Million dollar opportunity is to work directly with small to medium sized businesses pen-testing, then selling them contracts to keep them safe
Shocking number of vulnerabilities are open to even “novice” ethical hackers, and is a very positive sum type of opportunity
Economics around this are drastically different than they were just ~6 months ago and an entirely new business model is opened up
What to do after a hack
Attackers finish in minutes (like you)
> Drift lost 285m in 12 minutes
> Balancer 128m in under 30
Everything below runs in parallel, not in order
1. Pause everything
Kelp paused within the hour and the attacker's second packet for 40,000 rsETH (95m) reverted.
2. Open a war room
Audio channel, 6 roles: ops, scribe, strategy, protocol (pauses and upgrades), web (kill deposits on the frontend), comms
3. Ping SEAL 911 (TG - seal_911_bot)
Free, 24/7, they bring the issuer, exchange and chain contacts you don't have. Balancer got 19.3m back within hours through whitehat coordination
4. Collect and share, in UTC
Attack TX hashes, affected contracts, attacker addresses and where they got funded, where the funds are now. Get etherscan to label the addresses, alert every protocol that holds your token
5. Go after the money while it's still freezable
Tether freezes in hours on a law enforcement request, Circle wants a court order, so file the report in hour one.
Chain councils act too, Arbitrum froze 71m of Kelp's, Sui validators froze 162m of Cetus 223m before it bridged out
6. Message the attacker on chain
Standard offer is 10% and no legal action. GMX lost 42m, offered 10%, had 40.5m back in 2 days. Liquid
Network got 3,400 of 4,000 BTC back last month after on-chain negotiation.
7. One spokesperson, confirmed facts only
"Contracts are paused, we're investigating, no new information". Tell the truth and state the facts
That very thing you want. The one you work and pray tirelessly for. You'll get it, along with the satisfaction. But you'll crave more. For something else, for something different. You are human, after all.
And this is where being grateful comes in.
when my agents has gone crazy
@rez0__
blog:https://t.co/mdOxL8HSEp is always the perfect motivation to bring my mindset and to remind me of any mistake im doing. love you bro😀
Your competition is literally 0.00001. Everyone is distracted. No one can keep their attention on one thing and build. No one reads anymore. No one studies history and repeated patterns. Easiest time in history to make money. Less consumption, more creation.
For me hacking went from falling in love with a target, obsessing over the attack surface, loads of random ideas in text files, sleepless nights and aha shower moments.
To organizing workflows in kanban boards.
I stumbled across a simple IDOR yesterday after ordering something online. Here's how I found it:
After placing my order, I noticed the receipt URL contained two parameters:
`/order/receipt?orderId=12345&codeId={uuid}`
Opening this URL returned the full order details, including the shipping address and payment method.
Removing the `codeId` parameter returned an "invalid code" error.
Since the `codeId` was a UUID, it wasn't something I could simply increment.
But I wondered what would happen if I kept my valid UUID and changed the order ID.
My order:
`/order/receipt?orderId=12345&codeId={my-uuid}`
Another order:
`/order/receipt?orderId=12346&codeId={my-uuid}`
No luck. The request was rejected. Then I had another thought.
What if the backend wasn't validating the UUID properly? What if it accepted the order ID itself as the `codeId`?
So I tried:
`/order/receipt?orderId=12345&codeId=12345`
It worked. My full order details were returned, even though I hadn't supplied the UUID.
Now for the interesting part. I incremented both parameters:
`/order/receipt?orderId=12346&codeId=12346`
And there it was. Another customer's order details, shipping address, and payment method information. Because order IDs were sequential, this exposed thousands of customer records.
#BugBounty Tip:
Don't assume an endpoint is secure just because it uses UUIDs. When multiple parameters are involved, test how they're validated together, not just individually. A UUID is not an authorization check.