Personal account managed by editor of the Modern War Institute at West Point. Follows/likes ≠ endorsement. Views don't represent those of any US govt agency.
What if, instead of building a suite of new tools to find, fix, and finish targets in rapidly closed kill webs, the Army got a huge head start by adopting what already works in Ukraine? https://t.co/zg4tx18F2o
"The department is handing drones to the lowest level of the force, but the fire support system has not yet written down who may turn those drone feeds into an approved strike or the level at which they may do so." https://t.co/04SmTsOPPM
Hear retired Major General Doug Crissman speak with Cadet Orion van Buskirk about combat leadership, coalition operations, and the application of mission command! https://t.co/uhqQu08kLk
Can the Army succeed if it fields autonomous systems and assigns soldiers the additional duty of employing them? (Hint: It can't.) https://t.co/lafFQcyHSz
We can build all the munitions we want, but without assured access to the materials needed for the explosives they need to function, we risks ending up with vast but useless stockpiles. https://t.co/pKJ6bKdMEr
"A failed mandatory condition should contract the permission envelope immediately. Re-expansion should require persistent valid evidence, independent corroboration, fresh operator input, or some combination appropriate to the mission." https://t.co/S868dKAo1z
"The Army should pursue a licensing and fielding arrangement for DELTA now. Four years of use in large-scale combat provide a test record that no domestic program can match." https://t.co/zg4tx18F2o
The US military has a set of crucial jobs—forward observers and others—for people who bring artillery and airstrikes into the close fight. But drones change the battlefield dynamics in such a way that we need a new role: the unmanned fires observer. https://t.co/04SmTsPnFk
"The limiting factor... is no longer a soldier's ability to fly a drone. It is the Army's ability to develop professionals capable of integrating autonomous systems into combined arms operations under the demanding conditions of modern combat." https://t.co/lafFQcyHSz
An autonomous system with permissions that automatically restrict when it's jammed is a resilient one. A system with a built-in, deliberate process to determine when those permissions return is a governale one. That distinction is crucial. https://t.co/S868dKAo1z
What does the Army actually need in its autonomous systems specialists? And how can it foster that expertise, retain the necessary talent, and educate leaders to best make use of it? https://t.co/lafFQczfI7
"I had done a version of that job a decade earlier in Kunduz—as a forward observer trained as a joint fires observer. The job I trained for spread those functions across a room full of people. In Zaporizhzhia, they fit inside one soldier." https://t.co/04SmTsOPPM
"Revocation is only half the problem. Restoration needs a rule too. Without one, the system can enter permission flapping: repeated movement between higher and lower action states as its evidence hovers around a threshold." https://t.co/S868dKzQc1
How did a small number of Ukrainian drone operators destroy an entire US armored brigade in an exercise a few months ago? With this kill web architecture. https://t.co/zg4tx19cRW
"RDX’s own chemistry has barely changed since 1941. What has changed, repeatedly and expensively, is the industrial base asked to turn that chemistry into ordnance at wartime scale." https://t.co/pKJ6bKektZ
Captain Michael Villahermosa, an EOD technician who served as an NCO and commissioned officer in combat before becoming an ROTC professor of military science. He joins Charlie Faint on this episode of THE SPEAR. https://t.co/BQJK5A2QvO