So… your resume shows
your lack of knowledge, education of human values, the ignorance af ancient philosophical questions.
In Europe - legal systems under Roman Law (Corpus Iuris / Ius Romanum an oxymoron because it was at those times the only one - however I am not sure you get it) - you wouldn’t be able to pass the first semester.
Your legal system is a farce - a spit in the face. In Europe a real wound in the body of democracy! The third world!
So to explain you - for example - that the so called victims didn’t dare to come to the light is not the mistake of the so called raper but the system - it would be margaritas ante porcos
I assume you don’t have a clue what I mean (use google translate)!
The jury system itself seems to be a joke! Against any democratic, humanitarian, professional logic.
Therefore I reported your undereducated (my humble opinion if I am still allowed!) judge!
Look at that! This is how we - in Europe humanitarian minds think:
Judicial Conduct Investigations Office
Subject: Complaint regarding the personal conduct of Mr Justice Bennathan – sentencing hearing, R v Russell Brand, Southwark Crown Court, 9 November 2026
Dear Sir or Madam,
I wish to make a complaint about the personal conduct of Mr Justice Joel Bennathan in the language he used when delivering his sentencing remarks in R v Russell Brand at Southwark Crown Court on 9 November 2026.
I understand that the JCIO does not review judicial decisions, and I do not ask you to consider the sentence itself. My complaint concerns the manner and language of the judge's remarks, which in my view fell short of the standards of impartiality and courtesy set out in the Guide to Judicial Conduct.
1. Present-tense stigmatisation contrary to the judge's own findings
At paragraph 16 of his published remarks, the judge accepted that there is “no sound evidential basis” to conclude that Mr Brand poses a risk for the future. At paragraph 15 he acknowledged seventeen years without offending and a life spent “doing good work”. Yet at paragraph 14(4) he addressed Mr Brand in the present tense as one of the “sexual predators like you, Russell Brand”.
To describe a man in the present tense as a predator, while finding in the same remarks that he poses no present risk, goes beyond the judicial task of describing past conduct. A fair-minded and informed observer could regard it as personal condemnation rather than restrained judicial expression.
2. Emotive personal language
The remarks also contain strongly emotive personal characterisations, including “staggering arrogance” (paragraph 13) and the statement that an episode “reeks of casual disrespect” (paragraph 13). Taken together with the above, this language gives the impression of a judge expressing personal moral disapproval rather than dispassionately applying the law.
3. Criticism of the defendant for exercising his right to a defence
At paragraph 17, the judge stated that the complainants had to face being told they had lied or twisted the truth, and that “that was all done because of you, on your instructions”. Although he added that he did not increase the sentence for this reason, the remark nonetheless reproaches the defendant for exercising his fundamental right to plead not guilty and to have the evidence against him tested. At paragraph 6 he also described the defendant's evidence as “one of a series of lies you told”. Such language, in my view, risks giving the impression that the exercise of the right to a defence is itself held against an accused person.
4. Justice must be seen to be done
It is a long-established principle of English law that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done (R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256). The test of apparent bias set out in Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67 asks whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias… (read more)
Judicial Conduct Investigations Office
Subject: Complaint regarding the personal conduct of Mr Justice Bennathan – sentencing hearing, R v Russell Brand, Southwark Crown Court, 9 November 2026
Dear Sir or Madam,
I wish to make a complaint about the personal conduct of Mr Justice Joel Bennathan in the language he used when delivering his sentencing remarks in R v Russell Brand at Southwark Crown Court on 9 November 2026.
I understand that the JCIO does not review judicial decisions, and I do not ask you to consider the sentence itself. My complaint concerns the manner and language of the judge's remarks, which in my view fell short of the standards of impartiality and courtesy set out in the Guide to Judicial Conduct.
1. Present-tense stigmatisation contrary to the judge's own findings
At paragraph 16 of his published remarks, the judge accepted that there is “no sound evidential basis” to conclude that Mr Brand poses a risk for the future. At paragraph 15 he acknowledged seventeen years without offending and a life spent “doing good work”. Yet at paragraph 14(4) he addressed Mr Brand in the present tense as one of the “sexual predators like you, Russell Brand”.
To describe a man in the present tense as a predator, while finding in the same remarks that he poses no present risk, goes beyond the judicial task of describing past conduct. A fair-minded and informed observer could regard it as personal condemnation rather than restrained judicial expression.
2. Emotive personal language
The remarks also contain strongly emotive personal characterisations, including “staggering arrogance” (paragraph 13) and the statement that an episode “reeks of casual disrespect” (paragraph 13). Taken together with the above, this language gives the impression of a judge expressing personal moral disapproval rather than dispassionately applying the law.
3. Criticism of the defendant for exercising his right to a defence
At paragraph 17, the judge stated that the complainants had to face being told they had lied or twisted the truth, and that “that was all done because of you, on your instructions”. Although he added that he did not increase the sentence for this reason, the remark nonetheless reproaches the defendant for exercising his fundamental right to plead not guilty and to have the evidence against him tested. At paragraph 6 he also described the defendant's evidence as “one of a series of lies you told”. Such language, in my view, risks giving the impression that the exercise of the right to a defence is itself held against an accused person.
4. Justice must be seen to be done
It is a long-established principle of English law that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done (R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256). The test of apparent bias set out in Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67 asks whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. In my respectful view, the language described above does not meet the standard of visible impartiality that this principle requires.
I have no personal, financial or political interest in this case. I raise this complaint solely out of concern for public confidence in the restraint and impartiality expected of the judiciary.
The sentencing remarks are published at: https://t.co/SwC3axnTsV
Yours faithfully,
@Those3Amigos@FreeRusselBrand That’s your problem to cope with. I hope you have the same solidarity pr0stitutes that do the same things for money and not for fame + money. The so called “victim” are the worst scum. Greedy and manipulative. Saying me a real(!) rape victim. Not those that are faking it.
Your country is not a democracy so therefore it is full of ill minds like you. Therefore you have such ill legal system with bad and illogical lawyers, judges and state attorneys. Your country and its way of functioning have no relation to humanity, ancient cultures. One time pirate always pirate.
Really? Look at that!
Judicial Conduct Investigations Office
Subject: Complaint regarding the personal conduct of Mr Justice Bennathan – sentencing hearing, R v Russell Brand, Southwark Crown Court, 9 November 2026
Dear Sir or Madam,
I wish to make a complaint about the personal conduct of Mr Justice Joel Bennathan in the language he used when delivering his sentencing remarks in R v Russell Brand at Southwark Crown Court on 9 November 2026.
I understand that the JCIO does not review judicial decisions, and I do not ask you to consider the sentence itself. My complaint concerns the manner and language of the judge's remarks, which in my view fell short of the standards of impartiality and courtesy set out in the Guide to Judicial Conduct.
1. Present-tense stigmatisation contrary to the judge's own findings
At paragraph 16 of his published remarks, the judge accepted that there is “no sound evidential basis” to conclude that Mr Brand poses a risk for the future. At paragraph 15 he acknowledged seventeen years without offending and a life spent “doing good work”. Yet at paragraph 14(4) he addressed Mr Brand in the present tense as one of the “sexual predators like you, Russell Brand”.
To describe a man in the present tense as a predator, while finding in the same remarks that he poses no present risk, goes beyond the judicial task of describing past conduct. A fair-minded and informed observer could regard it as personal condemnation rather than restrained judicial expression.
2. Emotive personal language
The remarks also contain strongly emotive personal characterisations, including “staggering arrogance” (paragraph 13) and the statement that an episode “reeks of casual disrespect” (paragraph 13). Taken together with the above, this language gives the impression of a judge expressing personal moral disapproval rather than dispassionately applying the law.
3. Criticism of the defendant for exercising his right to a defence
At paragraph 17, the judge stated that the complainants had to face being told they had lied or twisted the truth, and that “that was all done because of you, on your instructions”. Although he added that he did not increase the sentence for this reason, the remark nonetheless reproaches the defendant for exercising his fundamental right to plead not guilty and to have the evidence against him tested. At paragraph 6 he also described the defendant's evidence as “one of a series of lies you told”. Such language, in my view, risks giving the impression that the exercise of the right to a defence is itself held against an accused person.
4. Justice must be seen to be done
It is a long-established principle of English law that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done (R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256). The test of apparent bias set out in Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67 asks whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. In my respectful view, the language described above does not meet the standard of visible impartiality that this principle requires.
I have no personal, financial or political interest in this case. I raise this complaint solely out of concern for public confidence in the restraint and impartiality expected of the judiciary.
The sentencing remarks are published at: https://t.co/SwC3axorit
Yours faithfully,
Look at that!
Judicial Conduct Investigations Office
Subject: Complaint regarding the personal conduct of Mr Justice Bennathan – sentencing hearing, R v Russell Brand, Southwark Crown Court, 9 November 2026
Dear Sir or Madam,
I wish to make a complaint about the personal conduct of Mr Justice Joel Bennathan in the language he used when delivering his sentencing remarks in R v Russell Brand at Southwark Crown Court on 9 November 2026.
I understand that the JCIO does not review judicial decisions, and I do not ask you to consider the sentence itself. My complaint concerns the manner and language of the judge's remarks, which in my view fell short of the standards of impartiality and courtesy set out in the Guide to Judicial Conduct.
1. Present-tense stigmatisation contrary to the judge's own findings
At paragraph 16 of his published remarks, the judge accepted that there is “no sound evidential basis” to conclude that Mr Brand poses a risk for the future. At paragraph 15 he acknowledged seventeen years without offending and a life spent “doing good work”. Yet at paragraph 14(4) he addressed Mr Brand in the present tense as one of the “sexual predators like you, Russell Brand”.
To describe a man in the present tense as a predator, while finding in the same remarks that he poses no present risk, goes beyond the judicial task of describing past conduct. A fair-minded and informed observer could regard it as personal condemnation rather than restrained judicial expression.
2. Emotive personal language
The remarks also contain strongly emotive personal characterisations, including “staggering arrogance” (paragraph 13) and the statement that an episode “reeks of casual disrespect” (paragraph 13). Taken together with the above, this language gives the impression of a judge expressing personal moral disapproval rather than dispassionately applying the law.
3. Criticism of the defendant for exercising his right to a defence
At paragraph 17, the judge stated that the complainants had to face being told they had lied or twisted the truth, and that “that was all done because of you, on your instructions”. Although he added that he did not increase the sentence for this reason, the remark nonetheless reproaches the defendant for exercising his fundamental right to plead not guilty and to have the evidence against him tested. At paragraph 6 he also described the defendant's evidence as “one of a series of lies you told”. Such language, in my view, risks giving the impression that the exercise of the right to a defence is itself held against an accused person.
4. Justice must be seen to be done
It is a long-established principle of English law that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done (R v Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256). The test of apparent bias set out in Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67 asks whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. In my respectful view, the language described above does not meet the standard of visible impartiality that this principle requires.
I have no personal, financial or political interest in this case. I raise this complaint solely out of concern for public confidence in the restraint and impartiality expected of the judiciary.
The sentencing remarks are published at: https://t.co/SwC3axnTsV
Yours faithfully,
Judicial Conduct Investigations Office
Subject: Complaint regarding the personal conduct of Mr Justice Bennathan – sentencing hearing, R v Russell Brand, Southwark Crown Court, 9 November 2026
Dear Sir or Madam,
I wish to make a complaint about the personal conduct of Mr. Justice Joel Bennathan in the language he used when delivering his sentencing remarks in R. vs. Russell Brand at Southwark Crown Court on 9 November 2026.
I understand that the JCIO does not review judicial decisions, and I do not ask you to consider the sentence itself. My complaint concerns the manner and language of the judge's remarks, which in my view fell short of the standards of impartiality and courtesy set out in the Guide to Judicial Conduct.
1. Present-tense stigmatisation contrary to the judge's own findings
At paragraph 16 of his published remarks, the judge accepted that there is “no sound evidential basis” to conclude that Mr Brand poses a risk for the future. At paragraph 15 he acknowledged seventeen years without offending and a life spent “doing good work”. Yet at paragraph 14(4) he addressed Mr Brand in the present tense as one of the “sexual predators like you, Russell Brand”.
To describe a man in the present tense as a predator, while finding in the same remarks that he poses no present risk, goes beyond the judicial task of describing past conduct. A fair-minded and informed observer could regard it as personal condemnation rather than restrained judicial expression.
2. Emotive personal language
The remarks also contain strongly emotive personal characterisations, including “staggering arrogance” (paragraph 13) and the statement that an episode “reeks of casual disrespect” (paragraph 13). Taken together with the above, this language gives the impression of a judge expressing personal moral disapproval rather than dispassionately applying the law.
3. Criticism of the defendant for exercising his right to a defence
At paragraph 17, the judge stated that the complainants had to face being told they had lied or twisted the truth, and that “that was all done because of you, on your instructions”. Although he added that he did not increase the sentence for this reason, the remark nonetheless reproaches the defendant for exercising his fundamental right to plead not guilty and to have the evidence against him tested. At paragraph 6 he also described the defendant's evidence as “one of a series of lies you told”. Such language, in my view, risks giving the impression that the exercise of the right to a defence is itself held against an accused person.
4. Justice must be seen to be done
It is a long-established principle of English law that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done (R. vs. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256). The test of apparent bias set out in Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67 asks whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. In my respectful view, the language described above does not meet the standard of visible impartiality that this principle requires.
I have no personal, financial or political interest in this case. I raise this complaint solely out of concern for public confidence in the restraint and impartiality expected of the judiciary.
The sentencing remarks are published at: https://t.co/SwC3axnTsV
Judicial Conduct Investigations Office
Subject: Complaint regarding the personal conduct of Mr Justice Bennathan – sentencing hearing, R v Russell Brand, Southwark Crown Court, 9 November 2026
Dear Sir or Madam,
I wish to make a complaint about the personal conduct of Mr. Justice Joel Bennathan in the language he used when delivering his sentencing remarks in R. vs. Russell Brand at Southwark Crown Court on 9 November 2026.
I understand that the JCIO does not review judicial decisions, and I do not ask you to consider the sentence itself. My complaint concerns the manner and language of the judge's remarks, which in my view fell short of the standards of impartiality and courtesy set out in the Guide to Judicial Conduct.
1. Present-tense stigmatisation contrary to the judge's own findings
At paragraph 16 of his published remarks, the judge accepted that there is “no sound evidential basis” to conclude that Mr Brand poses a risk for the future. At paragraph 15 he acknowledged seventeen years without offending and a life spent “doing good work”. Yet at paragraph 14(4) he addressed Mr Brand in the present tense as one of the “sexual predators like you, Russell Brand”.
To describe a man in the present tense as a predator, while finding in the same remarks that he poses no present risk, goes beyond the judicial task of describing past conduct. A fair-minded and informed observer could regard it as personal condemnation rather than restrained judicial expression.
2. Emotive personal language
The remarks also contain strongly emotive personal characterisations, including “staggering arrogance” (paragraph 13) and the statement that an episode “reeks of casual disrespect” (paragraph 13). Taken together with the above, this language gives the impression of a judge expressing personal moral disapproval rather than dispassionately applying the law.
3. Criticism of the defendant for exercising his right to a defence
At paragraph 17, the judge stated that the complainants had to face being told they had lied or twisted the truth, and that “that was all done because of you, on your instructions”. Although he added that he did not increase the sentence for this reason, the remark nonetheless reproaches the defendant for exercising his fundamental right to plead not guilty and to have the evidence against him tested. At paragraph 6 he also described the defendant's evidence as “one of a series of lies you told”. Such language, in my view, risks giving the impression that the exercise of the right to a defence is itself held against an accused person.
4. Justice must be seen to be done
It is a long-established principle of English law that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done (R. vs. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256). The test of apparent bias set out in Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67 asks whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. In my respectful view, the language described above does not meet the standard of visible impartiality that this principle requires.
I have no personal, financial or political interest in this case. I raise this complaint solely out of concern for public confidence in the restraint and impartiality expected of the judiciary.
The sentencing remarks are published at: https://t.co/SwC3axnTsV
Judicial Conduct Investigations Office
Subject: Complaint regarding the personal conduct of Mr Justice Bennathan – sentencing hearing, R v Russell Brand, Southwark Crown Court, 9 November 2026
Dear Sir or Madam,
I wish to make a complaint about the personal conduct of Mr. Justice Joel Bennathan in the language he used when delivering his sentencing remarks in R. vs. Russell Brand at Southwark Crown Court on 9 November 2026.
I understand that the JCIO does not review judicial decisions, and I do not ask you to consider the sentence itself. My complaint concerns the manner and language of the judge's remarks, which in my view fell short of the standards of impartiality and courtesy set out in the Guide to Judicial Conduct.
1. Present-tense stigmatisation contrary to the judge's own findings
At paragraph 16 of his published remarks, the judge accepted that there is “no sound evidential basis” to conclude that Mr Brand poses a risk for the future. At paragraph 15 he acknowledged seventeen years without offending and a life spent “doing good work”. Yet at paragraph 14(4) he addressed Mr Brand in the present tense as one of the “sexual predators like you, Russell Brand”.
To describe a man in the present tense as a predator, while finding in the same remarks that he poses no present risk, goes beyond the judicial task of describing past conduct. A fair-minded and informed observer could regard it as personal condemnation rather than restrained judicial expression.
2. Emotive personal language
The remarks also contain strongly emotive personal characterisations, including “staggering arrogance” (paragraph 13) and the statement that an episode “reeks of casual disrespect” (paragraph 13). Taken together with the above, this language gives the impression of a judge expressing personal moral disapproval rather than dispassionately applying the law.
3. Criticism of the defendant for exercising his right to a defence
At paragraph 17, the judge stated that the complainants had to face being told they had lied or twisted the truth, and that “that was all done because of you, on your instructions”. Although he added that he did not increase the sentence for this reason, the remark nonetheless reproaches the defendant for exercising his fundamental right to plead not guilty and to have the evidence against him tested. At paragraph 6 he also described the defendant's evidence as “one of a series of lies you told”. Such language, in my view, risks giving the impression that the exercise of the right to a defence is itself held against an accused person.
4. Justice must be seen to be done
It is a long-established principle of English law that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done (R. vs. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256). The test of apparent bias set out in Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67 asks whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. In my respectful view, the language described above does not meet the standard of visible impartiality that this principle requires.
I have no personal, financial or political interest in this case. I raise this complaint solely out of concern for public confidence in the restraint and impartiality expected of the judiciary.
The sentencing remarks are published at: https://t.co/SwC3axnTsV
Judicial Conduct Investigations Office
Subject: Complaint regarding the personal conduct of Mr Justice Bennathan – sentencing hearing, R v Russell Brand, Southwark Crown Court, 9 November 2026
Dear Sir or Madam,
I wish to make a complaint about the personal conduct of Mr. Justice Joel Bennathan in the language he used when delivering his sentencing remarks in R. vs. Russell Brand at Southwark Crown Court on 9 November 2026.
I understand that the JCIO does not review judicial decisions, and I do not ask you to consider the sentence itself. My complaint concerns the manner and language of the judge's remarks, which in my view fell short of the standards of impartiality and courtesy set out in the Guide to Judicial Conduct.
1. Present-tense stigmatisation contrary to the judge's own findings
At paragraph 16 of his published remarks, the judge accepted that there is “no sound evidential basis” to conclude that Mr Brand poses a risk for the future. At paragraph 15 he acknowledged seventeen years without offending and a life spent “doing good work”. Yet at paragraph 14(4) he addressed Mr Brand in the present tense as one of the “sexual predators like you, Russell Brand”.
To describe a man in the present tense as a predator, while finding in the same remarks that he poses no present risk, goes beyond the judicial task of describing past conduct. A fair-minded and informed observer could regard it as personal condemnation rather than restrained judicial expression.
2. Emotive personal language
The remarks also contain strongly emotive personal characterisations, including “staggering arrogance” (paragraph 13) and the statement that an episode “reeks of casual disrespect” (paragraph 13). Taken together with the above, this language gives the impression of a judge expressing personal moral disapproval rather than dispassionately applying the law.
3. Criticism of the defendant for exercising his right to a defence
At paragraph 17, the judge stated that the complainants had to face being told they had lied or twisted the truth, and that “that was all done because of you, on your instructions”. Although he added that he did not increase the sentence for this reason, the remark nonetheless reproaches the defendant for exercising his fundamental right to plead not guilty and to have the evidence against him tested. At paragraph 6 he also described the defendant's evidence as “one of a series of lies you told”. Such language, in my view, risks giving the impression that the exercise of the right to a defence is itself held against an accused person.
4. Justice must be seen to be done
It is a long-established principle of English law that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done (R. vs. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256). The test of apparent bias set out in Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67 asks whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. In my respectful view, the language described above does not meet the standard of visible impartiality that this principle requires.
I have no personal, financial or political interest in this case. I raise this complaint solely out of concern for public confidence in the restraint and impartiality expected of the judiciary.
The sentencing remarks are published at: https://t.co/SwC3axnTsV
Judicial Conduct Investigations Office
Subject: Complaint regarding the personal conduct of Mr Justice Bennathan – sentencing hearing, R v Russell Brand, Southwark Crown Court, 9 November 2026
Dear Sir or Madam,
I wish to make a complaint about the personal conduct of Mr. Justice Joel Bennathan in the language he used when delivering his sentencing remarks in R. vs. Russell Brand at Southwark Crown Court on 9 November 2026.
I understand that the JCIO does not review judicial decisions, and I do not ask you to consider the sentence itself. My complaint concerns the manner and language of the judge's remarks, which in my view fell short of the standards of impartiality and courtesy set out in the Guide to Judicial Conduct.
1. Present-tense stigmatisation contrary to the judge's own findings
At paragraph 16 of his published remarks, the judge accepted that there is “no sound evidential basis” to conclude that Mr Brand poses a risk for the future. At paragraph 15 he acknowledged seventeen years without offending and a life spent “doing good work”. Yet at paragraph 14(4) he addressed Mr Brand in the present tense as one of the “sexual predators like you, Russell Brand”.
To describe a man in the present tense as a predator, while finding in the same remarks that he poses no present risk, goes beyond the judicial task of describing past conduct. A fair-minded and informed observer could regard it as personal condemnation rather than restrained judicial expression.
2. Emotive personal language
The remarks also contain strongly emotive personal characterisations, including “staggering arrogance” (paragraph 13) and the statement that an episode “reeks of casual disrespect” (paragraph 13). Taken together with the above, this language gives the impression of a judge expressing personal moral disapproval rather than dispassionately applying the law.
3. Criticism of the defendant for exercising his right to a defence
At paragraph 17, the judge stated that the complainants had to face being told they had lied or twisted the truth, and that “that was all done because of you, on your instructions”. Although he added that he did not increase the sentence for this reason, the remark nonetheless reproaches the defendant for exercising his fundamental right to plead not guilty and to have the evidence against him tested. At paragraph 6 he also described the defendant's evidence as “one of a series of lies you told”. Such language, in my view, risks giving the impression that the exercise of the right to a defence is itself held against an accused person.
4. Justice must be seen to be done
It is a long-established principle of English law that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done (R. vs. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256). The test of apparent bias set out in Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67 asks whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. In my respectful view, the language described above does not meet the standard of visible impartiality that this principle requires.
I have no personal, financial or political interest in this case. I raise this complaint solely out of concern for public confidence in the restraint and impartiality expected of the judiciary.
The sentencing remarks are published at: https://t.co/SwC3axnTsV
Judicial Conduct Investigations Office
Subject: Complaint regarding the personal conduct of Mr Justice Bennathan – sentencing hearing, R v Russell Brand, Southwark Crown Court, 9 November 2026
Dear Sir or Madam,
I wish to make a complaint about the personal conduct of Mr. Justice Joel Bennathan in the language he used when delivering his sentencing remarks in R. vs. Russell Brand at Southwark Crown Court on 9 November 2026.
I understand that the JCIO does not review judicial decisions, and I do not ask you to consider the sentence itself. My complaint concerns the manner and language of the judge's remarks, which in my view fell short of the standards of impartiality and courtesy set out in the Guide to Judicial Conduct.
1. Present-tense stigmatisation contrary to the judge's own findings
At paragraph 16 of his published remarks, the judge accepted that there is “no sound evidential basis” to conclude that Mr Brand poses a risk for the future. At paragraph 15 he acknowledged seventeen years without offending and a life spent “doing good work”. Yet at paragraph 14(4) he addressed Mr Brand in the present tense as one of the “sexual predators like you, Russell Brand”.
To describe a man in the present tense as a predator, while finding in the same remarks that he poses no present risk, goes beyond the judicial task of describing past conduct. A fair-minded and informed observer could regard it as personal condemnation rather than restrained judicial expression.
2. Emotive personal language
The remarks also contain strongly emotive personal characterisations, including “staggering arrogance” (paragraph 13) and the statement that an episode “reeks of casual disrespect” (paragraph 13). Taken together with the above, this language gives the impression of a judge expressing personal moral disapproval rather than dispassionately applying the law.
3. Criticism of the defendant for exercising his right to a defence
At paragraph 17, the judge stated that the complainants had to face being told they had lied or twisted the truth, and that “that was all done because of you, on your instructions”. Although he added that he did not increase the sentence for this reason, the remark nonetheless reproaches the defendant for exercising his fundamental right to plead not guilty and to have the evidence against him tested. At paragraph 6 he also described the defendant's evidence as “one of a series of lies you told”. Such language, in my view, risks giving the impression that the exercise of the right to a defence is itself held against an accused person.
4. Justice must be seen to be done
It is a long-established principle of English law that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done (R. vs. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256). The test of apparent bias set out in Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67 asks whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. In my respectful view, the language described above does not meet the standard of visible impartiality that this principle requires.
I have no personal, financial or political interest in this case. I raise this complaint solely out of concern for public confidence in the restraint and impartiality expected of the judiciary.
The sentencing remarks are published at: https://t.co/SwC3axnTsV
Look at that:
Judicial Conduct Investigations Office
Subject: Complaint regarding the personal conduct of Mr Justice Bennathan – sentencing hearing, R v Russell Brand, Southwark Crown Court, 9 November 2026
Dear Sir or Madam,
I wish to make a complaint about the personal conduct of Mr. Justice Joel Bennathan in the language he used when delivering his sentencing remarks in R. vs. Russell Brand at Southwark Crown Court on 9 November 2026.
I understand that the JCIO does not review judicial decisions, and I do not ask you to consider the sentence itself. My complaint concerns the manner and language of the judge's remarks, which in my view fell short of the standards of impartiality and courtesy set out in the Guide to Judicial Conduct.
1. Present-tense stigmatisation contrary to the judge's own findings
At paragraph 16 of his published remarks, the judge accepted that there is “no sound evidential basis” to conclude that Mr Brand poses a risk for the future. At paragraph 15 he acknowledged seventeen years without offending and a life spent “doing good work”. Yet at paragraph 14(4) he addressed Mr Brand in the present tense as one of the “sexual predators like you, Russell Brand”.
To describe a man in the present tense as a predator, while finding in the same remarks that he poses no present risk, goes beyond the judicial task of describing past conduct. A fair-minded and informed observer could regard it as personal condemnation rather than restrained judicial expression.
2. Emotive personal language
The remarks also contain strongly emotive personal characterisations, including “staggering arrogance” (paragraph 13) and the statement that an episode “reeks of casual disrespect” (paragraph 13). Taken together with the above, this language gives the impression of a judge expressing personal moral disapproval rather than dispassionately applying the law.
3. Criticism of the defendant for exercising his right to a defence
At paragraph 17, the judge stated that the complainants had to face being told they had lied or twisted the truth, and that “that was all done because of you, on your instructions”. Although he added that he did not increase the sentence for this reason, the remark nonetheless reproaches the defendant for exercising his fundamental right to plead not guilty and to have the evidence against him tested. At paragraph 6 he also described the defendant's evidence as “one of a series of lies you told”. Such language, in my view, risks giving the impression that the exercise of the right to a defence is itself held against an accused person.
4. Justice must be seen to be done
It is a long-established principle of English law that justice should not only be done, but should manifestly and undoubtedly be seen to be done (R. vs. Sussex Justices, ex parte McCarthy [1924] 1 KB 256). The test of apparent bias set out in Porter v Magill [2001] UKHL 67 asks whether a fair-minded and informed observer would conclude that there was a real possibility of bias. In my respectful view, the language described above does not meet the standard of visible impartiality that this principle requires.
I have no personal, financial or political interest in this case. I raise this complaint solely out of concern for public confidence in the restraint and impartiality expected of the judiciary.
The sentencing remarks are published at: https://t.co/SwC3axnTsV