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➡️ That trend is very important to the negotiations. Each incremental increase in exports outside of Iran's control simultaneously: 1⃣ pushes out the tank-bottom date (that's the real deadline for the US, not the midterm elections), and 2⃣ lowers the value of Iran's own blockade. ➡️ In other words, if (if!) Persian Gulf exports are increasing steadily, every day that passes the US side gets a bit more time to negotiate while the Iranian position deteriorates. ➡️ The main questions are: (1) what is the actual level of daily exits of crude and refined products?, and (2) How fast are they increasing. We have seen all sorts of numbers put out over the last 48 hours on this, and my confidence in any of them is low. ➡️Meanwhile, tank bottoms will still likely be hit in the relatively near future, so Iran may still feel relatively secure in its position even if the trend is somewhat moving against them. #oott

➡️ There are a lot of interesting details in this article. Here are 3: 1⃣ Key takeaway is in the title "Russian seaborne crude exports show little signs of slowing". We agree, and note refined product exports were more robust than we expected, given everything. 2⃣ "Russian seaborne diesel exports fell to 740kbd, 26% lower y/y", o/w ~110kbd is due to "close to no diesel cargoes exported from Tuapse in May" after repeated strikes in late April. It is Russian diesel exports that should concern barrel counters. Even reduced, 740kbd is still a lot of supply at risk as drone strikes continue, and as the government mulls a diesel export ban. 3⃣ "Six refineries attacked in May went into full outage, reflecting a total of 1.5mbd of CDU capacity affected." We come up with a slightly different sum, and including Tuapse (which went offline in April), the total was 1.65mmbpd. However, a number of these plants have subsequently restarted, according to data from Seala. #oott #Russia