What matters is not whether a transaction benefits the SK Group as a whole, but whether it benefits SK hynix shareholders.

A transaction that makes sense from the perspective of the group does not necessarily make sense for SK hynix shareholders.

I do not see this merely as a question of gains or losses for SK hynix shareholders.

More broadly, I believe it is also a question of the future competitiveness of Korea’s capital market and, in the long run, even of monetary sovereignty.

The United States is rapidly strengthening the competitiveness of its financial markets.

From dollar stablecoins to tokenized securities, Treasuries, and funds, financial assets are increasingly moving toward a system in which they can be traded more easily over the internet and blockchain-based infrastructure.

The direction is clear: make it easier for people around the world to hold dollars and invest in dollar-denominated assets.

The barriers to investing in U.S. stocks and U.S. financial products are likely to become even lower in the future.

That means the Korean stock market must compete with the U.S. market for investors’ capital.

If U.S. companies separate businesses while preserving the rights of existing shareholders, while Korean companies repeatedly list successful subsidiaries without giving existing shareholders anything in return, the investor’s choice becomes obvious.

There will simply be less reason to own Korean stocks.

Ultimately, Korean equities are also investment products that investors choose among alternatives.

If another market offers stronger shareholder rights and allows investors to participate more fully in the value created by successful businesses, capital will naturally move in that direction.

When Korean investors sell domestic assets and buy U.S. stocks, they also have to sell won and buy dollars.

Of course, a Solidigm listing alone would not cause the exchange rate to surge.

But if cases like this continue to weaken the attractiveness of Korean equities and domestic capital keeps moving overseas, the situation becomes different.

As the competitiveness of Korea’s capital market weakens, structural demand for dollars to purchase overseas assets may continue to rise. Over the long term, a weaker domestic capital market could also affect demand for and confidence in the Korean won.

For now, the semiconductor supercycle is allowing companies such as Samsung Electronics and SK hynix to earn enormous amounts of foreign currency through exports.

But semiconductor conditions will not remain strong forever.

If the semiconductor cycle eventually turns down and dollar inflows from exports decline while Korean investors continue increasing their overseas investments, the won-dollar exchange rate could become significantly more unstable.

And a weaker won does not affect only the stock market.

South Korea imports a large portion of its energy and raw materials.

When the won weakens, import prices rise, and that eventually feeds into the cost of living.

That is why I do not view the Solidigm listing issue as simply a matter of gains and losses for SK hynix shareholders.

I see it as a question of whether Korea’s capital market can remain competitive with the United States and other developed markets, and ultimately whether Korea can build a market in which investors continue to want to hold won-denominated assets.

Korean companies may manufacture the world’s best semiconductors, automobiles, and batteries. But if existing shareholders cannot fully participate in the value created by those businesses, Korean equities will inevitably become less attractive as investments.

The competitiveness of a country’s capital market matters just as much as the industrial competitiveness of its companies.

If SK hynix shareholders shared the downside when Solidigm was struggling, they should also be the first to benefit when Solidigm succeeds.

If there is a genuine need to separate Solidigm, SK hynix should first consider a structure that preserves the economic rights of existing shareholders, as Western Digital did with SanDisk.

SK hynix does not belong solely to the SK Group.

It is one of South Korea’s flagship listed companies, jointly owned by countless shareholders who have invested their own capital.

A company of that stature should hold itself to a higher standard.

If SK hynix sets a good example, other companies may follow. But if even SK hynix opens the door to another double listing, it will give many other companies an easy excuse to do the same.

Chairman Chey Tae-won, Solidigm must never be separately listed.

This is not just about Solidigm.

It is about the rights of SK hynix shareholders, the attractiveness of the Korean stock market, the future competitiveness of Korea’s capital market, and, over the long run, even confidence in the Korean won.

[AlphaBet @Flex_AlphaBet]

Chairman Chey Tae-won, Solidigm must never be listed separately.
*Further Refined Version

[AlphaBet @Flex_AlphaBet]

Chairman Chey Tae-won, Solidigm must never be listed separately.
*Further Refined Version

Solidigm’s listing has not been finalized. But once the listing process actually begins, it may already be too late. That is why I believe this issue needs to be raised now.

First, we need to look at what Solidigm actually is.

In 2020, SK hynix decided to acquire Intel’s NAND and SSD business for approximately $9 billion. After completing the first phase of the acquisition in 2021, SK hynix took over Intel’s SSD business and established Solidigm in the United States to operate it.

Put simply, Solidigm is a company that was created as part of SK hynix’s acquisition of Intel’s NAND business.

SK hynix paid a massive acquisition price and then absorbed the losses that came with the NAND downturn and Solidigm’s weak performance. That burden was ultimately borne by SK hynix and its shareholders.

Now, however, AI data center investment is expanding, the enterprise SSD market is growing, and Solidigm is beginning to generate meaningful profits. If SK hynix were to list Solidigm separately at precisely this point, it would be difficult for existing shareholders to accept.

If SK hynix carried the burden when Solidigm was losing money, but then carves it out and lists it separately just as the business begins to improve, what exactly were existing shareholders taking that risk for?

Moreover, SK hynix is currently generating enormous operating cash flow from its core business. It is not a company in desperate need of capital, so it is difficult to understand why it would need to sell part of a high-growth subsidiary to outside investors simply to raise funds through a listing.

If additional capital is truly necessary, management should first explain why that need cannot be met through existing cash flow and financial capacity. For a highly profitable company to carve out and list one of its most valuable assets is difficult for shareholders to accept.

SK hynix is also one of South Korea’s flagship companies. A company of this stature should set an example in the capital market as well.

If even SK hynix establishes a precedent of separately listing a successful subsidiary, other Korean companies may feel even less hesitation about pursuing similar duplicate listings. The Korean stock market could end up in an even worse state than it is today.

An IPO is not free financing.

It means selling part of a company to new investors.

If Solidigm remains a wholly owned subsidiary of SK hynix, the profits and cash flows it generates in the future will ultimately belong to SK hynix shareholders. On the other hand, if outside investors are brought in and Solidigm is separately listed, those future profits will have to be shared with new shareholders.

On top of that, we also need to consider the parent-company discount that can come with a double listing.

Even if Solidigm’s value rises, there is no guarantee that the full value will be reflected in SK hynix’s share price. In fact, once the market begins valuing Solidigm as a separately listed company, a discount may be applied to the value of SK hynix’s stake in it.

That means existing SK hynix shareholders could face both dilution of their economic interest in Solidigm and an additional valuation discount at the parent-company level.

Of course, the situation could be different if the capital raised through the listing can create enough additional growth to more than offset both the dilution and the valuation discount.

If so, SK hynix should at least explain why listing Solidigm would be more beneficial to existing shareholders than continuing to own 100% of the company.

Management should show, with numbers, how much capital would be raised, how much equity would be sold, what returns that capital is expected to generate, and whether existing shareholders would still come out ahead even after taking the double-listing discount into account.

If that cannot be demonstrated, there is little reason to pursue the listing.

The contrast becomes even clearer when we look at SanDisk.

When Western Digital separated its NAND business into SanDisk, it distributed SanDisk shares to existing Western Digital shareholders.

The business was separated, but the economic rights of existing shareholders followed with it.

The issue is not the separation of a business itself. The issue is how the rights of existing shareholders are treated in the process.

If separating Solidigm is truly necessary, SK hynix should first consider a structure similar to SanDisk, one that allows existing SK hynix shareholders to directly retain the economic value of Solidigm.

Listing Solidigm after bringing in outside investors, while giving existing shareholders no direct rights to the company, would be a completely different matter.

Some argue that Solidigm could receive a much higher valuation if it were listed in the United States.

But I believe that argument is even more dangerous.

It is not very different from saying that because a good business cannot receive a proper valuation in Korea, it should simply be carved out and listed in the United States instead.

If every successful business is separately listed and the economic interests of parent-company shareholders are reduced each time, investors will naturally apply a discount to the parent company from the beginning.

In other words, having strong subsidiaries would no longer necessarily increase the value of the parent company. Instead, investors could apply an additional discount out of concern that those subsidiaries may eventually be carved out and listed separately.

Ultimately, overseas double listings do not solve the Korea Discount. They can actually make the Korea Discount even worse.

The way to address the Korea Discount is not to send attractive assets to the U.S. market. It is to raise shareholder rights and capital allocation standards at Korean listed companies to the level of leading global companies.

Berkshire Hathaway offers a sharp contrast to SK hynix.

Warren Buffett earned the long-term trust of shareholders not simply because he was a successful investor.

He consistently explained how the company used its capital, why it held cash, and what principles guided its investment decisions.

As a result, shareholders were not uncomfortable with Berkshire holding large amounts of cash.

They trusted management to use that capital in the interests of shareholders.

Good governance ultimately begins with a simple question:

Does management truly treat the company’s money as shareholders’ money?

The same question applies to Solidigm.

What matters is not whether a transaction benefits the SK Group as a whole, but whether it benefits SK hynix shareholders.

A transaction that makes sense from the perspective of the group does not necessarily make sense for SK hynix shareholders.

I do not see this merely as a question of gains or losses for SK hynix shareholders.

More broadly, I believe it is also a question of the future competitiveness of Korea’s capital market and, in the long run, even of monetary sovereignty.

The United States is rapidly strengthening the competitiveness of its financial markets.

From dollar stablecoins to tokenized securities, Treasuries, and funds, financial assets are increasingly moving toward a system in which they can be traded more easily over the internet and blockchain-based infrastructure.

The direction is clear: make it easier for people around the world to hold dollars and invest in dollar-denominated assets.

The barriers to investing in U.S. stocks and U.S. financial products are likely to become even lower in the future.

That means the Korean stock market must compete with the U.S. market for investors’ capital.

If U.S. companies separate businesses while preserving the rights of existing shareholders, while Korean companies repeatedly list successful subsidiaries without giving existing shareholders anything in return, the investor’s choice becomes obvious.

There will simply be less reason to own Korean stocks.

Ultimately, Korean equities are also investment products that investors choose among alternatives.

If another market offers stronger shareholder rights and allows investors to participate more fully in the value created by successful businesses, capital will naturally move in that direction.

When Korean investors sell domestic assets and buy U.S. stocks, they also have to sell won and buy dollars.

Of course, a Solidigm listing alone would not cause the exchange rate to surge.

But if cases like this continue to weaken the attractiveness of Korean equities and domestic capital keeps moving overseas, the situation becomes different.

As the competitiveness of Korea’s capital market weakens, structural demand for dollars to purchase overseas assets may continue to rise. Over the long term, a weaker domestic capital market could also affect demand for and confidence in the Korean won.

For now, the semiconductor supercycle is allowing companies such as Samsung Electronics and SK hynix to earn enormous amounts of foreign currency through exports.

But semiconductor conditions will not remain strong forever.

If the semiconductor cycle eventually turns down and dollar inflows from exports decline while Korean investors continue increasing their overseas investments, the won-dollar exchange rate could become significantly more unstable.

And a weaker won does not affect only the stock market.

South Korea imports a large portion of its energy and raw materials.

When the won weakens, import prices rise, and that eventually feeds into the cost of living.

That is why I do not view the Solidigm listing issue as simply a matter of gains and losses for SK hynix shareholders.

I see it as a question of whether Korea’s capital market can remain competitive with the United States and other developed markets, and ultimately whether Korea can build a market in which investors continue to want to hold won-denominated assets.

Korean companies may manufacture the world’s best semiconductors, automobiles, and batteries. But if existing shareholders cannot fully participate in the value created by those businesses, Korean equities will inevitably become less attractive as investments.

The competitiveness of a country’s capital market matters just as much as the industrial competitiveness of its companies.

If SK hynix shareholders shared the downside when Solidigm was struggling, they should also be the first to benefit when Solidigm succeeds.

If there is a genuine need to separate Solidigm, SK hynix should first consider a structure that preserves the economic rights of existing shareholders, as Western Digital did with SanDisk.

SK hynix does not belong solely to the SK Group.

It is one of South Korea’s flagship listed companies, jointly owned by countless shareholders who have invested their own capital.

A company of that stature should hold itself to a higher standard.

If SK hynix sets a good example, other companies may follow. But if even SK hynix opens the door to another double listing, it will give many other companies an easy excuse to do the same.

Chairman Chey Tae-won, Solidigm must never be separately listed.

This is not just about Solidigm.

It is about the rights of SK hynix shareholders, the attractiveness of the Korean stock market, the future competitiveness of Korea’s capital market, and, over the long run, even confidence in the Korean won.

[AlphaBet @Flex_AlphaBet]

최태원 회장님, 솔리다임 상장은 절대 일어나선 안 됩니다.
*추가로 다듬은 버전

[AlphaBet @Flex_AlphaBet]

최태원 회장님, 솔리다임 상장은 절대 일어나선 안 됩니다.
*추가로 다듬은 버전

현재 솔리다임 상장은 확정된 사안이 아닙니다. 하지만 실제 상장 절차에 들어간 뒤에는 이미 늦습니다. 그래서 지금 이야기해야 한다고 생각합니다.

먼저 솔리다임이 어떤 회사인지부터 봐야 합니다.

SK하이닉스는 2020년 인텔의 낸드·SSD 사업을 약 90억달러에 인수하기로 결정했습니다. 이후 2021년 1단계 인수를 마치면서 인텔의 SSD 사업을 넘겨받았고, 이 사업을 운영하기 위해 만든 미국 자회사가 바로 솔리다임입니다.

쉽게 말하면 솔리다임은 SK하이닉스가 인텔의 낸드 사업을 사오면서 함께 만들어낸 회사입니다.

SK하이닉스는 막대한 인수자금을 부담했고, 이후 낸드 업황 부진과 솔리다임의 적자도 감내했습니다. 그 과정의 부담은 결국 SK하이닉스와 그 주주들이 함께 짊어졌습니다.

그런데 이제 AI 데이터센터 투자 확대와 함께 기업용 SSD 시장이 커지고, 솔리다임이 본격적으로 돈을 벌기 시작하는 시점에 별도 상장을 한다면 주주 입장에서는 납득하기 어렵습니다.

적자일 때는 SK하이닉스가 책임지고, 좋아지기 시작하니 따로 떼어 상장한다면 기존 주주들은 무엇을 위해 그동안의 위험을 감수한 것입니까.

더구나 지금 SK하이닉스는 본업에서 막대한 영업현금흐름을 만들어내고 있습니다. 자금이 절박한 회사도 아닌데, 굳이 미래 성장성이 큰 자회사의 지분을 외부에 넘겨가며 상장 자금을 조달해야 하는지도 의문입니다.

정말 자금이 필요하다면 먼저 기존 현금흐름과 재무 여력으로 감당할 수 없는 이유부터 설명해야 합니다. 돈을 잘 벌고 있는 회사가 가장 좋은 자산 중 하나를 떼어 상장하는 것은 주주 입장에서 쉽게 받아들이기 어렵습니다.

특히 SK하이닉스는 대한민국을 대표하는 기업입니다. 이런 회사일수록 자본시장에서도 모범을 보여야 합니다.

SK하이닉스마저 잘되는 자회사를 따로 떼어 상장하는 선례를 만든다면 다른 기업들은 더 거리낌 없이 중복상장에 나설 수 있습니다. 그렇게 되면 한국 증시는 지금보다 더 엉망이 될 수 있습니다.

상장은 공짜로 돈을 조달하는 방법이 아닙니다.

회사의 일부를 새로운 투자자에게 파는 것입니다.

솔리다임이 SK하이닉스의 100% 자회사로 남아 있다면 앞으로 솔리다임이 벌어들이는 이익과 현금흐름은 결국 SK하이닉스 주주들의 몫입니다. 반대로 외부 투자자를 받고 별도로 상장하면 그만큼 미래의 이익을 새로운 주주들과 나눠 가져야 합니다.

여기에 더블리스팅에 따른 모회사 할인까지 생각해야 합니다.

솔리다임의 가치가 커지더라도 그 가치가 SK하이닉스 주가에 온전히 반영된다는 보장은 없습니다. 오히려 시장이 솔리다임을 별도의 상장회사로 평가하기 시작하면 SK하이닉스가 보유한 지분에는 할인율이 붙을 수 있습니다.

결국 기존 주주 입장에서는 솔리다임의 지분을 외부 투자자와 나눠 갖게 되는 데다, SK하이닉스에는 중복상장에 따른 할인까지 붙을 수 있는 것입니다.

물론 상장을 통해 들어온 자금으로 이런 할인과 지분 희석을 넘어서는 더 큰 성장을 만들어낼 수 있다면 이야기는 달라질 수 있습니다.

그렇다면 최소한 왜 솔리다임을 100% 보유하는 것보다 상장하는 것이 기존 SK하이닉스 주주에게 더 이익인지 설명해야 합니다.

상장으로 얼마를 조달하고, 지분을 얼마나 넘기며, 그 돈으로 어떤 수익을 만들어낼 것인지, 그리고 더블리스팅 할인까지 감안해도 기존 주주가 더 큰 이익을 얻을 수 있는지를 숫자로 보여줘야 합니다.

그 답을 보여주지 못한다면 굳이 상장해야 할 이유가 없습니다.

샌디스크 사례를 보면 차이가 더 분명합니다.

웨스턴디지털은 낸드 사업을 샌디스크로 분리하면서 샌디스크 주식을 기존 웨스턴디지털 주주들에게 나눠줬습니다.

사업은 분리했지만 기존 주주들의 권리는 그대로 따라갔습니다.

회사를 나누는 것 자체가 문제가 아니라 그 과정에서 기존 주주의 권리가 어떻게 처리되느냐가 중요한 것입니다.

솔리다임 역시 정말 분리가 필요하다면 샌디스크처럼 기존 SK하이닉스 주주들이 솔리다임의 가치를 직접 가져갈 수 있는 구조부터 고민해야 합니다.

기존 주주에게 아무런 권리도 주지 않은 채 외부 투자자를 받고 상장하는 것은 전혀 다른 문제입니다.

일각에서는 솔리다임을 미국에 상장하면 더 높은 가치를 받을 수 있다고 이야기합니다.

하지만 저는 이 논리가 더 위험하다고 봅니다.

한국 시장에서는 제대로 평가받지 못하니 좋은 사업은 미국 시장에 따로 상장시키겠다는 이야기와 크게 다르지 않기 때문입니다.

좋은 사업이 생길 때마다 자회사를 상장하고, 그때마다 모회사 주주들의 몫이 줄어든다면 투자자들이 처음부터 모회사 주식을 싸게 평가하는 것은 당연합니다.

좋은 자회사가 많을수록 모회사 가치가 올라가는 것이 아니라, 언젠가 그 자회사가 따로 상장될 수 있다는 우려 때문에 오히려 할인을 받는 구조가 되는 것입니다.

결국 해외 중복상장이 코리아 디스카운트를 해결하는 것이 아니라 오히려 코리아 디스카운트를 더 심화시키는 원인이 되는 것입니다.

코리아 디스카운트를 해결하는 방법은 좋은 자산을 미국으로 보내는 것이 아니라 한국 상장사의 주주권과 자본배분을 미국 기업 수준으로 끌어올리는 것이어야 합니다.

버크셔 해서웨이를 보면 SK하이닉스와는 정반대의 사례를 볼 수 있습니다.

버핏이 오랫동안 주주들에게 신뢰받은 이유는 단순히 투자를 잘했기 때문만은 아닙니다.

회사가 번 돈을 어디에 쓰는지, 왜 현금을 들고 있는지, 어떤 기준으로 투자하는지를 계속 설명했습니다.

결국 주주들은 회사가 돈을 가지고 있어도 불안해하지 않았습니다.

경영진이 그 돈을 주주의 이익을 위해 사용할 것이라는 믿음이 있었기 때문입니다.

좋은 거버넌스도 결국 여기서 시작한다고 생각합니다.

경영진이 회사의 돈을 정말 주주의 돈이라고 생각하고 있는가.

솔리다임 상장 역시 같은 문제입니다.

SK그룹 전체에 도움이 되는 거래인지가 아니라 SK하이닉스 주주에게 도움이 되는 거래인지가 중요합니다.

그룹 입장에서 좋은 거래라고 해서 반드시 SK하이닉스 주주에게 좋은 거래인 것은 아닙니다.

저는 이 문제를 단순히 SK하이닉스 주주의 손익 문제로만 보지 않습니다.

더 크게 보면 미래 한국 자본시장의 경쟁력, 나아가 장기적으로는 통화주권과도 연결되는 문제​라고 생각합니다.

미국은 지금 금융시장의 경쟁력을 빠르게 키우고 있습니다.

달러 스테이블코인부터 토큰화 증권, 국채와 펀드의 토큰화까지 금융자산을 인터넷과 블록체인 위에서 더 쉽게 거래할 수 있는 방향으로 가고 있습니다.

결국 전 세계 사람들이 더 쉽게 달러를 보유하고, 더 쉽게 달러 표시 자산에 투자할 수 있게 만드는 것입니다.

앞으로 미국 주식과 미국 금융상품에 투자하는 장벽은 지금보다 더 낮아질 가능성이 큽니다.

그렇다면 한국 증시도 미국 증시와 투자자의 자금을 놓고 경쟁해야 합니다.

미국에서는 회사를 분리하면서 기존 주주에게 신설회사 지분을 나눠주는데, 한국에서는 회사가 잘되면 자회사를 다시 상장하고 기존 주주는 아무것도 받지 못하는 일이 반복된다면 투자자의 선택은 뻔합니다.

굳이 한국 주식을 살 이유가 줄어듭니다.

결국 한국 주식도 투자자가 선택하는 하나의 투자상품입니다.

주주권이 더 강하고, 좋은 사업의 성과를 기존 주주가 더 온전히 가져갈 수 있는 시장이 있다면 자금은 그쪽으로 이동할 수밖에 없습니다.

사람들이 한국 주식을 팔고 미국 주식을 사려면 원화를 팔고 달러를 사야 합니다.

물론 솔리다임 하나를 상장한다고 환율이 폭등하는 것은 아닙니다.

하지만 이런 일이 반복되면서 한국 주식의 투자 매력도가 떨어지고 국내 자금이 계속 해외로 빠져나간다면 이야기는 달라집니다.

한국 자본시장의 경쟁력이 약해질수록 해외자산을 사기 위한 달러 수요는 구조적으로 늘어날 수 있습니다. 결국 자본시장의 경쟁력 약화가 장기적으로는 원화에 대한 수요와 신뢰에도 영향을 줄 수 있다는 이야기입니다.

지금은 반도체 슈퍼사이클 덕분에 삼성전자와 SK하이닉스가 해외에서 막대한 달러를 벌어오고 있습니다.

하지만 반도체 업황이 영원히 좋을 수는 없습니다.

언젠가 반도체 사이클이 꺾여 수출로 들어오는 달러가 줄어드는데 국내 투자자들의 해외투자는 계속 늘어난다면 환율은 지금보다 훨씬 불안정해질 수 있습니다.

환율이 오르면 그 영향은 주식시장에만 머무르지 않습니다.

한국은 에너지와 원자재를 해외에서 많이 수입합니다.

원화 가치가 떨어지면 수입물가가 오르고 결국 생활물가에도 영향을 줍니다.

그래서 저는 솔리다임 상장 문제를 단순히 SK하이닉스 주주의 손익 문제라고 생각하지 않습니다.

한국 자본시장이 미국을 비롯한 선진국 자본시장과 경쟁할 수 있느냐, 더 나아가 앞으로 원화 자산을 사람들이 계속 보유하고 싶어 하는 시장을 만들 수 있느냐의 문제라고 봅니다.

한국 기업이 세계 최고의 반도체를 만들고, 세계 최고의 자동차를 만들고, 세계 최고의 배터리를 만들어도 그 성과를 기존 주주가 제대로 가져갈 수 없다면 한국 주식의 투자 매력도는 떨어질 수밖에 없습니다.

기업의 산업 경쟁력만큼이나 중요한 것이 자본시장의 경쟁력입니다.

솔리다임이 어려울 때 위험을 함께 부담한 사람들이 SK하이닉스 주주들이었다면, 솔리다임이 잘됐을 때 그 과실도 먼저 기존 주주들에게 돌아가야 합니다.

정말 솔리다임을 분리해야 할 이유가 있다면 샌디스크처럼 기존 주주들의 경제적 권리를 보존하는 방법부터 고민해야 합니다.

SK하이닉스는 SK그룹만의 회사가 아닙니다.

수많은 주주들이 돈을 투자해 공동으로 소유하고 있는 대한민국 대표 상장사입니다.

그런 회사일수록 더 높은 기준을 보여줘야 합니다.

SK하이닉스가 모범을 보이면 다른 기업들도 따라갈 수 있습니다. 반대로 SK하이닉스마저 중복상장의 길을 열어버리면 다른 기업들에게도 너무 좋은 핑곗거리가 됩니다.

최태원 회장님, 솔리다임 상장은 절대 일어나선 안 됩니다.

이건 솔리다임 하나의 문제가 아닙니다.

SK하이닉스 주주의 권리와 한국 증시의 투자 매력도, 미래 한국 자본시장의 경쟁력, 그리고 장기적으로는 원화에 대한 신뢰까지 연결되는 문제입니다.

[AlphaBet @Flex_AlphaBet]

최태원 회장님, 솔리다임 상장은 절대 일어나선 안 됩니다
*추가로 다듬은 버전

현재 솔리다임 상장은 확정된 사안이 아닙니다. 하지만 실제 상장 절차에 들어간 뒤에는 이미 늦습니다. 그래서 지금 이야기해야 한다고 생각합니다.

먼저 솔리다임이 어떤 회사인지부터 봐야 합니다.

SK하이닉스는 2020년 인텔의 낸드·SSD 사업을 약 90억달러에 인수하기로 결정했습니다. 이후 2021년 1단계 인수를 마치면서 인텔의 SSD 사업을 넘겨받았고, 이 사업을 운영하기 위해 만든 미국 자회사가 바로 솔리다임입니다.

쉽게 말하면 솔리다임은 SK하이닉스가 인텔의 낸드 사업을 사오면서 함께 만들어낸 회사입니다.

SK하이닉스는 막대한 인수자금을 부담했고, 이후 낸드 업황 부진과 솔리다임의 적자도 감내했습니다. 그 과정의 부담은 결국 SK하이닉스와 그 주주들이 함께 짊어졌습니다.

그런데 이제 AI 데이터센터 투자 확대와 함께 기업용 SSD 시장이 커지고, 솔리다임이 본격적으로 돈을 벌기 시작하는 시점에 별도 상장을 한다면 주주 입장에서는 납득하기 어렵습니다.

적자일 때는 SK하이닉스가 책임지고, 좋아지기 시작하니 따로 떼어 상장한다면 기존 주주들은 무엇을 위해 그동안의 위험을 감수한 것입니까.

더구나 지금 SK하이닉스는 본업에서 막대한 영업현금흐름을 만들어내고 있습니다. 자금이 절박한 회사도 아닌데, 굳이 미래 성장성이 큰 자회사의 지분을 외부에 넘겨가며 상장 자금을 조달해야 하는지도 의문입니다.

정말 자금이 필요하다면 먼저 기존 현금흐름과 재무 여력으로 감당할 수 없는 이유부터 설명해야 합니다. 돈을 잘 벌고 있는 회사가 가장 좋은 자산 중 하나를 떼어 상장하는 것은 주주 입장에서 쉽게 받아들이기 어렵습니다.

특히 SK하이닉스는 대한민국을 대표하는 기업입니다. 이런 회사일수록 자본시장에서도 모범을 보여야 합니다.

SK하이닉스마저 잘되는 자회사를 따로 떼어 상장하는 선례를 만든다면 다른 기업들은 더 거리낌 없이 중복상장에 나설 수 있습니다. 그렇게 되면 한국 증시는 지금보다 더 엉망이 될 수 있습니다.

상장은 공짜로 돈을 조달하는 방법이 아닙니다.

회사의 일부를 새로운 투자자에게 파는 것입니다.

솔리다임이 SK하이닉스의 100% 자회사로 남아 있다면 앞으로 솔리다임이 벌어들이는 이익과 현금흐름은 결국 SK하이닉스 주주들의 몫입니다. 반대로 외부 투자자를 받고 별도로 상장하면 그만큼 미래의 이익을 새로운 주주들과 나눠 가져야 합니다.

여기에 더블리스팅에 따른 모회사 할인까지 생각해야 합니다.

솔리다임의 가치가 커지더라도 그 가치가 SK하이닉스 주가에 온전히 반영된다는 보장은 없습니다. 오히려 시장이 솔리다임을 별도의 상장회사로 평가하기 시작하면 SK하이닉스가 보유한 지분에는 할인율이 붙을 수 있습니다.

결국 기존 주주 입장에서는 솔리다임의 지분을 외부 투자자와 나눠 갖게 되는 데다, SK하이닉스에는 중복상장에 따른 할인까지 붙을 수 있는 것입니다.

물론 상장을 통해 들어온 자금으로 이런 할인과 지분 희석을 넘어서는 더 큰 성장을 만들어낼 수 있다면 이야기는 달라질 수 있습니다.

그렇다면 최소한 왜 솔리다임을 100% 보유하는 것보다 상장하는 것이 기존 SK하이닉스 주주에게 더 이익인지 설명해야 합니다.

상장으로 얼마를 조달하고, 지분을 얼마나 넘기며, 그 돈으로 어떤 수익을 만들어낼 것인지, 그리고 더블리스팅 할인까지 감안해도 기존 주주가 더 큰 이익을 얻을 수 있는지를 숫자로 보여줘야 합니다.

그 답을 보여주지 못한다면 굳이 상장해야 할 이유가 없습니다.

샌디스크 사례를 보면 차이가 더 분명합니다.

웨스턴디지털은 낸드 사업을 샌디스크로 분리하면서 샌디스크 주식을 기존 웨스턴디지털 주주들에게 나눠줬습니다.

사업은 분리했지만 기존 주주들의 권리는 그대로 따라갔습니다.

회사를 나누는 것 자체가 문제가 아니라 그 과정에서 기존 주주의 권리가 어떻게 처리되느냐가 중요한 것입니다.

솔리다임 역시 정말 분리가 필요하다면 샌디스크처럼 기존 SK하이닉스 주주들이 솔리다임의 가치를 직접 가져갈 수 있는 구조부터 고민해야 합니다.

기존 주주에게 아무런 권리도 주지 않은 채 외부 투자자를 받고 상장하는 것은 전혀 다른 문제입니다.

일각에서는 솔리다임을 미국에 상장하면 더 높은 가치를 받을 수 있다고 이야기합니다.

하지만 저는 이 논리가 더 위험하다고 봅니다.

한국 시장에서는 제대로 평가받지 못하니 좋은 사업은 미국 시장에 따로 상장시키겠다는 이야기와 크게 다르지 않기 때문입니다.

좋은 사업이 생길 때마다 자회사를 상장하고, 그때마다 모회사 주주들의 몫이 줄어든다면 투자자들이 처음부터 모회사 주식을 싸게 평가하는 것은 당연합니다.

좋은 자회사가 많을수록 모회사 가치가 올라가는 것이 아니라, 언젠가 그 자회사가 따로 상장될 수 있다는 우려 때문에 오히려 할인을 받는 구조가 되는 것입니다.

결국 해외 중복상장이 코리아 디스카운트를 해결하는 것이 아니라 오히려 코리아 디스카운트를 더 심화시키는 원인이 되는 것입니다.

코리아 디스카운트를 해결하는 방법은 좋은 자산을 미국으로 보내는 것이 아니라 한국 상장사의 주주권과 자본배분을 미국 기업 수준으로 끌어올리는 것이어야 합니다.

버크셔 해서웨이를 보면 SK하이닉스와는 정반대의 사례를 볼 수 있습니다.

버핏이 오랫동안 주주들에게 신뢰받은 이유는 단순히 투자를 잘했기 때문만은 아닙니다.

회사가 번 돈을 어디에 쓰는지, 왜 현금을 들고 있는지, 어떤 기준으로 투자하는지를 계속 설명했습니다.

결국 주주들은 회사가 돈을 가지고 있어도 불안해하지 않았습니다.

경영진이 그 돈을 주주의 이익을 위해 사용할 것이라는 믿음이 있었기 때문입니다.

좋은 거버넌스도 결국 여기서 시작한다고 생각합니다.

경영진이 회사의 돈을 정말 주주의 돈이라고 생각하고 있는가.

솔리다임 상장 역시 같은 문제입니다.

SK그룹 전체에 도움이 되는 거래인지가 아니라 SK하이닉스 주주에게 도움이 되는 거래인지가 중요합니다.

그룹 입장에서 좋은 거래라고 해서 반드시 SK하이닉스 주주에게 좋은 거래인 것은 아닙니다.

저는 이 문제를 단순히 SK하이닉스 주주의 손익 문제로만 보지 않습니다.

더 크게 보면 미래 한국 자본시장의 경쟁력, 나아가 장기적으로는 통화주권과도 연결되는 문제라고 생각합니다.

미국은 지금 금융시장의 경쟁력을 빠르게 키우고 있습니다.

달러 스테이블코인부터 토큰화 증권, 국채와 펀드의 토큰화까지 금융자산을 인터넷과 블록체인 위에서 더 쉽게 거래할 수 있는 방향으로 가고 있습니다.

결국 전 세계 사람들이 더 쉽게 달러를 보유하고, 더 쉽게 달러 표시 자산에 투자할 수 있게 만드는 것입니다.

앞으로 미국 주식과 미국 금융상품에 투자하는 장벽은 지금보다 더 낮아질 가능성이 큽니다.

그렇다면 한국 증시도 미국 증시와 투자자의 자금을 놓고 경쟁해야 합니다.

미국에서는 회사를 분리하면서 기존 주주에게 신설회사 지분을 나눠주는데, 한국에서는 회사가 잘되면 자회사를 다시 상장하고 기존 주주는 아무것도 받지 못하는 일이 반복된다면 투자자의 선택은 뻔합니다.

굳이 한국 주식을 살 이유가 줄어듭니다.

결국 한국 주식도 투자자가 선택하는 하나의 투자상품입니다.

주주권이 더 강하고, 좋은 사업의 성과를 기존 주주가 더 온전히 가져갈 수 있는 시장이 있다면 자금은 그쪽으로 이동할 수밖에 없습니다.

사람들이 한국 주식을 팔고 미국 주식을 사려면 원화를 팔고 달러를 사야 합니다.

물론 솔리다임 하나를 상장한다고 환율이 폭등하는 것은 아닙니다.

하지만 이런 일이 반복되면서 한국 주식의 투자 매력도가 떨어지고 국내 자금이 계속 해외로 빠져나간다면 이야기는 달라집니다.

한국 자본시장의 경쟁력이 약해질수록 해외자산을 사기 위한 달러 수요는 구조적으로 늘어날 수 있습니다. 결국 자본시장의 경쟁력 약화가 장기적으로는 원화에 대한 수요와 신뢰에도 영향을 줄 수 있다는 이야기입니다.

지금은 반도체 슈퍼사이클 덕분에 삼성전자와 SK하이닉스가 해외에서 막대한 달러를 벌어오고 있습니다.

하지만 반도체 업황이 영원히 좋을 수는 없습니다.

언젠가 반도체 사이클이 꺾여 수출로 들어오는 달러가 줄어드는데 국내 투자자들의 해외투자는 계속 늘어난다면 환율은 지금보다 훨씬 불안정해질 수 있습니다.

환율이 오르면 그 영향은 주식시장에만 머무르지 않습니다.

한국은 에너지와 원자재를 해외에서 많이 수입합니다.

원화 가치가 떨어지면 수입물가가 오르고 결국 생활물가에도 영향을 줍니다.

그래서 저는 솔리다임 상장 문제를 단순히 SK하이닉스 주주의 손익 문제라고 생각하지 않습니다.

한국 자본시장이 미국을 비롯한 선진국 자본시장과 경쟁할 수 있느냐, 더 나아가 앞으로 원화 자산을 사람들이 계속 보유하고 싶어 하는 시장을 만들 수 있느냐의 문제라고 봅니다.

한국 기업이 세계 최고의 반도체를 만들고, 세계 최고의 자동차를 만들고, 세계 최고의 배터리를 만들어도 그 성과를 기존 주주가 제대로 가져갈 수 없다면 한국 주식의 투자 매력도는 떨어질 수밖에 없습니다.

기업의 산업 경쟁력만큼이나 중요한 것이 자본시장의 경쟁력입니다.

솔리다임이 어려울 때 위험을 함께 부담한 사람들이 SK하이닉스 주주들이었다면, 솔리다임이 잘됐을 때 그 과실도 먼저 기존 주주들에게 돌아가야 합니다.

정말 솔리다임을 분리해야 할 이유가 있다면 샌디스크처럼 기존 주주들의 경제적 권리를 보존하는 방법부터 고민해야 합니다.

SK하이닉스는 SK그룹만의 회사가 아닙니다.

수많은 주주들이 돈을 투자해 공동으로 소유하고 있는 대한민국 대표 상장사입니다.

그런 회사일수록 더 높은 기준을 보여줘야 합니다.

SK하이닉스가 모범을 보이면 다른 기업들도 따라갈 수 있습니다. 반대로 SK하이닉스마저 중복상장의 길을 열어버리면 다른 기업들에게도 너무 좋은 핑곗거리가 됩니다.

최태원 회장님, 솔리다임 상장은 절대 일어나선 안 됩니다.

이건 솔리다임 하나의 문제가 아닙니다.

SK하이닉스 주주의 권리와 한국 증시의 투자 매력도, 미래 한국 자본시장의 경쟁력, 그리고 장기적으로는 원화에 대한 신뢰까지 연결되는 문제입니다.

[AlphaBet @Flex_AlphaBet]

Chairman Chey Tae-won, Solidigm must never be listed separately.
*Further Refined Version

Solidigm’s listing has not been finalized. But once the listing process actually begins, it may already be too late. That is why I believe this issue needs to be raised now.

First, we need to look at what Solidigm actually is.

In 2020, SK hynix decided to acquire Intel’s NAND and SSD business for approximately $9 billion. After completing the first phase of the acquisition in 2021, SK hynix took over Intel’s SSD business and established Solidigm in the United States to operate it.

Put simply, Solidigm is a company that was created as part of SK hynix’s acquisition of Intel’s NAND business.

SK hynix paid a massive acquisition price and then absorbed the losses that came with the NAND downturn and Solidigm’s weak performance. That burden was ultimately borne by SK hynix and its shareholders.

Now, however, AI data center investment is expanding, the enterprise SSD market is growing, and Solidigm is beginning to generate meaningful profits. If SK hynix were to list Solidigm separately at precisely this point, it would be difficult for existing shareholders to accept.

If SK hynix carried the burden when Solidigm was losing money, but then carves it out and lists it separately just as the business begins to improve, what exactly were existing shareholders taking that risk for?

Moreover, SK hynix is currently generating enormous operating cash flow from its core business. It is not a company in desperate need of capital, so it is difficult to understand why it would need to sell part of a high-growth subsidiary to outside investors simply to raise funds through a listing.

If additional capital is truly necessary, management should first explain why that need cannot be met through existing cash flow and financial capacity. For a highly profitable company to carve out and list one of its most valuable assets is difficult for shareholders to accept.

SK hynix is also one of South Korea’s flagship companies. A company of this stature should set an example in the capital market as well.

If even SK hynix establishes a precedent of separately listing a successful subsidiary, other Korean companies may feel even less hesitation about pursuing similar duplicate listings. The Korean stock market could end up in an even worse state than it is today.

An IPO is not free financing.

It means selling part of a company to new investors.

If Solidigm remains a wholly owned subsidiary of SK hynix, the profits and cash flows it generates in the future will ultimately belong to SK hynix shareholders. On the other hand, if outside investors are brought in and Solidigm is separately listed, those future profits will have to be shared with new shareholders.

On top of that, we also need to consider the parent-company discount that can come with a double listing.

Even if Solidigm’s value rises, there is no guarantee that the full value will be reflected in SK hynix’s share price. In fact, once the market begins valuing Solidigm as a separately listed company, a discount may be applied to the value of SK hynix’s stake in it.

That means existing SK hynix shareholders could face both dilution of their economic interest in Solidigm and an additional valuation discount at the parent-company level.

Of course, the situation could be different if the capital raised through the listing can create enough additional growth to more than offset both the dilution and the valuation discount.

If so, SK hynix should at least explain why listing Solidigm would be more beneficial to existing shareholders than continuing to own 100% of the company.

Management should show, with numbers, how much capital would be raised, how much equity would be sold, what returns that capital is expected to generate, and whether existing shareholders would still come out ahead even after taking the double-listing discount into account.

If that cannot be demonstrated, there is little reason to pursue the listing.

The contrast becomes even clearer when we look at SanDisk.

When Western Digital separated its NAND business into SanDisk, it distributed SanDisk shares to existing Western Digital shareholders.

The business was separated, but the economic rights of existing shareholders followed with it.

The issue is not the separation of a business itself. The issue is how the rights of existing shareholders are treated in the process.

If separating Solidigm is truly necessary, SK hynix should first consider a structure similar to SanDisk, one that allows existing SK hynix shareholders to directly retain the economic value of Solidigm.

Listing Solidigm after bringing in outside investors, while giving existing shareholders no direct rights to the company, would be a completely different matter.

Some argue that Solidigm could receive a much higher valuation if it were listed in the United States.

But I believe that argument is even more dangerous.

It is not very different from saying that because a good business cannot receive a proper valuation in Korea, it should simply be carved out and listed in the United States instead.

If every successful business is separately listed and the economic interests of parent-company shareholders are reduced each time, investors will naturally apply a discount to the parent company from the beginning.

In other words, having strong subsidiaries would no longer necessarily increase the value of the parent company. Instead, investors could apply an additional discount out of concern that those subsidiaries may eventually be carved out and listed separately.

Ultimately, overseas double listings do not solve the Korea Discount. They can actually make the Korea Discount even worse.

The way to address the Korea Discount is not to send attractive assets to the U.S. market. It is to raise shareholder rights and capital allocation standards at Korean listed companies to the level of leading global companies.

Berkshire Hathaway offers a sharp contrast to SK hynix.

Warren Buffett earned the long-term trust of shareholders not simply because he was a successful investor.

He consistently explained how the company used its capital, why it held cash, and what principles guided its investment decisions.

As a result, shareholders were not uncomfortable with Berkshire holding large amounts of cash.

They trusted management to use that capital in the interests of shareholders.

Good governance ultimately begins with a simple question:

Does management truly treat the company’s money as shareholders’ money?

The same question applies to Solidigm.

What matters is not whether a transaction benefits the SK Group as a whole, but whether it benefits SK hynix shareholders.

A transaction that makes sense from the perspective of the group does not necessarily make sense for SK hynix shareholders.

I do not see this merely as a question of gains or losses for SK hynix shareholders.

More broadly, I believe it is also a question of the future competitiveness of Korea’s capital market and, in the long run, even of monetary sovereignty.

The United States is rapidly strengthening the competitiveness of its financial markets.

From dollar stablecoins to tokenized securities, Treasuries, and funds, financial assets are increasingly moving toward a system in which they can be traded more easily over the internet and blockchain-based infrastructure.

The direction is clear: make it easier for people around the world to hold dollars and invest in dollar-denominated assets.

The barriers to investing in U.S. stocks and U.S. financial products are likely to become even lower in the future.

That means the Korean stock market must compete with the U.S. market for investors’ capital.

If U.S. companies separate businesses while preserving the rights of existing shareholders, while Korean companies repeatedly list successful subsidiaries without giving existing shareholders anything in return, the investor’s choice becomes obvious.

There will simply be less reason to own Korean stocks.

Ultimately, Korean equities are also investment products that investors choose among alternatives.

If another market offers stronger shareholder rights and allows investors to participate more fully in the value created by successful businesses, capital will naturally move in that direction.

When Korean investors sell domestic assets and buy U.S. stocks, they also have to sell won and buy dollars.

Of course, a Solidigm listing alone would not cause the exchange rate to surge.

But if cases like this continue to weaken the attractiveness of Korean equities and domestic capital keeps moving overseas, the situation becomes different.

As the competitiveness of Korea’s capital market weakens, structural demand for dollars to purchase overseas assets may continue to rise. Over the long term, a weaker domestic capital market could also affect demand for and confidence in the Korean won.

For now, the semiconductor supercycle is allowing companies such as Samsung Electronics and SK hynix to earn enormous amounts of foreign currency through exports.

But semiconductor conditions will not remain strong forever.

If the semiconductor cycle eventually turns down and dollar inflows from exports decline while Korean investors continue increasing their overseas investments, the won-dollar exchange rate could become significantly more unstable.

And a weaker won does not affect only the stock market.

South Korea imports a large portion of its energy and raw materials.

When the won weakens, import prices rise, and that eventually feeds into the cost of living.

That is why I do not view the Solidigm listing issue as simply a matter of gains and losses for SK hynix shareholders.

I see it as a question of whether Korea’s capital market can remain competitive with the United States and other developed markets, and ultimately whether Korea can build a market in which investors continue to want to hold won-denominated assets.

Korean companies may manufacture the world’s best semiconductors, automobiles, and batteries. But if existing shareholders cannot fully participate in the value created by those businesses, Korean equities will inevitably become less attractive as investments.

The competitiveness of a country’s capital market matters just as much as the industrial competitiveness of its companies.

If SK hynix shareholders shared the downside when Solidigm was struggling, they should also be the first to benefit when Solidigm succeeds.

If there is a genuine need to separate Solidigm, SK hynix should first consider a structure that preserves the economic rights of existing shareholders, as Western Digital did with SanDisk.

SK hynix does not belong solely to the SK Group.

It is one of South Korea’s flagship listed companies, jointly owned by countless shareholders who have invested their own capital.

A company of that stature should hold itself to a higher standard.

If SK hynix sets a good example, other companies may follow. But if even SK hynix opens the door to another double listing, it will give many other companies an easy excuse to do the same.

Chairman Chey Tae-won, Solidigm must never be separately listed.

This is not just about Solidigm.

It is about the rights of SK hynix shareholders, the attractiveness of the Korean stock market, the future competitiveness of Korea’s capital market, and, over the long run, even confidence in the Korean won.

[AlphaBet @Flex_AlphaBet]

Chairman Chey Tae-won, Solidigm must never be listed separately.
*Further Refined Version

Solidigm’s listing has not been finalized. But once the listing process actually begins, it may already be too late. That is why I believe this issue needs to be raised now.

First, we need to look at what Solidigm actually is.

In 2020, SK hynix decided to acquire Intel’s NAND and SSD business for approximately $9 billion. After completing the first phase of the acquisition in 2021, SK hynix took over Intel’s SSD business and established Solidigm in the United States to operate it.

Put simply, Solidigm is a company that was created as part of SK hynix’s acquisition of Intel’s NAND business.

SK hynix paid a massive acquisition price and then absorbed the losses that came with the NAND downturn and Solidigm’s weak performance. That burden was ultimately borne by SK hynix and its shareholders.

Now, however, AI data center investment is expanding, the enterprise SSD market is growing, and Solidigm is beginning to generate meaningful profits. If SK hynix were to list Solidigm separately at precisely this point, it would be difficult for existing shareholders to accept.

If SK hynix carried the burden when Solidigm was losing money, but then carves it out and lists it separately just as the business begins to improve, what exactly were existing shareholders taking that risk for?

Moreover, SK hynix is currently generating enormous operating cash flow from its core business. It is not a company in desperate need of capital, so it is difficult to understand why it would need to sell part of a high-growth subsidiary to outside investors simply to raise funds through a listing.

If additional capital is truly necessary, management should first explain why that need cannot be met through existing cash flow and financial capacity. For a highly profitable company to carve out and list one of its most valuable assets is difficult for shareholders to accept.

SK hynix is also one of South Korea’s flagship companies. A company of this stature should set an example in the capital market as well.

If even SK hynix establishes a precedent of separately listing a successful subsidiary, other Korean companies may feel even less hesitation about pursuing similar duplicate listings. The Korean stock market could end up in an even worse state than it is today.

An IPO is not free financing.

It means selling part of a company to new investors.

If Solidigm remains a wholly owned subsidiary of SK hynix, the profits and cash flows it generates in the future will ultimately belong to SK hynix shareholders. On the other hand, if outside investors are brought in and Solidigm is separately listed, those future profits will have to be shared with new shareholders.

On top of that, we also need to consider the parent-company discount that can come with a double listing.

Even if Solidigm’s value rises, there is no guarantee that the full value will be reflected in SK hynix’s share price. In fact, once the market begins valuing Solidigm as a separately listed company, a discount may be applied to the value of SK hynix’s stake in it.

That means existing SK hynix shareholders could face both dilution of their economic interest in Solidigm and an additional valuation discount at the parent-company level.

Of course, the situation could be different if the capital raised through the listing can create enough additional growth to more than offset both the dilution and the valuation discount.

If so, SK hynix should at least explain why listing Solidigm would be more beneficial to existing shareholders than continuing to own 100% of the company.

Management should show, with numbers, how much capital would be raised, how much equity would be sold, what returns that capital is expected to generate, and whether existing shareholders would still come out ahead even after taking the double-listing discount into account.

If that cannot be demonstrated, there is little reason to pursue the listing.

The contrast becomes even clearer when we look at SanDisk.

When Western Digital separated its NAND business into SanDisk, it distributed SanDisk shares to existing Western Digital shareholders.

The business was separated, but the economic rights of existing shareholders followed with it.

The issue is not the separation of a business itself. The issue is how the rights of existing shareholders are treated in the process.

If separating Solidigm is truly necessary, SK hynix should first consider a structure similar to SanDisk, one that allows existing SK hynix shareholders to directly retain the economic value of Solidigm.

Listing Solidigm after bringing in outside investors, while giving existing shareholders no direct rights to the company, would be a completely different matter.

Some argue that Solidigm could receive a much higher valuation if it were listed in the United States.

But I believe that argument is even more dangerous.

It is not very different from saying that because a good business cannot receive a proper valuation in Korea, it should simply be carved out and listed in the United States instead.

If every successful business is separately listed and the economic interests of parent-company shareholders are reduced each time, investors will naturally apply a discount to the parent company from the beginning.

In other words, having strong subsidiaries would no longer necessarily increase the value of the parent company. Instead, investors could apply an additional discount out of concern that those subsidiaries may eventually be carved out and listed separately.

Ultimately, overseas double listings do not solve the Korea Discount. They can actually make the Korea Discount even worse.

The way to address the Korea Discount is not to send attractive assets to the U.S. market. It is to raise shareholder rights and capital allocation standards at Korean listed companies to the level of leading global companies.

Berkshire Hathaway offers a sharp contrast to SK hynix.

Warren Buffett earned the long-term trust of shareholders not simply because he was a successful investor.

He consistently explained how the company used its capital, why it held cash, and what principles guided its investment decisions.

As a result, shareholders were not uncomfortable with Berkshire holding large amounts of cash.

They trusted management to use that capital in the interests of shareholders.

Good governance ultimately begins with a simple question:

Does management truly treat the company’s money as shareholders’ money?

The same question applies to Solidigm.

What matters is not whether a transaction benefits the SK Group as a whole, but whether it benefits SK hynix shareholders.

A transaction that makes sense from the perspective of the group does not necessarily make sense for SK hynix shareholders.

I do not see this merely as a question of gains or losses for SK hynix shareholders.

More broadly, I believe it is also a question of the future competitiveness of Korea’s capital market and, in the long run, even of monetary sovereignty.

The United States is rapidly strengthening the competitiveness of its financial markets.

From dollar stablecoins to tokenized securities, Treasuries, and funds, financial assets are increasingly moving toward a system in which they can be traded more easily over the internet and blockchain-based infrastructure.

The direction is clear: make it easier for people around the world to hold dollars and invest in dollar-denominated assets.

The barriers to investing in U.S. stocks and U.S. financial products are likely to become even lower in the future.

That means the Korean stock market must compete with the U.S. market for investors’ capital.

If U.S. companies separate businesses while preserving the rights of existing shareholders, while Korean companies repeatedly list successful subsidiaries without giving existing shareholders anything in return, the investor’s choice becomes obvious.

There will simply be less reason to own Korean stocks.

Ultimately, Korean equities are also investment products that investors choose among alternatives.

If another market offers stronger shareholder rights and allows investors to participate more fully in the value created by successful businesses, capital will naturally move in that direction.

When Korean investors sell domestic assets and buy U.S. stocks, they also have to sell won and buy dollars.

Of course, a Solidigm listing alone would not cause the exchange rate to surge.

But if cases like this continue to weaken the attractiveness of Korean equities and domestic capital keeps moving overseas, the situation becomes different.

As the competitiveness of Korea’s capital market weakens, structural demand for dollars to purchase overseas assets may continue to rise. Over the long term, a weaker domestic capital market could also affect demand for and confidence in the Korean won.

For now, the semiconductor supercycle is allowing companies such as Samsung Electronics and SK hynix to earn enormous amounts of foreign currency through exports.

But semiconductor conditions will not remain strong forever.

If the semiconductor cycle eventually turns down and dollar inflows from exports decline while Korean investors continue increasing their overseas investments, the won-dollar exchange rate could become significantly more unstable.

And a weaker won does not affect only the stock market.

South Korea imports a large portion of its energy and raw materials.

When the won weakens, import prices rise, and that eventually feeds into the cost of living.

That is why I do not view the Solidigm listing issue as simply a matter of gains and losses for SK hynix shareholders.

I see it as a question of whether Korea’s capital market can remain competitive with the United States and other developed markets, and ultimately whether Korea can build a market in which investors continue to want to hold won-denominated assets.

Korean companies may manufacture the world’s best semiconductors, automobiles, and batteries. But if existing shareholders cannot fully participate in the value created by those businesses, Korean equities will inevitably become less attractive as investments.

The competitiveness of a country’s capital market matters just as much as the industrial competitiveness of its companies.

If SK hynix shareholders shared the downside when Solidigm was struggling, they should also be the first to benefit when Solidigm succeeds.

If there is a genuine need to separate Solidigm, SK hynix should first consider a structure that preserves the economic rights of existing shareholders, as Western Digital did with SanDisk.

SK hynix does not belong solely to the SK Group.

It is one of South Korea’s flagship listed companies, jointly owned by countless shareholders who have invested their own capital.

A company of that stature should hold itself to a higher standard.

If SK hynix sets a good example, other companies may follow. But if even SK hynix opens the door to another double listing, it will give many other companies an easy excuse to do the same.

Chairman Chey Tae-won, Solidigm must never be separately listed.

This is not just about Solidigm.

It is about the rights of SK hynix shareholders, the attractiveness of the Korean stock market, the future competitiveness of Korea’s capital market, and, over the long run, even confidence in the Korean won.

[AlphaBet @Flex_AlphaBet]

최태원 회장님, 솔리다임 상장은 절대 일어나선 안 됩니다.
*추가로 다듬은 버전

현재 솔리다임 상장은 확정된 사안이 아닙니다. 하지만 실제 상장 절차에 들어간 뒤에는 이미 늦습니다. 그래서 지금 이야기해야 한다고 생각합니다.

먼저 솔리다임이 어떤 회사인지부터 봐야 합니다.

SK하이닉스는 2020년 인텔의 낸드·SSD 사업을 약 90억달러에 인수하기로 결정했습니다. 이후 2021년 1단계 인수를 마치면서 인텔의 SSD 사업을 넘겨받았고, 이 사업을 운영하기 위해 만든 미국 자회사가 바로 솔리다임입니다.

쉽게 말하면 솔리다임은 SK하이닉스가 인텔의 낸드 사업을 사오면서 함께 만들어낸 회사입니다.

SK하이닉스는 막대한 인수자금을 부담했고, 이후 낸드 업황 부진과 솔리다임의 적자도 감내했습니다. 그 과정의 부담은 결국 SK하이닉스와 그 주주들이 함께 짊어졌습니다.

그런데 이제 AI 데이터센터 투자 확대와 함께 기업용 SSD 시장이 커지고, 솔리다임이 본격적으로 돈을 벌기 시작하는 시점에 별도 상장을 한다면 주주 입장에서는 납득하기 어렵습니다.

적자일 때는 SK하이닉스가 책임지고, 좋아지기 시작하니 따로 떼어 상장한다면 기존 주주들은 무엇을 위해 그동안의 위험을 감수한 것입니까.

더구나 지금 SK하이닉스는 본업에서 막대한 영업현금흐름을 만들어내고 있습니다. 자금이 절박한 회사도 아닌데, 굳이 미래 성장성이 큰 자회사의 지분을 외부에 넘겨가며 상장 자금을 조달해야 하는지도 의문입니다.

정말 자금이 필요하다면 먼저 기존 현금흐름과 재무 여력으로 감당할 수 없는 이유부터 설명해야 합니다. 돈을 잘 벌고 있는 회사가 가장 좋은 자산 중 하나를 떼어 상장하는 것은 주주 입장에서 쉽게 받아들이기 어렵습니다.

특히 SK하이닉스는 대한민국을 대표하는 기업입니다. 이런 회사일수록 자본시장에서도 모범을 보여야 합니다.

SK하이닉스마저 잘되는 자회사를 따로 떼어 상장하는 선례를 만든다면 다른 기업들은 더 거리낌 없이 중복상장에 나설 수 있습니다. 그렇게 되면 한국 증시는 지금보다 더 엉망이 될 수 있습니다.

상장은 공짜로 돈을 조달하는 방법이 아닙니다.

회사의 일부를 새로운 투자자에게 파는 것입니다.

솔리다임이 SK하이닉스의 100% 자회사로 남아 있다면 앞으로 솔리다임이 벌어들이는 이익과 현금흐름은 결국 SK하이닉스 주주들의 몫입니다. 반대로 외부 투자자를 받고 별도로 상장하면 그만큼 미래의 이익을 새로운 주주들과 나눠 가져야 합니다.

여기에 더블리스팅에 따른 모회사 할인까지 생각해야 합니다.

솔리다임의 가치가 커지더라도 그 가치가 SK하이닉스 주가에 온전히 반영된다는 보장은 없습니다. 오히려 시장이 솔리다임을 별도의 상장회사로 평가하기 시작하면 SK하이닉스가 보유한 지분에는 할인율이 붙을 수 있습니다.

결국 기존 주주 입장에서는 솔리다임의 지분을 외부 투자자와 나눠 갖게 되는 데다, SK하이닉스에는 중복상장에 따른 할인까지 붙을 수 있는 것입니다.

물론 상장을 통해 들어온 자금으로 이런 할인과 지분 희석을 넘어서는 더 큰 성장을 만들어낼 수 있다면 이야기는 달라질 수 있습니다.

그렇다면 최소한 왜 솔리다임을 100% 보유하는 것보다 상장하는 것이 기존 SK하이닉스 주주에게 더 이익인지 설명해야 합니다.

상장으로 얼마를 조달하고, 지분을 얼마나 넘기며, 그 돈으로 어떤 수익을 만들어낼 것인지, 그리고 더블리스팅 할인까지 감안해도 기존 주주가 더 큰 이익을 얻을 수 있는지를 숫자로 보여줘야 합니다.

그 답을 보여주지 못한다면 굳이 상장해야 할 이유가 없습니다.

샌디스크 사례를 보면 차이가 더 분명합니다.

웨스턴디지털은 낸드 사업을 샌디스크로 분리하면서 샌디스크 주식을 기존 웨스턴디지털 주주들에게 나눠줬습니다.

사업은 분리했지만 기존 주주들의 권리는 그대로 따라갔습니다.

회사를 나누는 것 자체가 문제가 아니라 그 과정에서 기존 주주의 권리가 어떻게 처리되느냐가 중요한 것입니다.

솔리다임 역시 정말 분리가 필요하다면 샌디스크처럼 기존 SK하이닉스 주주들이 솔리다임의 가치를 직접 가져갈 수 있는 구조부터 고민해야 합니다.

기존 주주에게 아무런 권리도 주지 않은 채 외부 투자자를 받고 상장하는 것은 전혀 다른 문제입니다.

일각에서는 솔리다임을 미국에 상장하면 더 높은 가치를 받을 수 있다고 이야기합니다.

하지만 저는 이 논리가 더 위험하다고 봅니다.

한국 시장에서는 제대로 평가받지 못하니 좋은 사업은 미국 시장에 따로 상장시키겠다는 이야기와 크게 다르지 않기 때문입니다.

좋은 사업이 생길 때마다 자회사를 상장하고, 그때마다 모회사 주주들의 몫이 줄어든다면 투자자들이 처음부터 모회사 주식을 싸게 평가하는 것은 당연합니다.

좋은 자회사가 많을수록 모회사 가치가 올라가는 것이 아니라, 언젠가 그 자회사가 따로 상장될 수 있다는 우려 때문에 오히려 할인을 받는 구조가 되는 것입니다.

결국 해외 중복상장이 코리아 디스카운트를 해결하는 것이 아니라 오히려 코리아 디스카운트를 더 심화시키는 원인이 되는 것입니다.

코리아 디스카운트를 해결하는 방법은 좋은 자산을 미국으로 보내는 것이 아니라 한국 상장사의 주주권과 자본배분을 미국 기업 수준으로 끌어올리는 것이어야 합니다.

버크셔 해서웨이를 보면 SK하이닉스와는 정반대의 사례를 볼 수 있습니다.

버핏이 오랫동안 주주들에게 신뢰받은 이유는 단순히 투자를 잘했기 때문만은 아닙니다.

회사가 번 돈을 어디에 쓰는지, 왜 현금을 들고 있는지, 어떤 기준으로 투자하는지를 계속 설명했습니다.

결국 주주들은 회사가 돈을 가지고 있어도 불안해하지 않았습니다.

경영진이 그 돈을 주주의 이익을 위해 사용할 것이라는 믿음이 있었기 때문입니다.

좋은 거버넌스도 결국 여기서 시작한다고 생각합니다.

경영진이 회사의 돈을 정말 주주의 돈이라고 생각하고 있는가.

솔리다임 상장 역시 같은 문제입니다.

SK그룹 전체에 도움이 되는 거래인지가 아니라 SK하이닉스 주주에게 도움이 되는 거래인지가 중요합니다.

그룹 입장에서 좋은 거래라고 해서 반드시 SK하이닉스 주주에게 좋은 거래인 것은 아닙니다.

저는 이 문제를 단순히 SK하이닉스 주주의 손익 문제로만 보지 않습니다.

더 크게 보면 미래 한국 자본시장의 경쟁력, 나아가 장기적으로는 통화주권과도 연결되는 문제​라고 생각합니다.

미국은 지금 금융시장의 경쟁력을 빠르게 키우고 있습니다.

달러 스테이블코인부터 토큰화 증권, 국채와 펀드의 토큰화까지 금융자산을 인터넷과 블록체인 위에서 더 쉽게 거래할 수 있는 방향으로 가고 있습니다.

결국 전 세계 사람들이 더 쉽게 달러를 보유하고, 더 쉽게 달러 표시 자산에 투자할 수 있게 만드는 것입니다.

앞으로 미국 주식과 미국 금융상품에 투자하는 장벽은 지금보다 더 낮아질 가능성이 큽니다.

그렇다면 한국 증시도 미국 증시와 투자자의 자금을 놓고 경쟁해야 합니다.

미국에서는 회사를 분리하면서 기존 주주에게 신설회사 지분을 나눠주는데, 한국에서는 회사가 잘되면 자회사를 다시 상장하고 기존 주주는 아무것도 받지 못하는 일이 반복된다면 투자자의 선택은 뻔합니다.

굳이 한국 주식을 살 이유가 줄어듭니다.

결국 한국 주식도 투자자가 선택하는 하나의 투자상품입니다.

주주권이 더 강하고, 좋은 사업의 성과를 기존 주주가 더 온전히 가져갈 수 있는 시장이 있다면 자금은 그쪽으로 이동할 수밖에 없습니다.

사람들이 한국 주식을 팔고 미국 주식을 사려면 원화를 팔고 달러를 사야 합니다.

물론 솔리다임 하나를 상장한다고 환율이 폭등하는 것은 아닙니다.

하지만 이런 일이 반복되면서 한국 주식의 투자 매력도가 떨어지고 국내 자금이 계속 해외로 빠져나간다면 이야기는 달라집니다.

한국 자본시장의 경쟁력이 약해질수록 해외자산을 사기 위한 달러 수요는 구조적으로 늘어날 수 있습니다. 결국 자본시장의 경쟁력 약화가 장기적으로는 원화에 대한 수요와 신뢰에도 영향을 줄 수 있다는 이야기입니다.

지금은 반도체 슈퍼사이클 덕분에 삼성전자와 SK하이닉스가 해외에서 막대한 달러를 벌어오고 있습니다.

하지만 반도체 업황이 영원히 좋을 수는 없습니다.

언젠가 반도체 사이클이 꺾여 수출로 들어오는 달러가 줄어드는데 국내 투자자들의 해외투자는 계속 늘어난다면 환율은 지금보다 훨씬 불안정해질 수 있습니다.

환율이 오르면 그 영향은 주식시장에만 머무르지 않습니다.

한국은 에너지와 원자재를 해외에서 많이 수입합니다.

원화 가치가 떨어지면 수입물가가 오르고 결국 생활물가에도 영향을 줍니다.

그래서 저는 솔리다임 상장 문제를 단순히 SK하이닉스 주주의 손익 문제라고 생각하지 않습니다.

한국 자본시장이 미국을 비롯한 선진국 자본시장과 경쟁할 수 있느냐, 더 나아가 앞으로 원화 자산을 사람들이 계속 보유하고 싶어 하는 시장을 만들 수 있느냐의 문제라고 봅니다.

한국 기업이 세계 최고의 반도체를 만들고, 세계 최고의 자동차를 만들고, 세계 최고의 배터리를 만들어도 그 성과를 기존 주주가 제대로 가져갈 수 없다면 한국 주식의 투자 매력도는 떨어질 수밖에 없습니다.

기업의 산업 경쟁력만큼이나 중요한 것이 자본시장의 경쟁력입니다.

솔리다임이 어려울 때 위험을 함께 부담한 사람들이 SK하이닉스 주주들이었다면, 솔리다임이 잘됐을 때 그 과실도 먼저 기존 주주들에게 돌아가야 합니다.

정말 솔리다임을 분리해야 할 이유가 있다면 샌디스크처럼 기존 주주들의 경제적 권리를 보존하는 방법부터 고민해야 합니다.

SK하이닉스는 SK그룹만의 회사가 아닙니다.

수많은 주주들이 돈을 투자해 공동으로 소유하고 있는 대한민국 대표 상장사입니다.

그런 회사일수록 더 높은 기준을 보여줘야 합니다.

SK하이닉스가 모범을 보이면 다른 기업들도 따라갈 수 있습니다. 반대로 SK하이닉스마저 중복상장의 길을 열어버리면 다른 기업들에게도 너무 좋은 핑곗거리가 됩니다.

최태원 회장님, 솔리다임 상장은 절대 일어나선 안 됩니다.

이건 솔리다임 하나의 문제가 아닙니다.

SK하이닉스 주주의 권리와 한국 증시의 투자 매력도, 미래 한국 자본시장의 경쟁력, 그리고 장기적으로는 원화에 대한 신뢰까지 연결되는 문제입니다.

[AlphaBet @Flex_AlphaBet]

[수정 전]
솔리다임이 SK하이닉스의 100% 자회사로 남아 있다면 앞으로 솔리다임이 벌어들이는 이익과 현금흐름은 결국 SK하이닉스 주주들의 몫입니다. 반대로 외부 투자자를 받고 별도로 상장하면 그만큼 미래의 이익도 나눠 가져야 합니다. 물론 상장을 통해 들어온 자금으로 그 이상의 성장을 만들어낼 수 있다면 이야기는 달라질 수 있습니다. 그렇다면 최소한 왜 솔리다임을 계속 보유하는 것보다 상장하는 것이 기존 SK하이닉스 주주에게 더 이익인지 설명해야 합니다.
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[수정 후]
솔리다임이 SK하이닉스의 100% 자회사로 남아 있다면 앞으로 솔리다임이 벌어들이는 이익과 현금흐름은 결국 SK하이닉스 주주들의 몫입니다. 반대로 외부 투자자를 받고 별도로 상장하면 그만큼 미래의 이익을 새로운 주주들과 나눠 가져야 합니다. 여기에 더블리스팅에 따른 지주회사·중복상장 할인까지 붙는다면, 솔리다임의 가치가 커져도 정작 SK하이닉스 주가에는 그 가치가 온전히 반영되지 않을 수 있습니다. 물론 상장을 통해 들어온 자금으로 이런 할인과 지분 희석을 넘어서는 더 큰 성장을 만들어낼 수 있다면 이야기는 달라질 수 있습니다. 그렇다면 최소한 솔리다임 상장이 100% 보유를 유지하는 것보다 왜 기존 SK하이닉스 주주에게 더 이익인지 숫자로 설명해야 합니다.

[AlphaBet @Flex_AlphaBet]

Chairman Chey Tae-won, Solidigm must never be listed separately.

Solidigm’s listing has not been finalized. But once the listing process actually begins, it may already be too late. That is why I believe this issue needs to be raised now.

First, we need to understand what Solidigm actually is.

In 2020, SK hynix decided to acquire Intel’s NAND and SSD business for approximately $9 billion. After completing the first phase of the acquisition in 2021, SK hynix took over Intel’s SSD business and established Solidigm in the United States to operate it.

Put simply, Solidigm is a company that was created as part of SK hynix’s acquisition of Intel’s NAND business.

SK hynix paid a massive acquisition price and subsequently absorbed the losses from the NAND downturn and Solidigm’s weak performance. Ultimately, SK hynix and its shareholders bore that burden together.

Now, however, AI data center investment is accelerating, the enterprise SSD market is expanding, and Solidigm is beginning to generate meaningful profits. If SK hynix were to list Solidigm separately at precisely this point, it would be very difficult for existing shareholders to accept.

If SK hynix carried the burden when Solidigm was losing money, but then spins it off and lists it separately just as the business begins to improve, what exactly were existing shareholders taking that risk for?

Moreover, SK hynix is currently generating enormous operating cash flow from its core business. It is not a company in desperate need of capital, which makes it difficult to understand why it would need to sell part of a high-growth subsidiary to outside investors simply to raise funds through a listing.

If additional capital is truly necessary, management should first explain why that need cannot be met through existing cash flow and financial capacity. For a highly profitable company to carve out and list one of its most valuable assets is difficult for shareholders to accept.

SK hynix is also one of South Korea’s flagship companies. A company of this stature should set the standard for the Korean capital market.

If even SK hynix establishes a precedent of separately listing a successful subsidiary, other Korean companies may feel even less hesitation about pursuing similar duplicate listings. The Korean stock market could end up in an even worse state than it is today.

An IPO is not free financing.

It means selling part of a company to new investors.

As long as Solidigm remains a wholly owned subsidiary of SK hynix, the profits and cash flows it generates ultimately belong to SK hynix shareholders. If outside investors are brought in and Solidigm is separately listed, those future profits must also be shared with them.

Of course, the situation would be different if the capital raised through a listing could create significantly more value than the dilution it causes.

But in that case, SK hynix should at least explain why listing Solidigm would be more beneficial to existing SK hynix shareholders than continuing to own 100% of the company.

If that cannot be demonstrated with numbers, there is little reason to pursue the listing.

The contrast becomes even clearer when we look at SanDisk.

When Western Digital separated its NAND business into SanDisk, it distributed SanDisk shares to existing Western Digital shareholders.

The business was separated, but the economic rights of existing shareholders followed with it.

The issue is not the separation of a business itself. The issue is how the rights of existing shareholders are treated in the process.

If separating Solidigm is truly necessary, SK hynix should first consider a structure similar to SanDisk, where existing SK hynix shareholders can directly retain the economic value of Solidigm.

Listing Solidigm after bringing in outside investors, while giving existing shareholders no direct rights to the company, would be a completely different matter.

Some argue that Solidigm could receive a much higher valuation if it were listed in the United States.

I believe that argument is even more dangerous.

It is not very different from saying that because a good business cannot receive an appropriate valuation in Korea, it should simply be carved out and listed in the United States instead.

If every successful business is separately listed and the economic interests of parent-company shareholders are reduced each time, investors will naturally apply a discount to the parent company from the beginning.

In that sense, duplicate listings do not solve the Korea Discount. They can become one of the reasons the Korea Discount exists in the first place.

The way to address the Korea Discount is not to send attractive assets to the U.S. market. It is to raise shareholder rights and capital allocation standards at Korean listed companies to the level of leading global companies.

Berkshire Hathaway offers a useful contrast.

Warren Buffett earned the long-term trust of shareholders not simply because he was a successful investor.

He consistently explained how the company used its capital, why it held cash, and what principles guided its investment decisions.

As a result, shareholders were not uncomfortable with Berkshire holding large amounts of cash.

They trusted management to use that capital in the interests of shareholders.

Good governance ultimately begins with a simple question:

Does management truly treat the company’s money as shareholders’ money?

The same question applies to Solidigm.

What matters is not whether a transaction benefits the SK Group as a whole, but whether it benefits SK hynix shareholders.

A transaction that makes sense from the perspective of the group does not necessarily make sense for SK hynix shareholders.

I also see this as an issue that goes beyond SK hynix and concerns the Korean capital market as a whole.

The United States is rapidly strengthening the competitiveness of its financial markets.

From dollar stablecoins to tokenized securities, Treasury products, and funds, financial assets are increasingly moving toward a system in which they can be traded more easily over the internet and blockchain-based infrastructure.

The direction is clear: make it easier for people around the world to hold dollars and invest in dollar-denominated assets.

The barriers to investing in U.S. stocks and U.S. financial products are likely to become even lower in the future.

That means Korean equities must compete with U.S. equities as financial products.

If U.S. companies separate businesses while preserving the rights of existing shareholders, while Korean companies repeatedly list successful subsidiaries without giving existing shareholders anything in return, the investor’s choice becomes obvious.

There will simply be less reason to own Korean stocks.

When Korean investors sell domestic assets and buy U.S. stocks, they also have to sell won and buy dollars.

Of course, a Solidigm listing alone would not cause the exchange rate to surge.

But if cases like this continue to weaken the attractiveness of Korean equities and domestic capital keeps moving overseas, the situation becomes different.

Structural demand for dollars can continue to increase.

For now, the semiconductor supercycle is allowing companies such as Samsung Electronics and SK hynix to earn enormous amounts of foreign currency through exports.

But semiconductor conditions will not remain strong forever.

If the semiconductor cycle eventually turns down and dollar inflows from exports decline while Korean investors continue increasing their overseas investments, the won-dollar exchange rate could become significantly more unstable.

And a weaker won does not affect only the stock market.

South Korea imports a large portion of its energy and raw materials.

When the won weakens, import prices rise, and that eventually feeds into the cost of living.

That is why I do not view the Solidigm listing issue as simply a matter of gains and losses for SK hynix shareholders.

I see it as a question of whether the Korean capital market can remain competitive with the United States and other developed markets.

Korean companies may manufacture the world’s best semiconductors, automobiles, and batteries. But if existing shareholders cannot fully participate in the value created by those businesses, Korean equities themselves will inevitably become less competitive as investment products.

The competitiveness of a country’s capital market matters just as much as the industrial competitiveness of its companies.

If SK hynix shareholders shared the downside when Solidigm was struggling, they should also be the first to benefit when Solidigm succeeds.

If there is a genuine need to separate Solidigm, SK hynix should first consider a structure that preserves the economic rights of existing shareholders, as Western Digital did with SanDisk.

SK hynix does not belong solely to the SK Group.

It is one of South Korea’s flagship listed companies, jointly owned by countless shareholders who have invested their own capital.

A company of that stature should hold itself to a higher standard.

If SK hynix sets a good example, other companies may follow. But if even SK hynix opens the door to another duplicate listing, it will give many other companies an easy excuse to do the same.

Chairman Chey Tae-won, Solidigm must never be separately listed.

This is not just about Solidigm.

It is about the rights of SK hynix shareholders, the competitiveness of Korean equities as investment products, and ultimately the direction of the Korean capital market itself.Chairman Chey Tae-won, Solidigm must never be listed separately.

Solidigm’s listing has not been finalized. But once the listing process actually begins, it may already be too late. That is why I believe this issue needs to be raised now.

First, we need to understand what Solidigm actually is.

In 2020, SK hynix decided to acquire Intel’s NAND and SSD business for approximately $9 billion. After completing the first phase of the acquisition in 2021, SK hynix took over Intel’s SSD business and established Solidigm in the United States to operate it.

Put simply, Solidigm is a company that was created as part of SK hynix’s acquisition of Intel’s NAND business.

SK hynix paid a massive acquisition price and subsequently absorbed the losses from the NAND downturn and Solidigm’s weak performance. Ultimately, SK hynix and its shareholders bore that burden together.

Now, however, AI data center investment is accelerating, the enterprise SSD market is expanding, and Solidigm is beginning to generate meaningful profits. If SK hynix were to list Solidigm separately at precisely this point, it would be very difficult for existing shareholders to accept.

If SK hynix carried the burden when Solidigm was losing money, but then spins it off and lists it separately just as the business begins to improve, what exactly were existing shareholders taking that risk for?

Moreover, SK hynix is currently generating enormous operating cash flow from its core business. It is not a company in desperate need of capital, which makes it difficult to understand why it would need to sell part of a high-growth subsidiary to outside investors simply to raise funds through a listing. If additional capital is truly necessary, management should first explain why that need cannot be met through existing cash flow and financial capacity. For a highly profitable company to carve out and list one of its most valuable assets is difficult for shareholders to accept.

SK hynix is also one of South Korea’s flagship companies. A company of this stature should set the standard for the Korean capital market.

If even SK hynix establishes a precedent of separately listing a successful subsidiary, other Korean companies may feel even less hesitation about pursuing similar duplicate listings. The Korean stock market could end up in an even worse state than it is today.

An IPO is not free financing.

It means selling part of a company to new investors.

As long as Solidigm remains a wholly owned subsidiary of SK hynix, the profits and cash flows it generates ultimately belong to SK hynix shareholders. If outside investors are brought in and Solidigm is separately listed, those future profits must also be shared with them.

Of course, the situation would be different if the capital raised through a listing could create significantly more value than the dilution it causes.

But in that case, SK hynix should at least explain why listing Solidigm would be more beneficial to existing SK hynix shareholders than continuing to own 100% of the company.

If that cannot be demonstrated with numbers, there is little reason to pursue the listing.

The contrast becomes even clearer when we look at SanDisk.

When Western Digital separated its NAND business into SanDisk, it distributed SanDisk shares to existing Western Digital shareholders.

The business was separated, but the economic rights of existing shareholders followed with it.

The issue is not the separation of a business itself. The issue is how the rights of existing shareholders are treated in the process.

If separating Solidigm is truly necessary, SK hynix should first consider a structure similar to SanDisk, where existing SK hynix shareholders can directly retain the economic value of Solidigm.

Listing Solidigm after bringing in outside investors, while giving existing shareholders no direct rights to the company, would be a completely different matter.

Some argue that Solidigm could receive a much higher valuation if it were listed in the United States.

I believe that argument is even more dangerous.

It is not very different from saying that because a good business cannot receive an appropriate valuation in Korea, it should simply be carved out and listed in the United States instead.

If every successful business is separately listed and the economic interests of parent-company shareholders are reduced each time, investors will naturally apply a discount to the parent company from the beginning.

In that sense, duplicate listings do not solve the Korea Discount. They can become one of the reasons the Korea Discount exists in the first place.

The way to address the Korea Discount is not to send attractive assets to the U.S. market. It is to raise shareholder rights and capital allocation standards at Korean listed companies to the level of leading global companies.

Berkshire Hathaway offers a useful contrast.

Warren Buffett earned the long-term trust of shareholders not simply because he was a successful investor.

He consistently explained how the company used its capital, why it held cash, and what principles guided its investment decisions.

As a result, shareholders were not uncomfortable with Berkshire holding large amounts of cash.

They trusted management to use that capital in the interests of shareholders.

Good governance ultimately begins with a simple question:

Does management truly treat the company’s money as shareholders’ money?

The same question applies to Solidigm.

What matters is not whether a transaction benefits the SK Group as a whole, but whether it benefits SK hynix shareholders.

A transaction that makes sense from the perspective of the group does not necessarily make sense for SK hynix shareholders.

I also see this as an issue that goes beyond SK hynix and concerns the Korean capital market as a whole.

The United States is rapidly strengthening the competitiveness of its financial markets.

From dollar stablecoins to tokenized securities, Treasury products, and funds, financial assets are increasingly moving toward a system in which they can be traded more easily over the internet and blockchain-based infrastructure.

The direction is clear: make it easier for people around the world to hold dollars and invest in dollar-denominated assets.

The barriers to investing in U.S. stocks and U.S. financial products are likely to become even lower in the future.

That means Korean equities must compete with U.S. equities as financial products.

If U.S. companies separate businesses while preserving the rights of existing shareholders, while Korean companies repeatedly list successful subsidiaries without giving existing shareholders anything in return, the investor’s choice becomes obvious.

There will simply be less reason to own Korean stocks.

When Korean investors sell domestic assets and buy U.S. stocks, they also have to sell won and buy dollars.

Of course, a Solidigm listing alone would not cause the exchange rate to surge.

But if cases like this continue to weaken the attractiveness of Korean equities and domestic capital keeps moving overseas, the situation becomes different.

Structural demand for dollars can continue to increase.

For now, the semiconductor supercycle is allowing companies such as Samsung Electronics and SK hynix to earn enormous amounts of foreign currency through exports.

But semiconductor conditions will not remain strong forever.

If the semiconductor cycle eventually turns down and dollar inflows from exports decline while Korean investors continue increasing their overseas investments, the won-dollar exchange rate could become significantly more unstable.

And a weaker won does not affect only the stock market.

South Korea imports a large portion of its energy and raw materials.

When the won weakens, import prices rise, and that eventually feeds into the cost of living.

That is why I do not view the Solidigm listing issue as simply a matter of gains and losses for SK hynix shareholders.

I see it as a question of whether the Korean capital market can remain competitive with the United States and other developed markets.

Korean companies may manufacture the world’s best semiconductors, automobiles, and batteries. But if existing shareholders cannot fully participate in the value created by those businesses, Korean equities themselves will inevitably become less competitive as investment products.

The competitiveness of a country’s capital market matters just as much as the industrial competitiveness of its companies.

If SK hynix shareholders shared the downside when Solidigm was struggling, they should also be the first to benefit when Solidigm succeeds.

If there is a genuine need to separate Solidigm, SK hynix should first consider a structure that preserves the economic rights of existing shareholders, as Western Digital did with SanDisk.

SK hynix does not belong solely to the SK Group.

It is one of South Korea’s flagship listed companies, jointly owned by countless shareholders who have invested their own capital.

A company of that stature should hold itself to a higher standard.

If SK hynix sets a good example, other companies may follow. But if even SK hynix opens the door to another duplicate listing, it will give many other companies an easy excuse to do the same.

Chairman Chey Tae-won, Solidigm must never be separately listed.

This is not just about Solidigm.

It is about the rights of SK hynix shareholders, the competitiveness of Korean equities as investment products, and ultimately the direction of the Korean capital market itself.

[AlphaBet @Flex_AlphaBet]

[Before]
If Solidigm remains a wholly owned subsidiary of SK hynix, the profits and cash flows it generates in the future will ultimately belong to SK hynix shareholders. On the other hand, if outside investors are brought in and Solidigm is separately listed, those future profits will have to be shared with new shareholders. Of course, the situation could be different if the capital raised through the listing can generate even greater growth. If so, SK hynix should at least explain why listing Solidigm would be more beneficial to existing SK hynix shareholders than continuing to own 100% of the company.
->
[After]
If Solidigm remains a wholly owned subsidiary of SK hynix, the profits and cash flows it generates in the future will ultimately belong to SK hynix shareholders. On the other hand, if outside investors are brought in and Solidigm is separately listed, those future profits will have to be shared with new shareholders.On top of that, there is also the potential discount from a double listing. Even if Solidigm’s valuation rises, that value may not be fully reflected in SK hynix’s share price.Of course, the situation could be different if the capital raised through the listing can create enough additional growth to more than offset both the valuation discount and the dilution of existing shareholders.If so, SK hynix should explain, with numbers, why listing Solidigm would be more beneficial to existing SK hynix shareholders than continuing to own 100% of the company.

[AlphaBet @Flex_AlphaBet]

[Before]
If Solidigm remains a wholly owned subsidiary of SK hynix, the profits and cash flows it generates in the future will ultimately belong to SK hynix shareholders. On the other hand, if outside investors are brought in and Solidigm is separately listed, those future profits will have to be shared with new shareholders. Of course, the situation could be different if the capital raised through the listing can generate even greater growth. If so, SK hynix should at least explain why listing Solidigm would be more beneficial to existing SK hynix shareholders than continuing to own 100% of the company.
->
[After]
If Solidigm remains a wholly owned subsidiary of SK hynix, the profits and cash flows it generates in the future will ultimately belong to SK hynix shareholders. On the other hand, if outside investors are brought in and Solidigm is separately listed, those future profits will have to be shared with new shareholders.On top of that, there is also the potential discount from a double listing. Even if Solidigm’s valuation rises, that value may not be fully reflected in SK hynix’s share price.Of course, the situation could be different if the capital raised through the listing can create enough additional growth to more than offset both the valuation discount and the dilution of existing shareholders.If so, SK hynix should explain, with numbers, why listing Solidigm would be more beneficial to existing SK hynix shareholders than continuing to own 100% of the company.

[AlphaBet @Flex_AlphaBet]

최태원 회장님, 솔리다임 상장은 절대 일어나선 안 됩니다.

현재 솔리다임 상장은 확정된 사안이 아닙니다. 하지만 실제 상장 절차에 들어간 뒤에는 이미 늦습니다. 그래서 지금 이야기해야 한다고 생각합니다.

먼저 솔리다임이 어떤 회사인지부터 봐야 합니다.

SK하이닉스는 2020년 인텔의 낸드·SSD 사업을 약 90억달러에 인수하기로 결정했습니다. 이후 2021년 1단계 인수를 마치면서 인텔의 SSD 사업을 넘겨받았고, 이 사업을 운영하기 위해 만든 미국 자회사가 바로 솔리다임입니다.

쉽게 말하면 솔리다임은 SK하이닉스가 인텔의 낸드 사업을 사오면서 함께 만들어낸 회사입니다.

SK하이닉스는 막대한 인수자금을 부담했고, 이후 낸드 업황 부진과 솔리다임의 적자도 감내했습니다. 그 과정의 부담은 결국 SK하이닉스와 그 주주들이 함께 짊어졌습니다.

그런데 이제 AI 데이터센터 투자 확대와 함께 기업용 SSD 시장이 커지고, 솔리다임이 본격적으로 돈을 벌기 시작하는 시점에 별도 상장을 한다면 주주 입장에서는 납득하기 어렵습니다.

적자일 때는 SK하이닉스가 책임지고, 좋아지기 시작하니 따로 떼어 상장한다면 기존 주주들은 무엇을 위해 그동안의 위험을 감수한 것입니까.

더구나 지금 SK하이닉스는 본업에서 막대한 영업현금흐름을 만들어내고 있습니다. 자금이 절박한 회사도 아닌데, 굳이 미래 성장성이 큰 자회사의 지분을 외부에 넘겨가며 상장 자금을 조달해야 하는지도 의문입니다. 정말 자금이 필요하다면 먼저 기존 현금흐름과 재무 여력으로 감당할 수 없는 이유부터 설명해야 합니다. 돈을 잘 벌고 있는 회사가 가장 좋은 자산 중 하나를 떼어 상장하는 것은 주주 입장에서 쉽게 받아들이기 어렵습니다.

특히 SK하이닉스는 대한민국을 대표하는 기업입니다. 이런 회사일수록 자본시장에서도 모범을 보여야 합니다. SK하이닉스마저 잘되는 자회사를 따로 떼어 상장하는 선례를 만든다면 다른 기업들은 더 거리낌 없이 중복상장에 나설 수 있습니다. 그렇게 되면 한국 증시는 지금보다 더 엉망이 될 수 있습니다.

상장은 공짜로 돈을 조달하는 방법이 아닙니다.

회사의 일부를 새로운 투자자에게 파는 것입니다.

솔리다임이 SK하이닉스의 100% 자회사로 남아 있다면 앞으로 솔리다임이 벌어들이는 이익과 현금흐름은 결국 SK하이닉스 주주들의 몫입니다. 반대로 외부 투자자를 받고 별도로 상장하면 그만큼 미래의 이익도 나눠 가져야 합니다.

물론 상장을 통해 들어온 자금으로 그 이상의 성장을 만들어낼 수 있다면 이야기는 달라질 수 있습니다.

그렇다면 최소한 왜 솔리다임을 계속 보유하는 것보다 상장하는 것이 기존 SK하이닉스 주주에게 더 이익인지 설명해야 합니다.

그 답을 숫자로 보여주지 못한다면 굳이 상장해야 할 이유가 없습니다.

샌디스크 사례를 보면 차이가 더 분명합니다.

웨스턴디지털은 낸드 사업을 샌디스크로 분리하면서 샌디스크 주식을 기존 웨스턴디지털 주주들에게 나눠줬습니다.

사업은 분리했지만 기존 주주들의 권리는 그대로 따라갔습니다.

회사를 나누는 것 자체가 문제가 아니라 그 과정에서 기존 주주의 권리가 어떻게 처리되느냐가 중요한 것입니다.

솔리다임 역시 정말 분리가 필요하다면 샌디스크처럼 기존 SK하이닉스 주주들이 솔리다임의 가치를 직접 가져갈 수 있는 구조부터 고민해야 합니다.

기존 주주에게 아무런 권리도 주지 않은 채 외부 투자자를 받고 상장하는 것은 전혀 다른 문제입니다.

일각에서는 솔리다임을 미국에 상장하면 더 높은 가치를 받을 수 있다고 이야기합니다.

하지만 저는 이 논리가 더 위험하다고 봅니다.

한국 시장에서는 제대로 평가받지 못하니 좋은 사업은 미국 시장에 따로 상장시키겠다는 이야기와 크게 다르지 않기 때문입니다.

좋은 사업이 생길 때마다 자회사를 상장하고, 그때마다 모회사 주주들의 몫이 줄어든다면 투자자들이 처음부터 모회사 주식을 싸게 평가하는 것은 당연합니다.

결국 중복상장이 코리아 디스카운트를 해결하는 것이 아니라 오히려 코리아 디스카운트를 만드는 원인이 되는 것입니다.

코리아 디스카운트를 해결하는 방법은 좋은 자산을 미국으로 보내는 것이 아니라 한국 상장사의 주주권과 자본배분을 미국 기업 수준으로 끌어올리는 것이어야 합니다.

버크셔 해서웨이를 보면 반대의 사례를 볼 수 있습니다.

버핏이 오랫동안 주주들에게 신뢰받은 이유는 단순히 투자를 잘했기 때문만은 아닙니다.

회사가 번 돈을 어디에 쓰는지, 왜 현금을 들고 있는지, 어떤 기준으로 투자하는지를 계속 설명했습니다.

결국 주주들은 회사가 돈을 가지고 있어도 불안해하지 않았습니다.

경영진이 그 돈을 주주의 이익을 위해 사용할 것이라는 믿음이 있었기 때문입니다.

좋은 거버넌스도 결국 여기서 시작한다고 생각합니다.

경영진이 회사의 돈을 정말 주주의 돈이라고 생각하고 있는가.

솔리다임 상장 역시 같은 문제입니다.

SK그룹 전체에 도움이 되는 거래인지가 아니라 SK하이닉스 주주에게 도움이 되는 거래인지가 중요합니다.

그룹 입장에서 좋은 거래라고 해서 반드시 SK하이닉스 주주에게 좋은 거래인 것은 아닙니다.

저는 이 문제를 한국 자본시장 전체의 문제로도 봅니다.

미국은 지금 금융시장의 경쟁력을 빠르게 키우고 있습니다.

달러 스테이블코인부터 토큰화 증권, 국채와 펀드의 토큰화까지 금융자산을 인터넷과 블록체인 위에서 더 쉽게 거래할 수 있는 방향으로 가고 있습니다.

결국 전 세계 사람들이 더 쉽게 달러를 보유하고 더 쉽게 달러 표시 자산을 사게 만드는 것입니다.

앞으로 미국 주식과 미국 금융상품에 투자하는 장벽은 지금보다 더 낮아질 가능성이 큽니다.

그렇다면 한국 주식도 하나의 금융상품으로서 미국 주식과 경쟁해야 합니다.

미국에서는 회사를 분리하면서 기존 주주에게 신설회사 지분을 나눠주는데, 한국에서는 회사가 잘되면 자회사를 다시 상장하고 기존 주주는 아무것도 받지 못하는 일이 반복된다면 투자자의 선택은 뻔합니다.

굳이 한국 주식을 살 이유가 줄어듭니다.

사람들이 한국 주식을 팔고 미국 주식을 사려면 원화를 팔고 달러를 사야 합니다.

물론 솔리다임 하나를 상장한다고 환율이 폭등하는 것은 아닙니다.

하지만 이런 일이 반복되면서 한국 주식 자체의 상품성이 떨어지고 국내 자금이 계속 해외로 빠져나간다면 이야기는 달라집니다.

구조적으로 달러를 사야 하는 수요가 계속 늘어날 수밖에 없습니다.

지금은 반도체 슈퍼사이클 덕분에 삼성전자와 SK하이닉스가 해외에서 막대한 달러를 벌어오고 있습니다.

하지만 반도체 업황이 영원히 좋을 수는 없습니다.

언젠가 반도체 사이클이 꺾여 수출로 들어오는 달러가 줄어드는데 국내 투자자들의 해외투자는 계속 늘어난다면 환율은 지금보다 훨씬 불안정해질 수 있습니다.

환율이 오르면 그 영향은 주식시장에만 머무르지 않습니다.

한국은 에너지와 원자재를 해외에서 많이 수입합니다.

원화 가치가 떨어지면 수입물가가 오르고 결국 생활물가에도 영향을 줍니다.

그래서 저는 솔리다임 상장 문제를 단순히 SK하이닉스 주주의 손익 문제라고 생각하지 않습니다.

한국 자본시장이 미국을 비롯한 선진국 자본시장과 경쟁할 수 있느냐의 문제라고 봅니다.

한국 기업이 세계 최고의 반도체를 만들고, 세계 최고의 자동차를 만들고, 세계 최고의 배터리를 만들어도 그 성과를 기존 주주가 제대로 가져갈 수 없다면 한국 주식이라는 금융상품의 경쟁력은 떨어질 수밖에 없습니다.

기업의 산업 경쟁력만큼이나 중요한 것이 자본시장의 경쟁력입니다.

솔리다임이 어려울 때 위험을 함께 부담한 사람들이 SK하이닉스 주주들이었다면, 솔리다임이 잘됐을 때 그 과실도 먼저 기존 주주들에게 돌아가야 합니다.

정말 솔리다임을 분리해야 할 이유가 있다면 샌디스크처럼 기존 주주들의 경제적 권리를 보존하는 방법부터 고민해야 합니다.

SK하이닉스는 SK그룹만의 회사가 아닙니다.

수많은 주주들이 돈을 투자해 공동으로 소유하고 있는 대한민국 대표 상장사입니다.

그런 회사일수록 더 높은 기준을 보여줘야 합니다.

SK하이닉스가 모범을 보이면 다른 기업들도 따라갈 수 있습니다. 반대로 SK하이닉스마저 중복상장의 길을 열어버리면 다른 기업들에게도 너무 좋은 핑곗거리가 됩니다.

최태원 회장님, 솔리다임 상장은 절대 일어나선 안 됩니다.

이건 솔리다임 하나의 문제가 아닙니다.

SK하이닉스 주주의 권리와 한국 주식이라는 금융상품의 경쟁력, 그리고 한국 자본시장이 앞으로 어디로 갈 것인지에 관한 문제입니다.

[AlphaBet @Flex_AlphaBet]

[수정 전]
솔리다임이 SK하이닉스의 100% 자회사로 남아 있다면 앞으로 솔리다임이 벌어들이는 이익과 현금흐름은 결국 SK하이닉스 주주들의 몫입니다. 반대로 외부 투자자를 받고 별도로 상장하면 그만큼 미래의 이익도 나눠 가져야 합니다. 물론 상장을 통해 들어온 자금으로 그 이상의 성장을 만들어낼 수 있다면 이야기는 달라질 수 있습니다. 그렇다면 최소한 왜 솔리다임을 계속 보유하는 것보다 상장하는 것이 기존 SK하이닉스 주주에게 더 이익인지 설명해야 합니다.
->
[수정 후]
솔리다임이 SK하이닉스의 100% 자회사로 남아 있다면 앞으로 솔리다임이 벌어들이는 이익과 현금흐름은 결국 SK하이닉스 주주들의 몫입니다. 반대로 외부 투자자를 받고 별도로 상장하면 그만큼 미래의 이익을 새로운 주주들과 나눠 가져야 합니다. 여기에 더블리스팅에 따른 지주회사·중복상장 할인까지 붙는다면, 솔리다임의 가치가 커져도 정작 SK하이닉스 주가에는 그 가치가 온전히 반영되지 않을 수 있습니다. 물론 상장을 통해 들어온 자금으로 이런 할인과 지분 희석을 넘어서는 더 큰 성장을 만들어낼 수 있다면 이야기는 달라질 수 있습니다. 그렇다면 최소한 솔리다임 상장이 100% 보유를 유지하는 것보다 왜 기존 SK하이닉스 주주에게 더 이익인지 숫자로 설명해야 합니다.

[AlphaBet @Flex_AlphaBet]

@flywithmoony 감사합니다.

[AlphaBet @Flex_AlphaBet]

아니, 나만 몰랐던 건가…

X에서 긴 글을 쓰레드로 올리려면
메인 글 하나 쓰고 → 댓글 1 → 댓글 2 이렇게 다는 게 아니라,
메인 글 → 댓글 → 대댓글 → 대대댓글 → 대대대댓글…
이런 식으로 계속 연결해야 제대로 된 하나의 쓰레드가 되는 거였네요 ㅋㅋ

이때까지 제대로 삽질했음…
글이 길어서 한 번에 20개씩 대대대대대댓글 달고 있으니 진짜 개힘드네요 ㅠㅠ
그래도 오늘 실수한 건 전부 수정 완료.
이제 진짜 자야겠습니다…

X친들은 저 같은 실수하지 마시길 ㅋㅋ

[AlphaBet @Flex_AlphaBet]

아침부터 갑자기 필 받아서 써봤습니다. 쓰다 보니 대한민국의 미래가 조금 걱정되네요.

[AlphaBet @Flex_AlphaBet]

최태원 회장님, 솔리다임 상장은 절대 일어나선 안 됩니다.

현재 솔리다임 상장은 확정된 사안이 아닙니다. 하지만 실제 상장 절차에 들어간 뒤에는 이미 늦습니다. 그래서 지금 이야기해야 한다고 생각합니다.

먼저 솔리다임이 어떤 회사인지부터 봐야 합니다.

SK하이닉스는 2020년 인텔의 낸드·SSD 사업을 약 90억달러에 인수하기로 결정했습니다. 이후 2021년 1단계 인수를 마치면서 인텔의 SSD 사업을 넘겨받았고, 이 사업을 운영하기 위해 만든 미국 자회사가 바로 솔리다임입니다.

쉽게 말하면 솔리다임은 SK하이닉스가 인텔의 낸드 사업을 사오면서 함께 만들어낸 회사입니다.

SK하이닉스는 막대한 인수자금을 부담했고, 이후 낸드 업황 부진과 솔리다임의 적자도 감내했습니다. 그 과정의 부담은 결국 SK하이닉스와 그 주주들이 함께 짊어졌습니다.

그런데 이제 AI 데이터센터 투자 확대와 함께 기업용 SSD 시장이 커지고, 솔리다임이 본격적으로 돈을 벌기 시작하는 시점에 별도 상장을 한다면 주주 입장에서는 납득하기 어렵습니다.

적자일 때는 SK하이닉스가 책임지고, 좋아지기 시작하니 따로 떼어 상장한다면 기존 주주들은 무엇을 위해 그동안의 위험을 감수한 것입니까.

더구나 지금 SK하이닉스는 본업에서 막대한 영업현금흐름을 만들어내고 있습니다. 자금이 절박한 회사도 아닌데, 굳이 미래 성장성이 큰 자회사의 지분을 외부에 넘겨가며 상장 자금을 조달해야 하는지도 의문입니다. 정말 자금이 필요하다면 먼저 기존 현금흐름과 재무 여력으로 감당할 수 없는 이유부터 설명해야 합니다. 돈을 잘 벌고 있는 회사가 가장 좋은 자산 중 하나를 떼어 상장하는 것은 주주 입장에서 쉽게 받아들이기 어렵습니다.

특히 SK하이닉스는 대한민국을 대표하는 기업입니다. 이런 회사일수록 자본시장에서도 모범을 보여야 합니다. SK하이닉스마저 잘되는 자회사를 따로 떼어 상장하는 선례를 만든다면 다른 기업들은 더 거리낌 없이 중복상장에 나설 수 있습니다. 그렇게 되면 한국 증시는 지금보다 더 엉망이 될 수 있습니다.

상장은 공짜로 돈을 조달하는 방법이 아닙니다.

회사의 일부를 새로운 투자자에게 파는 것입니다.

솔리다임이 SK하이닉스의 100% 자회사로 남아 있다면 앞으로 솔리다임이 벌어들이는 이익과 현금흐름은 결국 SK하이닉스 주주들의 몫입니다. 반대로 외부 투자자를 받고 별도로 상장하면 그만큼 미래의 이익도 나눠 가져야 합니다.

물론 상장을 통해 들어온 자금으로 그 이상의 성장을 만들어낼 수 있다면 이야기는 달라질 수 있습니다.

그렇다면 최소한 왜 솔리다임을 계속 보유하는 것보다 상장하는 것이 기존 SK하이닉스 주주에게 더 이익인지 설명해야 합니다.

그 답을 숫자로 보여주지 못한다면 굳이 상장해야 할 이유가 없습니다.

샌디스크 사례를 보면 차이가 더 분명합니다.

웨스턴디지털은 낸드 사업을 샌디스크로 분리하면서 샌디스크 주식을 기존 웨스턴디지털 주주들에게 나눠줬습니다.

사업은 분리했지만 기존 주주들의 권리는 그대로 따라갔습니다.

회사를 나누는 것 자체가 문제가 아니라 그 과정에서 기존 주주의 권리가 어떻게 처리되느냐가 중요한 것입니다.

솔리다임 역시 정말 분리가 필요하다면 샌디스크처럼 기존 SK하이닉스 주주들이 솔리다임의 가치를 직접 가져갈 수 있는 구조부터 고민해야 합니다.

기존 주주에게 아무런 권리도 주지 않은 채 외부 투자자를 받고 상장하는 것은 전혀 다른 문제입니다.

일각에서는 솔리다임을 미국에 상장하면 더 높은 가치를 받을 수 있다고 이야기합니다.

하지만 저는 이 논리가 더 위험하다고 봅니다.

한국 시장에서는 제대로 평가받지 못하니 좋은 사업은 미국 시장에 따로 상장시키겠다는 이야기와 크게 다르지 않기 때문입니다.

좋은 사업이 생길 때마다 자회사를 상장하고, 그때마다 모회사 주주들의 몫이 줄어든다면 투자자들이 처음부터 모회사 주식을 싸게 평가하는 것은 당연합니다.

결국 중복상장이 코리아 디스카운트를 해결하는 것이 아니라 오히려 코리아 디스카운트를 만드는 원인이 되는 것입니다.

코리아 디스카운트를 해결하는 방법은 좋은 자산을 미국으로 보내는 것이 아니라 한국 상장사의 주주권과 자본배분을 미국 기업 수준으로 끌어올리는 것이어야 합니다.

버크셔 해서웨이를 보면 반대의 사례를 볼 수 있습니다.

버핏이 오랫동안 주주들에게 신뢰받은 이유는 단순히 투자를 잘했기 때문만은 아닙니다.

회사가 번 돈을 어디에 쓰는지, 왜 현금을 들고 있는지, 어떤 기준으로 투자하는지를 계속 설명했습니다.

결국 주주들은 회사가 돈을 가지고 있어도 불안해하지 않았습니다.

경영진이 그 돈을 주주의 이익을 위해 사용할 것이라는 믿음이 있었기 때문입니다.

좋은 거버넌스도 결국 여기서 시작한다고 생각합니다.

경영진이 회사의 돈을 정말 주주의 돈이라고 생각하고 있는가.

솔리다임 상장 역시 같은 문제입니다.

SK그룹 전체에 도움이 되는 거래인지가 아니라 SK하이닉스 주주에게 도움이 되는 거래인지가 중요합니다.

그룹 입장에서 좋은 거래라고 해서 반드시 SK하이닉스 주주에게 좋은 거래인 것은 아닙니다.

저는 이 문제를 한국 자본시장 전체의 문제로도 봅니다.

미국은 지금 금융시장의 경쟁력을 빠르게 키우고 있습니다.

달러 스테이블코인부터 토큰화 증권, 국채와 펀드의 토큰화까지 금융자산을 인터넷과 블록체인 위에서 더 쉽게 거래할 수 있는 방향으로 가고 있습니다.

결국 전 세계 사람들이 더 쉽게 달러를 보유하고 더 쉽게 달러 표시 자산을 사게 만드는 것입니다.

앞으로 미국 주식과 미국 금융상품에 투자하는 장벽은 지금보다 더 낮아질 가능성이 큽니다.

그렇다면 한국 주식도 하나의 금융상품으로서 미국 주식과 경쟁해야 합니다.

미국에서는 회사를 분리하면서 기존 주주에게 신설회사 지분을 나눠주는데, 한국에서는 회사가 잘되면 자회사를 다시 상장하고 기존 주주는 아무것도 받지 못하는 일이 반복된다면 투자자의 선택은 뻔합니다.

굳이 한국 주식을 살 이유가 줄어듭니다.

사람들이 한국 주식을 팔고 미국 주식을 사려면 원화를 팔고 달러를 사야 합니다.

물론 솔리다임 하나를 상장한다고 환율이 폭등하는 것은 아닙니다.

하지만 이런 일이 반복되면서 한국 주식 자체의 상품성이 떨어지고 국내 자금이 계속 해외로 빠져나간다면 이야기는 달라집니다.

구조적으로 달러를 사야 하는 수요가 계속 늘어날 수밖에 없습니다.

지금은 반도체 슈퍼사이클 덕분에 삼성전자와 SK하이닉스가 해외에서 막대한 달러를 벌어오고 있습니다.

하지만 반도체 업황이 영원히 좋을 수는 없습니다.

언젠가 반도체 사이클이 꺾여 수출로 들어오는 달러가 줄어드는데 국내 투자자들의 해외투자는 계속 늘어난다면 환율은 지금보다 훨씬 불안정해질 수 있습니다.

환율이 오르면 그 영향은 주식시장에만 머무르지 않습니다.

한국은 에너지와 원자재를 해외에서 많이 수입합니다.

원화 가치가 떨어지면 수입물가가 오르고 결국 생활물가에도 영향을 줍니다.

그래서 저는 솔리다임 상장 문제를 단순히 SK하이닉스 주주의 손익 문제라고 생각하지 않습니다.

한국 자본시장이 미국을 비롯한 선진국 자본시장과 경쟁할 수 있느냐의 문제라고 봅니다.

한국 기업이 세계 최고의 반도체를 만들고, 세계 최고의 자동차를 만들고, 세계 최고의 배터리를 만들어도 그 성과를 기존 주주가 제대로 가져갈 수 없다면 한국 주식이라는 금융상품의 경쟁력은 떨어질 수밖에 없습니다.

기업의 산업 경쟁력만큼이나 중요한 것이 자본시장의 경쟁력입니다.

솔리다임이 어려울 때 위험을 함께 부담한 사람들이 SK하이닉스 주주들이었다면, 솔리다임이 잘됐을 때 그 과실도 먼저 기존 주주들에게 돌아가야 합니다.

정말 솔리다임을 분리해야 할 이유가 있다면 샌디스크처럼 기존 주주들의 경제적 권리를 보존하는 방법부터 고민해야 합니다.

SK하이닉스는 SK그룹만의 회사가 아닙니다.

수많은 주주들이 돈을 투자해 공동으로 소유하고 있는 대한민국 대표 상장사입니다.

그런 회사일수록 더 높은 기준을 보여줘야 합니다.

SK하이닉스가 모범을 보이면 다른 기업들도 따라갈 수 있습니다. 반대로 SK하이닉스마저 중복상장의 길을 열어버리면 다른 기업들에게도 너무 좋은 핑곗거리가 됩니다.

최태원 회장님, 솔리다임 상장은 절대 일어나선 안 됩니다.

이건 솔리다임 하나의 문제가 아닙니다.

SK하이닉스 주주의 권리와 한국 주식이라는 금융상품의 경쟁력, 그리고 한국 자본시장이 앞으로 어디로 갈 것인지에 관한 문제입니다.

[AlphaBet @Flex_AlphaBet]

I got inspired this morning and just had to write it, lol.

[AlphaBet @Flex_AlphaBet]

Chairman Chey Tae-won, Solidigm must never be listed separately.

Solidigm’s listing has not been finalized. But once the listing process actually begins, it may already be too late. That is why I believe this issue needs to be raised now.

First, we need to understand what Solidigm actually is.

In 2020, SK hynix decided to acquire Intel’s NAND and SSD business for approximately $9 billion. After completing the first phase of the acquisition in 2021, SK hynix took over Intel’s SSD business and established Solidigm in the United States to operate it.

Put simply, Solidigm is a company that was created as part of SK hynix’s acquisition of Intel’s NAND business.

SK hynix paid a massive acquisition price and subsequently absorbed the losses from the NAND downturn and Solidigm’s weak performance. Ultimately, SK hynix and its shareholders bore that burden together.

Now, however, AI data center investment is accelerating, the enterprise SSD market is expanding, and Solidigm is beginning to generate meaningful profits. If SK hynix were to list Solidigm separately at precisely this point, it would be very difficult for existing shareholders to accept.

If SK hynix carried the burden when Solidigm was losing money, but then spins it off and lists it separately just as the business begins to improve, what exactly were existing shareholders taking that risk for?

Moreover, SK hynix is currently generating enormous operating cash flow from its core business. It is not a company in desperate need of capital, which makes it difficult to understand why it would need to sell part of a high-growth subsidiary to outside investors simply to raise funds through a listing.

If additional capital is truly necessary, management should first explain why that need cannot be met through existing cash flow and financial capacity. For a highly profitable company to carve out and list one of its most valuable assets is difficult for shareholders to accept.

SK hynix is also one of South Korea’s flagship companies. A company of this stature should set the standard for the Korean capital market.

If even SK hynix establishes a precedent of separately listing a successful subsidiary, other Korean companies may feel even less hesitation about pursuing similar duplicate listings. The Korean stock market could end up in an even worse state than it is today.

An IPO is not free financing.

It means selling part of a company to new investors.

As long as Solidigm remains a wholly owned subsidiary of SK hynix, the profits and cash flows it generates ultimately belong to SK hynix shareholders. If outside investors are brought in and Solidigm is separately listed, those future profits must also be shared with them.

Of course, the situation would be different if the capital raised through a listing could create significantly more value than the dilution it causes.

But in that case, SK hynix should at least explain why listing Solidigm would be more beneficial to existing SK hynix shareholders than continuing to own 100% of the company.

If that cannot be demonstrated with numbers, there is little reason to pursue the listing.

The contrast becomes even clearer when we look at SanDisk.

When Western Digital separated its NAND business into SanDisk, it distributed SanDisk shares to existing Western Digital shareholders.

The business was separated, but the economic rights of existing shareholders followed with it.

The issue is not the separation of a business itself. The issue is how the rights of existing shareholders are treated in the process.

If separating Solidigm is truly necessary, SK hynix should first consider a structure similar to SanDisk, where existing SK hynix shareholders can directly retain the economic value of Solidigm.

Listing Solidigm after bringing in outside investors, while giving existing shareholders no direct rights to the company, would be a completely different matter.

Some argue that Solidigm could receive a much higher valuation if it were listed in the United States.

I believe that argument is even more dangerous.

It is not very different from saying that because a good business cannot receive an appropriate valuation in Korea, it should simply be carved out and listed in the United States instead.

If every successful business is separately listed and the economic interests of parent-company shareholders are reduced each time, investors will naturally apply a discount to the parent company from the beginning.

In that sense, duplicate listings do not solve the Korea Discount. They can become one of the reasons the Korea Discount exists in the first place.

The way to address the Korea Discount is not to send attractive assets to the U.S. market. It is to raise shareholder rights and capital allocation standards at Korean listed companies to the level of leading global companies.

Berkshire Hathaway offers a useful contrast.

Warren Buffett earned the long-term trust of shareholders not simply because he was a successful investor.

He consistently explained how the company used its capital, why it held cash, and what principles guided its investment decisions.

As a result, shareholders were not uncomfortable with Berkshire holding large amounts of cash.

They trusted management to use that capital in the interests of shareholders.

Good governance ultimately begins with a simple question:

Does management truly treat the company’s money as shareholders’ money?

The same question applies to Solidigm.

What matters is not whether a transaction benefits the SK Group as a whole, but whether it benefits SK hynix shareholders.

A transaction that makes sense from the perspective of the group does not necessarily make sense for SK hynix shareholders.

I also see this as an issue that goes beyond SK hynix and concerns the Korean capital market as a whole.

The United States is rapidly strengthening the competitiveness of its financial markets.

From dollar stablecoins to tokenized securities, Treasury products, and funds, financial assets are increasingly moving toward a system in which they can be traded more easily over the internet and blockchain-based infrastructure.

The direction is clear: make it easier for people around the world to hold dollars and invest in dollar-denominated assets.

The barriers to investing in U.S. stocks and U.S. financial products are likely to become even lower in the future.

That means Korean equities must compete with U.S. equities as financial products.

If U.S. companies separate businesses while preserving the rights of existing shareholders, while Korean companies repeatedly list successful subsidiaries without giving existing shareholders anything in return, the investor’s choice becomes obvious.

There will simply be less reason to own Korean stocks.

When Korean investors sell domestic assets and buy U.S. stocks, they also have to sell won and buy dollars.

Of course, a Solidigm listing alone would not cause the exchange rate to surge.

But if cases like this continue to weaken the attractiveness of Korean equities and domestic capital keeps moving overseas, the situation becomes different.

Structural demand for dollars can continue to increase.

For now, the semiconductor supercycle is allowing companies such as Samsung Electronics and SK hynix to earn enormous amounts of foreign currency through exports.

But semiconductor conditions will not remain strong forever.

If the semiconductor cycle eventually turns down and dollar inflows from exports decline while Korean investors continue increasing their overseas investments, the won-dollar exchange rate could become significantly more unstable.

And a weaker won does not affect only the stock market.

South Korea imports a large portion of its energy and raw materials.

When the won weakens, import prices rise, and that eventually feeds into the cost of living.

That is why I do not view the Solidigm listing issue as simply a matter of gains and losses for SK hynix shareholders.

I see it as a question of whether the Korean capital market can remain competitive with the United States and other developed markets.

Korean companies may manufacture the world’s best semiconductors, automobiles, and batteries. But if existing shareholders cannot fully participate in the value created by those businesses, Korean equities themselves will inevitably become less competitive as investment products.

The competitiveness of a country’s capital market matters just as much as the industrial competitiveness of its companies.

If SK hynix shareholders shared the downside when Solidigm was struggling, they should also be the first to benefit when Solidigm succeeds.

If there is a genuine need to separate Solidigm, SK hynix should first consider a structure that preserves the economic rights of existing shareholders, as Western Digital did with SanDisk.

SK hynix does not belong solely to the SK Group.

It is one of South Korea’s flagship listed companies, jointly owned by countless shareholders who have invested their own capital.

A company of that stature should hold itself to a higher standard.

If SK hynix sets a good example, other companies may follow. But if even SK hynix opens the door to another duplicate listing, it will give many other companies an easy excuse to do the same.

Chairman Chey Tae-won, Solidigm must never be separately listed.

This is not just about Solidigm.

It is about the rights of SK hynix shareholders, the competitiveness of Korean equities as investment products, and ultimately the direction of the Korean capital market itself.Chairman Chey Tae-won, Solidigm must never be listed separately.

Solidigm’s listing has not been finalized. But once the listing process actually begins, it may already be too late. That is why I believe this issue needs to be raised now.

First, we need to understand what Solidigm actually is.

In 2020, SK hynix decided to acquire Intel’s NAND and SSD business for approximately $9 billion. After completing the first phase of the acquisition in 2021, SK hynix took over Intel’s SSD business and established Solidigm in the United States to operate it.

Put simply, Solidigm is a company that was created as part of SK hynix’s acquisition of Intel’s NAND business.

SK hynix paid a massive acquisition price and subsequently absorbed the losses from the NAND downturn and Solidigm’s weak performance. Ultimately, SK hynix and its shareholders bore that burden together.

Now, however, AI data center investment is accelerating, the enterprise SSD market is expanding, and Solidigm is beginning to generate meaningful profits. If SK hynix were to list Solidigm separately at precisely this point, it would be very difficult for existing shareholders to accept.

If SK hynix carried the burden when Solidigm was losing money, but then spins it off and lists it separately just as the business begins to improve, what exactly were existing shareholders taking that risk for?

Moreover, SK hynix is currently generating enormous operating cash flow from its core business. It is not a company in desperate need of capital, which makes it difficult to understand why it would need to sell part of a high-growth subsidiary to outside investors simply to raise funds through a listing. If additional capital is truly necessary, management should first explain why that need cannot be met through existing cash flow and financial capacity. For a highly profitable company to carve out and list one of its most valuable assets is difficult for shareholders to accept.

SK hynix is also one of South Korea’s flagship companies. A company of this stature should set the standard for the Korean capital market.

If even SK hynix establishes a precedent of separately listing a successful subsidiary, other Korean companies may feel even less hesitation about pursuing similar duplicate listings. The Korean stock market could end up in an even worse state than it is today.

An IPO is not free financing.

It means selling part of a company to new investors.

As long as Solidigm remains a wholly owned subsidiary of SK hynix, the profits and cash flows it generates ultimately belong to SK hynix shareholders. If outside investors are brought in and Solidigm is separately listed, those future profits must also be shared with them.

Of course, the situation would be different if the capital raised through a listing could create significantly more value than the dilution it causes.

But in that case, SK hynix should at least explain why listing Solidigm would be more beneficial to existing SK hynix shareholders than continuing to own 100% of the company.

If that cannot be demonstrated with numbers, there is little reason to pursue the listing.

The contrast becomes even clearer when we look at SanDisk.

When Western Digital separated its NAND business into SanDisk, it distributed SanDisk shares to existing Western Digital shareholders.

The business was separated, but the economic rights of existing shareholders followed with it.

The issue is not the separation of a business itself. The issue is how the rights of existing shareholders are treated in the process.

If separating Solidigm is truly necessary, SK hynix should first consider a structure similar to SanDisk, where existing SK hynix shareholders can directly retain the economic value of Solidigm.

Listing Solidigm after bringing in outside investors, while giving existing shareholders no direct rights to the company, would be a completely different matter.

Some argue that Solidigm could receive a much higher valuation if it were listed in the United States.

I believe that argument is even more dangerous.

It is not very different from saying that because a good business cannot receive an appropriate valuation in Korea, it should simply be carved out and listed in the United States instead.

If every successful business is separately listed and the economic interests of parent-company shareholders are reduced each time, investors will naturally apply a discount to the parent company from the beginning.

In that sense, duplicate listings do not solve the Korea Discount. They can become one of the reasons the Korea Discount exists in the first place.

The way to address the Korea Discount is not to send attractive assets to the U.S. market. It is to raise shareholder rights and capital allocation standards at Korean listed companies to the level of leading global companies.

Berkshire Hathaway offers a useful contrast.

Warren Buffett earned the long-term trust of shareholders not simply because he was a successful investor.

He consistently explained how the company used its capital, why it held cash, and what principles guided its investment decisions.

As a result, shareholders were not uncomfortable with Berkshire holding large amounts of cash.

They trusted management to use that capital in the interests of shareholders.

Good governance ultimately begins with a simple question:

Does management truly treat the company’s money as shareholders’ money?

The same question applies to Solidigm.

What matters is not whether a transaction benefits the SK Group as a whole, but whether it benefits SK hynix shareholders.

A transaction that makes sense from the perspective of the group does not necessarily make sense for SK hynix shareholders.

I also see this as an issue that goes beyond SK hynix and concerns the Korean capital market as a whole.

The United States is rapidly strengthening the competitiveness of its financial markets.

From dollar stablecoins to tokenized securities, Treasury products, and funds, financial assets are increasingly moving toward a system in which they can be traded more easily over the internet and blockchain-based infrastructure.

The direction is clear: make it easier for people around the world to hold dollars and invest in dollar-denominated assets.

The barriers to investing in U.S. stocks and U.S. financial products are likely to become even lower in the future.

That means Korean equities must compete with U.S. equities as financial products.

If U.S. companies separate businesses while preserving the rights of existing shareholders, while Korean companies repeatedly list successful subsidiaries without giving existing shareholders anything in return, the investor’s choice becomes obvious.

There will simply be less reason to own Korean stocks.

When Korean investors sell domestic assets and buy U.S. stocks, they also have to sell won and buy dollars.

Of course, a Solidigm listing alone would not cause the exchange rate to surge.

But if cases like this continue to weaken the attractiveness of Korean equities and domestic capital keeps moving overseas, the situation becomes different.

Structural demand for dollars can continue to increase.

For now, the semiconductor supercycle is allowing companies such as Samsung Electronics and SK hynix to earn enormous amounts of foreign currency through exports.

But semiconductor conditions will not remain strong forever.

If the semiconductor cycle eventually turns down and dollar inflows from exports decline while Korean investors continue increasing their overseas investments, the won-dollar exchange rate could become significantly more unstable.

And a weaker won does not affect only the stock market.

South Korea imports a large portion of its energy and raw materials.

When the won weakens, import prices rise, and that eventually feeds into the cost of living.

That is why I do not view the Solidigm listing issue as simply a matter of gains and losses for SK hynix shareholders.

I see it as a question of whether the Korean capital market can remain competitive with the United States and other developed markets.

Korean companies may manufacture the world’s best semiconductors, automobiles, and batteries. But if existing shareholders cannot fully participate in the value created by those businesses, Korean equities themselves will inevitably become less competitive as investment products.

The competitiveness of a country’s capital market matters just as much as the industrial competitiveness of its companies.

If SK hynix shareholders shared the downside when Solidigm was struggling, they should also be the first to benefit when Solidigm succeeds.

If there is a genuine need to separate Solidigm, SK hynix should first consider a structure that preserves the economic rights of existing shareholders, as Western Digital did with SanDisk.

SK hynix does not belong solely to the SK Group.

It is one of South Korea’s flagship listed companies, jointly owned by countless shareholders who have invested their own capital.

A company of that stature should hold itself to a higher standard.

If SK hynix sets a good example, other companies may follow. But if even SK hynix opens the door to another duplicate listing, it will give many other companies an easy excuse to do the same.

Chairman Chey Tae-won, Solidigm must never be separately listed.

This is not just about Solidigm.

It is about the rights of SK hynix shareholders, the competitiveness of Korean equities as investment products, and ultimately the direction of the Korean capital market itself.

[AlphaBet @Flex_AlphaBet]

I got inspired this morning and just had to write it, lol.

[AlphaBet @Flex_AlphaBet]

Chairman Chey Tae-won, Solidigm must never be listed separately.

Solidigm’s listing has not been finalized. But once the listing process actually begins, it may already be too late. That is why I believe this issue needs to be raised now.

First, we need to understand what Solidigm actually is.

In 2020, SK hynix decided to acquire Intel’s NAND and SSD business for approximately $9 billion. After completing the first phase of the acquisition in 2021, SK hynix took over Intel’s SSD business and established Solidigm in the United States to operate it.

Put simply, Solidigm is a company that was created as part of SK hynix’s acquisition of Intel’s NAND business.

SK hynix paid a massive acquisition price and subsequently absorbed the losses from the NAND downturn and Solidigm’s weak performance. Ultimately, SK hynix and its shareholders bore that burden together.

Now, however, AI data center investment is accelerating, the enterprise SSD market is expanding, and Solidigm is beginning to generate meaningful profits. If SK hynix were to list Solidigm separately at precisely this point, it would be very difficult for existing shareholders to accept.

If SK hynix carried the burden when Solidigm was losing money, but then spins it off and lists it separately just as the business begins to improve, what exactly were existing shareholders taking that risk for?

Moreover, SK hynix is currently generating enormous operating cash flow from its core business. It is not a company in desperate need of capital, which makes it difficult to understand why it would need to sell part of a high-growth subsidiary to outside investors simply to raise funds through a listing.

If additional capital is truly necessary, management should first explain why that need cannot be met through existing cash flow and financial capacity. For a highly profitable company to carve out and list one of its most valuable assets is difficult for shareholders to accept.

SK hynix is also one of South Korea’s flagship companies. A company of this stature should set the standard for the Korean capital market.

If even SK hynix establishes a precedent of separately listing a successful subsidiary, other Korean companies may feel even less hesitation about pursuing similar duplicate listings. The Korean stock market could end up in an even worse state than it is today.

An IPO is not free financing.

It means selling part of a company to new investors.

As long as Solidigm remains a wholly owned subsidiary of SK hynix, the profits and cash flows it generates ultimately belong to SK hynix shareholders. If outside investors are brought in and Solidigm is separately listed, those future profits must also be shared with them.

Of course, the situation would be different if the capital raised through a listing could create significantly more value than the dilution it causes.

But in that case, SK hynix should at least explain why listing Solidigm would be more beneficial to existing SK hynix shareholders than continuing to own 100% of the company.

If that cannot be demonstrated with numbers, there is little reason to pursue the listing.

The contrast becomes even clearer when we look at SanDisk.

When Western Digital separated its NAND business into SanDisk, it distributed SanDisk shares to existing Western Digital shareholders.

The business was separated, but the economic rights of existing shareholders followed with it.

The issue is not the separation of a business itself. The issue is how the rights of existing shareholders are treated in the process.

If separating Solidigm is truly necessary, SK hynix should first consider a structure similar to SanDisk, where existing SK hynix shareholders can directly retain the economic value of Solidigm.

Listing Solidigm after bringing in outside investors, while giving existing shareholders no direct rights to the company, would be a completely different matter.

Some argue that Solidigm could receive a much higher valuation if it were listed in the United States.

I believe that argument is even more dangerous.

It is not very different from saying that because a good business cannot receive an appropriate valuation in Korea, it should simply be carved out and listed in the United States instead.

If every successful business is separately listed and the economic interests of parent-company shareholders are reduced each time, investors will naturally apply a discount to the parent company from the beginning.

In that sense, duplicate listings do not solve the Korea Discount. They can become one of the reasons the Korea Discount exists in the first place.

The way to address the Korea Discount is not to send attractive assets to the U.S. market. It is to raise shareholder rights and capital allocation standards at Korean listed companies to the level of leading global companies.

Berkshire Hathaway offers a useful contrast.

Warren Buffett earned the long-term trust of shareholders not simply because he was a successful investor.

He consistently explained how the company used its capital, why it held cash, and what principles guided its investment decisions.

As a result, shareholders were not uncomfortable with Berkshire holding large amounts of cash.

They trusted management to use that capital in the interests of shareholders.

Good governance ultimately begins with a simple question:

Does management truly treat the company’s money as shareholders’ money?

The same question applies to Solidigm.

What matters is not whether a transaction benefits the SK Group as a whole, but whether it benefits SK hynix shareholders.

A transaction that makes sense from the perspective of the group does not necessarily make sense for SK hynix shareholders.

I also see this as an issue that goes beyond SK hynix and concerns the Korean capital market as a whole.

The United States is rapidly strengthening the competitiveness of its financial markets.

From dollar stablecoins to tokenized securities, Treasury products, and funds, financial assets are increasingly moving toward a system in which they can be traded more easily over the internet and blockchain-based infrastructure.

The direction is clear: make it easier for people around the world to hold dollars and invest in dollar-denominated assets.

The barriers to investing in U.S. stocks and U.S. financial products are likely to become even lower in the future.

That means Korean equities must compete with U.S. equities as financial products.

If U.S. companies separate businesses while preserving the rights of existing shareholders, while Korean companies repeatedly list successful subsidiaries without giving existing shareholders anything in return, the investor’s choice becomes obvious.

There will simply be less reason to own Korean stocks.

When Korean investors sell domestic assets and buy U.S. stocks, they also have to sell won and buy dollars.

Of course, a Solidigm listing alone would not cause the exchange rate to surge.

But if cases like this continue to weaken the attractiveness of Korean equities and domestic capital keeps moving overseas, the situation becomes different.

Structural demand for dollars can continue to increase.

For now, the semiconductor supercycle is allowing companies such as Samsung Electronics and SK hynix to earn enormous amounts of foreign currency through exports.

But semiconductor conditions will not remain strong forever.

If the semiconductor cycle eventually turns down and dollar inflows from exports decline while Korean investors continue increasing their overseas investments, the won-dollar exchange rate could become significantly more unstable.

And a weaker won does not affect only the stock market.

South Korea imports a large portion of its energy and raw materials.

When the won weakens, import prices rise, and that eventually feeds into the cost of living.

That is why I do not view the Solidigm listing issue as simply a matter of gains and losses for SK hynix shareholders.

I see it as a question of whether the Korean capital market can remain competitive with the United States and other developed markets.

Korean companies may manufacture the world’s best semiconductors, automobiles, and batteries. But if existing shareholders cannot fully participate in the value created by those businesses, Korean equities themselves will inevitably become less competitive as investment products.

The competitiveness of a country’s capital market matters just as much as the industrial competitiveness of its companies.

If SK hynix shareholders shared the downside when Solidigm was struggling, they should also be the first to benefit when Solidigm succeeds.

If there is a genuine need to separate Solidigm, SK hynix should first consider a structure that preserves the economic rights of existing shareholders, as Western Digital did with SanDisk.

SK hynix does not belong solely to the SK Group.

It is one of South Korea’s flagship listed companies, jointly owned by countless shareholders who have invested their own capital.

A company of that stature should hold itself to a higher standard.

If SK hynix sets a good example, other companies may follow. But if even SK hynix opens the door to another duplicate listing, it will give many other companies an easy excuse to do the same.

Chairman Chey Tae-won, Solidigm must never be separately listed.

This is not just about Solidigm.

It is about the rights of SK hynix shareholders, the competitiveness of Korean equities as investment products, and ultimately the direction of the Korean capital market itself.Chairman Chey Tae-won, Solidigm must never be listed separately.

Solidigm’s listing has not been finalized. But once the listing process actually begins, it may already be too late. That is why I believe this issue needs to be raised now.

First, we need to understand what Solidigm actually is.

In 2020, SK hynix decided to acquire Intel’s NAND and SSD business for approximately $9 billion. After completing the first phase of the acquisition in 2021, SK hynix took over Intel’s SSD business and established Solidigm in the United States to operate it.

Put simply, Solidigm is a company that was created as part of SK hynix’s acquisition of Intel’s NAND business.

SK hynix paid a massive acquisition price and subsequently absorbed the losses from the NAND downturn and Solidigm’s weak performance. Ultimately, SK hynix and its shareholders bore that burden together.

Now, however, AI data center investment is accelerating, the enterprise SSD market is expanding, and Solidigm is beginning to generate meaningful profits. If SK hynix were to list Solidigm separately at precisely this point, it would be very difficult for existing shareholders to accept.

If SK hynix carried the burden when Solidigm was losing money, but then spins it off and lists it separately just as the business begins to improve, what exactly were existing shareholders taking that risk for?

Moreover, SK hynix is currently generating enormous operating cash flow from its core business. It is not a company in desperate need of capital, which makes it difficult to understand why it would need to sell part of a high-growth subsidiary to outside investors simply to raise funds through a listing. If additional capital is truly necessary, management should first explain why that need cannot be met through existing cash flow and financial capacity. For a highly profitable company to carve out and list one of its most valuable assets is difficult for shareholders to accept.

SK hynix is also one of South Korea’s flagship companies. A company of this stature should set the standard for the Korean capital market.

If even SK hynix establishes a precedent of separately listing a successful subsidiary, other Korean companies may feel even less hesitation about pursuing similar duplicate listings. The Korean stock market could end up in an even worse state than it is today.

An IPO is not free financing.

It means selling part of a company to new investors.

As long as Solidigm remains a wholly owned subsidiary of SK hynix, the profits and cash flows it generates ultimately belong to SK hynix shareholders. If outside investors are brought in and Solidigm is separately listed, those future profits must also be shared with them.

Of course, the situation would be different if the capital raised through a listing could create significantly more value than the dilution it causes.

But in that case, SK hynix should at least explain why listing Solidigm would be more beneficial to existing SK hynix shareholders than continuing to own 100% of the company.

If that cannot be demonstrated with numbers, there is little reason to pursue the listing.

The contrast becomes even clearer when we look at SanDisk.

When Western Digital separated its NAND business into SanDisk, it distributed SanDisk shares to existing Western Digital shareholders.

The business was separated, but the economic rights of existing shareholders followed with it.

The issue is not the separation of a business itself. The issue is how the rights of existing shareholders are treated in the process.

If separating Solidigm is truly necessary, SK hynix should first consider a structure similar to SanDisk, where existing SK hynix shareholders can directly retain the economic value of Solidigm.

Listing Solidigm after bringing in outside investors, while giving existing shareholders no direct rights to the company, would be a completely different matter.

Some argue that Solidigm could receive a much higher valuation if it were listed in the United States.

I believe that argument is even more dangerous.

It is not very different from saying that because a good business cannot receive an appropriate valuation in Korea, it should simply be carved out and listed in the United States instead.

If every successful business is separately listed and the economic interests of parent-company shareholders are reduced each time, investors will naturally apply a discount to the parent company from the beginning.

In that sense, duplicate listings do not solve the Korea Discount. They can become one of the reasons the Korea Discount exists in the first place.

The way to address the Korea Discount is not to send attractive assets to the U.S. market. It is to raise shareholder rights and capital allocation standards at Korean listed companies to the level of leading global companies.

Berkshire Hathaway offers a useful contrast.

Warren Buffett earned the long-term trust of shareholders not simply because he was a successful investor.

He consistently explained how the company used its capital, why it held cash, and what principles guided its investment decisions.

As a result, shareholders were not uncomfortable with Berkshire holding large amounts of cash.

They trusted management to use that capital in the interests of shareholders.

Good governance ultimately begins with a simple question:

Does management truly treat the company’s money as shareholders’ money?

The same question applies to Solidigm.

What matters is not whether a transaction benefits the SK Group as a whole, but whether it benefits SK hynix shareholders.

A transaction that makes sense from the perspective of the group does not necessarily make sense for SK hynix shareholders.

I also see this as an issue that goes beyond SK hynix and concerns the Korean capital market as a whole.

The United States is rapidly strengthening the competitiveness of its financial markets.

From dollar stablecoins to tokenized securities, Treasury products, and funds, financial assets are increasingly moving toward a system in which they can be traded more easily over the internet and blockchain-based infrastructure.

The direction is clear: make it easier for people around the world to hold dollars and invest in dollar-denominated assets.

The barriers to investing in U.S. stocks and U.S. financial products are likely to become even lower in the future.

That means Korean equities must compete with U.S. equities as financial products.

If U.S. companies separate businesses while preserving the rights of existing shareholders, while Korean companies repeatedly list successful subsidiaries without giving existing shareholders anything in return, the investor’s choice becomes obvious.

There will simply be less reason to own Korean stocks.

When Korean investors sell domestic assets and buy U.S. stocks, they also have to sell won and buy dollars.

Of course, a Solidigm listing alone would not cause the exchange rate to surge.

But if cases like this continue to weaken the attractiveness of Korean equities and domestic capital keeps moving overseas, the situation becomes different.

Structural demand for dollars can continue to increase.

For now, the semiconductor supercycle is allowing companies such as Samsung Electronics and SK hynix to earn enormous amounts of foreign currency through exports.

But semiconductor conditions will not remain strong forever.

If the semiconductor cycle eventually turns down and dollar inflows from exports decline while Korean investors continue increasing their overseas investments, the won-dollar exchange rate could become significantly more unstable.

And a weaker won does not affect only the stock market.

South Korea imports a large portion of its energy and raw materials.

When the won weakens, import prices rise, and that eventually feeds into the cost of living.

That is why I do not view the Solidigm listing issue as simply a matter of gains and losses for SK hynix shareholders.

I see it as a question of whether the Korean capital market can remain competitive with the United States and other developed markets.

Korean companies may manufacture the world’s best semiconductors, automobiles, and batteries. But if existing shareholders cannot fully participate in the value created by those businesses, Korean equities themselves will inevitably become less competitive as investment products.

The competitiveness of a country’s capital market matters just as much as the industrial competitiveness of its companies.

If SK hynix shareholders shared the downside when Solidigm was struggling, they should also be the first to benefit when Solidigm succeeds.

If there is a genuine need to separate Solidigm, SK hynix should first consider a structure that preserves the economic rights of existing shareholders, as Western Digital did with SanDisk.

SK hynix does not belong solely to the SK Group.

It is one of South Korea’s flagship listed companies, jointly owned by countless shareholders who have invested their own capital.

A company of that stature should hold itself to a higher standard.

If SK hynix sets a good example, other companies may follow. But if even SK hynix opens the door to another duplicate listing, it will give many other companies an easy excuse to do the same.

Chairman Chey Tae-won, Solidigm must never be separately listed.

This is not just about Solidigm.

It is about the rights of SK hynix shareholders, the competitiveness of Korean equities as investment products, and ultimately the direction of the Korean capital market itself.