民

年纪大了，上推就为找点乐子。除非胡搅蛮缠，一般不会主动B人。理想主义者（民小等）和精致的利己主义者（岁静、田园女权等）勿扰。

[民 @48963563448a]

五年后如果中国出现大批投资失败背负贷款或者因失业而还不起房贷的人，请不要同情他们，也不要借一分钱给他们。因为共产党的发展而致富，也因为共产党的衰落而返贫，这是温和派中国人所应得的下场。

[民 @48963563448a]

因此随着政府财政失衡加剧，温和派中国人是第一批当韭菜的人。

[民 @48963563448a]

@ZickZeonOO79 阿姨对老习的判断失误，这可是阿姨自己承认过看走眼了的。

[民 @48963563448a]

@lilaoshizuikeai 你有没有发现，把你这段话的性别换一下，基本都成立。人性都是一样的，无非是立场不同罢了。人往往很容易看清别人，却看不清自己。做新闻最忌讳带立场，您老再这样下去，迟早有一天会被你的立场反噬的。

[民 @48963563448a]

@wangwatchworld 这和日本经济衰退时期的财团直接互相借贷有点类��，相当于把个人风险平摊到了每个家族成员头上。如果后面经济好转，风险自然解除。如果经济继续恶化，家族资金周转无以为继，产生的连锁反应造成的灾难远超经融危机的级别。

[民 @48963563448a]

@Qwerzqcig @Smilnk1132 @bigjusir 并非全世界，只有欧美和东亚。东亚近代以来效仿的欧美。

[民 @48963563448a]

一边让人给解释，一边关评论区，看来得给您老用意念传达观点了。

[五岳散人 @wuyuesanren]

有个事儿不太理解

我说重庆时代俊峰那事儿从根本上说不是男女对立，是目前经济与就业环境不好，男性因为固有社会角色要承担的责任无法实现、对未来的焦虑感增加导致的攻击性

然后一帮人说我这个老登的版本老了、没更新

更你马勒戈壁

我给出了解释，你们那个版本除了一句“男女对立”外有任何解释么？“男女对立”是现象，什么是原因？

男女对立本身就是原因？如果按照生物属性，男女应该操逼忙呢，为什么会对立？

您给我个新版本的解释吧，比我这个解释力强就行

[民 @48963563448a]

@wangjupaian 如果性别反过来。娱乐公司雇佣未成年女孩出演，一群人喊未成年女孩为老婆。你觉得舆论会怎么说？雇佣未成年女孩的公司会被怎么判？现场的警察会向着谁？

[民 @48963563448a]

@wangwatchworld 应该和15年的千人计划有关。当年大批二代去美国留学，只有少数有天赋的学到技术归国，大部分没天赋的二代进海外的人文社科类专业混个毕业证，回国靠关系进入司法体系。他们留学那些年又恰逢欧美左翼运动的巅峰时期，结果就是现在的中国司法机构官员相当的左。

[民 @48963563448a]

@BossBab75166800 @yeyeye13794055 @whyyoutouzhele 哪天孩子伸手去摸火零线是不是还要夸他法力无边了🤣

[Michael Pettis @michaelxpettis]

There are two reasons saving is so high, Gita. One, as you noted, is precautionary saving. With the economy slowing and employment uncertainty rising, that is hardly surprising. The standard IMF and World Bank recommendation is to strengthen the social safety net., but even if Beijing were to introduce Scandinavian-style welfare provisions tomorrow, the credibility of the system is so low that it would take many years, perhaps even decades, before household saving behavior changed materially. We saw this last year with the pension reforms. Very few workers chose to contribute to the new system because, they argued, they were unlikely ever to receive the promised benefits.

The more important reason for China's exceptionally high saving, however, is simply the extraordinarily low household share of GDP. Households must receive, directly or indirectly, a much larger share of what they produce. There are essentially two ways to accomplish this, but each comes with its own costs.

The sustainable solution is to redistribute income from businesses and governments to households. This can be done in many ways: raising wages, appreciating the currency, increasing deposit rates, eliminating the hukou system, strengthening labor protections, and so on. But none of these change can possible happen quickly enough to matter to China's trade partners, and, as you point out, none of these policies is painless. They would almost certainly slow growth by reducing the profitability of manufacturers that are already struggling to earn returns.

The alternative, and the one you seem to prefer, is to increase fiscal transfers to households without reducing the fiscal support that currently subsidizes investment in manufacturing and infrastructure.

That might have been a reasonable proposal fifteen years ago, or perhaps even ten, but China already has one of the highest debt burdens in the world relative to GDP (second only to Japan's) and by far the fastest-growing. To argue that China should postpone a difficult but necessary adjustment by allowing debt to grow even faster strikes me as a poor recommendation in light of the historical evidence.

The fundamental point is that China's low consumption share is not a temporary weakness but a structural feature of its growth model, and one that has been central to the explosive expansion of its share of global manufacturing. It took Japan eighteen years, from 1991 to 2008, to raise its consumption share of GDP by just ten percentage points, even though Japan began with smaller domestic imbalances and far lower debt levels than China has today. Even if China achieved the same adjustment, its consumption share of GDP would still remain exceptionally low.

During those eighteen years, however, Japan's GDP growth averaged well below 1%. What is less widely remembered is that Japan's share of global manufacturing fell by more than half over the same period. That was no coincidence. Then, as now in China, manufacturing competitiveness depended in large part on the systematic transfer of resources, directly and indirectly, from households to producers and investment.

It seems to me that you want to propose a way for China to enjoy the benefits of a profound structural transformation in its economy without bearing any of the associated costs, by relying on an even faster increase in an already alarming debt burden. This, among other cases, is essentially what Brazil and the Soviet Union attempted in the 1970s, and Japan in the 1980s. In every case, postponing the adjustment only ensured that it became much more difficult later.

My final point is a practical one. There are many precedents for the European Union demanding that large external imbalances be addressed through exchange-rate adjustment. There are almost none for demanding that a trading partner eliminate the hukou system, transform its social welfare system, raise wages, strengthen labor unions, liberalize interest rates, or undertake any number of other politically difficult domestic reforms quickly enough to matter for Europe's economy.

I do not think anyone, including Brad Setser, is arguing that currency appreciation is the only way to resolve China's domestic imbalances, or even necessarily the best way. It may, however, be one of the very few adjustment mechanisms that China's trading partners can realistically expect Beijing to implement within a timeframe that matters to them.

[民 @48963563448a]

@Nanquan8964 @whyyoutouzhele 鸟血惹人怜，鱼伤无人问。媒体往往只关注能发��声音的事物，对于默默承受痛苦的人却选择视而不见。既然媒体都是这副德性，那就怪不得保守主义抬头了。

[民 @48963563448a]

@kujyou_Miyako99 @darabunba @rwayne 那得看你怎么定义穷。老毛的时代可是既无内债也无外债。你地方政府的债务，中央政府不帮忙擦屁股，等到地方官员发不出工资，到时候造反的可就不是底层屁民了

[民 @48963563448a]

@above_zz 因为在境外女权主义也是政治正确，境外的这些民运不敢得罪她们，这会砸了自己的饭碗。他们就像墙内的官媒一样，只是一个效忠朝廷，一个效忠海外的某些组织罢了。

[民 @48963563448a]

@RonaldSimmonsUS @quarktalksss 一般来说，人们总会在情绪比较激动的时候干一些愚蠢的事。适当和喜欢情绪化的人保持一定距离是比较明智的。

[民 @48963563448a]

@wangchutian310 @H2N_R_5_P @whyyoutouzhele 你可拉倒吧。抚养到18岁父母的法定义务就没了，怎么选是你的自由，家长给不给学费就是家长的自由了。

[民 @48963563448a]

@SirSirindanger @browntime778249 @whyyoutouzhele 我没兴趣陪你在这玩文字游戏，说话是来论述观点的，非得抬杠的话我只能说，看不惯就滚，很简单。

[民 @48963563448a]

@browntime778249 @whyyoutouzhele 是的，当年确实有很多地主的女儿被迫嫁给贫农，贫农借此直接翻身。当年的女知青也是，只是年代稍有差异，但都是同一个阶级的人，叫法变了而已。你还是先把舌头捋直了再问问题吧。什么年代都能变小资，无非是小资的地位在不同年代有变化而已。最后一个问题，再发直接B了，不陪小屁��唠嗑了。

[民 @48963563448a]

@browntime778249 @whyyoutouzhele 当年去内地的城市女知青，不少是知识分子家庭出身，甚至还有干部家庭，你觉得她们能干嘛😄。那些娶了女知青还有地主家女儿的贫下中农最后直接都变了小资。你要是不了解这段历史，可以去问问家里的长辈，我这不给补课。

[民 @48963563448a]

@thejokerteng @whyyoutouzhele 那要看你怎么定义吃不起饭了。当时的城市下乡女知青，家庭条件是远胜于贫下中农的，但不妨碍她们被贫下中农拿捏的死死的。我只是想反驳这位所谓的峰哥讲话毫无逻辑而已，不必死扣字眼。

[民 @48963563448a]

@djsj254507 @Zhiminist @SagerRgyalpo 中国AI泡沫并不是指股市泡沫，中国股市确实没有泡沫，楼市企业在股市的泡沫同样也几乎没有。因为中国的泡沫根本不在股市，而是直接在企业端。中国吹泡沫的人也很美国不一样，美国是散户和机构在吹，而中国是政府在吹。你应该看政府对AI行业的投资，以及这些被投资企业的利润将来是否会有预期增长。

[民 @48963563448a]

@djsj254507 @Zhiminist @SagerRgyalpo 您老的版本该跟新一下了，光伏22年就开始入土了，皇上15年布局的新三样25年基本全部开始入土。25年开始布局数据中心，芯片还有AI相关行业，现在才刚开��发力，自然看不出泡泡。如果不出意外，AI也会走房地产的老路。等过几年AI这个泡泡破了，老共怕是没气运再吹新泡泡了。