Having recently traded China A shares myself, my impression was that the market is far too easily moved, and even manipulated, by absurd rumors.
At the time, I held a leading Chinese CCL stock. One day, a rumor circulated that Chinese securities regulators were investigating a fund for allegedly manipulating CCL related stocks. As a result, a stock that had been up nearly 7% intraday quickly gave back all its gains and fell back to around flat.
But after local Chinese media looked into the matter, the rumor was found to be false.
A shares are far too vulnerable to rumors. I no longer trade China A shares.
NEW: malware developers added nuclear & biological weapons text to to their spyware.
Goal? To trigger LLM safety refusals... so that their spyware wouldn't be analyzed by an AI security scanner.
Cleanest practical example I can think of for why over-indexing on first order safety alignment is risky.
When closed (and open) models ship with aggressive refusals, they will be sprinkled with second-order blindspots that attackers will discover...and exploit.
We are only in the earliest days of attackers leveraging these features, and it wouldn't surprise me if users systems that need to handle complex cybersecurity issues demand that models be less safety-blunted.
In the weeds: @SocketSecurity's post also shows why intention matters in how you design a malware analysis pipeline to avoid prompt manipulation.
H/T to colleagues that shared this with me https://t.co/f3Aj9TYxU4
Supply chain attacks and OSS sustainability go hand in hand. I've semi-seriously joked for years that OSS upstreams should periodically purposely inject full vulns into their code and let downstreams fuck around and find out. Downstreams can pay to get the non-FAFO version.
The not joke part is simply that OSS maintainers aren't a supply chain. OSS maintainers are not responsible for monitoring CVEs (because, they are not a supply chain). OSS maintainers are not at fault when bad shit happens to downstreams, because basically every OSS license (MIT, Apache, GPL, etc.) literally says: the software is provided "as-is, without warranty." You get what you pay for (that is to say: absolutely nothing!)
Now, the joke part is that I do believe there is an ethical obligation to try to prevent harm downstream. But "try" is the key word. So, this isn't a serious proposal.
But, if you're using OSS code and you're not paying for a license with a contract that promises some kind of warranty, you have no supply chain. You (the downstream user of an OSS lib) ARE the supply chain.
To use a metaphor: physical goods have a real supply chain. Car manufacturers, chips, clothes, toys, etc. You have a signed commercial agreement with all your suppliers that promises quantity AND quality and blowback if either are missed. Thats a supply chain.
If someone puts some chips on the side of the road with a "FREE" sign, then you integrate those into a product, then find out those chips are hacking customers, its your fault, not the person who dropped them on the side of the road.