🇺🇦🇷🇺
La Russie…
….pays producteurs et exportateurs de pétroles/hydrocarbures….
….dont 30 à 50 % des recettes du budget fédéral sont liées à l’exploitation du pétrole…
…..impose partout des restrictions massives sur les carburants
Bravo Poutine, brillant
💥 Девушка из Читы говорит: «Люди живут вокруг заправок. Очереди на заправки — 5 км: люди стоят там сутками. Скоро начнут бить и убивать друг друга, в очередях будут умирать. Светлого будущего при этой власти нет».
Another morning starts with both morning coffee and Russian skies an inky black. ☕️
The refinery in Slavyansk-on-Kuban is burning fiercely with a smoke plume over 100km in length, and the fuel shortages will keep getting worse.
Putin's swansong is getting closer. 🩰🦢🦢🦢🦢
Russian she-vatnik says they've spent 1.5 days in a line at gas station.
They've spent a night in a car just not to lose their spot.
The line isn't moving.
Good. Sanctions are working.
"It looks either like the sudden beginning of a war—or its dramatic end."
What has been happening in the Russia–Ukraine war this June evokes some of the darkest chapters of Russian and Soviet history: a sudden escalation in which a qualitatively superior force attacks a much larger, but significantly less organized army.
The issue is not that responsibility for the war rests with Russia and its leadership, or that the war itself has already been going on for years. Rather, the author argues that Ukraine's apparent ability to gain superiority in what is now the most important domain—the air—and to strike military and civilian infrastructure at the operational and strategic levels has fundamentally changed the battlefield. According to the author, this has created a new reality deep inside Russia, disrupting military operations without the need to break through heavily fortified front-line positions. It resembles either the sudden outbreak of a war or its rapid conclusion.
The author claims that Ukrainian strike drones now effectively control Russian airspace as far as the Ural Mountains, while Russia's air defense network has reportedly been reduced to a handful of heavily defended positions with dwindling missile supplies. This, the author argues, gives Ukraine the ability to strike almost any target on a nightly basis.
As examples, the author cites reported attacks on two satellite communications centers near Moscow and in the Vladimir region, including expensive imported antenna systems allegedly used by the Russian General Staff to communicate with deployed forces.
The article further claims that military depots, defense factories, warships, air defense systems, oil refineries, fuel depots, electrical substations, and gas compressor stations are being struck in large numbers. It also alleges that freight traffic has been severely disrupted in several Russian-occupied regions.
According to the author, the emergency measures introduced in Crimea and Sevastopol will likely spread to other occupied territories and southern Russian regions, and that Russian forces may be forced to retreat from positions that become difficult to supply.
The author argues that the more significant question is how quickly a broader socio-economic crisis could spread throughout Russia if fuel shortages worsen. They contend that such shortages would affect agriculture, transportation, small and medium-sized businesses, logistics, retail, emergency generators, and workers who rely on personal vehicles to commute.
The author suggests that such disruption could unfold within days if fuel supplies continue to deteriorate. While emergency reserves might temporarily ease the crisis, they question where additional fuel would come from afterward, especially if shortages spread across Russia.
The article also argues that importing fuel would be difficult because of sanctions, geopolitical tensions, and the vulnerability of transportation infrastructure. It further speculates that Belarus, previously an important supplier, could suspend deliveries under pressure from Kyiv or to protect its own refining capacity.
The author concludes that, while there may ultimately be a limit to how severe the crisis can become, that limit is not yet visible—and argues that Russia is moving toward it at an accelerating pace.
Our warriors began Ukraine’s Constitution Day with great accuracy. Last night, our long-range sanctions reached two oil refineries in Russia. The Slavyansk oil refinery in the Krasnodar region was hit �� about 300 kilometers from the frontline. We also reached a refinery in the Yaroslavl region, approximately 700 kilometers from our border.
We continue our operations that weaken Russia’s ability to wage this war. Each of our long-range sanctions means fewer resources serving Russia’s war machine, and another step toward peace. We will continue to respond to Russian terror. I thank our warriors for these results! I am grateful to everyone who helps us. Everyone who defends Ukraine also upholds the power of the Constitution.
- Kaja Kallas:
"The only language the Kremlin understands is strength.
...
This is what Russia does. Because it is not really gaining ground on the battlefield. So, what they are doing now is really increasing the terrorist attacks, because you cannot really describe it in other ways: creating fear inside the society. It has not worked for four years, but I do not think that it is going to work now."
России за последние 100 лет на руководителей не везло: или кровавые маньяки, или тупые придурки. Но такое трусливое и вороватое ничтоже��тво как Путин — это реальное днище.
Is Putin ready for real peace negotiations? No. But he can be forced.
Putin is being forced not only by the diplomatic efforts of President Trump and EU leaders, but above all by Ukrainian drones and missiles that are already flying over Moscow and blocking Crimea.
Ukraine has recently strengthened its negotiating position. It has cards and the determination.