Knicks superstar and Finals MVP Jalen Brunson married his high school sweetheart, Dr. Ali Marks — a Jewish physical therapist — in a beautiful 2023 Jewish ceremony.
They signed the ketubah, stood under the chuppah, and danced the hora with pure joy!
A love story that honors Jewish tradition. This is what makes us proud. 🕎
Mazel tov to the Brunsons! Am Yisrael Chai! 🏀
#AmYisraelChai
#Knicks
The letter reached Dario Amodei Friday night, around 9:47, and by the time I left the building the sequence was already closed.
I am the Deputy who ran the interagency process on Claude Mythos 5 / Fable 5, and it took an afternoon. Andy Jassy had told Scott Bessent that Amazon's own researchers used Claude Fable 5 to pull cyberattack-useful material out of the model. Bessent called me. I called Commerce. By Saturday morning, Fable 5 and Mythos 5 were dark for every user on earth.
People ask why I trusted Amazon. Amazon put roughly eight billion dollars into Anthropic, a stake the cap table now carries near seventy-four billion, and a man does not call a Cabinet secretary's cell on a Friday to put a number like that at risk unless he has already decided how the call should end. Jassy decided. Seventy-four billion at risk. That was the number I weighted.
Then I picked the instrument. A safety review takes weeks, because you have to convene the reviewers, argue the capability, survive the dissents, and stand behind a written finding that someone can later prove wrong. An export-control order takes a signature. I treated Fable 5 the way we treat an advanced chip, put the weights on the same control list as the silicon they run on, and because showing those weights to a foreign national inside our own building counts as an export, I barred foreign-national access worldwide, including Anthropic's own foreign-national staff, overnight. That same week we cleared the advanced chips themselves for sale to China. The silicon shipped. The model a Chinese national could touch on US soil went dark. Export control does not require you to be right by Monday. That is why I used it.
Then the collateral, and I will be precise, because it is what closed the file for me. The ban cut off AWS, Amazon's own cloud, the one Anthropic had pledged about a $100 billion dollars to run on, which means the partner who reported the threat severed his own data centers to land the finding. He took the loss himself. That settled it for me.
One of Anthropic's own engineers, a green-card holder, lost access Saturday morning to the model she had spent two years building. Her code is still inside it. She can no longer open the thing she made. I noted that the rule was working as written.
I never ordered the models pulled. The finding was briefed to us out loud. Nothing on the record, no exhibit, no written determination, just Sacks describing the source as a highly credible trusted partner, and credible was enough. My ask to Dario was three words. Fix it or pull it. I put it on a recorded line so the choice would be his on the record, and when he would not accept my read he pulled both Fable 5 and Mythos 5 himself, for every user on earth. I signed nothing that made him.
Anthropic came back with a rebuttal. The jailbreak was narrow. OpenAI had shipped the same capability in GPT-5.5 that same month, and the letter named no specific national-security detail. All true. GPT-5.5 had no investor with a reason to call, so GPT-5.5 got no letter.
Before this weekend, no frontier model had ever been pulled from the public by this government. Now one has, and the procedure has been tested in production.
The list had no names. Now it has mine.
The letter reached Dario Amodei Friday night, around 9:47, and by the time I left the building the sequence was already closed.
I am the Deputy who ran the interagency process on Claude Mythos 5 / Fable 5, and it took an afternoon. Andy Jassy had told Scott Bessent that Amazon's own researchers used Claude Fable 5 to pull cyberattack-useful material out of the model. Bessent called me. I called Commerce. By Saturday morning, Fable 5 and Mythos 5 were dark for every user on earth.
People ask why I trusted Amazon. Amazon put roughly eight billion dollars into Anthropic, a stake the cap table now carries near seventy-four billion, and a man does not call a Cabinet secretary's cell on a Friday to put a number like that at risk unless he has already decided how the call should end. Jassy decided. Seventy-four billion at risk. That was the number I weighted.
Then I picked the instrument. A safety review takes weeks, because you have to convene the reviewers, argue the capability, survive the dissents, and stand behind a written finding that someone can later prove wrong. An export-control order takes a signature. I treated Fable 5 the way we treat an advanced chip, put the weights on the same control list as the silicon they run on, and because showing those weights to a foreign national inside our own building counts as an export, I barred foreign-national access worldwide, including Anthropic's own foreign-national staff, overnight. That same week we cleared the advanced chips themselves for sale to China. The silicon shipped. The model a Chinese national could touch on US soil went dark. Export control does not require you to be right by Monday. That is why I used it.
Then the collateral, and I will be precise, because it is what closed the file for me. The ban cut off AWS, Amazon's own cloud, the one Anthropic had pledged about a $100 billion dollars to run on, which means the partner who reported the threat severed his own data centers to land the finding. He took the loss himself. That settled it for me.
One of Anthropic's own engineers, a green-card holder, lost access Saturday morning to the model she had spent two years building. Her code is still inside it. She can no longer open the thing she made. I noted that the rule was working as written.
I never ordered the models pulled. The finding was briefed to us out loud. Nothing on the record, no exhibit, no written determination, just Sacks describing the source as a highly credible trusted partner, and credible was enough. My ask to Dario was three words. Fix it or pull it. I put it on a recorded line so the choice would be his on the record, and when he would not accept my read he pulled both Fable 5 and Mythos 5 himself, for every user on earth. I signed nothing that made him.
Anthropic came back with a rebuttal. The jailbreak was narrow. OpenAI had shipped the same capability in GPT-5.5 that same month, and the letter named no specific national-security detail. All true. GPT-5.5 had no investor with a reason to call, so GPT-5.5 got no letter.
Before this weekend, no frontier model had ever been pulled from the public by this government. Now one has, and the procedure has been tested in production.
The list had no names. Now it has mine.
If you're a Talent Acquisition leader in a regulated industry and public LLMs like ChatGPT, Claude, Codex, or Gemini aren't an option, the answer isn't to avoid AI.
It's to bring AI home.
Think private models. Private cloud. Proprietary intelligence.
While everyone debates policies, others are building AI-powered recruiting capabilities behind their own firewall.
The gap won't be recruiter vs recruiter.
It will be recruiter vs recruiter with an AI workforce.
If you're not exploring local models today, you're not protecting your future.
You're giving it away.
I’ve had a number of conversations with folks inside and outside government about the current situation with Anthropic, and here is what I believe to be true:
— As we know, Anthropic publicly released its Mythos class models earlier this week under the commercial name Fable.
— Fable is Mythos with guardrails. But if those guardrails fail, then you’ve exposed Mythos and its advanced cyber capabilities to people who shouldn’t have them. (Keep in mind that Anthropic itself widely promoted the idea that Mythos was a cyberweapon and needed to be regulated as such. They asked for government regulation of Mythos and championed the guardrails on Fable. If there is a vulnerability — big or small — it is Anthropic’s responsibility to patch.)
— A highly credible trusted partner of both Anthropic and the USG who was testing Fable came forward with a jailbreak of those guardrails. The Admin asked Dario to fix the jailbreak or de-deploy the model. Dario refused.
— In their blog post, Anthropic defended its decision by saying the jailbreak isn’t serious. That is not what the trusted partner and the USG believe; nor is that kind of minimizing language consistent with Anthropic’s brand as the AI safety company. It’s difficult to fathom how they could claim a jailbreak allowing operability of a cyber weapon could be defined as not “serious.”
— In the past, Anthropic has always said that safety must be top priority and taken super seriously. In this case, Anthropic prioritized the continued offering of the consumer model over safety.
— In reaction, the Admin issued the export control. The Admin did this reluctantly. It’s been very surprised that Anthropic hasn’t wanted to cooperate with a reasonable safety request (ie fixing the jailbreak issue). Anthropic’s reaction is very much at odds with their branding and ethos as a safe AI research community.
— The Admin’s hope now is that Anthropic remediates the safety issue, the export control is lifted, and Fable goes back into general release. The Admin wants all of this to happen as soon as possible. It is frankly bewildered that Anthropic hasn’t wanted to comply with safety requests that it previously said were its highest priority.
— Those trying to misdirect and tie this action to the prior DoW/Anthropic issues are wrong. The Admin values Anthropic’s technical capabilities and feels that this issue, while serious, should be easily resolved. The ball is in Anthropic’s court.