Mr. Orange

Born, went to kindergarden, primary school, high school, now university.
Loved football and global politics ever since primary school.

[Mr. Orange @Mr0rangetracker]

#ISI always had the possible way out of declaring itself a caliphate. This would mean a global split in the jihadist movement.

[Mr. Orange @Mr0rangetracker]

@Mesoy640 See thread : )

[Mr. Orange @Mr0rangetracker]

@Dr_SaraHarmouch No may God protect him either.

[Vineet @cozyduke_apt29]

1) They used “hafidhahullah” twice for Saif al-Adel, but not for Hamza.

2) al-Qāʿidah and its other branches haven't used “rahimahullah” after the name of Ayman al-Zawahari since the U.S. announced his killing in 2022; the only exception being Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan who used it in their Urdu magazine released in October 2022.

[Mr. Orange @Mr0rangetracker]

This might point to the historical frame the video uses - 2001 to Bin Lâdin's death in Abbotabad. If it has to do with the problems, like Syria not having an #AQ franchise any longer, the near absence of #JNIM would put coals on the fire with regard to theories of #JNIM leaving.

[Mr. Orange @Mr0rangetracker]

The newest al-Sahâb #9/11 release is easily one of the most boring ever. Apart from unseen archival footage showing Hamza bin Lâdin and Dr. Z., there is literally nothing new. The story it tells could have been released in 2011.

[Mr. Orange @Mr0rangetracker]

Noteworthy, that there is few footage from #JNIM. Instead, mostly very old #AQIM material gets used. Also no Syria. Historical franchise group leaders who appear in talking roles are Zarqâwî (#AQI), Wuhayshî (#AQAP), 'Abd al-Wadûd (#AQMI) and Mukhtâr Abû Zubayr (#Shabab).

[Mr. Orange @Mr0rangetracker]

Add.: Most rules of war are out of the window - offensive warfare (Irân), attacking civilian infrastructure, and the general population (Gaza) - has been normalized. Jihâdists of course never cared, but it harmed their popularity. No longer, I think. https://t.co/LrDQKKAfW7

[Mr. Orange @Mr0rangetracker]

Still, I believe the two years of rules-for-thee-but-not-for-me conflict will come around to bite both Israel and Western Europe. Not this year, maybe not even this decade, but not too far in the future either.

[Mr. Orange @Mr0rangetracker]

Apart from 'I told you so tweets', I am in fact very surprised by how many capabilities Hizbullâh retains. I had considered them a spent force after the double-debacle that 2024 was for them.

[Mr. Orange @Mr0rangetracker]

Oh, and we are going to see whether Irân actually invested anything in #AQ. What they could do with Irânian manpads, SBIEDs, and drones...

[Mr. Orange @Mr0rangetracker]

Holds up as of yet, I'd say. Small fire bombings and explosives in Europe, possibly Canada. No casualties. https://t.co/K017ZSOKei

[Mr. Orange @Mr0rangetracker]

Based on how Irân and its allies have not shown a lot these past years, I somehow doubt that there are sleeper cells in the West ready to strike. Not saying that there won't be small stuff, but nothing TV shows imagined during the past decades since 9/11.

[Mr. Orange @Mr0rangetracker]

@SaladinAlDronni Or their best case: US retreat due to political pressure while militias are nearly wiped out.

[Mr. Orange @Mr0rangetracker]

After both Syria and Afghânistân went awry for #IS, the Gulf War presents an opportunity for the group. Not in Irân, but in 'Irâq. While #IS was forced underground by U.S. airpower there, most on the ground fighting was done by the militias that now trade airstrikes with the U.S.

[Mr. Orange @Mr0rangetracker]

But for the war itself, I think the assassination of Khamenei sr. was a blunder. He was clearly moderating Irânian responses to US/Israeli attacks. Practically the opposite to killing Sulaymani back in 2020.

[Mr. Orange @Mr0rangetracker]

The assassination of Khamenei brought back memories of the elephant debate between @allthingsct and @selectedwisdom et al. back when #UBL was killed. The former argued, that this could radicalise #AQ and make it more dangerous. The latter countered that this would weaken #AQ.

[Mr. Orange @Mr0rangetracker]

In hindsight, #UBL's killing terminally weakened #AQ. This does not need to be the case in Irân. A more radical approach is already visible. Bridges with Gulf neighbours currently burn, which might hurt Irân long-term.

[Mr. Orange @Mr0rangetracker]

And another thing I'd say holds. Let's see what the prisoner releases early this year do to the dynamics. I suppose it is more of a strain on #IS resources than a boost in capabilities, considering that most escapees are families, not fighters. https://t.co/CywiBKgjcA

[Mr. Orange @Mr0rangetracker]

Three, if #HTS is able to consolidate and expand to central Syria or even topple Assad for good, #IS in Syria is toast and will become a bunch of underground cells limited to sporadic terrorist attacks. 2/

[Mr. Orange @Mr0rangetracker]

Recruitment drive happened, no suicide attacks in #Suwayda yet.

[Mr. Orange @Mr0rangetracker]

#Suwayda + everything that happened is an unexpected gift to #IS BTW. Jawlânî lost face, tribal fighters up in arms in a sectarian conflict, and the cherry on top - Israel actively supporting Druze militias. I expect a recruitment drive + suicide attacks there within six months.

[Mr. Orange @Mr0rangetracker]

@SaladinAlDronni @chambersharold8 Certainly, the only people on the ground who remained with the Emirate were in Dagestan, but the foreign networks mostly staid with the Emirate. If Umarov had joined #IS, nothing of the Emirate would have remained. #IS could have tapped into all that more freely now.

[Mr. Orange @Mr0rangetracker]

Nice piece by @SaladinAlDronni here https://t.co/7EPASFUkRb on a less prominent #IS province. One medium nitpick though - Doku Umarov never joined #IS. He was poisoned before the caliphate was established in autumn 2013.