Temmy | DeFi Analyst🦇🔊

defi analyst breaking down protocol revenue, tokenomics and risk so you make better decisions with your money.

[Temmy | DeFi Analyst🦇🔊 @Only1temmy]

Anytime I want to do my own diligent research in DeFi, I make use of some tools for a more successful research😌.

In this Thread 👇, I'm going to show you my Top20 most used research tools.

🧵🧵

[Temmy | DeFi Analyst🦇🔊 @Only1temmy]

I would have voted NO if this was supposed to be Arbitrum’s answer to its revenue problem.

Both ideas are clever and I agree they should pass.

But they are not big enough.

At the $17 floor price and a target of 100 daily tickets, Fast Feed would generate roughly $620k a year before the split.

Demand could push the price higher and PGA would bring in more revenue. But the proposal gives no projections, so we don’t know how much more.

Either way, @arbitrum needs a bigger plan.

Arbitrum became important because it was once home to novel DeFi apps.

GMX, Dopex, Camelot and JonesDAO gave users a reason to bridge there. People came for the apps, and the activity followed.

That edge is disappearing while the fat app thesis plays out in real time.

Hyperliquid didn’t win by selling blockspace to other apps. It built the product, attracted the users and kept the revenue.

Arbitrum should return to what once made it important by building around The Big 4:

1. Tokenization
2. Perps
3. Stablecoins
4. Vaults

Tokenized assets bring productive collateral onchain. Stablecoins give the ecosystem a settlement currency.

Perps generate trading activity and fees, while vaults turn the available opportunities into products users can easily access.

Then put a great onchain neobank on top.

One account where users can save, invest, borrow, trade and spend without jumping between five different protocols.

The DAO shouldn’t run these apps through governance.

Arbitrum can create an independent app studio that builds missing products, backs promising teams and helps them with liquidity and distribution.

In return, the DAO gets equity, tokens or a share of the revenue.

PGA and Fast Feed should pass.

But selling priority and faster data will not make Arbitrum important again.

Great apps will.

[Ignas @DefiIgnas]

L2 narrative & revenue generation are struggling so they need to get creative.

Here's what Arbitrum came up with:

Arbitrum DAO is voting on two new revenue streams.

1. Priority Gas Auctions replaces old Timeboost: pay a higher tip, get ordered first. Same as Ethereum. Simple.

2. The Fast Feed

This one is clever.

After the sequencer orders txs, that order has real value for MEV searchers, MMs and propAMMs... so Arbitrum will sell early access to it as a subscription.

- Ordering is already final when the feed publishes, so no frontrunning or sandwiching

- ~100 tickets sold per day, price starts at $17 and changes with demand (EIP-4844 style curve)
- Anyone can subscribe, it's permissionless but paid

97% of revenue from both go to the DAO treasury, 3% to the dev guild.

Sad that the proposal gives no potential earnings but the Foundation asked the DAO for ~$43.5M to fund 2027 while the DAO made $23.49M in 2025 so they REALLY need to close that gap.

Btw, I voted Yes for the proposal.

I'd love to increase my $ARB delegation so if you have $ARB sitting around pls delegate to my address: 0x3DDC7d25c7a1dc381443e491Bbf1Caa8928A05B0

[Temmy | DeFi Analyst🦇🔊 @Only1temmy]

@EliBenSasson @andyyy micro payments?

[Temmy | DeFi Analyst🦇🔊 @Only1temmy]

@PinkBrains_io @krakenfx @xStocksFi @binance @Backpack @solana @RobinhoodApp @coinbase @base interesting. maybe okx

[Temmy | DeFi Analyst🦇🔊 @Only1temmy]

@Jackhaldorsson @cartist00 interesting

[Temmy | DeFi Analyst🦇🔊 @Only1temmy]

@TimHaldorsson great let's do this. can't wait to have 10k payout on creatorwire

[Temmy | DeFi Analyst🦇🔊 @Only1temmy]

@TimHaldorsson congratulations

[Temmy | DeFi Analyst🦇🔊 @Only1temmy]

@Ministerr it's not real 🥲

[Temmy | DeFi Analyst🦇🔊 @Only1temmy]

This is where i’m posting from.

[Minister 🔮 @Ministerr]

This is where i’m posting from.

[Temmy | DeFi Analyst🦇🔊 @Only1temmy]

@hantengri brooooo

[Temmy | DeFi Analyst🦇🔊 @Only1temmy]

@bandosei I'm on it😆😂

[Temmy | DeFi Analyst🦇🔊 @Only1temmy]

broo

[Robinhood @RobinhoodApp]

You can tell who's onchain by how they say good morning

[Temmy | DeFi Analyst🦇🔊 @Only1temmy]

@Jackhaldorsson pls check

[Temmy | DeFi Analyst🦇🔊 @Only1temmy]

@TimHaldorsson can't sign up

[Temmy | DeFi Analyst🦇🔊 @Only1temmy]

@creator_wire can't login @creator_wire

[Temmy | DeFi Analyst🦇🔊 @Only1temmy]

@TimHaldorsson let's go

[Temmy | DeFi Analyst🦇🔊 @Only1temmy]

@2lambro damn. cooked. how are you positioning now😭

[Temmy | DeFi Analyst🦇🔊 @Only1temmy]

how to stay poor:

ignore a coin for weeks, then buy because everyone suddenly won’t stop talking about it.

[Temmy | DeFi Analyst🦇🔊 @Only1temmy]

how to stay poor(crypto edition):

rely on influencers instead of doing your own research.

[Temmy | DeFi Analyst🦇🔊 @Only1temmy]

@SteakhouseFi https://t.co/3vb7oxedXJ

here's it

[Temmy | DeFi Analyst🦇🔊 @Only1temmy]

🚨 BREAKING: Someone moved a Pendle market by roughly 3% and triggered $36.39M in liquidations on Morpho

The oracle wasn’t hacked. reUSD never depegged. Lenders suffered no losses.

Yet highly leveraged borrowers still watched their positions get liquidated.

Here’s how it happened:

• A wallet aggressively bought YT-reUSD on Pendle, pushing implied yields toward 20%
• Those purchases pushed down the price of PT-reUSD in a relatively thin market
• A Steakhouse-deployed Morpho market used a 15-minute average of that market price (the lower of the TWAP and a fixed linear discount curve) as part of its collateral oracle
• As PT-reUSD fell roughly 3%, borrowers with health factors below approximately 1.03 became vulnerable to liquidation
• Another wallet stepped in to liquidate positions, with onchain analysis suggesting it was connected to the wallet buying YT

The result was approximately $36.39M in liquidated positions, according to PeckShield.

Do I think this was a traditional hack? No.

Pendle says the oracle worked exactly as designed, and Steakhouse says its lenders incurred no losses or bad debt.

But when a wallet moves a thin market and a potentially connected wallet profits from the resulting liquidations, that raises serious questions about deliberate liquidation hunting.

Re is investigating whether the market was intentionally manipulated and has opened a compensation and recovery program for affected users.

The uncomfortable lesson is that your collateral does not need to fail for someone to liquidate you.

If its price comes from a thin market and your safety buffer is small enough, moving the market becomes the trade.

[Temmy | DeFi Analyst🦇🔊 @Only1temmy]

@re https://t.co/3vb7oxedXJ

this is it

[Temmy | DeFi Analyst🦇🔊 @Only1temmy]

🚨 BREAKING: Someone moved a Pendle market by roughly 3% and triggered $36.39M in liquidations on Morpho

The oracle wasn’t hacked. reUSD never depegged. Lenders suffered no losses.

Yet highly leveraged borrowers still watched their positions get liquidated.

Here’s how it happened:

• A wallet aggressively bought YT-reUSD on Pendle, pushing implied yields toward 20%
• Those purchases pushed down the price of PT-reUSD in a relatively thin market
• A Steakhouse-deployed Morpho market used a 15-minute average of that market price (the lower of the TWAP and a fixed linear discount curve) as part of its collateral oracle
• As PT-reUSD fell roughly 3%, borrowers with health factors below approximately 1.03 became vulnerable to liquidation
• Another wallet stepped in to liquidate positions, with onchain analysis suggesting it was connected to the wallet buying YT

The result was approximately $36.39M in liquidated positions, according to PeckShield.

Do I think this was a traditional hack? No.

Pendle says the oracle worked exactly as designed, and Steakhouse says its lenders incurred no losses or bad debt.

But when a wallet moves a thin market and a potentially connected wallet profits from the resulting liquidations, that raises serious questions about deliberate liquidation hunting.

Re is investigating whether the market was intentionally manipulated and has opened a compensation and recovery program for affected users.

The uncomfortable lesson is that your collateral does not need to fail for someone to liquidate you.

If its price comes from a thin market and your safety buffer is small enough, moving the market becomes the trade.