Simon Palethorpe

Purveyor of gluten free deliciousness and global chocolate hunter

[Elisabeth Kendall @Dr_E_Kendall]

Today President #Trump gave his reaction to the threat by #Yemen's #Houthis to blockade #Saudi shipping in the Red Sea. Here's my 1-minute take for BBC Radio 4's PM programme. For the whole interview, go to: https://t.co/1YOwt9Ahg0

[Elisabeth Kendall @Dr_E_Kendall]

Truly delighted to share this big news. The hope is that the Rokos School of Government can - over time and across boundaries - become "an important element of that soft power which has been a great asset to the UK".
https://t.co/ZcuKHurLTZ

[Elisabeth Kendall @Dr_E_Kendall]

Despite all the talk, there's no clear end in sight for the #Iran war. What are the implications of #Yemen's #Houthis now entering the fray by firing at #Israel? I spoke to Al Jazeera lunchtime news.

[Elisabeth Kendall @Dr_E_Kendall]

This is the first interview I've done where the host took the time to ask about the historical context of #Yemen's conflict fault-lines before moving on to contemporary challenges. My thanks to @cmec_uk & @CharlotteLeslie for such a wide-ranging discussion.

[Elisabeth Kendall @Dr_E_Kendall]

#Yemen's separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC) was engineered from #AbuDhabi in 2017 & dissolved from #Riyadh in 2026. But the reality is that Yemen's southerners themselves will vote with their feet: Large rallies in #Aden yesterday in support of the separatist agenda show that long-distance deals are challenging to translate into reality on the ground.

Obviously, the STC won't just melt away. But major questions are yet to be addressed:
▪️How far east (and north east) does support for southern separatism really stretch?
▪️What kind of entity do most southerners want? Federal autonomy or full independence?

Yemen's population is c.42.5m. Roughly 11m live in the former South. 1m allegedly came out in support of the STC. That's c.10%. It's impressive, but it doesn't "speak for the people". Southerners know that, which is why they have called for a referendum.

Yemenis have shown that the southern question cannot be decided by Abu Dhabi or Riyadh. So what now? The Saudi proposal (endorsed by Abu Dhabi) for a comprehensive & inclusive dialogue seems a reasonable start ... even better if it were convened on neutral territory.

[Elisabeth Kendall @Dr_E_Kendall]

Delegates at the #Yemen Dialogue in #Riyadh have (controversially) announced the disbandment of the #UAE-backed Southern Transitional Council (STC). Al Jazeera asked how it came to this. Here's my answer in 90-seconds.

For the whole interview, including what might be next, go to: https://t.co/Yimtrdr6go

[Elisabeth Kendall @Dr_E_Kendall]

I spoke to Al Jazeera "Newshour" about what's next for south #Yemen & the #Saudi-#UAE confrontation. Is it over for the separatist President, Aidarous al-Zubaidi, following his dramatic escape to Somalia & on to UAE? Here's a 1-minute clip. For the whole interview, go to: https://t.co/0LatPb8R8A

[Elisabeth Kendall @Dr_E_Kendall]

Observation: It is more precise to refer to Rashad al-'Alimi as the Head/Chairman of the Presidential Leadership Council PLC of Yemen (as opposed to "President of Yemen"). PLC decisions should be taken by consensus or majority. However, article K.4 of the Transfer of Powers Announcement (7 April 2022) states "If it is not possible to have a simple majority of the attendees at the joint meeting, the Chairman of the PLC takes the decision."

[Elisabeth Kendall @Dr_E_Kendall]

Yesterday's statement by #Yemen's #UAE-backed separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC) condemning #Saudi air strikes demonstrates how the same reality can be interpreted very differently.

◾️It frames the clash as North vs South.
✏️Note: The North-South framing evokes history, but it fails to take account of residents of the former “South” who are pro-government, especially in #Hadramawt & #Mahra. The use of “North” also has the effect of lumping together the government with its Houthi enemy. This new faultline is more about East vs West.

◾️It describes Saudi strikes as a “serious military war being waged against South Arabia”.
✏️Note: Saudi air strikes were limited to positions in Hadramawt deemed occupied by separatist forces & came at the request from the President of Yemen’s internationally recognized government.

◾️It raises the spectre of terrorism, warning that terror groups & the Houthis will benefit from the instability.
✏️Note: This is true. The question is who should back down to ensure stability is restored.

◾️It accuses Saudi of “overriding the will of the people of the South”.
✏️Note: In the absence of a referendum, the will of people in the south is not known. The will of the #STC and its supporters is known.

[Elisabeth Kendall @Dr_E_Kendall]

#Yemen’s southern separatist #STC has accepted the #Saudi invitation to a southern dialogue. For context, this comes as: Saudi stands firm on its red lines; #UAE forces have been withdrawn; UAE-backed separatist forces retreat; and the crucial eastern governorates of Hadramawt & Mahra fall back into government hands.

Yet there is no sense of climbdown in the STC acceptance statement, and - while positive - elements of it hint at challenges ahead:

◾️It frames the dialogue invitation as Saudi finally implementing the STC approach (rather than the other way round)

◾️It stresses that STC attendance is consistent with its “Constitutional Declaration of the State of South Arabia” (2 Jan), i.e. the desired outcome is known

◾️It welcomes the participation of “Southern components that are partners and signatories to the Southern National Charter” (the Saudi statement embraces “*all* southern factions”)

◾️It affirms its commitment to previous initiatives like the 2019 Riyadh Agreement (but note that important elements, like integration of southern forces into the main military, were never implemented).

[Elisabeth Kendall @Dr_E_Kendall]

#Yemen's STC (#UAE-backed southern separatist council) has published a "Constitutional Declaration of the State of #SouthArabia". Article 3 allows for a 2-year transition period.
https://t.co/Yq3d78sTkx

[Elisabeth Kendall @Dr_E_Kendall]

There are signs that direct armed conflict between #UAE-backed southern separatists & #Saudi-backed forces may have been staved off (for now). The spokesman of Yemen’s southern separatist forces has delivered an important verbal statement. It asserts that both sides are cooperating & their forces are integrating. But, listening to it again, there is clear scope for future conflict to flare up. Three main points of contention:

1/ What does military integration really mean (who is integrating with whom)? The 2019 Riyadh Agreement was widely held to mean southern forces being integrated into the main military. This statement appears to frame it the other way round, at least in the south.

2/ What is meant by “southern homeland”? Disagreement is likely to surface over federal/ autonomous region versus independent state.

3/ Who will control the east? This statement asserts the “steadfastness of our [southern] armed forces across the entire theatre”, including Hadramawt & Mahra, “securing all our territories” & “guaranteeing … the unity of the South”, including Hadramawt & Mahra. These regions border Saudi & Oman, and they also have their own separatist movements.

[Elisabeth Kendall @Dr_E_Kendall]

Why is the clash between #Saudi & #UAE playing out in #Yemen so dangerous this time? Here's a clip from my interview with BBC News. To hear it all, go to https://t.co/di3w6utpfr

[Elisabeth Kendall @Dr_E_Kendall]

Will a #UAE withdrawal from #Yemen be enough to calm things down with #Saudi? Below are my thoughts for France 24. For the whole interview, go to https://t.co/S92V0ASAi6

[Simon Palethorpe @LunchyThoughts]

RT @Dr_E_Kendall: Important new statement this morning by #SaudiArabia demonstrates the widening rift with #UAE playing out in #Yemen. The…

[Elisabeth Kendall @Dr_E_Kendall]

Developments in east #Yemen are of great concern. Most eyes are on Hadramawt but locals in the eastern-most #Mahra governorate (bordering #Oman) feel war is inching closer. They report an uptick in military recruitment campaigns by both sides. I'm told that #UAE-backed southern separatist forces are promising more money (even before training) than the #Saudi-backed National Shield forces offer with training.

[Elisabeth Kendall @Dr_E_Kendall]

#China has released its stance on developments in #Yemen. It calls for "upholding Yemen's sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity". In other words, China would not support the declaration of an independent South Yemen; rather, it supports the #Saudi call for (UAE-backed) southern separatist forces to withdraw from Hadramawt & Mahra. But it is careful not to criticise UAE.

Note that China's statement is more clear-cut than the somewhat hedged US statement released by the US Secretary of State on 26 Dec.

Naturally, statements can also be negotiating tactics.

[Elisabeth Kendall @Dr_E_Kendall]

Here's my stab at a 90-second overview of the developing conflict in #Yemen for BBC Newshour.

For the whole interview, go to: https://t.co/EoE5T20dip

[Simon Palethorpe @LunchyThoughts]

RT @Dr_E_Kendall: So, today we have #UAE's carefully worded response to #Saudi's warning to (UAE-backed) southern separatist forces in #Yem…

[Elisabeth Kendall @Dr_E_Kendall]

Yes, I know it's Christmas Day but... #Saudi Arabia has just released a statement clearly condemning the advances of #Yemen's (UAE-backed) southern separatist forces eastwards into Hadramawt & Mahra, up to the border with #Oman.

The statement claims cooperation with the "brotherly" #UAE to contain the ambitions of the pro-southern independence Southern Transitional Council (STC). But the fact is that UAE & Saudi visions for Yemen have little in common beyond a desire to curtail Houthi influence.

While the Saudi statement recognises "that the Southern cause is a just cause", fundamental sticking points will likely emerge around:

1. Full independence for the south - This would leave the Saudis with a Houthi-dominated 'northern' state on their border.

2. Control of Hadramawt from Aden by the (UAE-backed) STC - Hadramawt shares a c.700km border with KSA; Hadrami and Saudi ties (family, business, cultural) run deep. Hadramawt is also home to Yemen's largest oil resources.

3. Control of Mahra by the STC - Mahra shares a c.300km border with Oman. Given historic tensions between Oman & UAE, Oman would baulk at having UAE entities at both its northern & southern borders.

Add to this that both Hadramawt and Mahra have independence movements of their own, and many Hadramis and Mahris still hold dismal memories of repression under the previous southern state (1967-1990). Moreover, the STC leader has said that an independent south would join the Abraham Accords, at a time when #Israel is deeply unpopular among many Yemenis, not just in Houthi-held areas.

That said, clearly something needs to change in the south. The existing Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), of which the STC is part, is weak, ineffective and beset by infighting; and the influence in the south of Houthi & al-Qaeda has been insufficiently checked.

The Saudi statement (which incidentally follows high-level meetings in Oman) is timely and measured. The question is: Will it send a strong enough message for the STC to pull back, or could Yemen's civil war flare up again in the south? If the latter, the real winners will be the Houthis.