@Telegraph We should rather combat such enemies of the rule of law as that "watchdog" who wants even more anti-civil rights statist authoritarianism and "anti-racist commitments" that are blatantly racist themselves and incompatible with anti-discrimination and the rule of law.
A year ago today, President Javier Milei gave Pope Leo XIV a copy of Hayek’s 1988 book
The Fatal Conceit: The Errors of Socialism
https://t.co/xP1EPOnFcw
@bnielson01@JonClap 3/3
Your "common understanding" drops Popper's explicit distinction: potential falsifiability concerns possible basic statements/ events in principle; actual falsification concerns whether such an event occurred and the falsifying statement is true. See attached.
@bnielson01@JonClap 2/3
Popper is not doing protocol-sentence empiricism; on the contrary, he critiqued that. He asks whether a theory, as a system of statements, excludes possible basic/test statements/ observable events under certain conditions. That exclusion relation gives it empirical content.
@bnielson01@JonClap 1/3
When you claim to disagree with Popper, the burden is on you to reconstruct the text carefully. I won’t reconstruct every technical term for you once your reading is challenged. The issue is still your initial claim, not my willingness to do your text work or state my views.
@bnielson01@JonClap You replaced the technical terms with a dictionary-style paraphrase, precisely the move critiqued in the attached passage. I’ve stated my view; the issue is whether your initial "subtle disagreement" actually targets Popper’s position in the texts or a simplified strawman instead
@bnielson01@JonClap No, I disagree. The most literal reading is not to ignore technical vocabulary. "Basic statement," "potential falsifier," and "event prohibited by the theory" presuppose Popper’s methodological apparatus. Calling that mere "interpretation" is just decontextualization.
@bnielson01@JonClap My view here is the one I’m reconstructing from Popper’s text. I accept its premises and conclusion. Your question is answered in the attached passage. If you disagree, specify which part fails; "what scientists do" is far too broad. I’m still trying to grasp your point.
@bnielson01@JonClap This is answered in the attached passage from The Two Fundamental Problems. The criterion is non-empirical, not derived from scientists' behavior or history. If you disagree, address Popper's concrete answer instead of repeating the objection he already addressed multiple times.
@JonClap Maybe, but I think this understates how anticipatory the early texts are. He was already resisting reductions of methodology to probability logic, psychology, sociology, or mere history of science. His later texts explicitly clarify conclusions he had already drawn in the '30s.
@bnielson01@JonClap Mostly, yes. It is not sociology or psychology of scientific practice. Historical examples like Einstein/Eddington matter as exemplifications, but Popper is doing interdisciplinary theoretical philosophy on logic, methodology, and the rational reconstruction of scientific inquiry
@bnielson01@JonClap Yes, he very much was, since it is a criterion he derived from a thorough interdisciplinary investigation into the different approaches up to him, from Bacon onward. For example, he pointed out the problems with Duhem and Poincaré's deductivism before Quine rehashed Duhem.
@bnielson01@JonClap Nice find, but that is the older, broad use of "metaphysical" (non-empirical/philosophical) you can find in his older works/prefaces. I cited his later and more precise formulation from The Two Fundamental Problems preface from 1978, calling the demarcation metascientific.
@JonClap@bnielson01 I don’t mean merely the word "metatheory". The point is structural. In the 1978 Introduction to The Two Fundamental Problems, Popper calls the demarcation criterion a thesis of metascience, not an empirical hypothesis, and explicitly separates it from observing what scientists do
@bnielson01@JonClap Also, metaphilosophy ≠ metatheory ≠ metaphysics. The metatheory of FOL, for example, belongs to metalogic; it's neither metaphysics nor broad metaphilosophy. Popper's texts can't be read lightly without the needed rigor and context in their respective fields, as I pointed out.
@bnielson01@JonClap Do you at least consider Popper's remarks on Duhem and Poincaré before Quine ever wrote on Duhem and holism? I often realize that many people don't know the rather intricate and detailed critiques Popper laid out before it was even prominent to discuss them, as in this case.
@JonClap@bnielson01 Not just almost metaphilosophical, Popper openly called his criterion of falsifiability, as well as the needed stance following from it, a metatheory of science. Also, both of your readings seem a bit superficial, as there is much more on this in Popper's works (Einstein, etc.).
@ChrDorner@RAin_Meusel@_MartinHagen Exakt dasselbe habe ich mir auch gedacht, der Post ist eine falsche Gleichsetzung einer involvierten, befangenen Person dazu ja auch noch.
“It would indeed be a tragic joke of history if man, who owes his rapid advance to nothing so much as to the exceptional variety of individual gifts, were to terminate his evolution by imposing a compulsory egalitarian scheme on all.”
— Friedrich Hayek
@EUintheUS Fuck that social-constructivist and anti-empirical identity ontologism flag representing the direct attack against the open society of scientists that are empirically truth seeking and thus the target of this new clericalism. Are you going to raid my home for hate speech now?