SpaceComputer

Orbital confidential computing and space internet infrastructure 🛰️

Developer support:

[SpaceComputer @SpaceComputerIO]

The chips on our satellites will generate their own security keys in orbit. No SpaceComputer key will ever exist on Earth.

That feature is enabled by the hardware decisions built into our verifiable satellite architecture.

We broke it down here:
https://t.co/Ktg7dLBEN2

[SpaceComputer @SpaceComputerIO]

Most of the security the tech you use every day relies on one thing remaining a secret: a signing key.

Often referred to as a private key, secret key, or signing key, they are what a computer system uses verify it is who it says it is. A few examples you might be familiar with:

🔑 Browser security (TLS/HTTPS)
🔑 Signed software updates
🔑 Digital signatures

These work because one key stayed secret and only the real system or system's owner could use it.

So here is a fair question to ask about any platform you're working with: where was that signing key created, and who had access to it before it reached you?

We wrote up what a signing key is, and why generating them in space changes trust systems.

https://t.co/dt8uJZOeGR

[exponent 👽🦇🔊 @semicondurian]

By end of the decade everyone will need to be prepared for migration to post quantum cryptography standards

The economy is ever more dependent on secure digital systems and more parts of the stack are migrating to space

The elegance encapsulated in Space Fabric’s hardware design choices is truly a work of art.

If you want to absorb in 5 min a year worth of r&d work by the epic SpaceComputer | Orbital Root of Trust team take a read!

[SpaceComputer @SpaceComputerIO]

If you're curious about the hardware we use to do it, check out our most recent blog post: https://t.co/IhkIXCmEU5

[SpaceComputer @SpaceComputerIO]

If locksmith copies your house key.
And they promise they destroyed the duplicate.
And you have no way to verify.

Do you trust them?

That's a vulnerability so many secure compute modules like TEEs face. Now imagine that level of trust in a satellite you can never double check after launch...especially if you don't have verification set up.

If satellite signing keys are generated on Earth by the manufacturer, sometimes years before launch, there's a gap in time for a pre-launch attack.

So when designing our security mechanisms, we engineered around this vulnerability.

Every SpaceComputer signing key will be generated after launch, on the satellite's first boot in orbit. No human or manufacturer on Earth ever holds the keys.

For customers evaluating orbital compute platforms, which is preferred: trusting a vendor's claim and contract, or verification from the hardware itself?

[SpaceComputer @SpaceComputerIO]

@zkpedrongmi pretty cool tech they're building tho 🤩

[Pedro @zkpedrongmi]

. @SpaceComputerIO threat model here.

You would have to:
- capture several of these
- transport them to a secret pressurized location in space
- compromise two chip manufacturers
- open it, use million-dollar tooling that prob doesn’t work in microgravity

Challenge accepted?

[SpaceComputer @SpaceComputerIO]

SpaceComputer handles signing key genesis differently.

A 'key' layer of security we offer: all signing keys are generated after reaching Low Earth Orbit. They were never on Earth, and never left in the contractual trust of the manufacturer.

And all compute tasks are secured without a single point of failure, through two key pairs, one for each co-processor onboard the satellite.

In orbit, we believe security is a priority, and never a compromise. 🛰️

@rezabfil outlines the post-launch process👇

[SpaceComputer @SpaceComputerIO]

@tayyibofweb3 really great job Tayyib!

[SpaceComputer @SpaceComputerIO]

@zkpedrongmi And yet you guys make it look easy 😎💫

[Pedro @zkpedrongmi]

Good post from @tarasjeans on SpaceComputer’s hardware.

As we iterate, we start with mostly off-the-shelf solutions neatly packed into a ~0.5U radiation shielded payload. Here’s a picture of test devices before the integration.

In Q4 we will see these on a “clever” mission with one of our partners.

More info soon ™️

[Ryan @RyanJLevy]

few will understand just how powerful this in-orbit key generation actually is as opposed to the traditional model on earth from a manufacturer!

[exponent 👽🦇🔊 @semicondurian]

There is a lot of hype around data centers in space, but that may be putting the cart before the horse.

Before we start talking about orbital mega-structures, we need the foundations: satellite-to-satellite networking, reliable routing, low-latency communication, and the infrastructure layer that lets space-based systems actually coordinate.

The exciting part might not just be “data centers in space.”

It might be the new internet that makes them possible.

[frezabek @rezabfil]

Cysat Europe was great!

Over the course of 48 hours, we got a great snapshot of what the current state of space security is and where the industry is heading! Great insights we gathered with Daniel, Toufic, and Amir, which will provide a lot of inspiration moving forward.

It was our first big presence at a space tech conference, and we realized truly how the space tech industry moves and what some of the hot topics are, including PQC, secure communication, and shared payloads.

During my talk, we covered a possible solution using Space Fabric, focusing on the crypto-agility it can provide moving forward.

I truly enjoyed getting to be around so many cybersecurity-focused companies and speaking with them about the focal points relevant for the European market and beyond, such as robust and secure interoperability solutions and end-to-end security.

My main takeaway is that there is still room for improvement in the space industry regarding security, with a huge and unique opportunity to avoid the same security pitfalls we know. Let's see how we manage to balance scaling, security, and unique design requirements.

We envision that security can scale with the space industry! Looking forward to seeing all our new space connects at the next conference! 🚀

Big shoutout to the @CYSAT23 team on getting the conference!

[exponent 👽🦇🔊 @semicondurian]

Cysat Europe was a fantastically focused security conference for the @SpaceComputerIO team with @rezabfil, @am_ylm and @utocif

Meeting cybersecurity-focused space companies.
Everyone building in this space understands the importance of being prepared for several key pillars:

- Post Quantum Cryptography migration: This is no longer an option, by 2030 or earlier there has to be a fail safe migration plan.
- Space compute tech inherently hits sensitive national security matters, it's imperative for nation states to either develop independent solution stack or use sovereign technology with 3rd parties
- Standards are only starting to emerge, we're starting to see healthy competition between ressembling bespoke solutions.

My main takeaway is that besides imaging and comms, space is undeniably becoming a critical compute frontier humanity will be focused on in the next decades.

I can't wait till our first satellite launch later this year!

ITS TIME TO BUILD SPACE COMPUTERS

[SpaceComputer @SpaceComputerIO]

@zadboykt what do you mean by this?

[SpaceComputer @SpaceComputerIO]

By 2027, several orbital compute platforms will be in production. Most will depend on a single compute chip vendor never being compromised. Once a satellite is in orbit, there isn't an easy fix to swap out a compromised chip.

The four hardware components that show up in our conversations around orbital security are:

→ Secure Elements (SEs)
→ Trusted Execution Environments (TEEs)
→ Trusted Platform Modules (TPMs)
→ Hardware Security Modules (HSMs)

Each hardware component has a different purpose. Whether a system can be independently verified depends on its hardware architecture and the manufacturing supply chain (aka who builds these pieces).

SpaceComputer's satellites will use:

→ Two secure elements from different vendors
→ All signing keys generated after orbital deployment
→ TPM is on the on-board relay, and provides security and a future PQC integration point.

The term "hardware root of trust" means exactly what it says. The trust is in the hardware. If the hardware is compromised, the rest of the stack has nothing to fall back on.

That is why every architectural choice is considered for if the system can be trusted or not.

Our paper, Space Fabric has the details: https://t.co/GAEyPnYDDc

[SpaceComputer @SpaceComputerIO]

@trungkts29 You can't repair a chip in orbit? The double edged sword of physical inaccessibility: as a security mechanism, but also you cannot fix pieces when they break or are hacked!

[Pedro @zkpedrongmi]

Starting now at @SatNewsEvents SmallSat conference

@SpaceComputerIO co-founder @rezabfil briefing on Post-Quantum Computing for the space industry 🚀

[SpaceComputer @SpaceComputerIO]

No SpaceComputer signing key has ever existed on Earth.

The secure elements on our satellites only generate their security keys after launch.

Two secure elements (chips) from different companies, and both must sign to certify.

@rezabfil walks through the architecture: https://t.co/YLTGHDWwrR