One dollar, invested for a working lifetime at 7 percent, becomes about thirty dollars. The same dollar, in a fund charging 2 percent a year, becomes about ten.
Two thirds of your money goes to somebody you have never met, for a service that on average subtracts value. Jack Bogle spent his life saying this out loud, and he says it here in one sentence.
If every share is held by someone, then all investors together hold the entire market. Their combined return, before costs, is the market's return. Not approximately. Exactly. It is an accounting identity, not a theory.
Now subtract what they pay to hold it. Fees, trading costs, taxes on churn. The group return after costs must be below the market. Half of them cannot beat it, because the group is it.
Bogle founded Vanguard in 1974 and structured it so its owners are the funds themselves. He made no fortune from the largest asset manager on earth. He died in 2019.
The recordings of him explaining this are free and have been for years. The industry that charges to do the opposite is still larger than the one he built.
The arithmetic is free and takes ten minutes. Believing it when a person in a good suit tells you otherwise is the entire edge.
$855 million in sales. $175 million of deployed capital. $100 million sitting in cash. He puts the numbers on the board and asks the room what the business is worth
this is Li Lu in Bruce Greenwald's value investing class in 2006, working an actual position in front of students rather than describing a philosophy
he arrived in America after Tiananmen with nothing and almost no English, wandered into a lecture because he thought there would be free food, and it turned out to be about investing
the method on display is arithmetic, not insight. What does the business earn, what did it cost to build, what would it cost someone else to build it again
Charlie Munger later handed him money to manage, which is a thing Munger did approximately never
the audio is rough and the camera never moves, because Columbia filmed it for the class and not for you
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America lost 1.8 million jobs in the recession and had already added back 5.8 million by the time he stood up to speak – and he says the number nobody quotes is the second one
this is the same 1994 lunch, the part where he stops taking questions about the market and starts arguing with the mood of the room
he is describing a country that had convinced itself things were bad while the data said otherwise, three years into a recovery
on his own record: he is careful to say that he was wrong constantly, and that being wrong six times out of ten was survivable because of what the other four did
the framing that has outlived him – you are not paid for being right, you are paid for the size of the thing you were right about
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In 1977 the fund had less than $20 million in it. By 1990 it was the largest mutual fund on earth. Then he quit at 46 and never managed outside money again
this is Peter Lynch four years after walking away, explaining the method to a room of journalists who mostly wanted market predictions instead
the rule he keeps returning to: you do not need many big winners – starting from $10,000 or $5,000, a handful of stocks that multiply several times over does the entire job
he is blunt that this is why the arithmetic favours the individual. A fund cannot take a meaningful position in something small. You can.
on the panic of 1990: he says it frightened him more than 1987 did, and then explains what he actually did about it, which was nothing
no slides – no notes – a podium, a glass of water, and the C-SPAN clock running in the corner of the frame
this tape exists only because the National Press Club records its lunches and C-SPAN carried it
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When he started, the American fund industry managed $2.5 billion. Today it manages $12.5 trillion. He built the largest piece of it and made almost nothing from it, on purpose, and explained exactly how on camera. for free.
his name is Jack Bogle. he founded Vanguard in 1974 and launched the first index fund available to ordinary people. he set it up so the fund company is owned by the funds themselves, which means nobody gets rich from it, including him.
he died in 2019. he was never a billionaire. every one of his competitors is.
the first thing he says is the arithmetic no salesperson will repeat: the return of all investors together is the market return minus costs. not on average, by definition. every dollar of fee comes out of somebody's retirement.
"the capital value of that little investment is probably $350,000 now" – he is describing what a modest sum becomes when nobody is skimming it.
the part nobody talks about: he is not arguing that active managers are stupid. he is arguing that they are collectively the market, so as a group they must underperform it by exactly what they charge. there is no version of the argument where they win.
Vanguard now holds trillions. Bogle gave away the one idea that made it possible and took none of it.
Between 1998 and early 2000 his firm shrank from $30 billion to $20 billion and lost about half its market share. He was right about what was coming. That was exactly the problem.
his name is Jeremy Grantham. he co-founded GMO. he called the Japanese bubble, the dot-com bubble and the housing bubble, and clients fired him for each one before it burst.
his method is not a signal. it is a single measurement: how far the price sits above the long-run fair value of the asset, and how many times in recorded history it has been that far.
"they had a 50% premium on fair value for the only time in history"
that sentence is the whole discipline. not a prediction, a census.
the part nobody repeats: he is explicit that being right early looks identical to being wrong, and that this is why the people who see bubbles clearly get fired before they get paid.
he also points out that the bottom half of earners have never held a smaller share of income than they do now, and connects it directly to what asset prices have done.
your fund manager charges a percentage of everything you own to be positioned for the opposite of what this man is describing. he explained it in an hour, free, on camera.
$10,000, left alone at 10 percent a year, becomes $600,000 in year 43. Not 43 times bigger. Sixty times. A hedge fund manager draws that on a whiteboard in the first fifteen minutes and gives the whole thing away for free.
his name is Bill Ackman. he founded Pershing Square. he is known for concentrated bets so large they move the companies he takes them in.
he starts with a company worth nothing. five hundred dollars in the bank, a thousand more because he had the idea, and from there he builds the balance sheet, the income statement, the cash flow statement and the valuation in front of you, one number at a time.
"how do we raise $4,000 if that's the appropriate value for our business?"
the part nobody talks about: he never once mentions a stock. the whole hour is about what a business actually is before anyone puts a price on it, which is the step almost every retail investor skips entirely.
there is no fund pitch. no book to buy. one man, a whiteboard, and the arithmetic underneath every company you will ever own a piece of.
45 minutes. it has been free for over a decade. almost nobody who talks about investing all day has watched it.
The professor who teaches valuation at NYU says most people do not believe in valuation, and he includes most people who do it for a living. They do it to cover themselves. It is their job.
Then he says why he does it: to fight the lemming in him.
The lemmings became famous about fifty years ago when a film crew captured thousands of them running off a cliff into the ocean. The question ever since has been why.
His answer is that a valuation is the only thing standing between you and the herd. Not because the number is right. Because doing the work forces you to say out loud what you actually believe about a business, in figures, before the price tells you what to think.
He puts the entire class online every semester. The sessions, the slides, the exams, the solutions. He also publishes his own valuations of real companies while he is making them, including the ones that turn out wrong.
The class is free. Writing down your number before you look at the price is the entire edge.
Toss a coin once a minute. Heads, your money goes up 50 percent. Tails, it goes down 40 percent. You start with $100.
Average one toss across a million players and the game is clearly favourable: 40 is less than 50, so on average everyone gains.
Now stop averaging across players and follow one player through time. Play for a day and the result is noisy. Play for a week and it settles. Play for a year and the noise disappears completely, and the number it settles on is a loss.
Both calculations are correct. They answer different questions, and economics spent three centuries treating them as the same one.
Ole Peters calls the first the ensemble perspective and the second the time perspective. His objection to the first is not mathematical, it is practical: you cannot access parallel universes. You get one sequence. Yours.
Everything painful about money lives in that gap. The fund that advertised 8 percent and delivered 3. The trader with a real edge who blew up anyway. The position that was right and sized wrong.
Gresham College has given free public lectures since 1597. This one has been sitting there the entire time.
The coin costs nothing to simulate. Believing the second number instead of the first one is the entire edge.
Yale had less than a billion dollars in its endowment in 1985. One man turned it into 22.9 billion by 2008. Then the crisis hit, it fell, and by June 2010 it was still 16.7 billion.
His name is David Swensen. He also taught a course at Yale, which is the part that matters here.
The professor telling this story is Robert Shiller, who won the Nobel Prize for showing that asset prices move far more than the news that supposedly explains them. He called the dot-com bubble in print before it burst. He called housing before that one did.
Yale filmed his entire semester and put it online without a paywall. Not highlights. The class, in order, with the syllabus and the transcripts.
A Yale undergraduate paid tuition to sit in that room. You get the same lectures, from the same man, about the same endowment, for nothing.
The semester is free. Watching it in order, the way the students had to, is the entire edge.
Coca-Cola went public in 1919 at $40 a share. One year later it was $19 – down half – and the family that had owned the whole business bought it in the 1880s for $2,000
this is Warren Buffett at 68, in a room of Florida MBA students, walking through the single stock he is most identified with and explaining why the worst year was irrelevant
the point he is making is not that Coke was cheap – it is that the price collapsed 50% while the business itself was fine
he goes on to what he actually watches instead of the price – volumes, pricing power, and where the growth is coming from ten years out
no slides – no notes – no prepared remarks, and no lawyer in the room
this lecture exists because a 1970 graduate endowed a fund so the university could invite one speaker a year
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