Prashant Suhas

[Gaurav M Tripathi @GauravT71548031]

My piece on the need for close political involvement in the process of Defence reforms in India.

"Goldwater-Nichols" moment, an unrealistic expectations unless there is a sustained political leadership driven dialogue.

Link to article below

https://t.co/4KlrUW8oLU

[Prashant Suhas @PrashantSuh]

@GauravT71548031 Thank you for the kind words. We are sensitive to the cost argument too. In the paper we included a graph that estimates the utility of 50-55 squadrons too.

[Gaurav M Tripathi @GauravT71548031]

Kudos for an excellent piece of work.

I hope that commentators will read and understand the premise first. 80% probability of achieving air superiority over BOTH adversaries.

And then come away with the larger point.

India is underdefended when it comes to air power. The size of its air force is also not in keeping with its stature, or requirements. Needs to expand majorly.

[vasabjit banerjee @vasabjit_b]

Why can't India produce major conventional weapons at scale despite decades of investments? We apply the ends, ways, and means model to explain it's problems with state owned enterprises, available skilled labor, and domestic machine tools production.

https://t.co/iawXyiJSHM

[Shiv Aroor @ShivAroor]

🚨🎙️You can always rely on @zone5aviation to cut through the bullshit on India’s air power programs.

He didn’t hold back in episode 53 of #CtrlAltDefence.

🔗: https://t.co/fWkRTKT5OY

[Prashant Suhas @PrashantSuh]

@vasabjit_b Free copies available upon request

[Prashant Suhas @PrashantSuh]

We estimate that the IAF would require roughly 67–79 squadrons to achieve an 80% probability of meeting our modeled air-superiority threshold, depending importantly on the scale of Chinese commitment. @vasabjit_b
https://t.co/DeNJBYJhr0

[Prashant Suhas @PrashantSuh]

@vasabjit_b The estimates are therefore best understood as force-planning benchmarks under explicit assumptions—not predictions of a future war.

[Prashant Suhas @PrashantSuh]

@vasabjit_b Recent reports suggesting a substantially larger J-20 fleet only reinforce the paper's central point: force requirements are highly sensitive to the size of the Chinese force India may actually have to confront.