Πριν ακριβώς 20 χρόνια ο Σμηναγός Κωνσταντίνος Ηλιάκης έχασε τη ζωή του υπερασπιζόμενος την εθνική κυριαρχία και τα κυριαρχικά δικαιώματα της Ελλάδας.
Χρέος μας στη μνήμη του, όπως και στη μνήμη όλων των πιλότων μας που «έπεσαν» εν ώρα καθήκοντος, είναι να συνεχίσουμε την προσπάθεια αμυντικής θωράκισης της Πατρίδας μας.
Η Διακήρυξη των Αθηνών προσέκρουσε στους γνωστούς «υφάλους». Η Αγκυρα εκτιμά ότι είναι ο ισχυρότερος πόλος στην Ανατολική Μεσόγειο και κάθε κίνηση πρέπει να έχει τη συγκατάθεσή της. Αυτή η περίπλοκη εξίσωση επιβαρύνεται από τις ραγδαίες περιφερειακές εξελίξεις σε Γάζα και Ιράν.
In my latest for @TheNatlInterest, I argue 🇹🇷 PMC
"SADAT is fundamental to Turkish leaders’ desire for military power and Islamist influence in Africa and maintains a presence in nine states across the Horn of Africa, the Sahel, and the Maghreb" https://t.co/flvXcvqmwz
Με 850,000+ ακολούθους, το @clashreport παρουσιαζόταν ως ανεξάρτητος aggregator ειδήσεων από εμπόλεμες ζώνες. Ερευνα του @EFischberger δείχνει ότι πίσω της βρίσκεται τουρκική εταιρεία με δεσμούς στο περιβάλλον Ερντογάν και στην 🇹🇷 αμυντική βιομηχανία.
https://t.co/VvNrnU5fOD
Bravo Senator @CoryBooker & @SenMcCormickPA!
An important step for the region as this bill will strengthen US support for IMEC, recognize the region’s role as a strategic gateway in IMEC, and reinforce regional initiatives like the 3+1 with 🇬🇷-🇮🇱 -🇨🇾 and the East Med Gas Forum.
Reading this interview by @HenryJFoy and @BMoens it's easy to realize why @donaldtusk is one of the very few serious leaders today in Europe https://t.co/vkuzXW1kTR via @ft
Trump has extended the ceasefire. Iran has seized two ships in the Strait of Hormuz. So are we looking at more diplomacy – or more war?
1. Probably some of both. The fight has moved from the air and land to the sea. It’s no longer a matter of drones versus interceptors but rather blockade versus blockade. An economic war, focused on the Strait of Hormuz.
2. Blockading Iranian ports and denying oil revenue to the IRGC is, for the U.S., far better than the President’s oft-invoked threats to bomb power plants and bridges. It’s hard to parse who is in charge of what in Tehran, but IRGC hardliners clearly have significant sway right now. And it’s a decent bet that they care more about their own access to resources than the suffering of their people. It’s telling that Tehran’s chief demand right now is an end to the blockade.
3. The problem is that Iran has leverage too, and knows it. Its grip on the world’s economic jugular produces pain everywhere, especially in Asia. Tehran bets that it can endure the pain of a blockade longer than the world can. That may or may not be right.
4. As it turns out, Iranian control over the Strait is more useful for Tehran than its nuclear program. It generates immediate leverage, can be dialed up and down, and takes little military resources to effectuate. Where the nuclear program generated potential threats, controlling the strait produces actual ones, and with economic results in hours.
5. That lesson won’t go unnoticed elsewhere. Does Beijing conclude that it can best generate leverage in a Taiwan crisis by blockading its exports of semiconductors? At a minimum, the old notion of key geographic choke points – the Strait of Hormuz, the Bab-el-Mandeb, the Strait of Malacca – will get a new look by military planners everywhere.
6. Lesser noticed right now are the UK and French efforts to assemble a coalition that keeps the Strait open after an enduring ceasefire. This is a key element in the ultimate solution here. The U.S. – and the world – cannot simply leave an Iranian sword of Damocles hanging over the waterway. For all the President’s complaints about U.S. allies, they are mobilizing to play a vital role.
7. Beyond reopening the Strait, the U.S. will necessarily focus on Iranian enrichment and the uranium stockpile. The VP had it right in shifting the discussion from Iran’s purported right to enrich to whether Tehran is actually enriching. The latter matters most.
8. Getting a permanent deal with Iran that addresses all U.S. concerns is impossible. Critics of the JCPOA long said that a better deal was always possible, if the U.S. had only pressured more, or negotiated harder, or been smarter and tougher. Now’s the time to show it. Yet count on Iran to remain intransigent on key issues, even after its leadership has been killed, its defense industrial base destroyed, and its country ravaged.
9. The U.S. must weigh the war’s global consequences, beyond the economic. Running down missile and interceptor stocks, for instance, and focusing military resources on the Middle East, means less for Asia and Europe. Russia and China will have an enduring interest in keeping it that way, including by helping Iran recover.
10. Completely lost at this point is how it all started: the Iranian regime, just months ago, killing thousands of protestors who wished nothing more than a better, freer life for themselves and their families. Help, it turns out, wasn’t exactly on the way. And, at least in the near term, the Iranian people will be the biggest losers in this fight.
@CharlesMichel Turkiye is also a country threatening with war an EU member-state. You could also try to include this point in your list to present a more accurate picture.
New: The US military has significantly depleted its stockpile of key missiles during war with Iran & created “near-term risk” of running out of ammunition in a future conflict should one arise in next few years, per experts & 3 people familiar w/ recent internal Pentagon assessments.
https://t.co/J75l4aqtXk
A bombshell if it happens... Some Gulf Arab and European leaders believe that a US-Iran peace deal will take about six months to be agreed and that the warring sides should extend their ceasefire to cover that timeframe... https://t.co/Ghzua0xNNN