Samuel Ramani

DPhil/PhD Intl Relations @UniofOxford Assoc Fellow @RUSI_org Author "Russia in Africa" & "Putin's War on Ukraine" @HurstPublishers Email [email protected]

[Giorgio Cafiero @GiorgioCafiero]

I see people from all walks of life, from countless countries, grieving @AzizAlghashian and sharing their sadness. It's very moving. It speaks volumes about the kind of man he was and the lives he touched. He meant so much to so many. I consider myself so lucky to have known him.

[Samuel Ramani @SamRamani2]

Deeply saddened to hear about the untimely and tragic passing of Aziz Alghasian

I had the pleasure of catching up with Aziz during a recent trip to Riyadh. We had a very interesting discussion about regional affairs and Saudi foreign policy.

An outstanding scholar of the region and a wonderful person, he will be greatly missed

[Samuel Ramani @SamRamani2]

I appeared on Sky News UK this weekend to discuss the Duma elections and Ukraine's strikes

The main takeaways:

- The Duma elections are largely performative and aimed at showing that Russia is still a "sovereign democracy" rather than an autocracy. The exclusion of Yabloko means only pro-war parties join, a fact spotlit by Communist Party standard-bearer Gennady Zyuganov

- They do have regime stability significance though: military veterans coming forward create a new layer of ultranationalists in the Duma. CPRF votes either show ultranationalist dissent or passive dissent more generally as there are no opposition options. United Russia dominates but region-wide support is watched as more regional backing means greater loyalty to Putin

- Ukraine's strikes on Moscow build on the St. Petersburg Economic Forum strikes and energy refinery attacks. They take the war to the Russian people but have a limited impact on Putin's calculus. Economic recessionary conditions and manpower losses exceeding recruitment don't seem to change tack yet.

- Russia and its proxies will do a what-aboutism: we hold elections even under attack, Ukraine does not. The reality is the diaspora and physical security concerns make Ukrainian elections orders of magnitude more risky than what Russia just held

[Samuel Ramani @SamRamani2]

Somaliland is getting more attention and is pushing for US recognition

Here are some points to consider:

1) Somaliland-U.S. Cooperation has growing foundations- AFRICOM engagements with Hargeisa and Berbera suggest that Somaliland's relative stability in a violent Red Sea region is a strategic asset. There is military training and cooperation between the U.S. and Somaliland, and a recent State Department report highlighted "positive, constructive" relations with the Somailand authorities. This momentum engaged Somaliland's President Abdirahman Mohamed Abdullahi to visit Washington DC and advance the recognition push.

2) Recognition from the U.S. is unlikely in the near-term- Somaliland is offering a military facility deal, lithium/coltan access and Berbera port use as compelling carrots for US officials to consider. They can reach members of Congress and diplomats via a representative office in Virginia. Nonetheless, the US remains committed to the One Somalia policy, and wants to thread the needle between Saudi Arabia/Egypt which align with Somalia, and the UAE and Ethiopia which have closer ties with Somaliland.

3) Somaliland's recognition case would benefit greatly from African support and this is hard- African institutional opinions have evolved on the Somaliland question and in ways that do not favor it. A 2005 AU fact-finding mission showed that Somaliland had a unique, justifiable sovereignty case that would not lead to a cascade of separatism Africa. The AU has moved way from stance and generally aligns with Somalia's unity. Israel's unilateral recognition of Somaliland has not helped its case in Africa.

4) Somaliland can further its cause without formal recognition- This middle ground is the most plausible scenario: leveraging its resources, location and stability to broaden trade agreements, consular offices, attract FDI and strengthen aerial connectivity beyond Ethiopia/the UAE logistical nodes. De facto recognition is a smoother path than formal recognition, and serves many of the same purposes.

[Samuel Ramani @SamRamani2]

I was in Saudi Arabia this week and my firm Pangea Geopolitical Risk is closely monitoring the Yemen developments

Some key points to consider

1) This is more than a Saudi-Houthi conflict, Yemen is a deepened state of hot civil war: the Houthis are gaining ground at the expense of Saudi-aligned government forces and the south Yemeni movement is taking steps to reconstitute and warning that the December 2025 attacks on them worsened security. 100,000 Yemenis are displaced in the latest fighting and the 2022 truce is over. Saudi airstrikes are unlikely to be as sustained as they were after 2015 but will continue as will Houthi cross-border attacks. Riyadh has been targeted by the Houthis for the first time since 2017-18 and the King Khalid Airport incident is a symbolic throwback to those times.

2) Pakistan will continue threading the needle on intervention: Pakistan has vowed solidarity with Saudi Arabia and is rhetorically giving the Mecca Agreement teeth. This means more air defence cover training and the utilization of the thousands of Pakistani security trained forces in Saudi Arabia for collective defence. It does not likely mean Pakistani jets striking Houthi targets or Pakistani boots on the ground. Pakistan's 2015 non-intervention logic partially holds and its backchannel role with Iran is not fully extinguished.

3) Confidence in US Leadership will be shaken further: Trump's first term in 2019 witnessed two successive events that shook confidence in the US within GCC countries: the passive abandonment of the Kurds in Turkey's Syria Operation Peace Spring offensive and the non-response to Abqaiq attack. Trump's refusal to assist Saudi Arabia in this crisis will compound those concerns. Europe-GCC cooperation will grow, as trust in Russia and China as backchannels has been strained by their Iran ties, but does it have substance? EDGE in UAE is making major European plays and both the GCC/Europe are modernizing at the same time.

4) Egypt is the country to watch- Egypt's parlous macroeconomic situation has been further affected by the latest escalations, it sees the Suez Canal and Bab el-Mandeb Strait as economically integrated. Calls for an Arab solution to the Red Sea security crisis are intensifying and Sisi's meeting with MBS is likely to fuel greater Egypt-Saudi Arabia security cooperation. Egypt is happy to continue contributing to maritime security in the Red Sea. The trauma of the 1960s and capacity constraints impede frontal involvement in Yemen. Egyptian officials see military intervention in Yemen as a trap. Possibility of formal Mecca Agreement inclusion grows modestly from last month but not a certainty.

[Samuel Ramani @SamRamani2]

A UNSC consensus here is hard

China has joined the non interference camp in most African conflicts and since 2023, Russia has gone from a two track to pro Burhan policy

US secondary sanctions are likely to be the enforcer rather than UN action

[U.S. Senior Advisor for Arab and African Affairs @US_SrAdvisorAF]

Proud to author with U.S. UN Ambassador Mike Waltz (@USAmbUN) this article about the importance of expanding the arms embargo in Sudan. “As long as weapons are easier to come by than food in Sudan, cooler heads have little chance to prevail. Any Security Council member considering abstaining or voting no should understand what it is voting for. It will mean business as usual in Sudan—and all the wanton violence that entails.”

[Samuel Ramani @SamRamani2]

The path forward for Sudan is the restoration of civilian rule and international humanitarian attention to the country, beyond its mineral resources, ports and strategic offerings

Only then can decades of violence come to a possible conclusion /END

[Samuel Ramani @SamRamani2]

Sudan's intra-military civil war is nearing its three-and-a-half year mark

Here are where things stand and what is likely to come next /THREAD

[Samuel Ramani @SamRamani2]

Sudan's post-2023 civil war is just 3.5 years of a decades-long story

Coups and instability have beset Sudan since the 1980s with the Bashir-era genocide in Darfur in the middle

The 2019 revolution brought glimmers of democratic hope but by 2021, a coup ended it /7

[Samuel Ramani @SamRamani2]

The SAF's use of chemical weapons has been revealed in this new expose from the New York Times

Yet another harrowing chapter in Sudan's 3.5 year long civil war

A conflict that gets so little international attention
https://t.co/hKOHkpKqsE

[Samuel Ramani @SamRamani2]

Sudan’s army chief Burhan is framing himself as a unity figure who can stabilise a war torn country

The real story is darker

Chemical weapons use, US sanctions and the weaponisation of food and international aid make him unfit to lead

[Hurst Publishers @HurstPublishers]

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@warmatters @SMonaghanPhD

[Samuel Ramani @SamRamani2]

I agree. Escalating tensions between Israel and Türkiye do not necessarily presage a confrontation

Something to keep in mind when considering the broader impacts of the Mecca Agreement

[خميس عبيد آل علي 🇦��� @KhamisOAlAli]

رغم كثرة القراءات والتحليلات التي تتن��أ بحدوث صدام إسرائيلي تركي مستقبلًا وكثرة الحوادث المتعلقة بسفن الإغاثة الإنسانية التي تحاول كسر حصار غزة وتنطلق من تركيا وحادثة قصف سلاح الجو الإسرائيلي معدات عسكرية تركية في سوريا إلا أنه ليس من المنطقي توقع حدوث مواجهة مباشرة بين الدولتين اللتين تعتبران واقعتين حتى الآن تحت المظلة الأمنية الأمريكية.. ووزير الخارجية التركي أكد بنفسه ذات مرة أن لتركيا مشكلة مع نتنياهو وليس مع دولة إسرائيل كما أن الأخيرة لها مصلحة استراتيجية مع تركيا تكمن في ضمان أمن إمدادات الطاقة القادمة من أذربيجان عبر الأراضي التركية.

[Samuel Ramani @SamRamani2]

Interesting layout of the UAE development model

[Abdulkhaleq Abdulla @Abdulkhaleq_UAE]

شكرا للزملاء في منصة #مفكرو_الامارات على نشر مقالي بعنوان النمو المتسارع: الإمارات نموذجا. عدد قليل جدا من الدول في العالم شهدت هذا النمط من النمو خلال ال 50 سنة الماضية.