💙Maxi1981.ttm.base

🚀 Cryptonaut from 🇦🇹 $TTM whale 🐳 Everything IMO! DYOR! $TTM @tothemoon_net @base 💙 #NFT #Metaverse #GameFi

[💙Maxi1981.ttm.base @Maxi__1981]

Boaz is a gentle giant with a serene energy, often misunderstood due to an intimidating appearance. Despite looking fierce, Boaz is a kind-hearted, shy soul who seeks to help others, fiercely protecting only those closest. @TTM_Universe #Base $TTM

#NeuesProfilfoto

[Ricardo Prado @ricklock99]

Neo X has been frozen at 318 transactions and 2 new addresses for a long time. In practice, the network is dead. Nobody uses it.
Expecting any project to deploy there is just... delusion.
Neo X is not going to happen. It's an expensive failure.
Time to shut it down.

[Ricardo Prado @ricklock99]

COZ has received millions directly and indirectly from the Neo Foundation with zero supervision and sits, alongside AxLabs, among the largest drains of network resources, an arrangement sustained for years through their influence inside NGD.

A founder who continues backing a group that absorbs millions and delivers no results is directly responsible for where Neo is today.

There’s nothing that could justify this support besides collusion to continue with the current status quo, where communities receive funds to spend without any accountability or consequences for their actions.

Unfortunately, if @dahongfei can’t see the obvious , then he is not fit to remain in Neo’s leadership, or even to nominate anyone to any council.

[Ricardo Prado @ricklock99]

"The current structure is roughly 813,000 FUSD backed by around 138,000 USD in FLM, 80,000 USD in NEO, and 180,000 USD in GAS"
Even if you assume the full FLM position could be offloaded at face value, that's still ~50% undercollateralized.

[Rob @snakey_rob]

@dahongfei @FranciscoMemor Sponsored by @ngd_neo!!!

This does not even look close to objective same as your financial report.

[Erik Zhang @erikzhang]

NGD employee insulted the core developer of NEO, calling him "intelligently disabled". This is the company managed by Da Hongfei, which looks like a gang organization.

[Ricardo Prado @ricklock99]

Crows, Rats, and Toads

Imagine there was a nature reserve that's been struggling for years. It used to be full of life, all kinds of species, but it slowly declined. The board kept pouring money into recovery programs. They'd bring in wolves, eagles, deer, and foxes. Build new habitats, expand territory, and hire consultants.

Every time, the same thing happened. The new animals would arrive, seem to adapt, and then quietly vanish. The wolves would get sick. The eagles would fly off. The deer would stop breeding. One by one, gone.

But three species always remained: the crows, the rats, and the toads. They were there before the decline, during every failed recovery attempt, and after. Nobody paid much attention to them. They weren't impressive, but they weren't causing trouble either. They just lived there.

After ten years and millions spent, a new director took over. She reviewed the reports: dozens of species introduced, almost none survived. Exposed habitats, contaminated water sources, disrupted breeding grounds. She walked the reserve and counted what was left. Crows, rats, and toads.

She sat with the data for a while. Then she started asking a different question. Everyone before her had asked, "Why don't the new animals survive?" She asked, "Why do these three always do?"

She looked closer. The crows had been pecking eggs from every nest that wasn't theirs. The rats had been gnawing through the fences built to protect newcomers. And the toads had been poisoning the water with toxins that only they were immune to.

The reserve wasn't failing despite them. It was failing because of them. And nobody had noticed, because nobody ever suspects the ones who never leave.

[Ricardo Prado @ricklock99]

The situation on Neo is simple: Forget the theoretical stuff and the fantasies. There is no "Neo Council." What exists is: two founders with enormous funds at their disposal, a group playing house and getting paid for it, a class of outcasts, and the holders. There are also core developers and NSPCC.

Erik controls the addresses holding NEO. Da Hongfei controls non-NEO assets, NGD, and its investments. Each side is sitting on over $200 million.

The group playing house, private groups, receives tens of thousands of dollars per month from contracts and consensus nodes. "Community" initiatives received over $430000 per month in 2025 alone.

Not all groups are dead weight. Some, like NeoSPCC and the core developers, are genuinely competent and deliver real work. But they're the exception, not the rule, and there's nothing in between.

You either have teams doing excellent work or teams delivering virtually nothing. The most competent ones often have to compensate for those who don't deliver, and even with their skill, it's still not enough to carry an entire ecosystem.

The rest show up once in a while, work on mostly pointless projects (if they even deliver anything), derail discussions, and disappear. Behind the scenes, they also actively work to sabotage competitors (when they rarely appear).

Then there are the outcasts. Community members with no contracts, no node, no seat at the table. People who try to build or contribute but don't see results. When they need funding, they have to beg and humiliate themselves for $300, $500. Many have probably sensed they belong to a different caste, but the arrangement is so absurd that they may not have fully processed it.

On one side, people collect five figures a month to deliver nothing. On the other hand, people scrape for pocket change to keep contributing.

And this isn't accidental. The first group created the second. The contracted insiders use their influence, amplified by the network's centralization, to ensure that no outside group or project can rise.
They gatekeep funding, visibility, and access through their influence over NGD. That's why the outcasts are outcasts. Not because they lack competence, but because allowing them to grow would threaten the arrangement.

Now, the founders are pissed at each other and have decided to split, not the network, but the management and funds. DHF has invested in his own preferences without accountability, even to his co-founder and director, Erik Zhang.

What changed is that Erik will likely stop directing NEO toward DHF's chosen investments. But that barely matters, since DHF still controls over $200 million in assets, even if you exclude the Binance stake, which nobody knows the size or worth of.

The difference is that Erik will now start deploying funds on his side. Before, DHF decided alone. Now, both will. Even if Erik stops sending to the multisig, DHF still has more resources under his control.

What happens next?

The near-impossible scenario is DHF and Erik reaching an agreement and consolidating funds. What will happen is simpler: if DHF refuses to disclose where and how the money went, Erik stops transferring funds, and each side invests in whatever they want, independently. The conflict doesn't resolve; it just becomes less relevant as both parties shift focus to their own goals.

Will DHF use non-NEO assets to cover project expenses? Will Erik start hiring on his own? Very likely. The change is that both founders now have greater autonomy to manage funds. Could that solve Neo's problems?

The problem on Neo is the existing cartel. We won't see improvement if the same groups that have failed for a decade continue to do so.

Keeping them in place removes all accountability for the current state of things: the lack of adoption, the lack of activity, the lack of everything on this network. The platform is technically capable of far more than what's being built on it today.
The failure is not technical; it is the total absence of consequences when these groups steer the network toward expensive and useless projects. Imagine giving nearly 500k per month to grow your project, only to end up smaller year after year.

Let's be honest about what's left: a handful of people operating as a cartel, a group that exists to protect itself. The network is in disarray, and some people are earning a lot while delivering very little.

Some are proposing that we let the people getting paid handsomely for producing nothing choose who controls the network. Let's give more power to the same caste that has drained the treasury while the outcasts beg for scraps. What do you think happens next? It's not hard to predict.

And there's another problem, maybe the worst one. NEO holders will barely show up to any vote. Governance participation is already low, not for the reasons many imagine, but simply because nobody wants to read a wall of text explaining candidate A versus candidate B.
Handing decision-making power to a process where almost no one participates is just another dead end.

In short, the situation is very problematic. But the fragmentation might actually be an improvement: real decentralization, born out of anger and distrust. One side literally does not trust the other. And that mutual distrust might be exactly the catalyst for building blockchain-based mechanisms that are actually realistic and enforceable, rather than governance theater.

As for the future, there are only two paths: one with the same groups, and one without them. We already know where one of those leads: one transaction per minute, on a good day.

[Erik Zhang @erikzhang]

I have officially submitted my proposal on GitHub:

Neo Governance Restoration Proposal

This proposal is focused on restoring governance order in Neo, establishing the legal force of on-chain governance, defining the governance boundary of Neo Public Assets, and creating a clearer structure for board responsibilities, supervision, accountability, and future on-chain governance infrastructure.

I welcome the community to read it, challenge it, and discuss it on GitHub. Link below.

https://t.co/S0yDKVP9Kc

[Erik Zhang @erikzhang]

People who cannot even speak clearly about right and wrong have no future.

Those who stay “neutral” in the face of obvious corruption and misconduct cannot be trusted to make the right decisions.

As for Neo’s future, some people are not truly thinking about how to make it succeed — they are only thinking about how to get their share of it.

[Erik Zhang @erikzhang]

Response to Da Hongfei’s Proposal

1. Neo’s legitimacy should be grounded in on-chain verifiability

In the blockchain world, addresses are the easiest thing to verify and the most trustworthy. Anything that can be proven by addresses should be proven by addresses first. Assets, control, and transfer paths should be brought back on-chain as much as possible, so the community can verify them directly.

Da’s proposal talks about improving transparency, yet it still leaves substantial room for off-chain structures and third-party endorsements. The authority of the restructured Foundation would depend on constitutional documents and bylaws. So-called tokenholder sovereignty would largely be embedded through off-chain governing documents. Significant fund flows could still be justified through “on-chain verification or independent third-party attestation.”

My position is very clear:

When on-chain addresses can directly prove the facts, addresses should be the default source of trust.

The community has no obligation to trust a third party that cannot be directly verified and whose identity may not even be disclosed. That kind of arrangement is absurd in the blockchain world.

2. This proposal keeps the most important governance gate in an artificially filtered off-chain structure

The proposal repeatedly uses words like “community,” “independent,” and “tokenholder powers,” but what it actually puts into the rules is a filtered governance entry point.

It explicitly states that the initial board will be formed from eight candidates, four nominated by each founder, and then selected by “independent community leaders and core developers.” Community leaders are defined as the heads of established sponsored communities, while core developers are those formally recognized on Neo's website. At the same time, under the formal governance structure, tokenholders may only nominate candidates after reaching certain thresholds, while the board still retains final appointment authority. The Supervisor would also first be nominated by the board and only then submitted to tokenholders for ratification or rejection.

The problem with this structure is obvious. The so-called “community” is not an open community. It is a group filtered in advance through an off-chain qualification system, and only then asked to express an opinion.

What makes it even more ridiculous is that the proposal writes Neo's website “formal recognition” directly into the logic for determining the initial board. A website is already under the control of a small number of people, and then that same website is used to define who counts as a “formally recognized community leader,” and those people are then allowed to decide the initial board. A design like this cannot seriously be called fair, let alone decentralized.

Neo’s existing governance logic is far more open in principle. Any individual or organization should have the opportunity to participate in governance under transparent rules, with token holders expressing their choices on-chain, instead of having some off-chain gateway decide in advance who is qualified to represent the community.

3. A technical founder must be on the board

The proposal explicitly states that for the first 24 months after redomiciliation, neither Da nor Erik may serve on the board or as Supervisor.

I do not agree with this arrangement.

Neo’s future certainly needs narrative, business development, and real-world adoption. Neo has clearly had long-standing weaknesses in these areas, and it absolutely needs more capable people to address them. But the board cannot be composed only of people focused on narrative, business, and market expansion. The board must also include people with a deep understanding of the protocol, the architecture, and the long-term technical direction.

Technical expertise is indispensable on Neo’s board.

I will serve on the NF board as a technical expert. There is no legitimate reason to exclude me.

Neo’s future depends on putting the right people in the right roles. If business development is weak, then someone capable should be brought in to lead BD. If technical direction is fundamental to Neo’s future, then people who truly understand the protocol, the architecture, and the long-term roadmap must take part in governance decisions. Only then does Neo have a real chance to change its current trajectory.

At the same time, we also need to face another reality: the person currently responsible for business development is not competent in that role. Since everyone already recognizes that Neo has long-standing weaknesses in narrative, BD, and adoption, that area should be entrusted to someone who is actually capable of solving those problems. The board can absolutely bring in a new and suitable person to take charge of business development and address one of Neo’s clearest long-term weaknesses. Neo only has a real chance to change its current situation when the right people are placed in the right positions.

4. People who remain neutral in the face of obvious corruption and misconduct cannot be trusted

This issue is fundamentally about governance. It is about fiduciary duty, transparency, loyalty, and basic moral judgment.

If a board director cannot even access the most basic financial transparency, if historical investments, asset ownership, control arrangements, and the relationships among off-chain entities remain unclear for years, then any reasonable person will ask: what exactly is this governance system trying to hide? Why is this kind of governance still being tolerated?

More importantly, people who remain neutral in the face of obvious corruption and misconduct simply cannot be trusted.

Many people like to present “neutrality” as something noble. But when faced with obvious conflicts of interest, financial opacity, double standards, and misconduct, neutrality means evading judgment, avoiding responsibility, and allowing the problem to continue.

Remaining neutral in the face of obvious wrongdoing is an act of enabling it.

Anyone unwilling to speak clearly about obvious corruption and misconduct cannot be trusted to defend Neo’s interests when it truly matters.

A board requires judgment. It requires responsibility. It requires a clear sense of right and wrong. People who are unwilling to say what is right and what is wrong do not deserve trust. People who pretend not to see obvious problems are not fit to govern Neo’s future.

I do not have any personal grudge against Da Hongfei. What I have consistently pointed out are specific actions and concrete governance problems. I made my position clear a long time ago: I would be willing to continue working with him under two conditions. First, the Foundation’s financial matters and historical investment projects must be fully clarified. Second, he must make a clear commitment to stop researching or developing projects that compete with Neo. If those two issues were genuinely resolved, I would have no problem continuing to work with him.

But the reality is that neither condition has been met. And this situation was not created by me. It was created by him.

The most absurd part is this: I am a director of NF, yet I cannot even see the most basic financial reports. Is that normal? Is that acceptable governance? Does that not make people wonder what exactly is being deliberately hidden?

So this has never been a private question of whether one person can sit on the same board as another. It is a question of whether a director is actually fulfilling fiduciary duty, meeting standards of transparency, and showing genuine loyalty to Neo.

5. There is no need to build a new Cayman shell in the name of a “reset”

This proposal tries to package a change in legal structure as a “reset.”

I do not agree with this path.

NF already exists. What needs to be addressed now are governance mechanisms, transparency, accountability boundaries, asset disclosure, and constraints on power. The community needs the facts to be clarified, the rules to be established, and the oversight mechanisms to be made real.

Changing the legal shell does not automatically create legitimacy. Moving to a different jurisdiction does not automatically produce better governance.

If the underlying problems remain unresolved, then a new Cayman structure will do nothing more than move the same old problems into a new container.

The community first needs to see a complete asset inventory, a clear control structure, a full explanation of historical investments, and clearly defined lines of responsibility. Those issues must be addressed before anyone has the standing to talk about institutional restructuring.

In addition, placing hundreds of millions of dollars of Foundation assets on Binance is already highly unprofessional. More importantly, isn’t that Binance account controlled by one person? If so, then this is exactly the accusation that has been used against me all along: that I supposedly controlled most of the Foundation’s assets alone. Yet in the end, the person who actually controlled most of the Foundation’s assets alone turns out to be him. That double standard and that blatant hypocrisy are exactly what make this governance problem so unacceptable.

6. I oppose this proposal, and I will put forward one that better serves the entire community

The reasons I oppose this proposal are already clear.

It grounds Neo’s legitimacy in off-chain structures, hands the governance entry point to a filtered version of the “community,” excludes the technical founder from the board, and attempts to use a newly packaged institutional design to cover up long-standing problems of opacity and poor governance.

Neo needs a different path.

Neo needs a framework that reanchors legitimacy in on-chain verifiability.

Neo needs a framework that clarifies assets, authority, and accountability before discussing governance restructuring.

Neo needs a framework with a genuinely open governance entry point, where the community can verify and supervise directly.

Neo needs a framework that can strengthen narrative, BD, and adoption while also keeping technical expertise at the center of governance.

I will present my own proposal in the coming days.

It will be a proposal that better serves the entire Neo community.

[holiman @colderthykiss]

@dahongfei So, who authorized the placement of these assets belonging to NF under the name of the private company NGD?
Is this legal?

[💙Maxi1981.ttm.base @Maxi__1981]

@dahongfei So, who authorized the placement of these assets belonging to NF under the name of the private company NGD?
Is this legal?

[Rob @snakey_rob]

@dahongfei So, who authorized the placement of these assets belonging to NF under the name of the private company NGD?
Is this legal?

[Erik Zhang @erikzhang]

@dahongfei So, who authorized the placement of these assets belonging to NF under the name of the private company NGD?
Is this legal?

[Ricardo Prado @ricklock99]

When Neo X was launched, they announced one “partnership“ per week. It had no impact.

As someone said on Discord: Neo X is a “humanless blockchain because nobody uses it”.

Technically speaking, it’s also bad. It goes offline for long periods frequently.

There’s absolutely no reason for a DeFi protocol to deploy on Neo X, even less providing liquidity. It’s simply not safe or even reliable.

[💙Maxi1981.ttm.base @Maxi__1981]

@ricklock99 $NEO is so f****** dead, as I always said... Noone believed me... 😬

[💙Maxi1981.ttm.base @Maxi__1981]

@ricklock99 $NEO is so f****** dead, as I always said... Noone believed me... 😬

[Ricardo Prado @ricklock99]

Do you remember last year when several people from the Neo ecosystem went on that trip, with expenses fully covered, even paying for their “friends” to join? At the end of it, all they produced was a letter promising to focus exclusively on Neo.

Of course, that never materialized. In practice, what we are happened was the opposite. Their priority seems to be building an 'exit' of Neo rather than rebuilding Neo itself.

Look at what is publicly visible. COZ is working on integrations with other chains. Flamingo is launching a new project on BSC. The NNT "reporter" barely references Neo. EON and SpoonOS can be added to the mix as well.

Meanwhile, core developers and the NSPCC continue to bear the technical burden of maintaining the network, while others continue receiving funding through contracts and consensus nodes, deploying their energy and resources into entirely different ecosystems.
Neo has become their funding source and nothing else.

What we are witnessing now is the final phase of capital extraction, where remaining treasury and ecosystem flows are used to finance parallel initiatives that have nothing with Neo, but to these groups own survival.

Even if individuals like Jimmy or Erik are giving everything they have, effort cannot compensate for a flawed strategic direction. You can push forward with maximum intensity, but there is no meaningful arrival point.

For Erik, I sincerely hope he has secured enough outside of Neo to remain financially independent regardless of what happens next. For Jimmy and the other core developers, I hope they begin to evaluate their value beyond this ecosystem. Within Neo, the upside from a financial or intellectual perspective appears largely exhausted.

I understand that some people dislike or feel discouraged by posts like this. But as I have said before, I strongly encourage everyone to build their own exit strategy.

The vast majority of actors around the ecosystem are extracting value. They are not going to reverse its trajectory. In many cases, they are a major reason why it failed.

Take a look at Flamingo. If you had invested one million dollars in Flamingo at its peak, you would be left with roughly 2,500 dollars today. That represents a decline of approximately 99.75%. It is not an exaggeration. And it is entirely plausible that Neo and GAS follow a similar path.

I have personally reached out to the founders to see whether meaningful change is possible. However, there are deeper structural issues, particularly around funding allocation and accountability, that are unlikely to be resolved in the near term and may ultimately require formal restructuring or legal clarity.
So, while Neo may have some people with good intent and good ideas, nothing can possibly divert the current path from its inevitable catastrophic end.

[Ricardo Prado @ricklock99]

To the surprise of exactly zero people, the financial report was not published.

Yes, the token price saw a small bump because NGD made a few purchases, but the reality is simple: there was no real increase in market interest. And it is very unlikely that anything meaningful will change.

Do you remember last year, when the consensus node operators published that “letter” claiming they would dedicate themselves exclusively to Neo?

Of course that never happened.

The truth is that Neo is not trustworthy in any sense. For both investors and developers, the only consistent outcome Neo delivers is frustration.

What we are seeing, and what we will keep seeing, is an endless cycle of empty promises about the future, with no short-term results and no real accountability.

As I’ve said many times before, this delay is intentional. People keep receiving funding over time, regardless of results. That is exactly why they became experts in stalling, recycling narratives, and constantly pushing everything into a “future roadmap” that never materializes.

Unfortunately, nothing has changed. And realistically, nothing will.

There are no serious projects, no traction, and no real ecosystem growth, yet, investors are still being misled with vague promises of a future that is always postponed.

At this point, Neo will likely self-extinguish within 1 to 3 years.

[Reddon NEO NEWS @kurubatermit]

@forevergalxy @wjcbaggio @EEEEdison1992 @0xstv3 @Neo_Blockchain @erikzhang As the founding leader, can you say whether this is true or false? 🤔