Pipo🇵🇸

[Pipo🇵🇸 @SDhunkal]

@hvorforkrig kem e kevin, Morgan?

[Sudanese Echo @SudaneseEcho]

Summer Holiday Photos Place the UAE-Backed Rapid Support Militia Leader in the Emirates as Atrocities Continue Across Sudan

A series of photographs circulated on Sudanese social media this month that, at first glance, appeared entirely ordinary. A spacious courtyard at dusk, a customised Mercedes parked on a quiet street, and an older man sitting on a pale sofa with a child on his lap. They could easily have been photographs from any family summer holiday, far removed from the war, famine and mass graves that have come to define Sudan’s landscape.

The older man in the photographs, however, is Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo, better known as Hemedti, commander of the UAE-backed Rapid Support Militia, the paramilitary force commonly associated with the Janjaweed.

In January 2025, the United States sanctioned Hemedti by name as it formally determined that members of the Rapid Support Militia and allied militias had committed genocide in Darfur. The decision came after nearly two years of war in which atrocities attributed to the militia had spread across large parts of Sudan.

In El Geneina, Human Rights Watch documented an ethnic cleansing campaign against the Masalit that included mass killings, rape, looting and forced displacement, among the most horrific episodes of violence since the war began.

In Khartoum, the militia controlled large areas of the capital for months. Civilian homes and buildings were turned into military positions and detention facilities. As the Sudanese army advanced and retook areas previously held by the militia, detention sites, graves and bodies began to emerge, alongside testimony from survivors describing torture, starvation, humiliation and detention in brutal conditions.

The period of militia control over large parts of Khartoum, Omdurman and Bahri was also marked by widespread looting of homes and property, the occupation of civilian residences, and repeated accounts of rape and sexual violence.

The same devastation then spread into Gezira State after the militia entered the region in December 2023. Towns and villages were subjected to killings, looting and attacks, forcing hundreds of thousands of people to flee. Many of them had already escaped Khartoum and had gone to Gezira in search of safety.

In June 2024, Wad Al-Noura became the site of one of the militia’s most notorious massacres in the state. Months later, a wave of attacks swept through villages in eastern Gezira, with Al-Sireha among the communities subjected to large-scale killings. The violence extended across dozens of villages and towns amid reports of killings, looting, arson, sexual violence and forced displacement.

The pattern repeated itself across different parts of Sudan: the militia entered civilian communities, killings and looting followed, homes were occupied, people were detained, sexual violence was reported, and entire populations were forced to abandon their towns and villages.

El Fasher became one of the bloodiest chapters in that trajectory. After a prolonged siege, the city fell to the Rapid Support Militia. United Nations investigators documented the killing of more than 6,000 people during the first three days, while the fate of an estimated 150,000 residents remained unknown. The UN Independent International Fact-Finding Mission for Sudan subsequently concluded that the violations committed there bore hallmarks of genocide.

As the geographical scale of these atrocities expanded and the war continued year after year, another question became central to international investigations: where was the militia obtaining the weapons, financing and supplies that allowed it to sustain its military capabilities?

The Rapid Support Militia continued fighting on multiple fronts, acquiring weapons, ammunition, vehicles and drones while also deploying foreign fighters in a war stretching from Darfur to Khartoum, Gezira, Kordofan and El Fasher.

From the early months of the conflict, evidence began accumulating around the UAE’s role in the supply network supporting the militia.

In a report dated January 15, 2024, the UN Panel of Experts on Sudan said information it had gathered concerning the transfer of weapons and ammunition to the Rapid Support Militia through Amdjarass airport in eastern Chad was “credible.”

In July 2024, The Guardian published an investigation into Emirati passports and documents discovered among equipment linked to the militia in Sudan. In September, The New York Times investigated UAE activity in Amdjarass and allegations that the humanitarian operation there was running alongside a pipeline supplying weapons and other support to the militia.

The following month, The Washington Post published an investigation based on weapons captured by the Sudanese army, together with US assessments and reports, linking equipment and ammunition found in the hands of the Rapid Support Militia to the UAE.

In November 2024, Amnesty International identified the French-made Galix defence system installed on UAE-manufactured Nimr Ajban armoured vehicles used by the militia.

Flight data then revealed another dimension of the supply network. In December 2024, Reuters tracked at least 86 flights from the UAE to Amdjarass since the war began. A significant number were operated by companies previously linked in UN reporting to arms-transfer operations in the region. Researcher Justin Lynch also contributed to tracking and analysing flight and supply networks connecting these routes to the Rapid Support Militia.

By early 2025, the issue had reached the level of official scrutiny in Washington. On January 24, Senator Chris Van Hollen and Representative Sara Jacobs said that, based on a briefing from the Biden administration and other reporting, they had confirmed that the UAE was continuing to provide weapons to the militia despite earlier assurances to Washington that it would stop.

Over the following months, further evidence emerged from weapons stockpiles and supply convoys themselves.

In April 2025, an investigation by France 24’s Observers team traced Bulgarian-made mortar rounds found in Darfur to a transaction involving an Emirati buyer, with the UAE Armed Forces listed in documentation as the end user.

On April 29, Reuters, in an investigation involving journalist Reade Levinson, reported that the UN Panel of Experts was examining how Bulgarian ammunition officially exported to the UAE had ended up in a Rapid Support Militia supply convoy in Darfur. Bulgaria said it had never authorised the ammunition to be re-exported to Sudan.

In May 2025, Amnesty International identified Chinese-made GB50A guided bombs and AH-4 155mm howitzers in the possession of the Rapid Support Militia. The organisation concluded that the weapons were “almost certainly” re-exported to Sudan by the UAE.

As the investigations widened, a broader network emerged involving mercenaries, financing, companies and regional logistics.

Beginning in 2024, Colombian investigative outlet La Silla Vacía exposed details of the recruitment of former Colombian soldiers to fight alongside the Rapid Support Militia. Subsequent investigations traced the networks used to recruit and transport these fighters, with UAE-based companies and routes repeatedly appearing in the reporting.

Bellingcat has also investigated weapons and supply routes associated with the militia, while a joint investigation by Lighthouse Reports and its partners uncovered training camps, sites used to prepare weapons and vehicles, and supply convoys in eastern Libya connected to the Rapid Support Militia, along with Colombian mercenaries operating within the same network.

On the financial side, The Sentry documented networks involving companies, gold trading, financing and property linked to senior Rapid Support Militia figures, including businesses and activities operating from within the UAE. These findings added a financial and commercial dimension to the military and logistical picture.

In October 2025, The Wall Street Journal reported that US intelligence agencies had detected an increase in the flow of Emirati weapons to the militia, including drones, light and heavy weapons, vehicles, artillery, mortars and ammunition.

The UAE continues to deny providing military support to the Rapid Support Militia. Over the course of the war, however, a substantial body of reporting and investigation has accumulated from the UN Panel of Experts, US assessments and sources, The New York Times, The Washington Post, The Wall Street Journal, The Guardian, Reuters, France 24, Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Lighthouse Reports, Bellingcat and The Sentry.

These are multiple, independent sources using different investigative methods. Flight records, export documentation, weapons and ammunition analysis, corporate and property records, satellite imagery and testimony from people on the ground have each exposed different parts of a support network that helped sustain the militia’s war.

Alongside the evidence concerning weapons, financing and logistics, direct indications of Hemedti’s own presence inside the UAE also emerged during the conflict.

In June 2025, The New York Times reported, citing US officials, that Hemedti had stayed at a protected residence in Abu Dhabi, where he recorded video addresses to his supporters in Sudan.

The Sentry also documented his personal ownership of three apartments in Dubai, close to Al Minhad military airbase.

The photographs that surfaced this month add another dimension to those reports. Hemedti appears once again inside the UAE, this time in quiet family photographs, while the war led by his militia continues in Sudan and the consequences of its atrocities stretch from El Geneina to Khartoum, Gezira and El Fasher.

The information is there. The investigations have been published. The evidence continues to accumulate.

The question becomes more urgent with every new investigation: how much more evidence does the world need before it acts?

#Sudan
#RSFisTerroristOrganization
#UAEKillsSudanesePeople
#UAESponsorsTerrorism

[Pipo🇵🇸 @SDhunkal]

@cryptobeast 👀

[Pipo🇵🇸 @SDhunkal]

@Mo_Ahamed Racismo for klikk, den e syk warya, stram deg opp

[Pipo🇵🇸 @SDhunkal]

@MikhailAwes @elbarcasiempre «yngste laget i ligaen». Tittelen der ryker hurtig, om du tar en titt i Bomb Squad garderoben.

[Pipo🇵🇸 @SDhunkal]

@MrBlackFootball

[Pipo🇵🇸 @SDhunkal]

@AdeerDepay E du gaaal brusj. Koste meg med støttepasninger i 90 min. Hold han i sjefstolen

[Pipo🇵🇸 @SDhunkal]

Kkkkkkk Maupay legg opp broder. Gå fulltid.

[Neal Maupay @nealmaupay_]

‘It’s coming home’

[Esheru @Eshprojet1]

I like how he skilfully handles this

[iBhubesi @mabasotf]

I need us to be as loud for DR CONGO as we were for Palestine!

[Pipo🇵🇸 @SDhunkal]

@FuadCadani madaax digsi, This tweet was directed at you."

[Kai Havertz @kaihavertz29]

Mood

[Kai Havertz @kaihavertz29]

Mood

[Pipo🇵🇸 @SDhunkal]

@sirarsalih @Nanabiel14 Ble ikke du kansellert av din arbeidsgiver ?

[Pipo🇵🇸 @SDhunkal]

@jjemej @Smoothedan @Magnus04983026 Han snakker om nøytralitet,alt han Twitterer er kamuflert racismo, wannabe Mads Hansen

[Pipo🇵🇸 @SDhunkal]

🫡

[CentreGoals. @centregoals]

🚨🚨| BREAKING: Former Aston Villa and Everton player Anwar El-Ghazi has been banned from training and participating in matches by German club Mainz after he supported Palestine on social media.

[Pipo🇵🇸 @SDhunkal]

Patrick Berg faren til støttepasninger

[Pipo🇵🇸 @SDhunkal]

@OleAsbjoernNess @faktisk_no @PalKom Her du en uavhengig kilde, ikke kom med noe Jerusalem post. Troll

[Pipo🇵🇸 @SDhunkal]

@bjellas @OleAsbjoernNess @GhPreste @sosialist @audunlysbakken @SV_Karin Hører vi på samme video? Hører slagord for frigjøring, ikke noe om utsletting av Israel.

[Pipo🇵🇸 @SDhunkal]

@OleAsbjoernNess @GhPreste @sosialist @audunlysbakken @SV_Karin Rask med å stemple folk som er uenige med deg som jødehater.

[Diskokukken @grahn1312]

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