Introducing the MANDA Staking Pool
After years of active involvement in the Cardano ecosystem, I’m launching my staking pool under the ticker MANDA.
My journey with Cardano began in 2017, and since then, my engagement with the project has steadily deepened.
With the introduction of on-chain governance, I became a DRep, which has further increased my responsibilities within the community.
I believe I’ve served the Cardano community well as a DRep—objectively, transparently, and with conviction. I now intend to bring the same dedication and integrity to the role of a SPO.
Initially, I held the view that the roles of SPO and DRep should remain distinct. However, the community has largely welcomed individuals who choose to fulfill both responsibilities.
Following this precedent, I am confident that the dual role can be handled constructively.
The MANDA staking pool is more than just an operational node—it’s an opportunity to deepen my commitment to Cardano.
Staking rewards will enable me to allocate more time toward ecosystem-related activities, including supporting projects that approach me for collaboration or guidance.
Launching a new pool in today’s saturated environment is undeniably a challenge. But challenges are not deterrents—they are calls to action. In that spirit: why not make waves?
As a Star Wars fan, you might know me as Cardano Yoda. Another favorite character? The Mandalorian.
That’s why MANDA is the ticker—this is the way!
MANDA Pool Parameters:
• Fixed fee: 340 ADA
• Margin: 4%
• Pledge: 10,000 ADA (with 100,000 ADA currently deposited into the pool)
If you believe in the values I represent and the direction I advocate for, please consider delegating ADA to MANDA. Every new delegator is deeply appreciated.
Pool ID:
pool1c3fjkls7d2aujud8y5xy5e0azu0ueatwn34u7jy3ql85ze3xya8
DRep ID:
drep1km69g7ksf8t5g0h9d9tkrcd2tezxelx0wtr76rv2mrkl5nzd6v3
Let’s move Cardano forward—together.
I can assure you that I want to make pragmatic decisions. But if there are things in the proposal, like not having a security audit done, I simply cannot approve it and risk the possible negative consequences.
It's only been about a week since the SecondFi incident. Cardano has always been about doing things right and not rushing anything. Is it really a problem to wait a few weeks and make sure it's safe to deploy 9M ADA to the Strike protocol?
Sometimes I feel like people would rather make unnecessary drama out of everything instead of thinking rationally. I have clearly stated that I will support Strine if they address the issues and resubmit.
As a DRep, I decided to vote NO on the Strike Finance V2 Treasury Deployment proposal.
My rationale:
I want to be clear at the beginning. I want to support Strike. It is one of the most visible DeFi protocols on Cardano. I recognize the importance of liquidity and trading infrastructure for the ecosystem.
I also appreciate that the proposal is not framed as a grant, but as a productive treasury deployment intended to return principal and yield to the Treasury.
However, as a responsible DRep, I must apply a high standard when Treasury assets are exposed to significant risks. For a 9M ADA request, the proposal does not yet provide enough detail, safeguards, or evidence to justify a YES vote. I remain open to supporting a revised proposal if these issues are addressed.
One concern is trade transparency. Strike reports strong growth numbers. However, because Strike V2 trading happens on the Strike execution layer rather than fully on-chain, DReps and the community need more information to verify the quality of this activity.
Strike should publish anonymized V2 trade concentration data, including the top 5, top 10, and top 20 accounts by volume and trade count, the percentage of volume generated by market makers, the percentage generated by the official liquidity vault, self-trade prevention rules, wash-trading controls, and a clear definition of what “unique traders” means.
Another concern is the need for support from the public treasury. The proposal states that Strike has generated millions of dollars in profit for liquidity providers and over $1M in protocol revenue. These numbers make Strike look successful, but they also weaken the argument that Treasury support is necessary.
If the protocol has already generated substantial LP profit and revenue, Strike should explain why the required liquidity cannot come from reinvested protocol revenue, LP profits, or the STRIKE token treasury.
I am also concerned about market timing. The proposal requires Treasury ADA to be sold into USDM. ADA is currently trading at low levels, which makes this a high-conviction treasury decision. Selling ADA at low prices to support USDM liquidity and a private DeFi protocol is difficult to justify without stronger Treasury protection and upside alignment.
Custody is another important issue. A 3-person council is relatively small for a 9M ADA deployment. I would expect a larger and more independent structure, potentially something like a 5-of-7 multisig. Including respected top DReps or other independent ecosystem representatives would add legitimacy and reduce concentration risk. The proposal should also provide exact signers, thresholds, wallet addresses, responsibilities, and conflict-of-interest disclosures before approval.
Audit readiness is also not sufficient yet. Strike has public evidence of prior audit work for older smart-contract components, but the official Strike V2 audit relevant to this 9M ADA deployment has not been published yet. DReps should require the final V2 audit report, audited commit hashes, and deployed contract addresses before approving a treasury deployment of this size.
The proposal should also include a clear commitment that, during the 12-month Treasury liquidity deployment, Strike will not unilaterally change protocol settings or economic terms in a way that materially increases Treasury risk or reduces Treasury upside. Any necessary changes should be disclosed publicly, clearly justified, reviewed by the independent council, and included in regular transparency reporting.
Finally, the proposal does not sufficiently describe how the ADA-to-USDM conversion will be executed. Since the Treasury position depends on selling 9M ADA into USDM, execution fees, spreads, slippage, and counterparties are material risks. These details should be specified before approval, not only reported afterwards.
Overall, I see a potentially interesting idea, but the proposal form is not adequate for the size and risk of the request. It describes the intention, but not enough of the execution plan, audit status, custody mechanics, conflict management, and downside protection.
For these reasons, I vote NO on the current proposal, while remaining open to a revised version with stronger Treasury protection and a more complete risk framework.
If you'd like to support my work, consider delegating to the MANDA pool and backing me as a DRep. Your support is the only way I can get time for governance.
MANDA Pool ID:
pool1c3fjkls7d2aujud8y5xy5e0azu0ueatwn34u7jy3ql85ze3xya8
My DRep ID:
drep1y2m0g4r66pyaw3p7u454wc0p4f0ygm8ueaev0mgd3tvwm7sskqwqp
Buy me a beer:
https://t.co/1eC6qJci2D
I'm not sure if it makes sense to repost someone's rationale and say "look how he voted, that's wrong, delegate me".
It's nonsense because Chris claims that I'm against liquidity, growth, and commercialization, while I spent half a year with many other DReps building DAOs that could have enabled growth and commercialization.
Actually, I'm not even against Strike. I'm just demanding stricter Treasury protection so that I can approve the proposal.
@EPOCHpool We are talking about Treasury ADA, not your or my ADA. For 9M ADA, a small council and a multisig with 3 signers are not enough, in my opinion.
I expected it. As a DRep, I can't vote YES just because there might be a shit-storm.
People are making unnecessary drama out of every decision. DReps have responsibility for the Treasury and unfortunately have to make unpopular decisions.
I have clearly stated that I would be happy to support Strike if they process the feedback and resubmit.
By the way, they could submit an info action to get feedback in advance.
@Max_1997_16 In on-chain governance, I ideally need to work with the proposal, not with off-chain data. Of course, I can debate details. In this case, I am afraid the proposal must be resubmitted.
@EPOCHpool You don't understand multisig. The proposal lacks details, but it's probably a 2-of-3 multisig. That means 2 people can send 9M ADA wherever they want.
26 DReps voted NO. This proposal poses risks. I'm glad some DReps are aware of this. Additionally, some parts of the proposal are unclear. It's a 9M ADA. The proposal deserves to be reworked and resubmitted. I'd be happy to support Strike, but I have to protect the Treasury first.
@Max_1997_16 I clearly declared that I want to support Strike. People think that every NO is the end of the world. It's not. The team just needs to process the feedback and resubmit.
Let the team explain this in the proposal, publish a security audit, set up a stronger multisig, explain how they will sell ADA to USDM, address my other concerns in the rationale, and I will be happy to support them.
They could submit an info action and get this feedback in advance.