$PGLD.V
P2 Gold is trading at 9% of my implied FS NPV5. This is compared to most of its peers in the 30-40%. Why the disconnect?
As Lucky Strike is proving to be even better than initially thought, I expect the MRE to be released Q4 2026 with the FS out in Q1 2027.
Black Pine's (Liberty Gold) upcoming feasibility study due out just weeks before Gabbs should be required reading. I've attempted to model out both reports and I get a similar NPV5 for both of them. However on a side by side comparison Gabbs has a higher avg. grade, lower AISC larger LOM AuEq, and annual production. Black Pine has lower CAPEX and longer mine life. Black Pine trades at 34% of my estimated NPV5. So why does it trade at that relative premium? When I think about the "what ifs" for Gabbs it's a) Permitting b) Resource Conversion. Black Pine is perhaps most relevant for Gabbs on permitting, being ~12 months ahead, having Fast-41 "covered" status and further along their EIS pathway. Given there previous PFS, the overhang or pressure Gabbs has for Lucky Strike to convert to indicated obviously does not exist for Black Pine. Their FS should be noticeably better than their 2024 PFS, however in relation to Gabbs its upside potential is less. The team has no doubt done an amazing job, however they are certainly more fairly priced. Production is expected in 2029 (same as Gabbs).
Talamore's (formally Fuerte Metals) Coffee Project is an interesting comparison for Gabbs, and its upcoming Q4 2026 FS should also be required reading. Despite it being a completely different kind of project in a very different location, its annual production, LOM & LOM AuEq will be similar to Gabbs. It trades today at US$1.1B. At $3,000 Gold the projects after-tax NPV5 is ~US$1.55B. You can do the math on valuation. Part of the premium likely comes from its backers many of which are mining royalty, and the fact they have more indicated resource as of now, however this is a project in middle of nowhere Yukon that requires a 214km road to be built. Production "expected" earliest 2030, likely later.
CK Gold (U.S. Gold Corp) is often cited as one of the closest comps to Gabbs and in some ways it is. It is also the most clear case for Gabbs being completely mispriced. They are the only other gold/copper equivalent. They are more advanced than Gabbs being fully permitted and having their FS in hand. However the main issue with CK is its scale is small. LOM AuEq is ~931,000 vs >3M for Gabbs, annual production is at least 2.5x smaller. CAPEX is v. high relative to its resource. Though like Gabbs they have a nice AISC and cost profile in general given copper credits. CK trades at ~US$250M MCAP vs US$200M for Gabbs. They should be in production in 2029.
There are other examples you could point to like Richmond Hill (Dakota Gold) or Converse (Roxmore) and they have their own pro's and con's relative to Gabbs, but mostly cons in my view.
At the end of the day no project has all seven attributes of P2, though many have one or two.
1) Copper credit (bottom-of-cost-curve, negative cash cost at spot)
2) Nevada / tier-one jurisdiction
3) Scale (~220k AuEq/yr)
4) Upside discovery potential
5) Cheap valuation
6) Near term production (2029)
7) Founder-led company, with aligned mgmt. w/ shares bought in open market
If you own Gabbs today, you really want to understand Lucky Strike. Have an understanding of what its potential upside and conversion looks like because the FS that comes out largely depends on the results. Tied to that is the permitting path: Gabbs is on federal land facing full NEPA, so FAST-41 covered status is the lever that could expedite the timeline. The copper exposure is so critical to the story including the leverage a 10c increase has to the economics. If you're modelling out your own estimates for what the MRE or FS could look like the recovery rate changes as well as TC/RC charges related to copper smelters is something to examine.
DYODD, never investment advice.
@nachkari different game.
basic mistake people make…if you want to be schwarzman don’t work for his company, ask what would he be doing if he were 20 today.
2 very different answers
Percentage change in the frequency of em dashes in ecology journals between 2021 and 2025: +202%
In the frequency of semicolons: -58%
Really not that hard people.
I invite $BRK.B shareholders to look at $FFH.TO and the amount of capital allocation opportunities HWIC has over the next 5 years. just not comparable at all, mathematically impossible for BRK to have a higher ROE
$MLP.V
The Crown Prince's new investment platform is privatizing AD Ports which is widely expected to build the Mayumba Deepwater Port beside the Banio Asset.
This has huge long-term consequences as the $8B buyout offer shields AD Ports from its upcoming growth phase its "complex, capital-intensive, and long-term in nature" and public markets short term desires conflicts with the heavy capital spending. free from the public scrutiny it also means they can aggressively back "large scale infrastructure projects without pressure".
just as the government is fast tracking a second pipeline to build resiliency against the hormuz, this privatization will let them build further dependency
"Abu Dhabi Ports forecasts capital expenditure of up to 5 billion dirhams in 2026 and 2027, with more than 75% of the planned spending up until 2030 earmarked for infrastructure assets, primarily ports and free zones."
https://t.co/NPWELTkusp
@RockBtmEntries food security & supply chain resilience is one of the main themes of this decade. whether your UAE or India, Brazil or South Africa governments are re-focusing on the basics.
For $MLP.V it's relevant that the most vulnerable countries are the closest geographically to Banio
$MLP.V
A - Phase 3 Drilling Preview
Since the 2024 PEA, MLP has completed Phase 2 drilling and is now working through Phase 3. Phase 2 began with BA-001-EXT, a 2017 hole the previous operator abandoned at 364m thinking it had hit a fault; Millennial re-read that ground as soft-sediment deformation, pushed the hole to 678m, and returned 112m of cumulative potash at 16% KCl.
BA-004 was a step out at the far east of the property. they're they found 101m @ 17% KCI through 7 cycles. to translate this, they drilled through 100 metres of ore....for reference in Saskatchewan they mine ~20% KCI but from seams 2-3m thick. Banio is 100m thick. So takeaways going into Phase 3 are grade has been very tight ~16%, thickness less so (70m-112m).
Re: phase 3, four holes, 1,000m each started in May. BA-005 tests the southern extension, BA-006 the western (this was the first hole to be drilled in the program and whose we should e getting results within weeks), as well as BA-007 and BA-008 on its newly acquired Haute Banio permit, west and closer to the Mayumba port. the most recent MRE recommend 700m holes, Farhad went ahead with 1,000m given the tremendous results Phase 2 brought. When looking at what the maiden DFS will look like a resource of 5Bt M+I is attainable. This is off of a current 2.4B M+I. How you scale what the annual production might be is very hard to do, you could look at Ross's assumptions which scale up quite aggressively. There should be at least 3 scenarios modelled in the FS however it's safe to assume within the first 3 years, your in the 2M+ /yr range.
The Sylvinite continuity should be watched especially carefully as it's one of the highest-value levers. The two Haute Banio holes will also be interesting, if they are anywhere near as attractive as a BA-004, the strategic value of the infrastructure itself makes it valuable. Also the depth of the targets is something to keep in mind, 004 hit at an unusually shallow 260m.
B - Ross Jennings Musings
Ross: "The freight advantage is approximately $20 per ton to Brazil port discharge which is approximately equal to what I have been informed, by Brazilian fertilizer players, is required for any new market entrant to buy its way into substantial market penetration."
What ross is saying here is MLP can essentially buy market share for free, by using its geography rather than its margin. this is a very astute observation and makes MLP more competitive than any new entrant to the Brazilian market.
The right way to price MLP is not a terminal value of the ore, as Ross highlighted, Banio has more potash than it could produce or sell for decades, discounting anything past two or three decades is a fruitless exercise. Ask instead what it costs a competitor not to have it. If MLP's cost to add a ton of capacity is below industry's, than as global demand continues, MLP is always the cheapest source. therefore capturing more than its fair share of growth. What you really own is the industry's lowest-cost source of incremental supply for the next century.
One of the largest risks up until H2 2025 was a major coming in and killing the asset (never letting the supply come online) thanks to Ross's aggressive buying that is not possible today.
NFA