ETH supply is up about 1% since the Merge.
In the same time period:
> solana:So11111111111111111111111111111111111111112 supply grew 66%, from 354M to about 589M.
> ripple:native supply grew 27%, from 49.83B to about 63.1B.
> cardano:native supply grew about 10%, from 34.18B to about 37.5B to 38B.
> bitcoin:native supply grew 4.96%, from 19.15M to about 20.10M.
> ethereum:native supply grew 1.0%, from 120.52M to about 121.7M.
@Jeyffre@beskay0x Point is that it's not permissionless. Those criminals now need to launder the money to bring back into the permissioned USD ecosystem.
@Jeyffre@beskay0x USD cash is not permissionless. Try depositing over $10k. It's minted under a central authority, distributed to that their chosen entities, and monitor large deposits which require explanation.
We got an important step closer towards unified liquidity between L2s and Ethereum via @etheconomiczone.
Here is a @CoWSwap trade settled on L2 while using liquidity from L1. Bridging tokens out and receiving other tokens back all happens atomically!
Public testnet soon!
It's an increasingly common take that AI hacking means cybersecurity is doomed.
I disagree. I think cybersecurity is naturally defense-favoring once people get their shit together. And anyone who continues to hold cryptocurrency (including me, ~90% of my net worth) is implicitly making that bet.
Here's why I am making that bet.
First, the oversimplified punchy one-line statement:
If AI can prove Navier-Stokes and FLT, then AI can prove the statement "this program is secure" as a mathematical theorem. Even if the program is very complicated.
Now, the nuance:
(See also: https://t.co/6YPWgVT7rO )
The word "secure" is hiding all kinds of skeletons in the closet in terms of what it actually means. What does it mean for Signal (the encrypted messenger) to be "secure"?
The most basic definition you might think of is: no one who doesn't hold the recipient's secret key can read the contents of the message.
But:
* Did you remember to include _other_ critical forms of security? Can the adversary forge messages? Can the attacker prevent messages from reaching the recipient? Can they cause your client to crash by sending malformed messages?
* Have you made sure that your model of the adversary includes attackers that interfere with the protocol actively and not just passively? And attackers that interfere by replaying messages to you or the recipient that either of you sent over the wire at any point earlier?
* What if the adversary hacked (or _is_) the Signal server?
* How did you learn which public key belongs to the recipient in the first place? What if that process was tampered with?
* What if your device gets hacked at some point in the past or future - is your message still safe then?
* What if your key leaks because of a bug in your operating system? Or because you got a bugged version of the Signal client? Or what if the database is corrupted?
* Or the libraries, interpreter or compiler of the programming language you wrote it in?
* What if your key leaks because tiny perturbations in perceptible signals generated by the hardware leak mathematical relationships that can extract the key a few hundredths of a bit at a time?
* Are you hiding the *size* of the payload? Does that matter?
* You're definitely not hiding the identity of the sender and the recipient, and the exact time each message was sent (think: not just time-of-day, but also time deltas between one message and the next). Is that not enough to deduce a lot of important facts about what relationships you have, and what *kinds* of conversations you are having?
So ... even definitions can be over a thousand lines of code, and need deep careful thought to figure them out.
Working on making definitions more human-readable is of extreme importance - it's perhaps the only "high-level language" that matters right now.
But even still, even despite all of the above, for security-critical components, the definition is a much smaller attack surface than the implementation. Verifying that the definition is adequate is a much more tractable task than scanning over the code directly - and can become even more tractable with better tooling.
Definitions are also _additive_: if two groups have two different definitions A and B, then, well, you can just prove that the program satisfies both A and B. Code is not additive in this way: if a program is A + B, a bug in A _or_ B can sink the whole thing. Definitions are additive. And if you can't satisfy A and B at the same time, you've isolated the most important philosophical issue for your project to spend its next few weeks grappling with.
Sometimes, definitions are not much smaller than the implementation - UI components might be one example. But for many of the most critical components - message-passing protocols, sandboxes, cryptography like SNARKs and FHE - the asymmetry is real.
Historically, a large class of failures with this approach have come from people only verifying a small portion of their code, that they self-declared to be the security-critical portion, and ignoring the rest - and it turns out that something in the rest of the code is security-critical too.
This was reasonable back when verification was difficult and scarce. The solution today: sorry, you have to verify over literally your entire program, including database, networking, any caching layers, everything. Modern AI can do it.
So it's not about "the good guys find all the vulnerabilities before the bad guys do" - that could maybe work too, after all a finite program only has a finite number of vulns, but it's riskier - it's specifically an asymmetric strategy of making code that is much more resilient in the first place.
This is the kind of direction that Ethereum is going in for the next few years. There is no future for blockchains - especially blockchains with scalability and privacy - without doing this. We need to make software actually secure. And we have already made a lot of progress.
@joelgriffith@brian_armstrong How does #3 stop #2 from happening?
It's a bill about digital assets infrastructure. Making it a weapon against a corrupt president is almost as callous as unleashing Gary Gensler at us.
#SignatureBank
@lex_node Yeah you've lost me at "good at business". Our president is a corrupt asshole who should pay for his crimes.
But refusing to pass crypto policy because he's a corrupt asshole just makes the Democrats assholes too.
@Dennis_Porter_ Not a hot take. It's obvious that's the hinge point for @SenWarren and her nonsense diatribe today. Just because the President is a corrupt prick, how does "not creating laws" help?
@SenatorSlotkin So in order to prevent the corrupt president who is actively "bilking" the blockchain industry out of billions, you voted no to a bill that would have helped the industry grow, just to get even?
Does the no vote stop him? Or just equally hurt crypto to get a weird payback
@macrosam@jdetychey Probably the most insulting statement "They've had five years to adjust, what's two more?"
You don't represent Ethereum and you're not addressing opposers. You're representing your own thoughts on the matter and there's a world of brilliant people here you have to convince.
Listening in pieces as @macrosam and @jdetychey on EIP-8363 on bankless.
One of the worst ways I've heard an argument. Sam's arrogance and condescension has me turning the podcast off every 15 minutes. If I listen past 15 I start dreaming of choking him.
@macrosam@jdetychey As a "solo staker" and "small business staking services provider" I do have thoughts on the matter. It's less a problem on issuance and more a matter of lacking an enshrined LST to me.
But it's taking me says to get through this podcast and formulate thoughts.