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@CrMapReport@OnePositiveDude@RipJalens A millionaire who made money of meme coins compared to someone who made it through blood and sweat have 2 ideologies on how money is spent..Not a bad thing to give advice regardless of situation..also sybau
Here’s a breakdown of what happen with Cetus, in simple terms based on the article from Dedaub.
On May 22, 2025, Cetus, a decentralized exchange (DEX) on the Sui blockchain, was hacked, resulting in over $200 million in losses. The hack was due to a mistake in the code that allowed the attacker to steal a huge amount of tokens by exploiting a flaw in how the system handled calculations.
The Key Problem: A Math Mistake
Cetus is an Automated Market Maker (AMM), which lets users trade tokens by adding or removing liquidity (tokens) to pools. When someone adds liquidity, they specify how much of the pool they want to own (called a “liquidity parameter”). The system then calculates how many tokens they need to deposit to get that share.
The issue was in a function called `checked_shlw`, which was supposed to prevent errors when numbers in the calculations got too big (this is called an “overflow”). In simple terms:
- The function was meant to check if a number was too large before doing a calculation (like shifting bits, a technical operation in programming).
- However, the check was written incorrectly. It used a “mask” (a way to filter numbers) that didn’t work as intended.
- Because of this, the system didn’t catch when a number was too big, and it allowed an overflow to happen silently.
How the Attacker Exploited It
The attacker used a trick:
1. They took out a huge loan of tokens (called a flash loan, which is common in DeFi).
2. They opened a liquidity position in Cetus, but they picked a very specific, narrow price range (e.g., between 300,000 and 300,200). This made the liquidity parameter extremely large.
3. Because of the flawed `checked_shlw` function, the system miscalculated how many tokens the attacker needed to deposit. Instead of requiring a huge amount, it only asked for **one token**.
4. The attacker deposited just one token but was credited with a massive share of the pool’s liquidity.
5. They then withdrew a ton of valuable tokens from the pool, worth about $223 million, and paid back the flash loan, keeping the profit.
Why Was This Missed?
- The bug came from a third-party math library called `integer-mate`, which had issues handling certain edge cases (unusual situations).
- When Cetus’s code was moved from the Aptos blockchain to Sui, this bug was either reintroduced or not properly fixed.
- Multiple audits (by firms like Ottersec, MoveBit, and Zellic) didn’t catch the issue, possibly because:
- The math library wasn’t thoroughly checked.
- Sui natively supports large numbers (256-bit integers), so auditors might have assumed overflows weren’t a risk.
- The Move programming language (used by Sui) prevents most overflows, but bit-shift operations (like the one in `checked_shlw`) can still overflow, and this wasn’t properly accounted for.