lyon-77

Enjoyer of history, languages, food, music, international sports, movies, etc.

[lyon-77 @77_lyon]

There are no ethnic Chinese, I would substitute that with Han if that's your intention. Even till today, in census you'd see that the majority ethnic group in China is Han—not Chinese, whereas in Russia the majority ethnicity would obviously be Russian, and Korean in South and North Korea.

[lyon-77 @77_lyon]

Well, I definitely think that the nature of a centralized government binds the ruler more closely to the state, which ironically increases accountability.

In China’s case, this accountability is more stable and long-term as the ruler typically follows a monarchy-like dynastic succession rather than relying primarily on military might and charisma. At the same time, governing such a large centralized state required a large and mature bureaucratic system that could continue functioning even under an emperor who played a relatively limited role in governance. This further bound the emperor to the state and created expectations that he govern in the state’s interest. In extreme cases, officials might strongly condemn or even abandon an emperor who appeared to have betrayed the state itself.

Some scholars have argued that translating the Chinese Huangdi (皇帝) simply as “emperor” can be misleading because the institution itself evolved quite differently from what many people associate with the term. The title was created by the Qin after the first unification and was intended to stand above the rank of king, but many later dynasties would go on to have ten or more hereditary successions with only sporadic military activity and a heavy emphasis on civil governance.

So Chinese “emperors” were more monarchy-like and more closely tied to the state than most people think. Their legitimacy rested more on maintaining order and governing effectively than on personal military achievement. This was reinforced by a bureaucratic system that allowed the state to endure beyond any particular ruler.

It’s an interesting dynamic. The more the state became independent of any individual emperor, the more the office itself became accountable to the state it governed. In that sense, the institution combined hereditary succession with a centralized bureaucratic state in a way that does not fit neatly into the usual distinction between “emperor” and “monarch.”

[lyon-77 @77_lyon]

I always find it fascinating that the first instinct of many failed European monarchs was exile abroad, whereas Chinese rulers usually abdicated or died where they stood.

The last Song emperor died with his ministers rather than surrender. The last Ming emperor hanged himself in Beijing when the Ming fell. And the last Qing regent, after surviving multiple assassination attempts and the collapse of the dynasty, simply retired to his Beijing mansion. He then spent the rest of his life in Beijing and Tianjin through the warlord era, the Republican period, the Japanese invasion, and the founding of the PRC. When Japan established the puppet state of Manchukuo, he publicly denounced it rather than treating it as a refuge. Bro never seemed to think there was another state he could flee to or call home.

[Angelica 🌐⚛️🇹🇼🇨🇳🇺🇸 @AngelicaOung]

Not just forgot I straight up did not know this. I thought it was kinda strange that European royalty were such a transcultural layer and often had such weak ties to the people they ruled. I just figured it wasn’t a problem.

But it was a problem. Created a crisis of legitimacy.

“Everyone forgets that the French Revolution villainized the monarchy for being alien to the French nation. King Louis XVI was 80% ethnically German/Austrian and his wife was 100% Austrian. In his trial, charges 9, 19, 20, 28, 31, and 33 were all concerning his foreignness to France which led to his treasonous collaboration with the Germans/Austrians fighting France at the time.”

[lyon-77 @77_lyon]

@IgnatianThomist Haha I am aware

[lyon-77 @77_lyon]

@IgnatianThomist I wouldn't use the word "cosmopolites," but otherwise see the quote for the discussion thread before my input. I don't disagree with you as I find Chinese rulers more connected to the land and their legitimacy dependent on this connection.

[lyon-77 @77_lyon]

我没有在赞扬他😂 明朝名节方面的社会风气我整体上是反感的，钓名沽誉，逼人死节，都挺恶心。皇帝怎样我不管，我不觉得不相干的文人需要为了王朝覆灭自尽，先杀自家女眷更是毫无人性，把女眷当作个人私产随意处置。如果个人想死，可以，自己的选择；别人帮忙"自杀"，恕我完全不认同。
崇祯难道不是公认的糟糕皇帝？除了很努力以外，执政一塌糊涂，总觉得别人对不起他，还看不清自己错在哪儿。我说他本来不用死，但自个儿走了死路，不是在赞扬他。
另外北宋本来就不是必然要变成南宋的，如果没有些令人窒息的决策，把中流的牌打出了最差的可能，也不至于送成这样。但北宋的民生底子比明朝好太多了，政治也没糟糕到明末那种情形。一个本来就还没腐坏到要倒塌的王朝，退到南方再撑个 150 年是合理的。我不觉得明末有这个条件，而且政治上它的君臣关系长期恶劣到难以言喻，皇帝下限又极低，在整个中国史上都得垫底。它那个环境就是该洗牌了，能以最少伤害民生的方式最好，但苟延残喘我看够呛。

[lyon-77 @77_lyon]

不是，他死前一小时身边是谁能说明什么问题，至少得看崇祯十七年那两个半月里他都干了啥吧。他就是能跑的时候大臣怎么劝都不跑，这咋说。当然我觉得明朝政治已经积弊很深了，再延长也没什么意义，不过是换一种方式亡，但就当时情况而言，崇祯是自己没在可以跑、朝廷也愿意跟着他跑的时候跑。
慈禧当然有实权，但慈禧也是垃圾时间，满清最后那些瞎七八糟的事，改革也没改出名堂，政治强人和既得利益者都在体制里分赃。反正我是觉得封建王朝腐朽到该死的时候就赶紧好死，硬上呼吸机拖着只折磨所有人。

[lyon-77 @77_lyon]

我的意思就是关键不是熟不熟，是不强接收不起。

另外崇祯是可以不死守北京的，但他非不走，而且他上吊前还要先砍家人。很多人都觉得明朝那会儿家底还厚，李自成和八旗也不太强，朝廷南迁是可以再杀回来的。但是有徽钦二帝又有土木堡之变的历史记忆，南迁就非常地政治不正确，崇祯又是死钻牛角尖的那种，最后就这样了。大家都是人，皇帝也没比普通人更怕死或更不怕死，崇祯这种偏激的，死和耻辱之间选死很正常。

以及载沣的例子，我觉得他留在北京横死概率更大，要么真的很自信要么就是无所谓了。他下台以后有两三年满汉关系非常紧张，他一个被革命党暗杀过的人还呆在首都不跑路就很神奇。而且像载沣这样对复辟没兴趣的，携款逃亡去一个没有战乱的西方国家都是可以的，但从军阀到抗日再到共产党解放北京，他都没离开过京津。1932 年后，对他而言是满洲更安全还是北京更安全也都不好说，但人家只在 1934 年去瞄了眼溥仪，就宁可装病绝食也要拎着小儿子跑回北京。都这样了，没道理说他有机会出逃肯定会逃吧。人总有更看重的东西，假如为那些东西丢了命，也能接受。

[lyon-77 @77_lyon]

到明朝还不熟吗？明朝那会儿都熟透了。欧洲君主逃亡他国都不用两国熟，而且理论上两国关系不好还更方便投靠，因为可以制造合法性危机，如果反攻成功还欠下自己人情。当然咱们都知道有一百个不会去朝鲜的理由，中国政治体系事实造成一整个区域内都没有能够接收逃亡的国家。
不是正当路径上位的君主总会遇到合法性质疑，不论是八贤王啊，二郎神啊，朱三太子啊，应编尽编，都不需要本人事实存在。但这些对于当权者的质疑，一是从未实际威胁到中央政权，二是和旧政府复辟的可能性不挂钩，也就是不满的群众搞个舆论，顶了天在部分地区上有些骚动，但旧君主和其嫡系是没法靠这个卷土重来的。

[lyon-77 @77_lyon]

也可以投降嘛，但投降会被认为是耻辱，以及把自身命运交到敌人手上。中国皇帝肯定也会投降，没人否认这一点，但出逃去别国的真的极少。虽然是大一统国家，但理论上可以出逃朝鲜吧，实际上没人会这么干。
我是从政治体制的角度看这件事，可能去贵族化的中央集权政府就会这样。欧洲君主出逃可行是因为统治者的合法性来源是血统，少部分情况靠个人武力。而中央集权政府的合法性来源是官僚和国家，所以统治者很难只身跑路再重新驾临母国。朝廷必须得跟他一起跑，只要没有官僚体系支持，统治者本人的合法性完全不够；如果逃亡他国，想借助外部力量再杀回母国，大概率被视为背叛，罪加一等。
我原博里比对的就是，相较于出逃，中国失败了的统治者基本是原地退位，投降，自杀，被杀，应有尽有。但是出国界的少，除了被掳活捉的那几个… 那几个谁提起来不觉得耻辱至极，不如尽早死在外面？说是中央集权，但是君权是置于国权之下的。

[lyon-77 @77_lyon]

两码事。首先是有自杀以全名节的文化，在认为自己没有错但是失败了的时候，和在可能面对凌辱的时候，自杀是和气节直接挂钩的。像卫子夫在支持刘据造反失败后自杀，也会被认为是烈女子不愧为卫家人。赵匡胤的儿子被赵光义怀疑要造反时，也是直接自杀。宋亡明亡时，除了皇帝也有很多文人自杀。清末八国联军入京，很多留在京城的官员全家自杀，包括后来的摄政王载沣当时的未婚妻。中国的这种气节文化跟日本也不太一样，有更多生死宁可掌握在自己手中的意味，跟那些自杀有罪的宗教文化更加不一样。
另一方面，上述根本不是我的重点，你看原博转发，讨论的是国家认同和民族主义。你说的和我说的没关系，我前面举例的载沣可以很容易跑去伪满，但他不认同也不会去。欧洲现在认为民族主义或者国族主义是一种现代发明，但我认为中国的国族认同发展路径跟欧洲完全不一样，也要早得多。

[lyon-77 @77_lyon]

Not really. Zaifeng seemed completely chill staying in the capital as an "abdicated" minority ruler. The nation was in crisis and ethnic tension was high. He had encountered multiple assassinations during his rule already. However, he made the correct judgment that he's Chinese rather than an outsider ruler, and the threat was driven by political failures of the Qing house rather than substantive ethnic animosity. Thus, by keeping a low political profile and continuing to participate in the local community, he lived peacefully for another four decades until natural death right in the middle of the Beijing city.

[lyon-77 @77_lyon]

This is unironically not about morality, beyond perhaps "moral pressure." I was musing on a political tradition, and if it's not clear already, you could check the OP thread—the discussion is not about whether rulers submit or even retreat, but whether they go on exile to a foreign state.

[lyon-77 @77_lyon]

@Weltschmerzheit Was just talking about your first two points!
https://t.co/4Qk5eo9pEy

[lyon-77 @77_lyon]

Very true! The Eastern Zhou period would be the most similar to medieval-19th century Europe, likely with even less loyalty towards one's state of birth. Not only did aristocrats routinely go on exile, intellectuals travelled around different states to market their philosophy of governance and hegemony to different dukes and kings. Men were expected to change their patrilineal last name (氏) to the location where they finally established themselves.

There was also the interesting 质子 (roughly translated to "hostage prince" though those were not actual princes) system where one sent their heir apparent to a dominant or adversary state as hostage to show loyalty or commitment to peace agreement; despite the inherent safety risk, if the heir successfully returned to his home state, it was considered a great diplomatic success and link, and would grant him greater legitimacy to succeed to the title.

I would say that the national identity (or more accurately, state identity) among intellectuals, one step below the aristocrats, was even weaker than in medieval Europe. Somewhat in parallel to the late Roman Empire, people still remembered their shared political entity (Zhou) and used the same language developed in the Shang Dynasty. However, unlike vernacular Latin, natural divergences in old Chinese were then re-standardized during the short-lived Qin Dynasty and re-inforced by the Han Dynasty.

History then took very different turn.

[lyon-77 @77_lyon]

Very true! The Eastern Zhou period would be the most similar to medieval-19th century Europe, likely with even less loyalty towards one's state of birth. Not only did aristocrats routinely go on exile, intellectuals travelled around different states to market their philosophy of governance and hegemony to different dukes and kings. Men were expected to change their patrilineal last name (氏) to the location where they finally established themselves.

There was also the interesting 质子 (roughly translated to "hostage prince" though those were not actual princes) system where one sent their heir apparent to a dominant or adversary state as hostage to show loyalty or commitment to peace agreement; despite the inherent safety risk, if the heir successfully returned to his home state, it was considered a great diplomatic success and link, and would grant him greater legitimacy to succeed to the title.

I would say that the national identity (or more accurately, state identity) among intellectuals, one step below the aristocrats, was even weaker than in medieval Europe. Somewhat in parallel to the late Roman Empire, people still remembered their shared political entity (Zhou) and used the same language developed in the Shang Dynasty. However, unlike vernacular Latin, natural divergences in old Chinese were then re-standardized during the short-lived Qin Dynasty and re-inforced by the Han Dynasty.

History then took very different turn.

[lyon-77 @77_lyon]

Ha, I almost included "post-hoc" in my previous reply when composing it, so we can agree on that. People hated on the last two Northern Song emperors and the first Southern Song one as well, don't they?
Post-hoc is not the problem here. In fact, post-hoc evaluations of those three emperors contribute to the Grand Chancellor's decision to commit "suicide" of the emperor, and same for the Defense of Beijing during the Jingtai era and the suicide of Chongzhen in Beijing. To surrender or to go on exile is seemed as shameful. Just to be clear, I'm not condoning or condemning any of these decisions. They could certainly be viewed through a pragmatic lens and yielded different evaluations case by case.
I reckon all those historical memories across thousands of years shape the trajectory of the political values and the expectations.

[lyon-77 @77_lyon]

@moghilemear13 Which is why no one thinks of them as serious emperors. Their legitimacy is abysmally low 😂
Orientations certainly do not dictate all human actions, but they heavily influence the results and the evaluations.

[lyon-77 @77_lyon]

@moghilemear13 I wasn't talking about anything inherent to Chinese rulers but rather a difference in political orientations.
https://t.co/jvgMrLgJvJ

[lyon-77 @77_lyon]

They never could because that's not how the Chinese political system worked. Imagine there were a consort of foreign origin in the palace. The emperor would still not exile to her country in the moment of crisis.
My take is not about the ruler's personal courage and virtue, but rather how the political context historically shaped the relationship between the Chinese rulers and the Chinese states, so that the expectation diverged from what's typically seen in European monarchs.
The OP discussed the modern emergence of nationalism and the transnational nature of European aristocrats. I would argue that nationalism emerged much earlier and developed through a different trajectory in China.
The point is exactly that these are two very different political contexts and orientations. It matters today because I still see Western-educated intellects struggle to understand the perceived and expected duty Chinese rulers have towards the state, as well as the Chinese national identity not explained by the modern concept of ethno-national state as developed by the Europeans.

[lyon-77 @77_lyon]

是，道德约束力有时不比法律约束力低，道德要求你死，有时候你真的得死。先不谈这是否正确，但今天的讨论中很多人低估了中国政治环境里的道德压力和法治以外的约束机制。
我跟人讨论过中国传统政治重民轻君，并且认为得民心非常重要，得民心者得天下。对方认为人民或知识分子抱有这种想法很天真，我不知道要如何让不同文化背景的人理解，中国真的有"违背民心，民众就会让你死"的历史文化传统…

[lyon-77 @77_lyon]

并非，他也确实不是皇帝，只是执政者(摄政王)。清朝覆灭时有旁支宗室提过要不要回东北，载沣不支持。他退位得很利落，之后就低调生活不再从政，既没离开京津也没转移资产。溥仪这种自己从未掌权却有一堆人捧的，才会脑子发抽想要复位掌权。他爹那样真正掌过权也见证过晚清景象的一直对复位冷淡，对溥仪去满洲国强烈且公开反对。
载沣经历过戊戌变法，八国联军，预备立宪，东北鼠疫等等清末大事。他第一任未婚妻就是在八国联军入京时全家自杀，他自己 18 岁时被朝廷甩锅派去德国给侵略者赔罪。后来从政期间，他一直支持改革(虽然折腾不来，让大清死更快了)，还在知道军校留学生中革命党众多的情况下，提拔任用那批留学生组建新军。革命党刺杀他，他没要人性命，也没选择血腥镇压，没有在国家存亡之际、政权更迭之中激化社会矛盾。他胞弟载涛在日本侵华时参加过国难会议，建国初和朝鲜战争时又给新中国做过马政顾问，最后葬于八宝山。
说清朝最后的统治者看待国家高于自家没毛病。

[lyon-77 @77_lyon]

They never could because that's not how the Chinese political system worked. Imagine there were a consort of foreign origin in the palace. The emperor would still not exile to her country in the moment of crisis.
My take is not about the ruler's personal courage and virtue, but rather how the political context historically shaped the relationship between the Chinese rulers and the Chinese states, so that the expectation diverged from what's typically seen in European monarchs.
The OP discussed the modern emergence of nationalism and the transnational nature of European aristocrats. I would argue that nationalism emerged much earlier and developed through a different trajectory in China.
The point is exactly that these are two very different political contexts and orientations. It matters today because I still see Western-educated intellects struggle to understand the perceived and expected duty Chinese rulers have towards the state, as well as the Chinese national identity not explained by the modern concept of ethno-national state as developed by the Europeans.