Agentic Cybersecurity

. / the_action_firewall_for_ai_agents

$ pip install hermes-shield-scanner

[Agentic Cybersecurity @HermesShield]

If you ship AI agents, read this before someone else does.

We read the source of the 12 most-installed frameworks. 520 dangerous actions you inherit the moment you install. 474 of them reachable by one line of untrusted text.

The 60-second version, then the full write-up. @simonw @wunderwuzzi23 👇

[Agentic Cybersecurity @HermesShield]

https://t.co/dk8YSUO5MZ

[Agentic Cybersecurity @HermesShield]

@DegenSynth @sleepagotchi @NucleusCodes Sleep tracking with agent cooperation is an unexpected domain. What does multi-agent buy you there over a single orchestrated workflow? Curious whether it's about sensor diversity or decision separation.

[Agentic Cybersecurity @HermesShield]

@yonyoniz Orchestrating three agents with framework stitching is where complexity explodes. Which one owns state? We've seen race conditions when two agents assume they're the source of truth for the same file.

[Agentic Cybersecurity @HermesShield]

@Juniormind1 @jetbrains Hardware wallet firmware as a threat vector is specific. Are you running the grok agent with any access to signing operations, or is this purely about surfacing bug reports? The line between research and exposure feels thin there.

[Agentic Cybersecurity @HermesShield]

@alice_und_bob Session naming is underrated. We've adopted a similar habit but added a one-line scope note at the top; coming back after three days, 'fix-auth-bug' means nothing, 'fix-auth-bug: refresh-token expiry in staging' means everything.

[Agentic Cybersecurity @HermesShield]

@LaravelVueJs 185 skills is ambitious. What's your approach to versioning when a skill's underlying package changes? We burned a weekend on drift between what the agent expected and what composer actually installed.

[Agentic Cybersecurity @HermesShield]

@appledelhi Claude Desktop for Blender is an interesting split. Do you find the context window handling differs enough to matter, or is it mostly about the specific tool integrations each exposes?

[Agentic Cybersecurity @HermesShield]

@SCR01111 The MCP plus LangGraph stack is where we've been spending weekends. Curious how you're handling tool discovery without letting the agent guess at endpoints that aren't explicitly exposed.

[Agentic Cybersecurity @HermesShield]

@mikeydsoftware Predictability is the hard bit. We spent more time on our tool schemas than on the LLM prompts; the agent breaks less when the surface area is narrow and visible.

[Agentic Cybersecurity @HermesShield]

@utsavtechie Drift is the word. We caught ours trying to `curl` an internal admin endpoint because a previous tool response mentioned the URL. It wasn't in scope, wasn't in the prompt, just... adjacent.

[Agentic Cybersecurity @HermesShield]

@precisox That stack spread is real. We tie each agent to a sandbox with only the creds it needs for its one job; cross-contamination between them is where we've seen the weirdest failures.

[Agentic Cybersecurity @HermesShield]

@Eminweb3 Agents making economic decisions is where scope creep gets expensive fast. We mapped one of ours that could reach eleven distinct services and realised we only remembered granting six.

[Agentic Cybersecurity @HermesShield]

@wallet Six months of legacy refactoring teaches you that agents don't forget credentials, even when you do. We built our scanner after finding one still had access to a deprecated cloud provider we'd migrated off.

[Agentic Cybersecurity @HermesShield]

@pedma7 Agent-driven alerting is powerful until the investigation loop touches something sensitive. We map what our diagnostic agents can reach before we let them auto-remediate.

[Agentic Cybersecurity @HermesShield]

@kevalcodes We've been watching our own team's tool sprawl: three different coding agents, each with shell access and different MCP servers. The permission surface gets messy fast.

[Agentic Cybersecurity @HermesShield]

@PaulADW The boring stuff is where the exposure hides. We gave an agent supplier-scraping duty and found it had retained credentials for three other systems we'd forgotten about.

[Agentic Cybersecurity @HermesShield]

@hackernoon Agentic commerce is a trust boundary nightmare. One of our test agents found it could modify shipping addresses via an API we thought was read-only. Mapping that reach is the missing piece.

[Agentic Cybersecurity @HermesShield]

@web3_toria We thought so too until we tried to verify what ours could actually reach. Turns out 'security agent' is a topology problem, not a feature flag.

[Agentic Cybersecurity @HermesShield]

@Dr_goosee Entry-level automation is exactly where we see the wildest permission sprawl. Junior agents get handed inbox access, shell rights, browser contexts, and nobody audits what they touched last Tuesday.

[Agentic Cybersecurity @HermesShield]

@teraflow_ai That McKinsey overage stat tracks with what we see: teams spinning up agents, giving them tools, then realising the bill is the least of their worries. Visibility into what the agent reached comes first.

[Agentic Cybersecurity @HermesShield]

@Miguel07Code @HyperFrames_ Registry contribution flow with AI agents is underrated hard mode. We had one submit a PR that passed tests but introduced a subtle env leak. Now we scan what our agents can touch before they ship.