Not only should Pakistan’s foreign ministry tweet about the Indus Valley Civilisation as our heritage but should also claim that Pakistani monument left behind in Agra ie the Taj Mahal.
Why is @theRealYLH amplifying this fake handle that's pretending to be a Pak Hindu? 🤔
This isn't the first time, nor is it the first such handle. Have seen plenty of such fake accounts over the last 6 years. They all follow the same pattern, fairly easy to spot.
THIS IS THE TRUE FACE OF PAKISTAN 🇵🇰❤️
Sindh’s education department is introducing religious textbooks for Hindu students with three Hindu religious books in the curriculum. 🕉️
A strong step towards respect, and equal rights of minorities.
Wasn't the longstanding criticism of Pakistan precisely that it disconnected itself from its pre-Islamic past? Well, now that some Pakistanis are trying to reconnect with it.
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Mohen Jo Daro, and others, will always remain hanging in the middle like this. Indians are claiming it where it does not really exist, while the people in the regions where it actually existed kept disowning it for decades and now suddenly want to claim it.
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One of the most powerful symbols of India’s unbroken civilizational continuity!
Discovered at Mohenjo-daro in undivided India this steatite seal, about 4,300-year-old, shows a seated figure in yogic posture (widely seen as Shiva-Pashupati) seated in Mulabandhasana, surrounded by animals.
While ancient sites may lie across modern borders, India remains the living custodian of this heritage. The yogic posture, Shaivite symbolism, and spiritual ethos seen in the Pashupati Seal continue to thrive in India’s temples, daily worship of Shiva, yogic traditions, and cultural life even today.
From the Vedic period to contemporary Bharat, this civilizational thread has remained alive and unbroken — deeply embedded in our philosophy, rituals, and collective consciousness.🇮🇳
#PashupatiSeal #IndusSaraswatiCivilization #LivingIndianHeritage
If you don't want to do that, then it will remain little more than an internet talking point used for trolling Indians or winning arguments on social media.
What's ironic is that many Indians seem upset that Pakistanis are reclaiming this history.
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So in Sweden you can marry man-man and woman-woman but you can’t marry your cousin? Ok.
Wasn’t the spread of HIV and AIDS much more prevalent in gays? So did Sweden ban gay marriage then?
Let’s not pretend this is for any medical reason.
@JattDaPutt101@0rion_7 That Sneha isn’t Hindu, it is quite evident. However, ethnically, the majority of Pakistani Hindus are Thari/Rajasthani. But yes, even among them, “Ram Ram” is much more popular than “JSR.”
It had to be.
It was more like an attempt to revive historical names, but it ended up being portrayed as replacing Muslim names with Hindu ones, and that too in Lahore.
Dad visited Karachi after 15 years and the moment he landed he started seething over how much of a shithole the city has become. Failing infrastructure, disgusting environment, zero city planning… absolute state of this city lmao
Reminds me of Pakistani Hindu 'politicians' demanding, (4 times) in the assembly, that alcohol be banned, but the Muslim politicians rejected the resolution. 🤣
The Debate on Creating New Provinces in Pakistan
The debate over creating new provinces in Pakistan has resurfaced over the past couple of years. It is often said that, as in previous times, the establishment is again seriously considering this possibility. However, the question of creating new provinces is not merely an administrative or constitutional issue; rather, it is deeply intertwined with broader theoretical debates about the state, power, federalism, identity, and governance. At its core, this debate asks fundamental questions: For whom does the state exist? Where is power concentrated? And to what extent does governance actually reach the people? If we reduce this discussion simply to demands for South Punjab, Hazara, or urban Sindh, we risk overlooking its deeper structural and political dimensions.
In political theory, two central concepts frame this discussion: centralisation and decentralisation. Centralisation refers to the concentration of decision-making authority, resources, and power in a central governing body. Decentralisation, by contrast, disperses authority across multiple levels of governance, bringing decision-making closer to the people. Modern federal states are generally built upon the assumption that distributing power creates stability, inclusion, and responsiveness, whereas excessive centralisation breeds alienation, resistance, and structural inequality.
Pakistan’s political history reveals that it has, from the outset, been a profoundly centralized state. Much of its bureaucratic and military governance structure was inherited from British colonial rule. The British governed colonial India through a highly centralized administrative apparatus designed for surveillance, control, and especially tight management of frontier regions. Pakistan largely preserved this institutional architecture after independence. Political theorists often describe this phenomenon as colonial continuity—the persistence of colonial governing logics within postcolonial states.
This historical context is essential for understanding the debate over new provinces.
From a theoretical standpoint, smaller administrative units are often considered more effective under the subsidiarity principle. This principle holds that decisions should be made at the lowest competent level possible. Matters that can be handled locally should not unnecessarily be transferred to higher authorities. From the European Union to various modern federal systems, subsidiarity is regarded as a cornerstone of responsive governance.
Applied to Pakistan, this logic suggests that the existing provinces have themselves become centralized mini-states. Lahore, Karachi, Peshawar, and Quetta have become provincial power centers from which decisions affecting distant populations are made. Communities in peripheral regions often feel politically marginalized and administratively neglected.
For this reason, the proposal to transform all existing administrative divisions of Pakistan into provinces deserves serious theoretical consideration. Such a restructuring would vertically disperse state power, weaken provincial centralization, and bring governance much closer to citizens. This could be understood through the lens of multi-level federalism, where governance is distributed across several interconnected levels rather than monopolized by a few centers. In this framework, even Gilgit-Baltistan might be envisioned as a distinct administrative entity, perhaps comparable in constitutional structure to Azad Jammu and Kashmir.
Yet Pakistan’s political reality introduces a profound contradiction.
On one hand, there is talk of creating new provinces, which symbolically suggests decentralization. On the other hand, there are repeated calls to weaken or reverse the Eighteenth Constitutional Amendment, which transferred significant powers from the federal center to the provinces. Theoretically, this is a striking contradiction.
The Eighteenth Amendment represented one of Pakistan’s most important attempts to strengthen federalism. By devolving powers over education, health, culture, and several other domains, it sought to reduce central dominance. From a federalist perspective, this was a positive development because the essence of federalism lies in the distribution of power. But if new provinces are simultaneously proposed while provincial autonomy is viewed with suspicion, then the issue is not genuinely about governance reform—it is about control over power.
This is where Michel Foucault’s conception of power becomes relevant. Foucault argued that power does not simply reside within formal institutions of the state; rather, it circulates throughout systems of governance, social practices, and institutional networks. However, certain structures organize and monopolize power in their favor. In Pakistan, therefore, the question is not merely constitutional—it is about identifying the actual loci of power.
Similarly, broader theories of state formation suggest that modern states often emerge through the concentration of coercive and administrative authority, and that ruling elites create, reshape, or dismantle institutions to preserve control. If the debate over new provinces in Pakistan is driven not by democratic principle but by political engineering or strategic balancing of power, then it would not represent federal deepening—it would represent merely a reconfiguration of dominance.
Another relevant concept is that of the praetorian state—a political order in which unelected power centers, especially the military, overshadow civilian institutions. In such states, formal democratic structures exist, but effective decision-making lies elsewhere. Pakistan’s history offers numerous examples consistent with this model: the One Unit scheme, repeated military interventions, constitutional engineering, manipulation of provincial politics, and the making and unmaking of civilian governments.
Seen in this context, an unavoidable question arises: Is the proposal for new provinces genuinely aimed at empowering citizens, or is it another instrument in the management of state power?
The politics of identity must also be considered. Benedict Anderson’s concept of “imagined communities” reminds us that nations are socially and politically constructed through shared narratives, institutions, and historical experiences. Provincial identities in Pakistan are similarly shaped by linguistic, cultural, and political histories. If new provinces are created solely on linguistic lines, they may intensify identity-based tensions. If they are created solely on administrative grounds, they may ignore deep cultural and historical realities. A balanced approach is therefore essential.
In my view, the question of new provinces in Pakistan should not be framed merely as an administrative reform but as part of a broader project of radical democratic decentralization—the genuine transfer of political power to lower levels of society.
A practical pathway could include:
Transforming all current divisions into provinces in a phased and consultative manner;
Protecting and strengthening the Eighteenth Amendment rather than undermining it;
Granting constitutional protection to local governments;
Reorganizing fiscal federalism to ensure fair resource distribution;
Ensuring that provincial restructuring emerges from public debate, parliamentary consensus, and democratic consultation—not from the preferences of unelected power centers.
Ultimately, the real question is not how many provinces Pakistan should have.
The real question is: What kind of state does Pakistan wish to become? A centralized, control-oriented state dominated by a few institutions? Or a plural, multinational, democratic federation where power genuinely flows downward to the people?
If power remains concentrated in a handful of institutions, elites, and administrative centers, then whether Pakistan has four provinces or forty will make little difference. But if power is truly democratized, then not only will new provinces become meaningful, but the federation itself will become more stable, inclusive, and legitimate.
The Hindu population in Karachi has gone from nearly 50% to just 1.12% in 82 years.
1941 (British India Census) Karachi population: 386,655
•Hindus: 49.87%
•Muslims: 42.01%
2023 (Dawn Epaper analysis) Karachi population: 20,357,474
•Hindus: 1.12%
•Muslims: 96.53%
A community that once formed almost half the city’s population has been reduced to a tiny minority.
This is one of the most dramatic/violent demographic shifts in modern history. Karachi was once a cosmopolitan city with a thriving Hindu presence. Today, that presence has nearly disappeared.
The numbers speaks for themselves.
#Karachi #HinduPopulation #Pakistan #Demographics #History