加密LEO話不多

[加密LEO話不多 @LeoCryptoBrief]

有sNUSD的朋友赶紧去DEX换回稳定币！
亲测 @KyberNetwork @matchaxyz @jumperapp 还有一点点流动性！

[Neutrl @Neutrl]

Neutrl has temporarily paused minting, redemptions, and other protocol functions following circumstances affecting protocol reserves. These measures have been taken in the interest of our users, after advice from legal counsel, to preserve an orderly process while the impact is assessed.

Users will be provided with a clear and orderly process in due course. Further information on timing, and next steps will be shared as soon as available.

[加密LEO話不多 @LeoCryptoBrief]

https://t.co/6w8HDLuAzK

[加密LEO話不多 @LeoCryptoBrief]

https://t.co/t9HMQJydw9

[大方BigFang @dafangbigfang]

《Coldcard被破解之后，我们重新理解一次助记词》
哈喽大家好，我是大方，欢迎来到我的频道。
最近 Coldcard 硬件冷钱包的安全事件，让很多囤币党心里有点慌。
这几天在 X 上，经常可以看到一些用户说，自己一直没有动过的 Coldcard 钱包，里面的比特币突然被转走了。

对于那些选择 Coldcard、正常保管助记词，最后依然遭受损失的用户，我只能说，真的非常遗憾。

因为这一次，问题并没有发生在用户把助记词拍照、上传云端，或者输���钓鱼网站这些常见场景。

问题发生在钱包刚创建的那一刻。

设备生成助记词时，使用了强度不足、可以被攻击者缩小范围的随机数。

这件事也再次印证了我以前讲过的一个观点。

我们购买硬件钱包，其实是在信任厂商。

大部分普通用户看不懂源代码。

就算代码是公开的，也很少有人有能力检查几万行代码，更不可能知道设备生成助记词时，最终连接的是哪一个随机数函数。

Coldcard 一直被认为是非常硬核、非常专业、非常受比特币玩家信任的一款产品。

它的代码公开，支持多签，甚至允许用户加入骰子熵。

可这一次发生问题的，偏偏是钱包最基础、也最不能出错的一步：生成助记词时使用的原始熵。

什么是原始熵

原始熵可以理解成：

钱包在生成助记词之前，先随机抽出来的一串数字。

比如一个使用24个助记词的钱包，通常会先生成256位二进制数据。

看起来像这样：

1011010010110111001001100101111010100001110010111101000110011010
0110111000011100101010110110010011010110101110010101001011100111
1100101001110101100010011011110000110101010011110010110101001001
0001111010100110111100011100101010110001110010100101111001101011

这一长串数字一共有256个位置。
每一个位置只能填写：
0 或 1

“熵”这个词原本来自物理���，后来被信息论借来描述一件事情有多难预测。

放在钱包里，可以把它理解成：

这串数字里面有多少不确定性。

比如抛一枚公平硬币。

抛出去之前，你不知道它落下来会是正面还是反面。

我们可以规定：

正面 = 1
反面 = 0

一次公平的抛硬币，可以提供1 bit熵。

连续独立抛256次，就可以获得256个无法提前预测的 0 和 1。

这就是一份256位原始熵。
助记词到底帮助我们记住什么

助记词，顾名思义，就是帮助记忆的单词。

它帮助我们记住的，其实就是刚才那一长串原始熵。

因为让普通人手写和保管256个 0 和 1，实在太容易抄错。

所以 BIP39 把这串数字转换成一组常见英文单词，让人类更方便抄写和备份。

可以把整个关系理解成：

原始熵
↓
助记词
↓
BIP39 Seed
↓
主私钥
↓
大量子私钥、公钥和地址

严格来说，比特币地址并不是直接由原始熵一步算出来的。

原始熵先被转换成助记词，助记词再经过算法生成钱包 Seed，Seed继续派生私钥、公钥和地址。

但从安全关系上看，最初的原始熵确实是整套钱包的起点。

一旦攻击者能够找到这份原始熵，就可以重新生成相同的助记词、Seed、私钥和地址。
为什么256位很难被猜中
256位随机数，代表256个只能填写0或1的位置。
每增加一个位置，可能性就翻一倍。
1位有：
2种可能

2位有：
4种可能

3位有：

8种可能

256位就有：

2²⁵⁶

种可能。

这是一个大约78位的数字：

115792089237316195423570985008687907853269984665640564039457584007913129639936

这个数字到底有多大？

假设地球上的每一粒沙子，都代表一种不同的原始熵。

把地球上所有沙子全部用完，仍然远远不够。

你大约还需要10的58次方个“拥有同样多沙子的地球”，才有机会��所有256位组合排列出来。

它已经接近可观测宇宙中原子数量的数量级。

只要这256位真的来自不可预测的随机源，而且没有泄露，攻击者依靠穷举找到同一个钱包，在现实世界中几乎没有可行性。

钱包地址没有人分配，为什么不会和别人重复

我经常问一些刚接触比特币的人一个问题。

你的银行账号是银行分配给你的。

可是比特币没有一个中心机构给你分配账号。

你的钱包是在离线状态下自己生成私钥，然后再计算出地址。

那么你怎么敢往这个地址里转入比特币？

会不会刚好和别人生成了同一个钱包？

理论上，确实存在碰撞的可能。

数学上不能说绝对等于零。

但这个概率小到在现实世界中可以忽略。

你可以把它理解成，在一个大到接近宇宙原子数量的号码池里，随机抽取一个号码。

别人刚好抽中同一个号码的概率，几乎无法发���。

所以比特币并不需要一家公司给每个人分配不同的账号。

它依靠巨大的数学空间，让所有人都可以独立生成自己的密钥。

这也是比特币所有权能够脱离中心机构运行的重要基础。

Coldcard这次到底哪里出了问题

正常情况下，Coldcard 应该从设备中的硬件随机数发生器、安全芯片或者其他高质量随机源中，取得足够随机的数据。

理想流程应该是：

硬件TRNG
+
安全芯片随机源
↓
充分混合
↓
生成256位原始熵
↓
生成助记词

但根据目前公开的技术复盘，部分旧固件在生成新钱包时，错误走进了一个软件备用随机数发生器。

设备中虽然有硬件随机数发生器，相关代码也确实存在，但生成钱包时调用到的函数，并没有按照原本预期使用完整的硬件随机数。

部分较新的型号虽然加入了安全芯片提供的数据，但真正保留下来参与软件随机数状态的数据量仍然严重不足。

这就造成了一个很危险的结果。

屏幕上生成的24个助记词，看起来完全正常。

没有重复单词，没有明显规律，也能通过BIP39校验。

但攻击者真正需要尝试的候选范围，可能远低于正常的：

2²⁵⁶

部分旧型号的有效搜索空间，被估算下降到40位左右。

2⁴⁰
≈ 1万亿

1万亿听起来依然很大，但对拥有GPU、云计算资源和优化程序的专业攻击者来说，已经进入可以现实尝试的范围。

另外一些型号的综合不确定性可能在70多位附近。
这并不代表攻击者可以直接把全部2⁷⁰候选简单扫完。
但如果攻击者还能够推测设备编号、生成时间、计时器状态和程序调用次数，真正需要搜索的范围可能进一步缩小。
所以攻击者做的并不是破解SHA-256，也没有破解比特币的椭圆曲线算法。
攻击者利用的是：
钱包一开始只从一个很小的候选池里抽取原始熵

然后把这个较小的候选池全部重新计算一遍，生成对应的地址，再去链上检查哪些地址��面有币。
为什么SHA-256没有救回来
有些人���能会问：

这些随机数据最后不是还会经过SHA-256吗？

为什么做完SHA-256以后，依然不安全？

因为SHA-256只能把输入搅乱，不能凭空创造新的随机性。

假设最初只有100万个可能输入。

把这100万个输入分别做SHA-256，会得到100万个看起来毫无规律的Hash。

但总数依然只有100万个。

100万个低熵输入
↓
SHA-256
↓
100万个看起来很随机的输出

输出再乱，攻击者仍然只需要尝试这100万个候选。

所以SHA-256可以隐藏规律，却无法补回原本不存在的熵。

为什么助记词保管得再好也没有用
正常情况下，我们一直提醒大家：

助记词不能拍照

不能上传云端

不能输入陌生网页

不能发给任何人

最好离线手写保存

这些安全习惯依然非常重要。

但Coldcard这次的问题发生在助记词生成之前。

假如设备一开始就从一个可以被攻击者穷举的范围里生成助记���，那么你把这24个单词锁进保险柜，也无法改变它原本的随机强度。

攻击者不需要偷走你的助记词。

他可以重新计算出你的助记词。

钱包明明还在自己手里，黑客为什么可以隔空转走比特币

这是很多新手都会问的问题。

硬件钱包里面并没有真正装着比特币。

比特币一直记录在区块链上。

硬件钱包保存的是能够授权转账的私钥。

谁掌握私钥，谁就能够签署交易，把链上的比特币转走。

比特币
一直存在区块链上

硬件钱包
保存私钥并完成签名

所以设备在你手上，并不代表资产就一定安全。
假如攻击者通过低熵原始熵重新算出了相同私钥，他不需要碰到你的Coldcard，也不需要连接你的电脑。
他可以在世界任何地方创建一笔有效交易，然后把资产转走。
为什么256位原始熵会变成24个助记词

接下来，我们继续讲一个很多人一直没有完全弄明白的问题。

为什么是24个助记词？

这24个单词和256位原始熵，到底是怎么对应起来的？

首先，BIP39英文词库一共有2048个单词。

每个单词都有固定编号：
0到2047

例如第一个单词：
abandon

它的编号是：

0

0写成11位二进制就是：

00000000000

为什么每个单词对应11位？

因为：

2¹¹ = 2048

11位二进制刚好可以表达2048种不同结果。

范围就是：

00000000000 = 0
00000000001 = 1
……
11111111111 = 2047

所以每11位二进制，就可以对应词库中的一个单词。

例如：

10110100101

转换成十进制是：

1445

然后去BIP39词库里寻找编号1445对应的单词。
https://t.co/0dLkitscxj
这样一来，机器使用的二进制，就被转换成了方便人类抄写的单词。

为什么256除以11，不等于24

细心的你一定已经发现：

256 ÷ 11

并不能刚好分成24组。

24组11位，需要：

24 × 11 = 264位

原始熵只有256位，还差8位。

这8位来自SHA-256。

大白话解释SHA-256

SHA-256可以理解成一台数字指纹机。

你把任何一份数据放进去，无论是一句话、一张照片、一部电影，还是钱包的256位原始熵，它都会计算出一串固定长度的结果。

任何数据
↓
SHA-256
↓
固定256位数字指纹

同样的输入，每次一定得到同样的指纹。

输入只要发生一点变化，哪怕只把其中一个 0 改成 1，最终的指纹通常也会完全不同。

同时，根据这个指纹，几乎无���倒推出原来的数据。

可以把它想成碎纸机和指纹机的结合。

原始文件放进去之后，会得到一份固定长度的数字指纹。

你可以拿着原始文件重新计算，验证指纹是否相同。

但只拿着指纹，无法把原始文件恢复出来。

BIP39如何使用SHA-256

钱包会把256位原始熵转换成32个真实字节，然后送进SHA-256。
这里需要特别注意：
Hash的是32字节原始熵，不是屏幕上那256个字符形式的 "0" 和 "1"。
256位原始熵
↓
转换成32字节
↓
SHA-256
↓
得到256位Hash

这个Hash不需要全部使用。

BIP39只取最前面的8位。

假设SHA-256结果的开头是：

10110110 01101001 1100……

只取：

10110110

这8位叫做校验和。

然后把它接在原始熵后面：

256位原始熵
+
8位校验和
=
264位

264位就可以刚好分成24组：

264 ÷ 11 = 24

每一组11位，再对应BIP39词库里的一个单词。

于是就得到了24个助记词。

完整流程就是：

256位原始熵
↓
SHA-256
↓
取Hash前8位作为校验和
↓
256 + 8 = 264位
↓
每11位分成一组
↓
24组数字
↓
对应24个助记词

所以24个助记���里面包含的，是：

256位原始熵
+
8位校验信息

最后的8位有什么用

这8位并不是为了增加钱包安全强度。
它的作用主要是检查助记词有没有抄错。
当钱包恢复24个助记词时，会把每一个单词重新换成11位二进制。
24 × 11 = 264位

其中：

前256位 = 原始熵
后8位 = 校验和

钱包再对前256位做一次SHA-256。

如果算出来的前8位，与助记词中携带的最后8位一致，这组助记词就符合BIP39格式。

可以把这8位理解成给原始熵盖上的防伪印章。

它能够帮助钱包发现部分抄写错误。

但也要注意，通过校验只代表这是一组格式正确的助记词。

它无法证明原始熵足够随机。

一组由低质量随机数生成的助记词，同样可以通过BIP39校验。

这正是Coldcard这次事件最让人后怕的地方。

受影响用户应该怎么处理

如果你的Coldcard钱包是在受影响的固件版本中生成的，仅仅更新固件是不够的。

因为旧助记词已经在过去生成完成。
更新固件只能保证以后生成的新助记词使用修复后的随机数路径，无法给旧助记词重新增加熵。
正确处理方式是：
确认官方受影响型号和固件范围
↓
升级到官方最新修复固件
↓
生成一套全新助记词
↓
验证新钱包可以正常恢复
↓
先转入小额测���
↓
确认无误后转移全部资产
↓
停止使用旧助记词

不要把旧助记词导入另一台硬件钱包继续使用。
换设备只能换一个保存和签名工具，无法改变旧助记词本身的随机强度。
如果旧助记词已经存在可预测风险，导入Ledger、Trezor、OneKey或者其他设备，恢复出来的仍然是同一个有风险的钱包。

如果是我自己遇到这种情况，我会重新选择其他厂商的设备生成新钱包。

原因并不只是技术漏洞本身。

生成原始熵是硬件钱包最基础的职责。

一次普通功能出错，可以通过升级继续观察。

但种子生成路径出现问题，会动摇我对整个工程、测试和审计体系的信任。

这次事件给我们的警示

第一，助记词看起来很随机，不代表它真的拥有足够熵。

低质量随机数经过SHA-256之后，同样可以变成一组看起来毫无规律的24个单词。

第二，设备里有安全芯片，不代表生成助记词时一定正确使用了安全芯片。
硬件条件只是起点，固件必须把随机数据完整、正确地带进最终原始熵。
第三，代码开源能够增加发现问题���机会，无法保证没有问题。
代码公开多年，却没有人检查到最终生成助记词时连接到了错误的随机数实现，这次已经给出了非常现实的例子。
第四，升级固件无法修复已经生成的低熵助记词。

���现种子生成漏洞以后，需要重新生成钱包，再迁移资产。

第五，大额资产全部交给一家厂商、一台设备和一套助记词，风险会集中在一个点上。

对于长期持有较大金额的比特币，可以考虑不同厂商设备组成的多签钱包。

例如：

Ledger生成一套独立种子
Trezor生成一套独立种子
OneKey、Keystone或其他设备生成一套独立种子
↓
组成2-of-3多签

即使其中一家出现随机数漏洞，攻击者仍然缺少第二把签名密钥。

我们过去经常把注意力放在助记词要不要刻钢板、冷钱包要不要联网、固件是否开源、安全芯片达到什么认证级别。

这些都值得关注。

但 Coldcard 这次事件提醒我们，钱包安全在助记词出现之前就已经开始了。

在屏幕显示第一个单词之前，设备内部必须先生成一份真正不可预测的原始熵。只要这一步出现问题，后面的 SHA-256、BIP39、气隙签名和助��词钢板，都无法补回已经缺失的随机性。

比特币的所有权由数学保护。

数学可以保证，一串真正随机的 256 位数据几乎无法被穷举，却无法保证厂商一定正确生成了这串数据。这里依赖代码、芯片、测试、审计，以及整个��队的工程能力。

自托管让我们不需要把资产交给银行或交易所，同时也把选择工具、关注安全公告、备份和风险分散的责任交给了自己。

冷钱包可以隔离私钥，却无法隔离厂商犯错。

对于长期资产，真正可靠的保障来自一套能够承受单点失效的安全方案。

在熊市里，我们可以暂时放下价格腰斩了多少，也不去讨论谁赚了钱、谁被套在高点。

比特币能够吸引全世界这么多人，当然离不开它的金融属性。财富、涨跌和利益距离每个人都很近，所以人们才会趋之若鹜。

但我也希望有一天，我们谈起比特币和区块链时，话题不再只围绕币价、牛熊和财富故事。

这项技术让个人第一次有机会真正掌握自己的数字资产，让价值可以在没有中间机构许可的情况下完成转移，也让普通人可以独立验证一套规则是否被遵守。

未来，它还可能进入身份认证、产权登记、跨境结算、公益捐赠、版权保护，以及更多今天尚未被充分想象的领域。

一项技术真正走向成熟，最终要看它能否解决现实问题，能否让普通人的生活多一点自由、多一点透明，也多一点选择。

Coldcard 事件也让我们重新理解了去中心化。

离开银行和平台之后，信任并没有消失，而是被分散到了代码、芯片、开发者、审计机构和我们自己身上。

学习原始熵、助记词和随机数，不需要每个人都成为密码学专家。

至少当我们把资产交给一台设备时，应该知道自己正在相信什么；当这份信任出现问题时，也知道怎样把资产安全地转移出来。

我是大方，我们下期再见。

[加密LEO話不多 @LeoCryptoBrief]

https://t.co/TxnKhO1dQW

[加密LEO話不多 @LeoCryptoBrief]

https://t.co/kT0hX1E4p9

[加密LEO話不多 @LeoCryptoBrief]

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[加密LEO話不多 @LeoCryptoBrief]

https://t.co/kRgifmzKBA

[加密LEO話不多 @LeoCryptoBrief]

https://t.co/e6pxPMefGV

[Lorenzo Valente @LorenzoARK]

Why USDT and USDC are Harder to Kill than Crypto Twitter Thinks: My last Thoughts on Open USD

The launch of OUSD has taken Twitter by storm. Many people are now convinced @circle is doomed because a consortium of 150 companies spanning payments, fintech, banks, crypto infrastructure, and consumer technology is somehow going to crush the competition and launch a stablecoin that rivals USDC, and potentially even USDT.

I already wrote a tweet on why people are vastly overestimating this initiative and why consortiums are poor organizational structures to conquer anything, let alone a market with an established duopoly. In this short piece, I want to focus on one thing only: the true network effects of stablecoins. Instead of rehashing every argument, I want to walk through a tangible example that everyone is ignoring, because I believe both USDT and USDC have liquidity moats that are vastly misunderstood and underappreciated.

Stablecoin network effects are not created by a long list of logos. They are created by liquidity, habit, collateral acceptance, integrations, brand recognition, market depth, settlement flows, and the fear of breaking what already works.

This is why I think @tether and @circle are companies that are vastly misunderstood.

First, the obvious: OUSD will be GENIUS compliant, which means it cannot share yield directly with users. This isn’t news, yet people are screaming at Circle to pay stablecoin holders, as if OUSD were going to be able to do that. The reality is the opposite: Circle is probably the issuer that passes on the most yield to platforms, and by extension to users, of anyone in the market.

This matters because a lot of people are talking as if OUSD will create a fundamentally different yield product for end users. That is not the model. The model is not “pay stablecoin holders.” The model is “share the reserve economics with the platforms and businesses that distribute and use the stablecoin.

This is an important distinction.

The strongest argument I’ve seen for OUSD is that consortium members will be highly incentivized to entrench it in their businesses because they get a revenue share from the structure. Without knowing the details, let’s assume the economics resemble previous consortiums we’ve seen: Open Standard, the operating company, keeps a 25 bps management fee while each participant keeps 100% of the NIM on any OUSD sitting on their platform, network, or protocol.

On paper, that’s a deal anyone signs immediately. But it completely discounts the fact that these companies accrue value in other ways, and in many cases their core businesses depend on the existing liquidity and network effects of USDT, USDC, other stablecoins or simply other FIAT currencies.

The NIM from stablecoin reserves is attractive only if pursuing it does not jeopardize a much larger revenue stream.

That is the key point.

The best case study in the industry, and probably the strongest counterexample to OUSD, is Binance.

Binance as the best Case Study

@binance is the largest exchange in the industry by several miles. It initially had its own branded stablecoin, BUSD, which peaked at roughly $23B in supply before NYDFS ordered Paxos, the issuer, to shut the product down in February 2023.

Look at the three biggest Asian exchanges and you get three clean case studies. Today @binance holds about $45B of USDT, @Bybit_Official about $4B, and @okx about $9B. Binance has been, and remains, Tether’s fortress and crown jewel. USDT is the most liquid counterpair on the biggest exchange in the world. Today, if you want to buy BTC, ETH, SOL, or open a perp position in size, USDT is still the dominant quote currency across much of the offshore exchange complex. Binance helped make that true. USDT is embedded into the deepest order books, the most liquid pairs, the most active derivatives markets, and the workflows of the most important market makers and traders.

That is a real network effect.

Now many of you must be thinking: why is CZ so naive? Why hasn’t he called Paolo and Giancarlo and demanded at least a portion of the USDT yield, if not most of it? Binance knows it has extreme leverage here.

There is an extremely simple reason this has never happened: Binance’s crown jewel, from a revenue and enterprise value perspective, is its trading business. And that trading business is cemented by USDT liquidity.

Running the math

So let’s run the rough numbers and see why it is entirely rational for CZ not to chase the NIM, or try to replace USDT with a more “aligned” stablecoin. The back-of-the-envelope math below is based on on-chain data and assumptions; none of it is confirmed information.

Building it bottom-up:

Derivatives (the core engine). Binance runs roughly 40% of global crypto derivatives volume. Call it $40-50B per day on average through the cycle, so $10-15T annually. Blended taker/maker take rate after VIP discounts and BNB rebates is maybe 5 bps. That’s roughly $5B from perps and futures alone.

Spot. Maybe $8-10B per day on average, around $3T annually, at a blended 15 bps (much lower than Coinbase’s retail take rate, because Binance’s mix skews heavily VIP and they run zero-fee promos). Call it another $5B.

Everything else. Earn and lending spread, margin interest, Launchpool and listing economics, Binance Pay, staking commissions, plus the float: they sit on roughly $46B in customer stablecoins, and while they don’t sweep it like a broker-dealer, the corporate treasury and interest-bearing products around it are meaningful at these rates. Add BNB ecosystem economics and you’re conservatively looking at another $5-7B.

And remember, these are bear market numbers. Very conservatively, Binance is a business generating close to $17-20B in bear markets and probably closer to $25B in bull markets. A business of that scale and quality is plausibly worth north of $200B.

So why isn’t CZ in a rush to replace USDT or demand better economics from the Tether team?

Because the whole reason Binance is what it is today, the reason 300M+ customers keep returning to the platform, is that it is the most liquid venue on earth. Let’s price the trade Binance would actually be making.

Binance has $45B of USDT on its platform. Say it struck a deal with OUSD handing Binance 90% of the yield. At an average T-bill yield of 3.8%, that’s about $1.55B a year. Very appealing, until you frame it properly: risking a $25B revenue engine for $1.5B of upside is something only a madman would do.

The glue holding Binance’s trading castle together is precisely USDT. There is no incentive in the world that would make CZ rethink which stablecoin to entrench.

And we don’t need to speculate, because it has already been tried. Over a year ago, Circle reportedly paid Binance a one-time $60M plus ongoing monthly incentives tied to USDC balances held on the platform. Despite all of that, USDC supply on Binance has been essentially flat at $5B.

People are vastly underestimating the network effects these stablecoins generate for the businesses that host them. In most cases, the upside is simply not worth jeopardizing your core revenue engine.

For an exchange, the stablecoin is not just cash. It is the quote asset, the collateral asset, the risk-management asset, the working-capital asset, and the unit of account for millions of traders. Switching that substrate is not free.

Not All Consortium Members Have the Same Incentives

The final point is that the OUSD consortium includes very different types of businesses. They do not all monetize stablecoins in the same way.

Broadly, there are two models.

The first model is AUM monetization. These are companies and protocols that benefit from idle balances, deposits, or float. For them, reserve economics are directly relevant. A lending protocol, wallet, neobank, or exchange with large customer balances may care a lot about the NIM attached to stablecoin supply.

The second model is turnover monetization. These are payments networks, processors, remittance companies, and commerce platforms that monetize transaction flow rather than idle balances. For them, the stablecoin is more of a rail than a balance-sheet asset. They may care more about reliability, cost, compliance, speed, reach, and customer experience than about reserve yield.

An @aave and a @WesternUnion do not bring the same thing to OUSD.

A DeFi protocol can help create supply by making OUSD useful as collateral or as a yield-bearing venue for liquidity. A payments company may instead move OUSD through its system and burn it quickly at the edge. That can be valuable for volume, but it is very different from creating persistent supply.

This is why the consortium structure is less powerful than it appears. The members may all like the idea of shared economics, but their incentives are not identical. Some will create supply. Some will create turnover. Some will integrate deeply. Some will experiment. Some may do very little once the press cycle is over.

In equilibrium, it is hard to believe all members will be equally motivated to push OUSD. Some will do the hard work of adoption. Others will coast.

That is the classic consortium problem.

Conclusion

OUSD is not irrelevant. It is one of the more interesting stablecoin experiments we have seen, and the economic model is clearly designed to attack the reserve-income advantage of the incumbents.

But the market is overestimating how quickly shared economics can overcome embedded liquidity.

Stablecoins are not won by press releases. They are won through deep, repeated, high-trust usage across the venues where money actually moves.

That is why USDT remains so powerful. That is why USDC has proven resilient and is growing so fast. And that is why OUSD, despite the impressive consortium behind it, faces a much harder path than the market currently assumes.

The core question is not whether OUSD can offer better economics to partners.

The core question is whether those economics are valuable enough for partners to risk disrupting businesses that are already built around other currencies or stablecoins.

In many cases, the answer will be no.

[DefiLlama.com @DefiLlama]

When you deposit into a vault, you're exposed to more than the vault itself: oracles, bridges, collateral, the sequencer, holders of vault roles.

Introducing risk scenario planning on DefiLlama.

* Maps every dependency that touches your deposit
* Models your max loss from each failure point
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[Jesse Myers @Croesus_BTC]

STRC down to $82.6 today. Here's my read:

1. Strategy is fine. If everything stays as is, they can pay STRC dividends for 32 years. If BTC appreciates at ~2% CAGR, they can pay dividends indefinitely.

2. Why the sell-off? This appears to be a liquidation cascade.

Over the last 6 months, the narrative became that STRC volatility was reducing, and price began to spend all its time in $99-100 range.

This invites leverage. If you expect the price to always be north of $95, you can take on 20x leverage with your portfolio to buy more STRC and dramatically increase the yield on your portfolio.

This works great, until it doesn't.

STRC is designed as a free-market asset. When attention shifted to SATA and STRC price flagged, it may have raised the attention of opportunistic short-selling hedge funds.

By shorting aggressively, they could push the price down and start triggering margin calls and liquidations from folks who aggressively levered up their STRC positions.

The price action today is a clear liquidation cascade, rapidly pushing prices lower, in turn triggering additional liquidations.

3.
What happens now? The market will heal itself.

Opportunistic hedge funds will recognize that this is a firesale and the fundamentals are unchanged for STRC and step in as buyers. Shorts will close, becoming buyers. Individuals are getting a tremendous entry price for long-term holding STRC shares.

Buyers at this level will get ~13.7% effective yield. If STRC trades back to $100 and they sell, they get an easy +18% return.

4.
What will Strategy do?

Strategy will likely increase the dividend rate on June 30 - maybe to 11.75% but possibly to 12%. Buyers at the current price level then would get 14.2% effective yield from that point forward.

Strategy may also step in to buy STRC shares back. They could do this by issuing new shares of MSTR (currently at 1.14 mNAV) or by taking on traditional debt and deploying those funds to buy discounted STRC shares on the market.

If/when STRC trades back to $100, Strategy could then re-issue those STRC shares. The ~$15 delta per share could be used to buy BTC as pure accretion to MSTR holders, with no net change to amplification.

No doubt that Saylor has already at least considered this, and it wouldn't surprise me if they're currently doing this.

5.
In summary...

The market is freaked out that this depeg is like Terra/Luna... but this is not an asset like that. Strategy's balance sheet determines whether STRC continues to receive dividend payments... and Strategy's balance sheet is completely unchanged.

This is a leverage wipeout.

From this, the market will learn that Digital Credit is mostly very low volatility. But because it is a free market asset, the longer that a Digital Credit instrument trades within a tight range to par... the more leverage will inevitably pile up as people get greedy.

And that creates the conditions for a leverage wipeout depeg. Following that, the instrument will make its way back to par value as the market heals itself and recognizes that the dividend payments will continue uninterrupted because the issuer's balance sheet is unaffected.

[Evan Luthra @EvanLuthra]

🚨THE FBI CREATED A FAKE CRYPTOCURRENCY.. LISTED IT ON UNISWAP.. HIRED MARKET MAKERS TO PUMP IT.. THEN ARRESTED EVERYONE WHO SAID YES..

THIS IS THE CRAZIEST LAW ENFORCEMENT OPERATION IN CRYPTO HISTORY!!!

The FBI built an actual ERC-20 token on Ethereum called NexFundAI.. 100 billion token supply.. A professional website.. Whitepapers promising "passive income through AI-powered investing"..

It looked exactly like every other crypto project.. Because that was the point..

Undercover agents posed as the founding team.. Then reached out to professional market-making firms and said "we need you to fake our trading volume"..

Every single firm said yes..

Here's what they recorded..

Gotbit.. A firm run by a 26-year-old Russian who publicly bragged in 2019 that he built a business faking trade volumes.. His team kept internal spreadsheets with columns literally labeled "fake volume" vs "market volume"..

When asked how fast they could pump NexFundAI's volume to $1 million per day.. They said "6 hours.. It will cost about $200"..

$200 to fake $1 million in daily trading volume..

MyTrade.. Run by a guy who called himself "the mastermind".. He explained the exact psychology of the scam on camera..

"We make the chart look like a really nice roller coaster ride.. That's where people jump in.. We have to make them lose money in order to make profit"..

He said that on a recorded FBI video call..

CLS Global.. A Dubai-based firm.. Their bots generated 98% of NexFundAI's total trading volume.. When the FBI asked if they could sync fake volume spikes with fake news announcements.. They said absolutely..

ZM Quant.. Bots executing 10 to 20 trades per minute through dozens of wallets to look organic..

All of them knew it was fraud.. All of them did it anyway.. All of it was recorded..

And the clients were even worse..

Saitama.. A meme coin that hit $7.5 billion market cap.. The founders coordinated buys through private Telegram chats.. Sent "pump it" memes while manipulating the price.. Then dumped on retail investors..

$7.5 billion.. Built entirely on fake volume.. Every penny of real money came from retail investors who thought the momentum was organic..

One founder left Saitama and started Robo Inu.. Used Gotbit again.. Another launched VZZN.. Same playbook..

Lillian Finance.. Founder claimed to be a defense contractor who addressed Congress.. Marketed the token as funding children's hospitals.. Pocketed everything..

When the FBI shut it down.. They seized $25 million in one day.. 18 people indicted across the US, UK, and Portugal.. The CEO of Gotbit was arrested in Portugal and extradited.. Sentenced to 8 months plus $23 million forfeiture..

But here's the part that broke my brain..

Real people bought NexFundAI..

The FBI's fake token.. With zero utility.. Zero real developers.. Created solely to catch criminals.. Attracted real retail investors because the fake volume made the chart look bullish..

When the FBI pulled the liquidity to end the operation.. Those people lost real money.. On a government-issued token..

The FBI had to set up a restitution portal to pay them back..

And it gets worse..

Within 24 hours of the DOJ announcing the sting.. Someone cloned the FBI's exact smart contract.. Launched a copycat token.. Rode the viral momentum.. And made $127,000 in a single day..

Using the exact same manipulation tactics the FBI just arrested 18 people for..

Then in 2026.. The FBI did it again.. New token called Lexobit.. 10 more arrests.. Including operators extradited from Singapore..

IRS forensics showed that in one firm's trading.. 1,209 out of 1,221 consecutive transactions went straight back to wallets the firm controlled.. 99% circular..

The FBI proved what everyone in crypto suspected..

The volume is fake.. The charts are painted.. The momentum is manufactured..

And every time you buy a token because "the chart looks bullish".. You might be the exit liquidity.

[加密LEO話不多 @LeoCryptoBrief]

https://t.co/XW0De45OWV

[加密LEO話不多 @LeoCryptoBrief]

https://t.co/29FZJsyAgF

[Ondo Finance @Ondo]

Tokenized $STRC is now live.

Stretch (STRC) is @Strategy's perpetual preferred stock paying monthly dividends, currently yielding 11.5%.

Now available across Ethereum, BNB Chain, and Solana through Ondo Global Markets.

[加密LEO話不多 @LeoCryptoBrief]

https://t.co/CC8iMf8Bxm

[Sweep @0xSweep]

Curve's founder pulled $100 MILLION out of his own token to buy two Australian mansions and left holders with a token that dumped 98%

In 2023 Curve Finance founder Michael Egorov took out $100 million in stablecoin loans across Aave, Frax, Inverse, Abracadabra and other protocols

His collateral was 427 million CRV, which was 47% of the circulating supply of his own token

Lookonchain traced $31 million in stablecoins flowing from Egorov to Bitfinex in April 2023

One month later his wife bought a $41 million mansion in Melbourne, right next door to the $18 million home they had purchased the year before

That's $59 million in Australian real estate funded by loans against the token his own community was holding

In July 2023 Curve was hacked for $70 million through a Vyper bug, CRV crashed and his positions almost got liquidated

A liquidation would have created tens of millions in bad debt across Aave, Frax and other protocols and triggered a DeFi wide catastrophe

To avoid this Egorov sold 106 million CRV in OTC deals at $0.40 per token, well below the market price, to a roster that included Justin Sun, convicted felon Michael Patryn, Jeffrey Huang, DWF Labs and several anonymous wallets

He raised $42 million in stablecoins from these deals while community holders watched CRV dump

In April 2024 he had to do it again, selling another 159 million CRV in OTC to 33 different buyers for $63 million

In June 2024 CRV crashed 24% in 3 hours and he got fully liquidated for $140 million across 5 protocols

The liquidation created $10 million of bad debt that the community had to absorb

Ethereum developer Eric Conner did the math: "He got 100 million in stables out of a 140 million CRV position. He just transferred the rektage to the community instead"

Egorov's response was that he was "committed to building Curve more than ever" thanks to veTokenomics, meaning he locked his remaining CRV to keep control of governance

CRV is down 98% from its all time high and Egorov still owns the two mansions and the protocol

When the founder of your protocol uses your bag as collateral for his mansion, you're not an investor

You're his ATM

[加密LEO話不多 @LeoCryptoBrief]

https://t.co/Bnk8zdxcr2

[加密LEO話不多 @LeoCryptoBrief]

https://t.co/Ojz8VYzROD