Leni 💻

Security Researcher at @DonjonLedger. Microarchitecture, iOS security, side-channel analysis, fault injection. All views are my own.

[Leni 💻 @6c656e69]

At the Donjon, we continue to evaluate the hardware security of Post-Quantum Cryptography (PQC) algorithms. Today, we present our attack on a masked implementation of Kyber (ML-KEM).

Have a good read!

[Ledger Donjon @DonjonLedger]

Our applied PQC series continues.

This time, @k15ab_ and @6c656e69 attack masked Kyber768.

Masking defeats first-order SCA. But with a centered cross-product and the right covariance model, a second-order CPA recovers the secret coefficient.

https://t.co/ViCQ5KrKIf

[Ledger Donjon @DonjonLedger]

We continue our series on applied PQC.

This time, a study of side-channel attacks on ML-KEM by @k15ab_ and Alain M.

Math is the foundation, but in the real world, attackers have other tricks.

https://t.co/LMIn7YeELM

[Leni 💻 @6c656e69]

It's been great working on PQC security lately, such an important topic across industries. Stay tuned!

[Charles Guillemet @P3b7_]

⚡"Breaking Post Quantum Cryptography with AI"
A non-profiled deep-learning side-channel attack on an unprotected reference implementation. The convolutionnal neural network just plays the role CPA's correlation used to play.

The @DonjonLedger 's PQC journey continues. They pointed their open-source deep-learning SCA tooling at the NIST-standardized ML-KEM reference.
No clone device. No profiling phase. No fixed leakage model.
Only EM traces, chosen ciphertexts, and a small MLP trained per key hypothesis. The correct key is the one under which the network actually learns. ~400 traces. Unprotected target, no masking, no shuffling.

- ML-KEM is mathematically sound and standardized.
- A reference implementation running on a real chip, without countermeasures, leaks the secret in minutes.

PQC security does not stop at standardization. It starts when implementations meet real-world attackers, with probes, not just headlines.

Read the article: https://t.co/YTdkS7S6oZ