Baz Mordem

Yerel kaynak(2 karşıt görüş)+Küresel kaynak(destek-karşıt)+Saha delilleri+
Sosyoloji-Psikoloji+Yapay zeka=Gerçek bilgi

KAOS olmadan DÜZEN varolamaz

[Baz Mordem @ABDvsIranV4]

Herşeyin içindeyim,bir okadar hiçbirşeyin içinde değilim,bu kaderi tartmaktır,ben ise basit bir tartıyım

[Baz Mordem @ABDvsIranV4]

Suriye-Rojava özelinde herkes taviz verdi,tavizsizlik yok oluştu,yok oluştan ise en az zarar ile çıkmak taviz gerektirir,Ortadoğu'da olacaklar,Suriye-Rojava özelinde hayat buluyor-bulacak yoksa Ortadoğu savaşının sadece bir fragmanı olur.

[Baz Mordem @ABDvsIranV4]

Bender Abbas tekrardan bombalanıyor

[Baz Mordem @ABDvsIranV4]

22 Haziran'da NATO Kürdistanı kurmaya geliyor diyen @medreyata Kürdistan kuruldu mu?

[Baz Mordem @ABDvsIranV4]

Şengal'in fedakar kızları,2014 ilk İŞİD saldırısında silahlandılar.

[Baz Mordem @ABDvsIranV4]

Şengal, tacê ronahiyê li ser serê Kurdistanê ye 🥀☀🥀

[Baz Mordem @ABDvsIranV4]

Giden tanker uçaklar geri geliyor

[Baz Mordem @ABDvsIranV4]

Slemani de Talabanilerle görüşmesinin nedeni de budur,Rus gazından ya çıkacak yada çıkartılacaktır. Ortadoğuda büyük değişimlerin ayak sesleri yavaştan olsa her geçen gün-ayda büyüyor-büyüyecek

[Baz Mordem @ABDvsIranV4]

Türkiye Rusya'dan yüzde 35 civarından dizel alıyor,bu açığı kapatması zor,dizel için büyük bir zam gelebilir,bu zam Tarım,nakliye ve sanayi gibi çoğu sektörleri vuracak,enflasyon içinde büyük bir darbe olacak

[Baz Mordem @ABDvsIranV4]

@Behzad3434 Ukrayna,Rusyanın rafinerine saldırılar yaptı,buda dizel üretimini düşürdü,eğer yasaklamasaydı,kendisine yetecek kadar bulamazdı

[Baz Mordem @ABDvsIranV4]

Beklediğim haber gelmiş,Rusya Dizel ihracatını yasakladı

[Baz Mordem @ABDvsIranV4]

Trump'un söylemlerinin altında birşey saklıdır,eğer Türkiye bunu kabul ederse,hertürlü silah verilecek eğer kabul etmez ise Türkiye hedefe koyacaklar.

[Baz Mordem @ABDvsIranV4]

Şengal, tacê ronahiyê li ser serê Kurdistanê ye 🥀☀🥀

[Baz Mordem @ABDvsIranV4]

Türkiye Rusya'dan yüzde 35 civarından dizel alıyor,bu açığı kapatması zor,dizel için büyük bir zam gelebilir,bu zam Tarım,nakliye ve sanayi gibi çoğu sektörleri vuracak,enflasyon içinde büyük bir darbe olacak

[Baz Mordem @ABDvsIranV4]

Beklediğim haber gelmiş,Rusya Dizel ihracatını yasakladı

[The National Context @NatlContext]

Why Washington No Longer Treats the Kurdistan Region as One Actor

The US now treats the KDP and PUK as two separate energy and security actors, and has stopped pretending otherwise. Washington's priority is no longer governance but, as the 2025 US National Security Strategy makes clear, energy dominance and economic statecraft. The Kurdistan Region is split not only into two administrative zones but also almost perfectly along resource lines: most oil production sits in the KDP zone, the source of its growing leverage through the 2010s, while nearly all natural gas sits in the PUK zone, which has become especially valuable in the last two years.

Oil and gas are not equally useful right now. While oil earns revenue, gas changes politics. Iranian gas still fuels roughly a third of Iraq's power generation, giving Tehran standing leverage over Baghdad that PUK-zone gas could loosen. Turkey's own gas contract with Iran, 9.6 billion cubic metres a year, expires this month, and analysts already describe Kurdistan gas exports through Turkey as the mechanism that could anchor a durable PUK-Ankara relationship. The KDP's oil serves budgets. The PUK's gas serves the region's central strategic project: reducing Iranian leverage in Baghdad and Ankara simultaneously.

Meanwhile, the KDP's border advantage is eroding in parallel. Assad's fall opened a Syrian route between Turkey and Iraq that is shorter and cheaper than the Kurdish one. A first cargo convoy crossed it in May; a rail line through Nusaybin, Qamishli, Rabia and Mosul is next; and Baghdad has approved feasibility studies for pipelines running from Basra through Haditha toward both the Turkish and Syrian coasts. Each of these routes gives Ankara and Baghdad an option that bypasses KDP territory, meaning Ibrahim Khalil no longer sets the terms it once did.

The PKK file has flipped in the same direction. For decades, Turkey's Kurdish policy was a military campaign, which made the KDP valuable in a specific way: it was the PKK's oldest Kurdish rival, its territory bordered Qandil, and it functioned as Ankara's local security partner in that war. The PUK's closeness to the PKK made it a problem, and Turkey treated it as one, closing its airspace over Sulaimani and shutting the PUK's office in Ankara.

The peace process reverses the value of both positions. A Turkey winding the conflict down needs a partner who can talk to the PKK, not one built to fight it. The PUK's proximity, a liability for a decade, is now the asset: the PKK's disarmament ceremony took place near Sulaymaniyah, a Turkish visa office has opened in the city, and the PUK sits closest to the PKK-SDF-Turkey triangle the process now has to manage. The KDP's anti-PKK role, meanwhile, loses value at the same rate as the war that created it. Ankara's own parliamentary committee has framed the process as a regional undertaking rather than a domestic one, which makes the party that can work the regional Kurdish network more useful than the party that once helped contain it.

The third difference is how each party answers Baghdad. The current American and Turkish design rewards local actors who integrate into state frameworks rather than stand outside them, and the PUK has been more responsive to that model. It holds the Iraqi presidency. Its premier counterterrorism force operates under the legal umbrella of Baghdad's federal Counter Terrorism Service while Washington funds it directly, an arrangement the Pentagon's own budget documents treat as the template. Its leadership also pitches PUK-zone gas as the answer to Iraq's national energy crisis rather than as a party asset, a framing aimed at Baghdad and Washington at once.

The KDP has moved the other way, and its bet is legible in its diplomacy. It has spent years building the UAE into an external pole of its own: more than $3.3 billion in Emirati investment, over 120 Emirati companies in the region, repeated Barzani summits with Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed, and, since September 2025, a dedicated UAE special envoy for economic affairs to the Kurdistan Region, a state-level instrument aimed at a sub-state government. The KDP also carries an older Israel-facing history: Israel was the only state to openly back the 2017 independence referendum, and Kurdish oil found its way to Israeli buyers for years before that. None of this is disqualifying on its own. But it places the KDP nearer the UAE-Israel pole at exactly the moment that pole is hardening against Turkey, a rivalry on open display this week in the dispute over selling Turkey F-35s.

What has changed is the direction of the two bets. The KDP is betting on autonomy: external patrons, its own energy machinery, a position strong enough that regional powers have to come to it. The PUK is betting on usefulness: integration with Baghdad, alignment with Ankara's peace process, and gas that serves everyone else's strategy. In the regional order now being built, state-anchored, Turkey-centred, organised around connectivity rather than confrontation, the second bet is currently paying better. Neither party designed that order, but the choice lies in how each lives inside it, and for the first time in decades, the choice that involves less autonomy is the one gaining ground.

More details: https://t.co/10JxamYcJC

[Baz Mordem @ABDvsIranV4]

Çok değil,2030 yılına kadar ya taktik füze yada nükleer bombalar patlayacak

[Baz Mordem @ABDvsIranV4]

@kurdsmen76678 @Sondxwari2026 Sende abartma,tamam Kürdlerin 4 parçaya bölünmesi projeydi,gelecekte yeni bir kaos yaratmak içindi ama şuan Kürdlerin gücü var,bunu bozup-bozamayacağı bize kalmış

[Baz Mordem @ABDvsIranV4]

Toprağımızı tartarken büyük Kürdistan üzerinden değil,büyük Kürdistana ne kadar kaldı üzerinden tartışmak gerekir.

[Baz Mordem @ABDvsIranV4]

@emekliduayen Kendi kendilerine ettiler :)

[Baz Mordem @ABDvsIranV4]

ABD'nin tüm savaş stratejisi düşmanlık üzerine kurulu,Vietnam,Nazi Almanyası,Japonya,Afganistan vd derken geriye bir Rusya,Çin ve İran kaldı,Ortadoğuda ise İran tek kaldı eğer İran düşerse Ortadoğu stratejisi için yeni bir düşmana ihtiyacı var,ve bir seçenek kaldı Türkiye mi?

[Baz Mordem @ABDvsIranV4]

Bu seferde akşam İran'ı vuracam diyor :)

[Baz Mordem @ABDvsIranV4]

22 Haziran'da NATO Kürdistanı kurmaya geliyor diyen @medreyata Kürdistan kuruldu mu?

[Baz Mordem @ABDvsIranV4]

Bu seferde akşam İran'ı vuracam diyor :)

[Baz Mordem @ABDvsIranV4]

ABD İranı vuruyor,İran'da Kuveyt ve Bahreyn'i vuruyor 😂