Tomorrow, July 11, people from around the world will gather at the Potocari Memorial Center in Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) to commemorate the genocide that took place in and around Srebrenica in July 1995, and families will gather there to bury loved ones who were victims of that genocide.
The world has an obligation to remember the tragic events that unfolded after the Army of Republika Srpska (VRS) overran Srebrenica, a town the international community had promised it would protect. What happened after the now-convicted war criminal Ratko Mladic strutted down Srebrenica’s main street has been established beyond a shadow of a doubt by forensic evidence and two international tribunals: elements of Mladic’s forces systematically killed more than 8,000 Bosniak men and boys in what was the most horrific war crime to take place in Europe since World War 2.
Those who choose to remain silent about what took place in and around Srebrenica in July 1995 do not erase it from history, but their silence reflects poorly on them by, among other things, lending aid and comfort to those who deny the Srebrenica genocide. Their silence facilitates efforts by genocide deniers in BiH to avoid their responsibility to acknowledge the facts, teach the truth to future generations, honor the victims, locate, recover, and identify the missing, and investigate and prosecute the suspects who still walk free.
Genocide denial is a cancer on the body politic of BiH, and it is metastasizing. The only road to a future that reconciles the people of BiH, that heals and binds their wounds, and that guarantees a just and lasting peace for the children and grandchildren of those who suffered and died between 1992 and 1995, is acknowledgement of the Srebrenica genocide and the other horrible war crimes that occurred in BiH.
I extend my deepest condolences and sympathies to the families of the victims of the Srebrenica genocide.
It was a terrific evening of soccer in the United States. I was happy to see the U.S. team come away with a win but sad to see BIH knocked out of the tournament. I would have preferred to see the two teams meet in the finals. Regardless, the BIH team’s performance in its qualifying round and World Cup matches was inspiring. I hope everyone in BiH - from Sarajevo to Mostar to Banja Luka - is proud of what they accomplished.
Either Mr. Dodik or his allies were in power, whether as RS Prime Minister, RS President, or the Serb member of the BiH Presidency, from 2006 until 2026. So, let's call it twenty years. It is true that Mr. Dodik owes his political rise immediately after the 1992-1995 war to the international community, but he was a very different politician with a very different agenda when he first became RS Prime Minister in 1998 with the support of OHR, the U.S., and others. People change. Victor Orban was not always an autocratic chud. It is a bit unfair to imply U.S. support for Mr. Dodik continued unabated (or without or qualification) through 2026, when it clearly did not. The strains in the relationship were publicly visible as early as Charles English’s tenure as U.S. Ambassador to BiH. And, of course, the U.S. government sanctioned him twice. Regardless, the thrust of Borger’s argument that Mr. Dodik is a threat to BiH’s territorial integrity and that the current administration flipped U.S. policy towards him is correct.
Borger may overstate his claim on the Bonn Powers, but I think it is fair to say that since Ashdown, successive High Representatives were either reluctant to use the Bonn Powers or dissuaded from doing so by the PIC, especially by the Europeans. Indeed, Lajcak’s most significant use of the Bonn Powers – the 2007 imposition amending the Law on the Council of Ministers – was undercut, in part, because Europe refused to back him at a time when it was essential that it do so. European antipathy to the Bonn Powers did not dissipate, and after 2009, the Obama administration effectively outsourced its BiH policy to Europe.
In any case, there was a qualitative and quantitative difference between what came before 2006 and what came afterwards re: the Bonn Powers. Many of the post-2006 uses of the Bonn Powers were what I would label “defensive impositions” (i.e., annulments of anti-Dayton actions, usually coming from the RS). You can make a credible argument that Lajcak’s 2007 imposition – designed to prevent ethnonationalist blockades from crippling the state – was a “defensive imposition.” And after 2012, the Bonn Powers were used almost exclusively for lifting bans on political figures. You can make a strong case that “defensive impositions” should have occurred more, not less, given Mr. Dodik’s agenda after 2006.
These differences pre- and post-2006 regarding the Bonn Powers reflected a genuine shift in strategy within the international community away from the “push of Dayton” and towards “the pull of Europe.” There may have been some grounds for optimism when this change in strategy was made, but I would argue it clearly had failed by 2021. From 2022, there was disagreement between the U.S. and the EU about the state of affairs in BiH as well as the utility of the Bonn Powers. Obviously, I think the U.S. assessment was correct, but whatever your view, I think part of the problem with the international community’s policy in BiH for the last couple of decades has been its failure to build a strategy around a clear-eyed view of its interests and rooted in BiH political realities.
“I am not in a place to measure the effectiveness of Mr. Dodik’s lobbyists. They may have been pushing on an open door when they began approaching the administration. It is certainly true that some in Washington have accepted at face value Mr. Dodik’s litany of false historical, political, and legal claims about BiH and U.S. policy towards BiH… Mr. Dodik’s ethnonationalism remains the most destabilizing force in BiH, and he is openly pursing RS independence. He even has lobbyists advocating for it in Washington. This is not hard to discern… I have not seen compelling evidence that the current administration takes seriously the threat Mr. Dodik poses to BiH’s territorial integrity but I would welcome being proven wrong.”
https://t.co/QYFfe2ST9S
"My impression is that the administration made a deal with Mr. Dodik about the High Representative. Mr. Dodik agreed to step down from the Republika Srpska (RS) presidency, something he was required to do because of his conviction by the BiH Court, then the administration would remove Christian Schmidt from the position of High Representative."
FORMER US AMBASSADOR MICHAEL MURPHY (1): I don't know if the USA is still committed to the territorial integrity of BiH @MidlifePlaylist
https://t.co/FCFcfWrSd5
R. Bruce Hichner is 100 percent correct: “'Empowering local actors' is not a neutral phrase. It means empowering whichever actors are already strongest, which in Bosnia means the ethno-nationalists, above all in the Serb-led entity, Republika Srpska, who have spent more than a decade hollowing the state from within."
Next week, the PIC Steering Board will meet to consider the future of OHR and possibly name a new High Representative. The key questions PIC member states must ask themselves as they make these decisions are: First, what is their core strategic interest in BiH? Second, can the OHR with the Bonn Powers advance that interest? Third, if so, who is best suited to serve as a High Representative?
For 30 years, the U.S. identified BiH territorial integrity as its core strategic interest in BiH. This reflected not just the United States’ values but its hard security interests. That’s because, again for 30 years, the U.S. understood that challenges to BiH’s territorial integrity risked violence inside BiH and the Western Balkans. The signals coming from the current administration suggest this 30-year bipartisan policy has come to an end. In its place, the administration has embraced “local ownership” along with Mr. Dodik – a man who over the past several days has suggested the RS requires its own armed forces, called into question BiH’s territorial integrity, and underscored his goal is to dissolve BiH. Separately, calls for the creation of a third entity are spiking and a leading Bosniak ethnonationalist has proposed the creation of mega-cantons within the Federation (FWIW, this sounds an awful lot like an endorsement of a third entity). This is critical context for next week’s PIC discussions.
For everyone else around the PIC table, there does not seem to be any ambiguity in their support for BiH’s territorial integrity. That said, there may be some misplaced faith in the power of EU accession to drive a reform process that overcomes BiH’s internal political problems and stabilizes it for the long-term. In my judgment, the evidence for this faith is limited. Regardless, right now in BiH one ethnonationalist leader is threatening to walk away from the EU accession process if does not take place on his terms, while another is providing the first with de facto political support, belying claims he and his party embrace the EU 100 percent. In this environment, it may be a risky bet to place all your chips on the EU accession process as the best means of safeguarding BiH’s territorial integrity.
The OHR is not about “nation building” or constructing someone’s ideal of a “civic state” at the expense of BiH’s constituent peoples. It is about implementation and defense of the DPA. Among other things, this means protecting BiH and its institutions, including those agreed upon by post-war governments, from attempts to undermine them. The OHR cannot do this with a supine High Representative who lacks PIC support to use his authorities when necessary. If the PIC’s judgment is that this is no longer necessary or desired, then the OHR is longer necessary. In that case, the countries around the PIC table will need to come up with another credible strategy for protecting BiH from those seeking to destroy it.
Yesterday, the U.S. administration reported to Congress on policy toward the Western Balkans. The short report said several things about BiH. The administration says it remains committed to the DPA and BiH’s territorial integrity. It also claims to have resolved the most “acute crisis” in BiH since the war while preserving BiH’s “legal cohesion,” a curious choice of words. This is a reference to the administration’s 2025 deal with Mr. Dodik (i.e., lifting of U.S. sanctions against him as well as removal of the High Representative in return for repeal of some, but not all, of the RS’s anti-DPA legislation and Mr. Dodik’s resignation as RS President).
This deal has not worked out well for an administration allegedly concerned about threats posed by “ethnic grievances” and “destabilizing actors” to U.S. interests in the Western Balkans. Mr. Dodik’s ethnonationalism remains the most destabilizing force in BiH, and he remains very open about his goal – RS independence. He is paying lobbyists in Washington to make this case for it. It does not take a lot of research to determine that Mr. Dodik continues to peddle a litany of false historical, political, and legal narratives. Of course, you can always choose not to look.
The administration says it is encouraging “actors to avoid destabilizing and divisive actions” but it is hard to find much evidence of that. Rhetoric has consequences, and like the early signs of cancer, it is perilous to ignore it. The administration labels looking the other way "an end to the era of nation-building," but for the United States that era ended years ago with the onset of the Obama administration. The current administration confuses, perhaps deliberately, past U.S. efforts to preserve the DPA and BiH’s territorial integrity with “nation building.” They are not the same thing, and the former is critical to thwarting ethnonationalists threatening BiH stability.
It is difficult to avoid the conclusion that Mr. Dodik pocketed sanctions relief and other concessions and went right back to undermining the DPA, BiH, and the BiH institutions required to maintain the stability the administration says it seeks, and that it requires for its commercial agenda in BiH to succeed. Dodik and other ethnonationalist actors now seem more emboldened, and consequently more likely to provoke a crisis. That is not resolving the most “acute crisis” in BiH since the war.
The May 12 U.S. intervention at the UNSC suggests the administration’s commitment to BiH’s territorial integrity is not quite as firm as the report to Congress states. The report appeared after the intervention, but experience suggests the report was drafted before the intervention and those driving BiH policy would have shaped what was and wasn’t said at the UN. BiH’s ethnonationalist political leaders no doubt welcomed it, perhaps even Mr. Izetbegovic who told U.S. officials during the 2021-2022 constitutional reform talks that he could live with BiH’s partition because his part would be the size of Slovenia. Maybe he has signaled the same to the current administration, too.
In any case, the report at best suggests U.S. BiH policy is a muddle, but there are disturbing straws in the wind about what Washington is prepared to tolerate. The report did nothing to dispel that.
I have a great deal of respect for you and your expertise, Adi, even when we disagree, as we do here. That said, I think it would be helpful to share the full quote from my April 20, 2023, N1 interview, rather than just a portion of it, as the ESI report did. I was asked by N1 about accusations by Mr. Novalic and others in SDA that the U.S. had engineered his criminal conviction to discredit SDA. This was, of course, ridiculous. Here’s my full reply. I think the context here matters.
“Well, let me start with the first part of your question regarding judicial proceedings. The United States does not, has not, and will not interfere in judicial proceedings in Bosnia and Herzegovina. I mentioned earlier that we do engage with law enforcement, prosecutors, and the judiciary in the form of helping those individuals who are looking to do their jobs properly, to help build their capacity by providing them with training and equipment and other things to improve the functioning of these institutions. And we're going to continue to do that. Now, there are plenty of independent reports by European Union bodies, by civil society and other non-governmental organizations that talk about the interference by political leaders here and political parties here in judicial processes and investigations. Now, perhaps because they do that regularly, they believe that the United States does it, too. We don't. With regards to the second part of your question. We're not engaged in the business of discrediting political parties or political leaders either. We're not engaged in the business of picking ministers. Now, we do support policies that are aimed at advancing Bosnia and Herzegovina's integration into Euro-Atlantic institutions. We do not support specific political parties. You know, there were recently elections, and it's no secret that some political leaders and some political parties didn't fare well or as well as they had hoped anyway. We also know that some political parties are not the preferred partners of just about every other political party in the country. My suggestion would be that those leaders and political parties take a look in the mirror and ask themselves why did the citizens vote the way they voted? Why does nobody want to partner with us? They should focus on rebuilding their own credibility for their own future as opposed to attacking their friends. Let me make one other observation before I close. When a political leader threatens secession or the territorial reorganization of BiH we speak out, we act. When we see corruption and corrupt actors, we speak out and we act. That behavior is discrediting to political leaders and political parties, not our response to it.”
There will be a lot of hot takes regarding today's U.S. intervention at the UN Security Council discussion of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH). These will focus primarily on what was said or implied about the future of OHR. What struck me was the absence of a statement reaffirming long standing U.S. support for BiH's territorial integrity.
It is difficult for some to accept, but the DPA – warts and all – did not cause BiH’s divisions, it reflected them. To acknowledge this is not to justify the past, especially the 1992-1995 war, or to allow those divisions to define BiH’s history or its future, as some want to do to advance their own, narrow ethnonationalist agendas. Acknowledgement is the predicate for the political wisdom required to govern on behalf of all BiH’s constituent peoples and citizens, and to make the meaningful compromises that will secure for BiH and its people the peaceful, prosperous future they want for themselves, their children, and their grandchildren. (6/6)
There are many bad and often deliberately deceptive takes on the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA). The legal flimflam of Mr. Dodik’s “Original Dayton” is the most prominent and destructive but there are others. The notion that the DPA was designed to appease Serbia and Croatia is similarly ridiculous and dangerous. (1/6)
There are politicians in today’s BiH who make similar magical promises that they can deliver their preferred utopia. These promises will intensify in the coming months as politicians seek to persuade voters to follow them like a will-o-the-wisp into the dismal swamp of more division and stagnation from which only these leaders and their friends benefit. Progress in BiH requires compromise among the country’s three constituent peoples. That is political reality, and it is what brought the country to the cusp of opening EU negotiations. An all or nothing approach to resolving BiH’s challenges is a recipe for deadlock or worse. (5/6)
Third, the current RS leadership’s most recent full-throated embrace of Russia and its dangerous agenda is sad, but of course, predictable. There is no future in it, no matter how much RS officials click their heels and repeat Russian talking points a la Dorothy in the Wizard of Oz. They are never going to get to Kansas. At least President Cvijanovic had the good sense to be out of the country and distance herself from this foolishness. (3/3)
A few thoughts on recent events in BiH. First, the HJPC decision to amend its rulebook and undermine the 2023 HJPC integrity amendments was bad. It moves the country further from the rule of law, not closer to it. It is problematic enough when political actors undermine BiH and its institutions, but it is even more troubling when a state institution acts to undermine itself, and by extension, the state. Why would the HJPC take such decision? It is difficult to escape the conclusion that those who took it are seeking to avoid accountability and to safeguard opportunities for corruption inside the judiciary. (1/3)
Second, BiH HoP delegates are elected to consider legislation, whether related to the excise tax, to EU accession requirements, or to any other matter. Delegates can oppose legislation if they wish, though they will need to explain their votes to their constituents. They can invoke VNI if they wish, but they will need to make sound legal arguments when they do so. Blockading the HoP is a cop-out. Perhaps those doing the blockading want to avoid accountability with their voters or believe they would lose their case if they invoked VNI. Whatever the reason, as things now stand BiH HoP delegates are getting paid for doing nothing. SNSD and HDZ BiH are the primary culprits now, but SDA engaged in the same behavior in 2024. The country’s elected officials from all its constituent peoples need to show up, do their jobs, and work to create a better future for all BiH citizens. It is difficult to argue credibly that they can sort these and others matters for themselves when they are not doing so and haven’t been for months. (2/3)