Suriye-Rojava özelinde herkes taviz verdi,tavizsizlik yok oluştu,yok oluştan ise en az zarar ile çıkmak taviz gerektirir,Ortadoğu'da olacaklar,Suriye-Rojava özelinde hayat buluyor-bulacak yoksa Ortadoğu savaşının sadece bir fragmanı olur.
@AnalistHoca01 Fark edilmeyen şey ise son dönemin tüm düşmanlık politikası İran üzerine inşa edilmiştir,Trump şuan halk nezdinde düşman karşısında ezik kalmış bir figür gibi eğer Trump sağlam hamle yapmaz ise ezikliği unutulmaz
Biri buna Rojava'da İran yanlılarının olmadığını,en son SDF'nin İran milislerini Ebû Kemal bölgesinde temizlediğini,
İranlıların hepsinin Halep-Hama-Humus-Şam hattında olduğunu anlatmalıdır.
The Kurdish Layer in Washington's Iraq-Syria-Turkey Design
A new Middle East order is taking shape, and its organising principles are aimed to be trade and connectivity more than military power. The order being built is state-anchored. For the first time, the Kurdistan Region has accepted a unified customs system under federal oversight, and its oil exports run through Iraq's state marketer SOMO. But beneath that state layer, the KDP and the PUK and other Kurdish actors such as SDF and PKK are being brought in as partners in their own right: separate local actors inside the new architecture, in the case of KDP and PUK not two halves of one regional government.
The National Context has proposed the Fulcrum Doctrine: a US-led Iraq-Syria, or Mesopotamian-Levantine, economic-security architecture that reads as the regional execution of the National Security Strategy the administration released in December.
Barrack's own appointment, ambassador to Turkey and envoy to both Iraq and Syria, put one person in charge of all three files, and the deals that followed, Chevron and HKN in Iraq, ConocoPhillips in Damascus, read as that strategy put into practice. Turkey is not one of three equal states in this design. It is the market, the transit hub and the security gatekeeper, and its peace process with the PKK decides whether Kurdish networks function as a connector or a threat.
This is happening alongside Turkey's renewed peace process with the PKK, and Ankara's own framing of that process matters. The final report of the parliamentary committee overseeing it, adopted in February with cross-party support, does not describe a terror-free Turkey as a domestic settlement. It presents the process as necessary for regional stability, invokes Saladin and Alparslan to frame Turks and Kurds as historic partners, and treats Kurdish populations in neighbouring countries as part of the same file. In this framing, Kurds across the region, as local partners, are envisioned as a source of Turkish influence rather than a security liability. This is where the American and Turkish approaches overlap. They are not the same or want the same thing, but they are compatible.
In this emerging framework, Kurdish actors are becoming important nodes. They are not treated as one unified Kurdish bloc. They are dealt with as separate actors, each with a specific use.
There is also a historical echo here. The Ottoman order dealt with Kurdish power through multiple local dynasties and rival centres rather than through one unified Kurdish authority. A similar pattern is visible today. Kurdish actors are again being handled as separate power centres, each useful for a different route, asset or political channel.
The design carries one open contradiction, and it surfaced this week. Weakening Iran strengthens Turkey. At the NATO summit in Ankara on Tuesday, Trump called Turkey an extraordinary ally and signalled he would lift the ban on selling it F-35 fighter jets. Netanyahu told CNN the same day that the sale would destroy the regional balance of power, and the US defense secretary's planned meeting with him on the issue was then cancelled on Wednesday. The question after Hormuz is no longer whether Iranian leverage falls. It is who takes the space Iran leaves, and Israel does not want the answer to be Turkey.
The result is that Kurds are becoming one of the connective layers of the new regional order. The main strategy is connectivity: roads, pipelines, trade routes, gas, ports and political corridors. Kurdish actors are among the links that make this possible. They are not the architects of the order, but they are becoming part of the structure that holds Iraq, Syria and Turkey together inside it.
The full analysis and detailed map: https://t.co/Z3BjLVf7M6
İnsan isyankârdır,ya onları kandırırsın daha iyi bir dünya inşa etmek için yada gerçekleri anlatırsın,yani sonuç herzaman aynıdır insan isyankârdır,isyan etmeyi sever :)
İnsan isyankârdır,ya onları kandırırsın daha iyi bir dünya inşa etmek için yada gerçekleri anlatırsın,yani sonuç herzaman aynıdır insan isyankârdır,isyan etmeyi sever :)
@rejturk Bir karış değil bin karış toprak var,sen onu boşver 1 günde Balkanlardan Arabistan'a kadar nasıl kaybettiğini anlatsana,bin yıllık imparatorluk değilmiydiniz :))
Muhtemelen Ankara'da Bafil Talabani ile bu konu konuşulacak,gelişmeler olumlu olursa Türkiye Rus ve İran gazından çıkıyor,bir şekilde ordaki doğal gazını Avrupa'ya gönderecekler, eğer İran ile ilgili gelişmeler rejimin değişmesine sebep olursa İran Gazıda Türkiye üzerinden+