🚨 New unpatched Windows flaw lets attackers steal your NTLMv2 hash.
The issue lives in the built-in search: URI handler. A simple malicious link can force your system to leak your hash to an attacker-controlled server.
Captured hashes could be used in relay attacks for deeper network access.
Details here: https://t.co/umigYNnYxO
🚨 Google Quantum result was just rediscovered and IMPROVED!
On March 31, 2026, Google Quantum AI published a paper showing that 256-bit ECDLP, the hard problem behind ECDSA and therefore behind Bitcoin, Ethereum, TLS, and most of the world's authentication, can be solved with fewer than 1,200 logical qubits and ~90M Toffoli gates. Under 20 minutes on ~500,000 physical qubits.
BUT, they didn't publish the circuits. They published a zero-knowledge proof that the circuits hit those numbers. The standard read at the time: clever responsible disclosure, elegant.
Two months later, that read needs an update. Two things happened, in opposite directions.
1. The ZKP wasn't a stylistic choice. Google was stopped from publishing.
What was speculation in April is no longer. Google did not choose to keep the circuits private. The U.S. government prevented publication. The blog post phrased it politely ("we engaged with the U.S. government"). Call it what it is: diplomatic cover for a publication block.
This is the line Scott Aaronson warned about. At some point, the people estimating the resources needed to break deployed cryptosystems would stop publishing. We just watched it happen, and the actor enforcing the silence isn't Google's PR team. It's a government.
2. The ZKP turned out to be a reward function. AI used it.
Here's the part that's almost funny.
A ZK proof that "this hidden circuit achieves these resource counts" is, when you flip it, a public verifier of any candidate circuit. Submit a circuit, get back: does it compute ECC point addition correctly, and at what cost. Pass/fail plus a number. That is exactly the shape of a reinforcement-learning reward function.
The ZKP was designed to hide the attack. What it actually published is the reward function for rediscovering it.
The research community wired the verifier into an automated AI-driven search loop. They reproduced Google's numbers. Then they improved them by 11.5%. Two months, from outside Google, no access to the circuits, using the very artifact Google released to keep them proprietary.
Both of these are true at once. Hiding the circuits worked: nobody outside Google has Google's exact circuits. And hiding the circuits did not slow the frontier; it changed who is doing the search, and arguably accelerated it, because the verifier industrialized the search loop.
Let's NOT PANIC!
Neither of these is a working CRQC. There is still no quantum computer that can run this circuit. The headline state of the world has not changed.
What has changed is the honesty of every public PQC timeline. Cryptography exists to create mathematical trust in the security of systems. Trust isn't broken when an attack runs. It is eroded when the foundation looks thinner than the public record suggests, and the public record is now demonstrably thinner than reality in two ways: by classification on one end, by AI-driven re-derivation on the other.
In security, the moment you start doubting the foundation is the moment you start rebuilding it. Not the moment you panic. The moment you plan.
This isn't a moment to rush. It's a moment to commit to a migration plan and execute against it, knowing the threat model is shaped by what governments are willing to classify, not by what researchers are allowed to publish.
Stay safe. Stay honest about your trust assumptions.
So-called age verification for social media is spreading across the world, framed as an effort to create a safer internet for children. In reality, age verification lays the foundation for a fully controlled internet.
The age verification rush must be slowed down, and politicians need to recognize the consequences of different types of legislation and systems.
Age verification is the wrong approach to fix “the social media problem”
The big tech social media companies are bad. Their business model is bad; it is based on mass surveillance and manipulation, and they cooperate with governments in mapping entire populations. But age verification is fundamentally the wrong approach to preventing children from using big tech social media platforms. Introducing age verification is based on coercion; the state forces social media companies to verify their users’ identities. But the big tech social media platforms already know which of their users are children. Their business model depends on knowing this. They know how old users are, and they know exactly what type of person they are. As age verification is based on coercion, politicians could instead force platforms to stop doing the things politicians consider harmful to children, or force them to block children (again, they know who they are) from using their services. But instead, politicians seek to massively invade everyone’s privacy and undermine democratic rights on a global scale. In other words, the latter is the real objective – they do not want to protect children; they want to impose control.
Slippery slope of age verification
It is undeniable that age verification threatens freedom of expression, risks increasing mass surveillance, and is likely to lead to censorship. It will not only shrink the online world and reduce young people’s right to privacy (for example, if VPN services were to be restricted); but also risks becoming a significant step toward a controlled internet for everyone.
Most age verification is identity verification
Most countries are now considering introducing age verification systems, meaning that everyone would have to identify themselves either to the service/website they want to use or to a third party capable of linking them to their activity on that service or website. This is not age verification but identity verification, and the consequence is therefore that freedom of information is restricted (you can no longer visit regulated websites anonymously) and that you can no longer post anonymously on social media. This is a major problem in countries like the UK and Germany where the police conduct raids on people’s homes for posting content on social media that the authorities dislike. Or in the United States, where authorities are trying to pressure tech companies into revealing the identities behind accounts protesting ICE. Social media identity verification removes important tools for activists in countries where criticizing those in power is dangerous.
Restrictions on app store or operating system level
Some countries are looking to impose identity verification at the app store level or even within the operating system itself. This is an exciting experiment, since this is possible to circumvent using open-source operating systems. Some countries are already looking to include open-source systems. Since open-source systems cannot be controlled, politicians would ultimately need to ban devices that are not controlled by the state. The end point: telescreens like those in Orwell’s 1984, devices that both monitor you and broadcast only the information approved by the state.
The Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) alternative and the EU
The EU has presented its own age verification app as “completely anonymous”. The idea is to use Zero-Knowledge Proof (ZKP) cryptography to break the link between the age credential issuer (EU governments) and the regulated services/sites. Currently, the EU app does not have ZKP functionality, contrasting Ursula von der Leyen’s claim that the app ”is technically ready to be used”. But more importantly, the app is currently designed to always function without ZKP technology; if ZKP is unavailable, the app falls back to a non-ZKP model. Even if fully developed ZKP technology could be implemented in the future, it would remain an optional extra feature that countries may choose to disable and that the EU could remove at any time.
Read more on our site.
https://t.co/wTVKHMS1zg
Send the video to everyone you know showing how heinously Nowak was treated by the police in his dying moments and how the police cravenly kowtowed to his murderer.
Legacy mainstream media, same ones who wrote about George Floyd millions of times, are dead silent about Nowak.
🚨Warning: #Discord age verification is going live any day now.
While huge public backlash put Discord's plans on hold, they were never abandoned.
👉 Learn here what's next & how to protect your #identity: https://t.co/ttt70kgJE4
#IDcheck#anonymity#privacy#AgeVerification
Introducing Claude Opus 4.8: it builds on Opus 4.7 with sharper judgment, more honesty about its own progress, and the ability to work independently for longer than its predecessors.
Available today at the same price.
@Wario64 Hmm, there must be a market for it, but for me personally this is way too expensive for a handheld. Maybe because I wouldn't use that thing that often.
Desktop is still peak for me.
I think AI coding hype follows roughly four stages:
1. Amazement
You try it and can’t believe how much code it generates from a few prompts.
2. Expansion
You start more and more projects because shipping suddenly feels cheap and fast.
This is also the phase where people start convincing everyone around them:
- coworkers
- management
- friends in other companies
because nobody wants to “fall behind” in 6–12 months.
That creates a massive snowball/FOMO effect.
3. The grind phase
You realize the generated code has architectural issues, sloppy mistakes, weird abstractions, duplicated logic, broken edge cases, etc.
So you start:
- re-prompting
- switching models
- increasing reasoning effort
- reviewing fixes
- generating fixes for previous fixes
And suddenly you spend your days reviewing AI-generated pull requests instead of building software.
4. Realization
You realize AI coding increases output much faster than it increases certainty.
The code still needs:
- review
- testing
- ownership
- architectural understanding
- long-term maintenance
Usually by expensive senior engineers.
And the interesting thing is:
this whole cycle can take many months or even more than a year because people become socially and professionally invested in the narrative themselves.
Once teams, managers, and entire companies have been convinced that this is the future, it becomes psychologically and politically very hard to later say:
“Actually, the ROI is much lower than we expected.”
We’ve shipped a security-guidance plugin for Claude Code that helps identify and fix vulnerabilities as you’re writing code.
Available for all Claude Code users. Install from the plugin marketplace (/plugins).