Reading the German mass media's coverage of Crimea and comparing it with AMK's coverage is a perfect reminder of why I stopped taking mainstream media seriously a long time ago. The contrast is striking. I would much rather read the kid from New Zealand.
Apparently, every day is yet another "game changer" that will finally bring Russia to its knees. Western armchair warriors are already celebrating, patting themselves on the back and declaring victory. But I know who will not be celebrating: the Ukrainian families who will have to bury their loved ones when the inevitable retaliation comes.
And then there is the Western media narrative about Russia using the Crimean Bridge for military transport. While that has certainly been the case, the extent of its current military use is a different question. Apparently, that distinction does not always make it into the headlines.
🇷🇺🇺🇦 Which is more critical: The destruction of Russian Kerch bridge in Crimea, or the destruction of Dniper River bridges in Ukraine?
Now that we have entered the phase of "Bridge Wars" I think its time to assess the overall impact each incident will have given that we are on the path to total destruction of all these bridges. I will base my assessment on 3 main factors:
- Impact on Military
- Impact on Civilians
- Impact on the total war effort.
1st
- The destruction of the Kerch bridge creates a semi-major problem militarily for the Russian's, but only in southern Ukraine. The land bridge they hold that connects Crimea to Donetsk it critical. Since 2022 the Russians have build numerous highways and railway lines along the Sea of Azov, created to help alleviate the brunt of this exact problem.
That being said, Crimea itself is no longer the major military hub it once was for Russia. Dont get it wrong, its still vital, but it has reduced in its battlefield importance since 2022. Aircraft have relocated to Rostov region, Navy has relocated further east in the Black Sea.
Militarily, the cutting of the Kerch bridge creates real problems for the Russians down south. However, the land bridge from Donetsk helps alleviate some of those issues, even under attack from Ukrainian drones.
- On the flip side, if the Dniper bridges are destroyed, Ukraine has no land bridge to the east, essentially splitting the country in half.
I think the negative military implications are pretty obvious. Reduced logistical capabilities, Reduced repair capabilities, Reduced transportation of troops and equipment, etc.
2nd
- Destruction of the Kerch bridge means that Russia will have to find a way to supply roughly 2.5 million civilians. This also includes those individuals (however few) in the Kherson region. That being said, the land bridge can help facility some of those needs.
- For Ukraine, the destruction of Dniper River bridges means having to find a way to supply roughly 9 million civilians across a vast area of land.
3rd
- The total war implications of Kerch bridge being destroyed are mainly limited to southern Ukraine. I would estimate that this impacts roughly 100,000-150,000 servicemen at the most. Additionally, the Russian military will have to shift part of its focus to helping the civilian population in Crimea.
Once again, this will all be aided by the land bridge (even under Ukrainian drone attack)
The rest of the frontline will be unaffected.
- For Ukraine, the total war implications of losing the Dniper bridges is catastrophic.
Every bullet, vehicle, missile and drone has to cross that river. Even if the equipment is manufactured in the east, every piece of material crosses the river. The destruction of these bridges impacts roughly 95% (my estimate) of Ukraine's entire military.
This also impacts roughly 750,000-800,000 servicemen Ukraine has stationed on or near the frontline.
: I fully understand that this is a very basic assessment of this bridge war. Its also a hypothetical look because neither the Kerch bridge or the Dniper bridges have been completely destroyed.
That being said, this assessment doesnt take into account improvised crossings or repair, nor does it incorporate the breakdown of each sides entire logistical chains.
However, my point remains. Should the Russians decide to destroy all of the Dniper bridges (Which I believe to be the case now) this will have a devastating impact on Ukraine's ability to fight the war, compared to the destruction of Kerch bridge in Crimea.
Let me know what you think down below.
BREAKING: Russia hit Kyiv's Northern and Southern bridges tonight in a massive ballistic missile attack across Ukraine. The two bridges are among the main crossings over the Dnipro River, which splits the capital in half, and the Southern Bridge also carries a metro line
Yall worried about wasting drones on symbolic strikes, while Russia is knocking out every locomotive, functional bridge, power and other essential part of infrastructure? LOL.
Zelensky reports that Russia is now receiving "dozens" of Kn-23 ballistic missiles per month from North Korea.
If this is true, and we assume a minimum of 24 missiles per month, Russia is now capable of launching over 124 ballistic missiles per month, based on reporting by The Economist in September that Russia is producing 100 ballistic missiles (Iskander-M + RM-48U modified S-400).
This means that Russia has the capacity to launch 4 ballistics every single day, or carry out a medium-sized attack on Kyiv using 10 ballistics every 2-3 days, or carry out a large scale attack on Kyiv using 20 ballistics every 6 days.
And this doesn't even take into account the 200+ hypersonic, supersonic, and subsonic cruise missiles that Russia is producing monthly, or let alone the several thousand Geran-2/4/5 drones produced monthly.
Before we start seeing all the usual "analysts" making crazy predictions, I'd like to emphasise that the destruction of the roadway part of the Crimean Bridge will not cause a frontline collapse for Russia in the south, and will not result in any major Ukrainian advances anywhere.
Ukraine has been attacking the bridge since 2022. Russia has always known that it would probably be taken down at some point, and there was nothing they could really do about it. As such, for the last four years, they have been heavily investing in other routes along the "land bridge" connecting Russia with Crimea via Zaporizhzhia and Donetsk Oblasts.
While early on in the war, a significant amount of Russian logistics flowed along the Crimean Bridge, over time this has decreased relative to the amount of logistics moving along the various highways on the "land bridge". This is why we have seen Ukraine's mid-range drone strike campaign against Russian supply vehicles focus so heavily on these areas in recent months.
Additionally, the railway part of the bridge hasn't (yet) been destroyed, and if it isn't destroyed and the rather limited damage is repaired, then trains will obviously be able to resume movement to Crimea.
The Crimean Bridge only directly affects the frontline along the section stretching approximately from Kherson to the Orikhiv direction, and any advances along nearly 85% of this sector are already blocked by the Dnieper River. And of course, most logistics to the remaining ~15% part of the sector between Stepnohirsk and Orikhiv are already mostly supplied via the "land bridge".
The destruction of the Crimean Bridge in 2022 or 2023 would have had much more serious consequences for the Russian frontline than it will now. I still expect it will have an impact on the frontline even now, but it will be nowhere near as significant as many are probably expecting.
Resident
⚡️⚡️
The propaganda machine will be ecstatic about the attacks on the Crimean Bridge, while the opposition will be upset about the attacks on bridges in Kyiv. Our prediction is that, after the destruction of the Crimean Bridge, there will be no more bridges across the Dnipro River in Ukraine.
All operations were prepared in anticipation of the Trump/Xi/Putin meeting, as we wrote in our "Resident" intelligence report. We will provide an assessment in the morning.
According to a source, all the missiles used by the Ukrainian Armed Forces were received from partners several weeks ago, but it will be claimed that they are Ukrainian-made missiles. The closer we get to a potential peace process, the more escalation we will see. We advise caution...
Do you notice how the decent accounts reporting in this war talked about both strikes?
Multiple cities in Ukraine targeted and bridges directly struck but not a peep.
Just remember who you’re choosing to follow.
It’s been another hard night in Kyiv. Russian missile strikes have stopped traffic on two river bridges connecting E + W districts. Some problems with water and electricity. Meanwhile reports of big parallel Ukrainian operation to take out Russia’s Crimean bridge. Unclear how effective it was right now.
It's crazy how all the so-called "pro-Ukrainian" accounts completely ignored ALL the Russian strikes on bridges in Kyiv, Dnipro, and Kherson, which involved dozens of missiles and drones, but then the SECOND Ukraine attacks the Crimean Bridge, there is 24/7 minute-by-minute coverage of every single development.
🇷🇺🇺🇦 Close up footage has been released by Ukrainian channels of a bridge in the city of Kramatorsk that was recently struck by Russian glide bombs.
Looks heavily damaged but not 100% destroyed.
Друзі, розкажу вам про обстановку навколо Краматорська.
Фронт проходить приблизно в 10 кілометрах від міста. Росіяни тиснуть майже з усіх напрямків — намагаються протискати наші бойові порядки в лоб по лінії Никонорівка — Білокузьминівка.
Також важкі бої йдуть на південно-східному фланзі в районах Костянтинівки та Часового Яру — ці сектори нашої оборони не дають ворогу прорватися до Дружківки, яка є містом-воротами до Краматорської алгомерації.
Логістика вкрай ускладнена, оскільки дрони з кожнем місяцем залітають все далі і атакують все, до чого можуть дотягнутись.
Сам Краматорськ вже офіційно є не прифронтовим, а фронтовим містом. Там запроваджена довга комендантська година, яка не діє з 11:00 до 16:00. Місто спорожніло, незважаючи на те, що там ще залишається багато цивільних. Люди пересуваються дворами і виходять лише за продуктами або водою.
Майже в усіх районах про��леми із водопостачанням, газом та світлом. Про опалення, дуже ймовірно, можна взагалі забути.
Росіяни щоденно завдають ударів КАБами по будинках, мостах та критичній інфраструктурі. Найбільше страждають східні райони міста, які розташовані найближче до лінії фронту.
В плані дронів пересування в будь-якому районі є небезпечним, особливо в районі переправ через річку Казенний Торець. Піший похід вулицями зі стрілецькою зброєю став буденністю.
Незважаючи на надважку обстановку, в місті ще працюють кілька продуктових магазинів, пару відділень пошт�� та навіть декілька кав'ярень. Оборона триває. В 15 кілометрах від Краматорська б'ються воїни 24-ї бригади, яким потрібні зарядні станції, генератори та Starlink для безперебійної роботи на позиціях. І я прошу вас допомогти нашим підрозділам: https://t.co/7oyyQuYYHF
Буду вдячний за вашу підтримку і поширення.
@clement_molin But surely, aside from your analysis, you must have choosen a side right? Since day 1 of d war? I am unable to see any negative post about negative situation of the ukrainians, if so, show me please.
Today marks the seventh consecutive day of speed restrictions on Starshield in Ukraine’s temporarily occupied territories, with no response or clarification from either the Pentagon or SpaceX.
The Embassy continues to be approached by American media outlets reporting that, in response to their inquiries, the Pentagon has stated that no restrictions are in place.
I want to be unequivocal: that is contrary to what is happening on the ground. I can confirm that speed restrictions are indeed in effect.
These restrictions have real operational implications for Ukraine and require an urgent explanation and resolution. Seven days without answers is seven days too many.
It is very impressive that Russia still hasn’t ran out of air defense missiles for S300/400 and Pantsir, Buk, Tor and Osa. Their stockpiles (and production capacity) is something we Europeans could be jealous of
During recent negociations, we heard some words about an exchange, Ukraine 🇺🇦 in NATO and Russia 🇷🇺 taking all of Donbas
But why is Russia that much obsessed by taking Donbas on the negociation field and not on the battlefield ?
I read an interesting explanation on a Russian channel recently : "The task of liberating Sloviansk and Kramatorsk becomes extremely difficult. If we do not secure access to the borders of these two cities during the winter campaign, then liberating these settlements in 2027 will be a task that is, in all likelihood, impossible to achieve."
What they are not saying is that the battle for Donbas has been going on since 2014 and most of the Russian offensives have been going on in the region since June 2022. Putin asked a large number of time his army to seize the region but they still didn't manage to do it.
▫️▫️▫️Battle for Western Donbas▫️▫️▫️
Since October 2023, Russian forces are fighting a prolonged battle for the "western fortress belt". After they secured Donetsk suburbs during the first 6 months of 2024 (battle was ongoing since 2014), Russia assaulted the western Donbas fortress belt, composed of multiple small mining cities, most very close to each other. The battle started in Novohrodivka and Selydove and continued in Pokrovsk, Myrnohrad, Rodynske, Bilytske and now Dobropilla. During this battle, Russia suffered from at least 150 000 casualties.
But the Russian objective was never to conquer these small mining towns in the western Donbas. Russia’s stated goal since 2022 has been to take control of the fortress belt, the large Donbas cities still held by Ukraine, especially Kramatorsk and Sloviansk. If the Russians had managed to capture Bakhmut and Soledar as early as late 2022 or early 2023, they could have hoped to push west towards these cities. But they failed, first at Chasiv Yar and then at Siversk. A frontal assault on the fortress cities was therefore called into question.
So from late 2023 the Russian army began a large outflanking manoeuvre through the south and west of the Donbas. It first “liberated,” the heavily fortified western suburbs of Donetsk, and then advanced into the western fortress of the Donbas. Moving north step by step, the Russians are now attacking the fortress from the south and from the east. Meanwhile, they have taken control of Siversk. And after more than three years of fighting for Chasiv Yar, the town still cannot be used to launch offensives on Kramatorsk.
▫️▫️▫️Battle for Kostiantynivka▫️▫️▫️
The battle for Kostiantynivka, which began more than a year ago, is still under way. The Russians are struggling to keep pushing north, first towards Druzhkivka, the last lock south of Kramatorsk, and then towards the large fortress cities of the Donbas. This is why Russian forces are putting maximum effort into encircling the Donbas from the west and the north. In the west, they had relatively great success in 2024 and 2025, and the fighting for Dobropillia is therefore decisive. The Russians hope to seize the town in order to launch offensives towards Barvinkove, a town in Kharkiv Oblast that serves as a logistics hub for the Donbas.
▫️▫️▫️Defeat in Northern Donbas▫️▫️▫️
At the same time, the Russians hoped to launch an offensive from the north. Until early summer, they had a chance to capture Lyman, the key town that protects Sloviansk from the north. Had they taken it, they would probably have pushed along the Siverskyi Donets River, reached Izium and cut one of the main supply routes from Kharkiv to Sloviansk. They could then have crossed the river and infiltrated deep behind the lines to attack the Donbas from its northern flank. Thanks to Operation Vivaldi, carried out by the Ukrainian army, this plan failed. The Russians can now only attack from the south or launch frontal assaults, all of which have so far been repelled east of Sloviansk.
▫️▫️▫️What is Russia's plan▫️▫️▫️
Today, Russia is therefore trying to achieve through political and diplomatic negotiations the military objectives it set itself in 2022. These military objectives are a minimum. Nothing suggests that Russia intends to stop its war once the Donbas is under its control. Russian strategy is now very clear. This year, Russia failed in its battle for Sloviansk through the two strategic locks: Lyman in the north, where the prospects of capture are fading fast, and Mykolaivka in the east, where the front has been pushed back.
The risk of a Russian capture of Sloviansk remains very limited. So all Russian reserves are heading south. First, from Pokrovsk, Russian forces have been attacking northwards for months. Fighting is under way inside Dobropillia, and they hope to capture the town this coming winter. They would then use it to launch offensives towards Bilozerske, Novodonetske, Oleksandrivka and then Barvinkove, towns located west of the Donbas. To do so, they will have to break through the new Ukrainian defensive lines, which are much stronger. They will also have to enter an area with very few urban areas.
These offensives are therefore the Russian army’s long-term objective. At the same time, if these objectives are not achieved, Russia will try by every means to push towards Druzhkivka, the last lock south of Kramatorsk. Since the battle for Kostiantynivka is still under way and Russian forces have not yet taken full control of the town, the battle for Druzhkivka has not started.
The Russians are therefore focusing their assaults on Dobropillia and Kostiantynivka. At the same time, they are attacking across the fields and through the Ukrainian fortifications on the high ground between Druzhkivka and Dobropillia. This is where the war will be decided. The Ukrainians have managed to stop the Russian offensive on Sloviansk and to slow down the one on Kramatorsk considerably. They have, to some extent, stabilised the situation in Kostiantynivka. They have pushed the Russians back at Lyman and, further south, at Novopavlivka. The only front where Russia is still making gains is Dobropillia, and this is the region that is strategic for the future of the conflict. That is why Russia hopes to seize it without a fight.
Thanks for following !
Russia is preparing to throw up to 6,500 jet-powered drones at Ukraine in November — 12 times more than in August — acc. to the Ukrainian PM. Add guided bombs, regular missile strikes, and tens of thousands of fiber-optic FPV drones on top of that.
What PM does not explain is how the government actually intends to protect people or energy infrastructure when the basic physical protection that was promised still does not exist. The message remains the same: prepare for the worst and survive on your own.