NanoJS

Behind every wallet, there's a pattern waiting to be uncovered.

[NanoJS @NanoJS10]

Lost crypto to a scam or hack? I trace where it went and give you a documented report for an exchange or law enforcement.
✅ Find & document where funds went
❌ No recovery promises
❌ No "unlocking" fees
Flat fee, USDT upfront. I'll tell you if a trace is possible before you pay.
DM

[NanoJS @NanoJS10]

@JNXintel Not really, most people who absorbed the loss is due to fear of getting scammed in process of getting what they lost.

[NanoJS @NanoJS10]

For those who've had a wallet drained or interacted with a scam contract: did you report it anywhere, or just move on? Curious how much actually gets reported versus quietly absorbed as a loss.

[NanoJS @NanoJS10]

The blockchain remembers everything. The only question is whether anyone's looking.

[NanoJS @NanoJS10]

Lazy Summer Protocol's $6M flash loan
On July 7, https://t.co/vyvcQ8BrIM's Lazy Summer Protocol paused every vault and zeroed out deposit caps across every network it runs on. CertiK's read: an attacker used the protocol's own flash loan mechanics against it, depositing $64.8M and redeeming $70.9M in the same transaction. Net theft: about $6M, extracted and gone before anyone could react.
Flash loans get treated like a novelty in most explainers, borrow and repay in one transaction, no collateral, so what. But the actual risk isn't the loan, it's what a huge, temporary balance sheet lets you do to a protocol's internal math for the fifteen seconds you hold it. If a protocol calculates a redemption rate, a collateral ratio, or a price based on its own current balances, and you can temporarily inflate those balances by nine figures, you can convince the protocol that a bad trade is a good one.
This is close to the mechanism I traced in the Zunami Protocol case, a flash loan used to manipulate an internal price calculation just long enough to walk away with the difference. Different protocol, same shape of attack. That's usually how it goes with exploits: the specific contract changes, the vulnerable pattern barely does.
If you're auditing or building DeFi protocols, the question worth asking isn't "can someone take out a flash loan against us." It's "what internal number does our contract trust, and can that number be temporarily distorted before we act on it." Most flash loan exploits are really just an old-fashioned trust problem wearing new plumbing.

[NanoJS @NanoJS10]

@SlowMist_Team Is there a way to test the effectiveness of tools?

[NanoJS @NanoJS10]

@BNBCHAIN Norway 2 - 1 England

[NanoJS @NanoJS10]

@SonicLabs Norway 1 - 0 England

[NanoJS @NanoJS10]

@HTX_Global Belgium 1 - 0 Spain

[NanoJS @NanoJS10]

@Adamsziri6_7 Not at all, I'm just curious about the whole thing

[NanoJS @NanoJS10]

@RektHQ @summerfinance_ Still looking 👀

[NanoJS @NanoJS10]

When you're evaluating a new protocol before depositing, what's the first thing you check: contract ownership renouncement, audit history, or on-chain deployer reputation? Curious what other people actually use in practice.

[NanoJS @NanoJS10]

Most DeFi audits check if code does what it's supposed to. Fewer check what it does if the deployer turns hostile. Insider risk is still the least modeled threat in this industry, and it's been the cause of some of the largest losses this year. Malicious or Not, the eyes 👀 can see 🙈

[BONK!!! @bonk_inu]

BonkDAO was the target of a malicious governance proposal resulting in an estimated $20M worth of BONK tokens being drained from the BonkDAO treasury.

During the investigation, BonkDAO identified the exchange wallets used to purchase BONK ahead of the proposal. BonkDAO is currently actively working with exchanges, bridges and Solana Foundation to best manage the situation.

Law enforcement has been notified. BonkDAO continues to work with relevant parties to recover funds and identify those responsible.

[NanoJS @NanoJS10]

SuiSentinel v0.3.0 is moving from static scanning into live monitoring. Right now it's watching package IDs on Cetus and Turbos mainnet for the same integer overflow class that cost Cetus ~$220M. Detection before disclosure is the goal, not after. @SuiFoundation

[NanoJS @NanoJS10]

@8lazing @zachxbt The real wallet behind the drain has been marked, if you are interested I don't mind sharing with you or working alongside investigators behind the case.

[NanoJS @NanoJS10]

@8lazing @zachxbt Check your DM

[NanoJS @NanoJS10]

@8lazing Check your DM

[NanoJS @NanoJS10]

Wallet clustering isn't magic. It's pattern recognition across three signals: shared funding sources, timing correlation, and gas fee fingerprints. Most "anonymous" wallets share at least one of these with wallets you already know.

[NanoJS @NanoJS10]

@CIA God bless America 🇺🇲🇺🇲🫡

[NanoJS @NanoJS10]

Happy Independence Day to you and Happy 250th America 🇺🇸 🦅 🎆
@GodblessAmerica🇺🇲🇺🇲🇺🇲🇺🇲