Multilingual analysis of power, memory, institutions & geopolitics. Challenging narratives, questioning assumptions. Anonymity is a boundary, not a mask.
🇺🇸 As Democrats, we have every reason to celebrate this electoral breakthrough. We have changed the balance of power in Washington and secured an opportunity to chart a different course. But victory is not an end in itself. It comes with responsibility, expectations and, above all, an obligation to deliver.
We will have the opportunity to shape the legislative agenda, restore congressional oversight and offer a credible alternative to the Trump administration. But winning elections is one thing; turning that victory into effective governance is quite another.
Our immediate task must be to establish clear priorities, rebuild public confidence in Congress and demonstrate that Democratic leadership can make a tangible difference in people’s lives.
We will have to address the cost of living, protect healthcare and voting rights, defend democratic institutions and hold the administration accountable. These objectives must be pursued through a coherent legislative programme rather than a succession of political confrontations.
But what kind of governing majority do we want to be? A Congress focused exclusively on investigating the administration risks missing an opportunity to articulate an alternative vision. Conversely, a legislative strategy that neglects accountability would leave an important part of our mandate unfulfilled.
We will need to find the right balance between oversight, legislation and political positioning. That balance will define the next two years.
The next phase will also test our internal cohesion. Our coalition brings together moderates, progressives, establishment figures and a younger generation seeking a different political direction. Electoral unity does not automatically translate into legislative unity. We will have to manage our differences without losing sight of the common purpose that brought us here.
And then there is 2028.
These midterms will inevitably reshape the presidential succession debate. Potential candidates will begin positioning themselves, alliances will emerge and disagreements over our party’s identity, economic priorities and foreign policy will become more visible. We must begin preparing for that debate without allowing the 2028 race to undermine the work we have to do now.
For Donald Trump, losing congressional control fundamentally changes the political environment of his final two years. Investigations, hearings, subpoenas and budget negotiations could become recurring confrontations. We will have oversight powers, but we will not have the votes to automatically override presidential vetoes or enact our entire programme. We must understand both the opportunities and the limits of our new position.
The immediate political message is clear: voters have entrusted us with a greater share of responsibility. We must rise to that responsibility.
Winning the midterms is the opportunity. Governing through Congress, exercising meaningful oversight and presenting a credible alternative for 2028 is our responsibility.
The blue wave has changed the political landscape. What we do with this mandate will determine whether this victory becomes a lasting political turning point or simply another electoral moment.
@DNC@TheDemocrats@DemSocialists@DemsAbroad@DemsAbroadCan@HouseDemocrats@SenateDems
🚨 IT’S OFFICIALLY WEEKEND O’CLOCK! 🎉
Work is MUTED. 🔇
Notifications are on DO NOT DISTURB. 📵
Responsibilities have been rescheduled for MONDAY. 😂
And stress? Not on the guest list!
What’s your weekend vibe?
🌿 Getting outdoors and enjoying nature?
🏡 Staying home, resting and recharging?
👨👩👧 Spending quality time with family?
🥂 Catching up with friends and loved ones?
🎨 Exploring hobbies or trying something new?
📚 Reading, learning or working on personal goals?
🛍️ Running errands and getting life organised?
🙏 Taking time for faith, reflection and gratitude?
💼 Working a shift or handling responsibilities?
😴 Simply sleeping in and doing absolutely NOTHING?
Or are you doing something nobody saw coming?
Drop your plans below 👇
⚽️ Following the success of its previous summer and winter programs, @InterMiamiCF is bringing back its Winter Camps, giving young fútbol players the opportunity to sharpen their skills and train in an environment inspired by the Club’s professional development programs.
Scheduled for Dec. 27–30 at the Florida Blue Training Center in Fort Lauderdale, the four-day camps are open to boys and girls ages 6–16. Sessions will be led by certified Inter Miami Academy coaches, with specialized training for both field players and goalkeepers focused on technical ability, individual development and overall performance on the pitch.
Previous editions of the Club’s camps have attracted more than 1,000 young players and featured dozens of coaches, including members of the Inter Miami Academy staff. The programs have also helped aspiring players advance in their development, with more than 35 participants earning spots on various @InterMiamiAcad teams.
In addition to the training, campers will enjoy four days of soccer, opportunities to meet and connect with fellow players, and an immersive experience within the Inter Miami CF community.
Registration, program information and pricing are available ⬇️
🔗 https://t.co/RpTZ6sZYCZ
⚽️ It’s Miami Time: Get Ready for Inter Miami CF’s Playoffs Opener This Saturday
@InterMiamiCF begins its MLS Cup title defense this Saturday, November 21, as the club hosts Columbus Crew in Game 1 of their best-of-three Round One series in the 2026 @MLSCupPlayoffs.
Ahead of kickoff, captain Leo Messi will be presented with the 2026 @MLS Golden Boot. Messi made history by leading the league with 26 goals in 31 appearances, becoming the first player in MLS history to win the Golden Boot in consecutive seasons.
🇺🇳 #UNSG10 | Ninth Security Council straw poll for the next UN Secretary-General (20 November 2026)
The Security Council has completed its ninth informal straw poll in the search for António Guterres’s successor. This round used colour-coded ballots that separate the votes of the ten elected members from those of the five permanent members. As usual, the official results were not released, but they leaked rapidly and match independent reporting.
No candidate is yet free of opposition from the permanent members. Every name on the ballot attracted at least two “discourage” votes from the P5, and one candidate received all five. Under the established practice, a candidate needs at least nine positive votes in the Council and no veto from any permanent member before the Council can recommend a name to the General Assembly. With Guterres’s term ending on 31 December, the continuing deadlock has already prompted contingency discussions about the possibility of a temporary leadership gap.
Rebeca Grynspan of Costa Rica remains the clear frontrunner by overall numbers. She received ten “encourage” votes, four “discourage” votes and one “no opinion.” Of the permanent members, three encouraged her and two discouraged her. She has led or been near the top of almost every poll since the process began and brings extensive UN experience as head of UNCTAD, former UNDP Associate Administrator and former Vice-President of Costa Rica. Reporting has linked the two permanent-member discourages to concerns in Washington and Moscow over her positions on Israel, China and the Ukraine war, including the Black Sea grain initiative.
Rafael Grossi of Argentina, Director-General of the IAEA, placed second with eight encourage votes, six discourage votes and one no opinion. He received only two encourage votes and three discourage votes from the permanent members. Russia has criticised his handling of the Zaporizhzhia nuclear plant; China is widely reported to view him as too closely aligned with the United States and the Milei government.
Lana Nusseibeh of the United Arab Emirates, a late entrant, finished third with seven encourage, six discourage and two no-opinion votes, including three discourages from the permanent members.
Carolyn Rodrigues Birkett of Guyana received six encourage, six discourage and three no-opinion votes. Among the permanent members she attracted three encourage votes and only two discourage votes — the same number of permanent-member discourages as Grynspan. Her overall support from the elected members is weaker, but the permanent-member breakdown keeps her relevant if the leading candidates remain blocked. She is Guyana’s Ambassador to the United Nations and a former foreign minister with recent Security Council experience.
The remaining candidates — Feridun Hadi Sinirlioğlu of Türkiye, Olara Otunnu of Uganda, María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés of Ecuador and Ivonne A-Baki of Ecuador — are effectively out of contention. Otunnu received discourage votes from all five permanent members; the others face high total discourage counts and limited permanent-member support.
The broader context remains unchanged. Regional rotation expectations favour a candidate from Latin America and the Caribbean, and five of the eight candidates are women, so the first female Secretary-General is still possible. Geopolitical divisions over Ukraine, the Middle East, US–China competition and UN reform continue to shape the permanent members’ positions. Further polls or quiet bilateral bargaining among the P5 are expected before any formal recommendation is attempted.
🇺🇳 #UNSG10 | The Security Council's continued deadlock over the next UN Secretary-General means the process is likely to move into another round of informal consultations rather than produce an immediate recommendation. The straw polls are designed to identify candidates capable of securing the necessary support, expose opposition — particularly among the P5 — and encourage candidates whose prospects are weakening to reconsider their position.
With the reported ninth straw poll still showing competing support and resistance, the next step will likely be further diplomatic negotiations, additional straw polls if needed, and efforts to narrow the field. Candidates may seek to address concerns raised by permanent members, while member states attempt to build a consensus around a compromise candidate capable of clearing the Council.
➡️ What happens next?
The ninth straw poll clarified the balance of support, but as the Council remains deadlocked, the process is likely to move into a phase of intensive P5 negotiations and candidate viability assessments, rather than simply continuing to repeat straw polls.
• Further consultations and negotiations: The permanent members will seek to identify which candidates are acceptable to all five, particularly those attracting discouragement votes from veto-holding members.
• Pressure for candidates to withdraw: Candidates unable to build a viable coalition may face growing diplomatic pressure to step aside, allowing the field to narrow organically.
• A compromise candidate: If the leading candidates remain blocked, the Council could turn to another contender who has not generated significant opposition among the P5.
• A possible late-stage agreement: The Council could negotiate behind closed doors and move directly toward a formal recommendation once a candidate emerges with sufficient support and no veto.
The selection requires at least nine votes in the Security Council and no veto from any of the five permanent members. The Council's recommendation is then submitted to the General Assembly for appointment.
➡️ The December 31 deadline is the real pressure point
With António Guterres scheduled to leave office on December 31, 2026, the Council has limited time to resolve the impasse. If no successor is agreed upon before the end of his term, the UN could face an unprecedented leadership transition without a confirmed Secretary-General. Possible contingency scenarios include a negotiated extension of Guterres's tenure, an acting Secretary-General arrangement, or a temporary compromise appointment, although none is automatic under the UN Charter.
The most likely path is therefore a negotiated compromise, not necessarily the emergence of a clear winner through successive straw polls. If Grynspan and Nusseibeh remain unable to overcome P5 resistance, the Council may eventually have to look beyond the two leading contenders and identify someone acceptable to all five permanent members.
The longer the deadlock persists, the greater the pressure for a compromise candidate — and the more the process becomes a test of whether the P5 can reach agreement on the UN's next chief diplomat before the clock runs out.
🇺🇳 #UNSG10 | According to unverified figures attributed to a diplomat, the ninth straw poll for the next UN Secretary-General appears to favor Rebeca Grynspan of Costa Rica over Nusseibeh of the UAE. Grynspan reportedly received ten encourage votes, three of them from the five permanent members of the Security Council (P5), against two discourage votes from the P5. Nusseibeh reportedly secured seven encourage votes, two from the P5, while three permanent members registered discourage.
The figures place Grynspan in the stronger position, both in overall support and among the permanent members. Straw polls remain informal and confer no endorsement, yet the P5 balance carries real weight: a viable path to the Secretary-Generalship requires that no permanent member stand in the way. Nusseibeh's road therefore looks steeper, while Grynspan enters the next stage of the selection with the better hand.
🇺🇳 #UNSG10 | According to unverified figures attributed to a diplomat, the ninth straw poll for the next UN Secretary-General appears to favor Rebeca Grynspan of Costa Rica over Nusseibeh of the UAE. Grynspan reportedly received ten encourage votes, three of them from the five permanent members of the Security Council (P5), against two discourage votes from the P5. Nusseibeh reportedly secured seven encourage votes, two from the P5, while three permanent members registered discourage.
The figures place Grynspan in the stronger position, both in overall support and among the permanent members. Straw polls remain informal and confer no endorsement, yet the P5 balance carries real weight: a viable path to the Secretary-Generalship requires that no permanent member stand in the way. Nusseibeh's road therefore looks steeper, while Grynspan enters the next stage of the selection with the better hand.
🇺🇳 #UNSG10 | Ninth Straw Poll | 12:00 EST
The UN Security Council is scheduled to conduct its ninth informal ballot today at noon as part of the process to identify the next Secretary-General. The exercise is intended to gauge the level of support for each contender before the Council eventually selects a candidate to recommend to the General Assembly through a formal resolution adopted in a closed meeting.
On 18 November, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and France were designated to serve as tellers for the latest round.
One notable feature of today’s vote will be the return of colour-coded ballots, separating the positions of the five permanent members (P5) from those of the ten elected members (E10). This system was last used during the sixth straw poll on 16 October before being abandoned for the seventh and eighth rounds, held on 30 October and 5 November.
➡️ With no additional nominations since the previous ballot, eight candidates are expected to remain in contention:
• Ivonne A-Baki (Ecuador) — nominated by Tonga on 17 August.
• María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés (Ecuador) — nominated by Antigua and Barbuda on 11 May.
• Rafael Mariano Grossi (Argentina) — nominated by Argentina on 26 November 2025.
• Rebeca Grynspan Mayufis (Costa Rica) — nominated by Costa Rica on 3 March.
• Lana Zaki Nusseibeh (United Arab Emirates) — nominated by the UAE on 21 October.
• Olara Otunnu (Uganda) — nominated by Uganda on 24 July.
• Carolyn Rodrigues Birkett (Guyana) — nominated by Guyana on 15 June.
• Feridun Hadi Sinirlioğlu (Türkiye) — nominated by Türkiye on 1 November.
As with previous rounds, the Security Council is not expected to disclose individual voting results. Latvia’s Ambassador Sanita Pavļuta-Deslandes, serving as Council President for November, is expected to confirm that the ballot has taken place without revealing how members voted.
➡️ Why this round matters
Diplomatic speculation suggests that one of the female candidates may have attracted the support of all five permanent members. However, this remains unverified.
The reintroduction of colour-coded ballots makes today’s exercise particularly significant. Unlike the previous two rounds, it should provide a clearer indication of how the P5 are positioning themselves individually, including whether any permanent member has issued a red discourage vote.
The distinction matters: a candidate may enjoy substantial support among elected members, but securing the confidence of all five permanent members is a considerably more consequential hurdle in the selection process.
Today’s ballot could therefore offer an important indication of whether a leading candidate is emerging with the political backing necessary to advance towards the final selection.
🇺🇸 America Is Not Europe’s War Treasury
Washington must put American interests first. Macron cannot dictate America’s security agenda, and Zelenskyy cannot expect an unlimited financial commitment without accountability.
There is a growing disconnect between Washington’s foreign-policy establishment and the US taxpayer. For years, Americans have been asked to finance conflicts overseas, underwrite other countries’ security and absorb the cost of strategic decisions made thousands of miles away. That arrangement deserves to be challenged, and Ukraine is no exception.
Russia invaded Ukraine, and Ukraine has the right to defend its sovereignty. But recognising that principle does not mean accepting an open-ended American commitment to a war with no defined endpoint, no credible exit strategy and no guarantee that additional billions will produce a settlement. America’s first responsibility is to America.
That case is hardest to dismiss when European leaders are so eager to talk about escalation while remaining dependent on Washington’s military capabilities. Emmanuel Macron has cast himself as Europe’s strategic spokesman on Ukraine’s security architecture, NATO membership and a more direct European military presence. If Europe’s security is at stake, European governments should finance it, equip it and bear its risks. They cannot demand strategic autonomy and expect American taxpayers to supply the backstop. Macron is entitled to defend French and European interests. He is not entitled to define America’s.
Washington should be wary of rhetoric that makes confrontation sound inevitable. American diplomacy should aim to end this war, not to underwrite an indefinite European confrontation with Russia. Deterrence matters, but so does diplomacy, and a negotiated settlement is not a betrayal of Ukraine. It is a legitimate objective of American foreign policy.
Then there is governance in Kyiv. Zelenskyy has become an international symbol of resistance, but wartime symbolism does not exempt a government from scrutiny. Ukraine has faced serious corruption investigations touching senior officials, the energy sector, defence procurement and figures close to the presidential administration. The Midas affair, with its allegations of large-scale kickbacks and money laundering, shows why oversight of Western assistance is indispensable. Senior officials have resigned, and Ukraine’s own anti-corruption institutions keep uncovering misconduct.
To be precise, Zelenskyy himself has not been charged. But that does not absolve his administration of its duty to guarantee transparency and independent oversight. Every dollar must be accounted for, every contract scrutinised and every allegation involving public money investigated, however inconvenient the outcome. This is not anti-Ukrainian. It is pro-accountability, and it is pro-American.
The new Congress will face precisely this dilemma in 2027. Democrats may want to restore military and financial assistance, but they should not confuse supporting Ukraine’s sovereignty with accepting every demand from Kyiv or Paris. There is a difference between defending an ally and subsidising an open-ended conflict, between supporting European security and assuming responsibility for it, between American leadership and American financial dependency.
The United States has priorities of its own: infrastructure, healthcare, housing, industrial competitiveness, border security and the national debt. These are not afterthoughts to be addressed once every foreign commitment has been satisfied. The next chapter of American foreign policy should rest on a simple principle: allies carry more of their own security, assistance comes with enforceable accountability, and diplomacy remains the ultimate objective.
America is an ally, not an ATM. It has its own interests, its own priorities and its own taxpayers, and those interests come first.
@TheDemocrats@DemSocialists@USProgressives@HouseDemocrats@SenateDems
🧐 Berlin vs. Shenzhen: Macron’s Bid to Keep Europe at the Table
As Donald Trump prepares to meet Vladimir Putin bilaterally and then sit down with Xi Jinping in a trilateral format, German Chancellor Merz, French President Macron and British Prime Minister Burnham are jointly convening European leaders in Berlin to reinforce Ukraine’s position. The timing is no accident. Shenzhen offers the spectacle of three great powers at the summit; Berlin is Europe’s attempt to consolidate leverage before the contours of any Washington-Moscow understanding take shape. The fear in European capitals is not that Trump will talk to Putin, but that the outcome could redraw the continent’s security order without European participation. Ukraine’s sovereignty, the security of NATO’s eastern flank and Europe’s long-term exposure to Russian military pressure cannot be treated as secondary items in a great-power bargain.
The guest list reflects that calculation. Merz, Macron, Burnham, Donald Tusk and Giorgia Meloni are joined by NATO Secretary-General Mark Rutte and American envoys @SEPeaceMissions Steve Witkoff and Jared Kushner, bringing political weight, alliance leadership and the American channel into one room. The objective is more than reiterating support for Kyiv. It is to establish a common position on what a credible ceasefire would require and what security guarantees must follow. The presence of Trump’s envoys also connects Berlin directly to Washington’s diplomatic initiative, rather than leaving the meeting as a European declaration detached from the negotiations.
Legally binding security guarantees are central to that effort because a ceasefire alone cannot resolve the underlying security dilemma. Without credible deterrence, a pause in fighting risks becoming merely an interval before renewed conflict, not the foundation of a durable settlement. Europeans are therefore trying to move beyond expressions of solidarity towards sustained military assistance, monitoring, intelligence cooperation and deeper commitments to Ukraine’s postwar security. Yet the practical and political questions remain difficult. What is Europe prepared to guarantee, and what would it actually do if those guarantees were tested?
Macron has long argued that Europe must act strategically rather than remain dependent on Washington’s shifting priorities. Berlin offers an opportunity to translate that argument into collective positioning, but the coalition is far from homogeneous. Its members differ over settlement terms, escalation risks, possible force deployments and the duration of any commitments. Unity is easier to demonstrate than to sustain, particularly when the discussion moves from political declarations to military obligations. Ultimately, a security guarantee is only as credible as the capabilities, resources and political will behind it.
The juxtaposition with Shenzhen nevertheless carries a larger message. In an era increasingly shaped by transactional diplomacy among major powers, Europe is signaling that it will not accept the role of bystander, let alone remain merely the arena in which others compete. Its economic weight, military capabilities and alliance structures give it a direct stake in the outcome. But influence cannot rest on declarations alone. The risk is that European unity remains reactive, assembled in response to diplomatic initiatives elsewhere rather than driven by a coherent strategy of its own.
Shenzhen may bring the great powers together, but Berlin represents Europe’s refusal to be excluded from decisions that will shape its own security. The distinction is significant: while Washington, Moscow and Beijing may command the diplomatic spectacle, the consequences of any settlement will be felt most directly on European soil. Europe’s challenge is therefore not simply to secure a place at the table, but to demonstrate that it has the strategic unity and political resolve to influence what is decided there.
📸 Archives
⚜️ Le Québec pourrait devenir le Danemark de l’Amérique du Nord
Un Québec indépendant n’aurait pas à devenir un autre Canada, une petite France ou un appendice des États-Unis. Il pourrait choisir une voie plus ambitieuse : celle d’un État de taille moyenne, prospère, innovant et profondément attaché à son identité.
Lorsqu’on débat de l’avenir d’un Québec indépendant, la comparaison avec le Canada s’impose naturellement. Mais elle est aussi, à bien des égards, trop limitée.
Les comparaisons les plus éclairantes se trouvent ailleurs, notamment en Europe du Nord.
Un Québec souverain aurait une population comparable à celle de l’Autriche, une économie qui pourrait se situer dans la même catégorie que celle du Danemark, des ressources naturelles qui rappellent celles de la Norvège et, potentiellement, une culture institutionnelle inspirée de la Suisse.
Parmi ces modèles, le Danemark offre peut-être le point de comparaison le plus intéressant.
Bien sûr, les deux pays sont très différents. Le Danemark est un petit royaume européen d’environ six millions d’habitants, alors que le Québec compterait plus de neuf millions de citoyens sur un territoire près de quarante fois plus vaste. Le Danemark dispose de peu de ressources naturelles comparables aux immenses forêts, aux réserves d’eau douce et aux ressources minières du Québec. Et surtout, il bénéficie de la proximité du marché unique européen.
Mais si l’on cesse de comparer les superficies pour s’intéresser à ce qu’un petit pays peut accomplir, le parallèle devient beaucoup plus pertinent.
Le Danemark démontre qu’un État n’a pas besoin d’une population immense pour disposer d’une économie sophistiquée, d’entreprises compétitives à l’échelle mondiale, d’institutions solides et d’une identité nationale affirmée.
C’est précisément la leçon que le Québec pourrait en tirer.
🧵 1/7
@partiquebecois@PaulPlamondon
#Québec2026 #LeChoixDeLaConfiance
🇺🇳 #UNSG10 | Ninth Straw Poll | 12:00 EST
The UN Security Council is scheduled to conduct its ninth informal ballot today at noon as part of the process to identify the next Secretary-General. The exercise is intended to gauge the level of support for each contender before the Council eventually selects a candidate to recommend to the General Assembly through a formal resolution adopted in a closed meeting.
On 18 November, the Democratic Republic of the Congo and France were designated to serve as tellers for the latest round.
One notable feature of today’s vote will be the return of colour-coded ballots, separating the positions of the five permanent members (P5) from those of the ten elected members (E10). This system was last used during the sixth straw poll on 16 October before being abandoned for the seventh and eighth rounds, held on 30 October and 5 November.
➡️ With no additional nominations since the previous ballot, eight candidates are expected to remain in contention:
• Ivonne A-Baki (Ecuador) — nominated by Tonga on 17 August.
• María Fernanda Espinosa Garcés (Ecuador) — nominated by Antigua and Barbuda on 11 May.
• Rafael Mariano Grossi (Argentina) — nominated by Argentina on 26 November 2025.
• Rebeca Grynspan Mayufis (Costa Rica) — nominated by Costa Rica on 3 March.
• Lana Zaki Nusseibeh (United Arab Emirates) — nominated by the UAE on 21 October.
• Olara Otunnu (Uganda) — nominated by Uganda on 24 July.
• Carolyn Rodrigues Birkett (Guyana) — nominated by Guyana on 15 June.
• Feridun Hadi Sinirlioğlu (Türkiye) — nominated by Türkiye on 1 November.
As with previous rounds, the Security Council is not expected to disclose individual voting results. Latvia’s Ambassador Sanita Pavļuta-Deslandes, serving as Council President for November, is expected to confirm that the ballot has taken place without revealing how members voted.
➡️ Why this round matters
Diplomatic speculation suggests that one of the female candidates may have attracted the support of all five permanent members. However, this remains unverified.
The reintroduction of colour-coded ballots makes today’s exercise particularly significant. Unlike the previous two rounds, it should provide a clearer indication of how the P5 are positioning themselves individually, including whether any permanent member has issued a red discourage vote.
The distinction matters: a candidate may enjoy substantial support among elected members, but securing the confidence of all five permanent members is a considerably more consequential hurdle in the selection process.
Today’s ballot could therefore offer an important indication of whether a leading candidate is emerging with the political backing necessary to advance towards the final selection.
🇺🇳 #UNSG10 | Shenzhen-New York: A Straw Poll Moved to the Day After the Summit
The ninth Security Council straw poll for the UN Secretary-General was scheduled for today, November 19, coinciding with the first trilateral meeting between Donald Trump, Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin in Shenzhen. It has now been postponed until tomorrow, November 20, with a colour-coded ballot expected. The stated reason is that Council members requested additional time. The timing, however, is striking: the vote will now take place after the three leaders have met, rather than before. The calendar has thus created a diplomatic sequence that no communiqué would need to announce.
Coincidence is not coordination, and the distinction matters. Nothing in the reporting places the UN succession on the Shenzhen agenda, which is expected to cover the Iran war, Ukraine, nuclear weapons, trade and artificial intelligence, with expectations of a concrete outcome described as low. No public source says the postponement was requested to align Washington, Beijing and Moscow. What can be said is narrower and more interesting: three of the five veto-holders will have shared a room one day before a ballot that shows how many of the five stand against each candidate.
The structure of the vote explains why that matters. A candidate needs nine encourage votes and no veto from any permanent member. Colour-coding does not name the member who discourages, but it exposes how many do. On October 16, the only colour-coded round so far, every candidate drew at least one permanent-member discourage vote, and the frontrunner, Rebeca Grynspan of Costa Rica, drew two. On November 5, in an undifferentiated ballot, she led with 12 encourage votes and three discourage. The open question is whether the October holdouts have moved, and three presidents with a direct line to their missions in New York could answer it faster than any Council consultation.
The limits of this thesis are just as instructive as its appeal. Britain and France hold the other two vetoes and are due to meet today in Berlin. Great powers rarely need a summit to coordinate their positions on a UN appointment; their ambassadors conduct that diplomacy routinely in New York. Even the ballot format reveals divisions: diplomats say Russia and the United States favoured retaining colour-coding, while most Council members preferred unmarked ballots. China, notably, was not among the countries reported to have supported either position. Three capitals acting in concert can bring a candidacy to an end. They cannot, however, create one.
The approaching deadline adds urgency to the process. António Guterres’s term expires on December 31, with his successor expected to take office on January 1, 2027. In 2016, six straw polls were enough to identify a viable candidate. This time, the Council is approaching its ninth round, yet no recommendation appears imminent for the General Assembly to consider.
✈️ #AvGeek | Air Force One is back at Joint Base Andrews following the longest continuous flight in its history.
The VC-25B completed a nearly 15-hour nonstop sortie from Shenzhen, China, to Maryland, following an exceptionally demanding flight profile. The aircraft reportedly departed at just under one million pounds, marking the heaviest takeoff in Air Force history.
Cruising at 33,000 feet and averaging 500 knots, the route crossed the Pacific and North America, passing over Shanghai, Tokyo, Shemya AK, Winnipeg MB and Cleveland OH.
A remarkable aviation milestone — and quite a flight for the presidential airlift fleet.
#AirForceOne #Aviation #USAF #VC25B
Macron, le va-t-en-guerre qui isole la diplomatie française, semble avoir progressivement confondu politique étrangère et posture personnelle. À force de vouloir être au centre de tous les dossiers internationaux, le président donne parfois le sentiment de chercher moins à construire des solutions diplomatiques qu’à imposer sa présence, ses déclarations et ses ambitions personnelles sur la scène internationale.
De l’Ukraine au Liban, de l’Iran aux grandes orientations de la politique étrangère française, le même schéma semble se répéter : des déclarations péremptoires, des initiatives souvent déconnectées des rapports de force réels et une volonté persistante de jouer les premiers rôles, quitte à compliquer les efforts de ceux qui tentent réellement de faire avancer les négociations. Cette diplomatie de l’affichage finit par brouiller la lisibilité de la position française et par fragiliser sa crédibilité.
Sur l’Ukraine, Macron a multiplié les prises de position maximalistes, allant jusqu’à évoquer la possibilité d’un engagement militaire occidental. Il est parfaitement légitime de défendre une ligne de fermeté face à Moscou. Encore faut-il que cette fermeté repose sur une stratégie cohérente, des objectifs clairement définis et une appréciation réaliste des moyens disponibles. La politique étrangère ne peut se réduire à une surenchère verbale ou à une compétition de postures entre dirigeants européens.
Le problème est d’autant plus préoccupant que la France dispose des attributs d’une véritable puissance diplomatique. Son siège permanent au Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies, son arsenal nucléaire, son appartenance à l’Union Européenne et l’étendue de ses intérêts internationaux lui confèrent une responsabilité particulière. Cette position devrait lui permettre de porter une voix autonome, pragmatique et respectée, capable de dialoguer avec tous les acteurs, y compris ceux avec lesquels Paris est en profond désaccord.
Or, Macron donne trop souvent l’impression de privilégier l’affichage politique au détriment de cette capacité d’équilibre. Les ambitions affichées ne s’accompagnent pas toujours d’une lecture suffisamment réaliste des rapports de force ni d’une stratégie diplomatique clairement identifiable. La France doit pouvoir défendre ses intérêts et ses principes sans pour autant se couper des interlocuteurs nécessaires à la résolution des crises.
La diplomatie n’est pas un concours d’ego. Elle ne consiste pas à multiplier les déclarations pour démontrer que l’on existe, encore moins à transformer chaque crise internationale en tribune présidentielle. Elle exige du discernement, de la constance, une compréhension fine des équilibres internationaux et, surtout, la capacité de faire avancer des solutions concrètes plutôt que de chercher systématiquement à occuper le devant de la scène.
Macron laissera derrière lui un bilan diplomatique lourdement contesté, marqué par des ambitions contrariées, des crises non résolues, des alliances fragilisées et une influence française considérablement érodée sur la scène internationale. L’histoire ne retiendra pas le nombre de fois où il aura voulu être à la table des négociations, mais ce qu’il aura effectivement contribué à y obtenir.
La France a besoin d’une diplomatie d’État, pas d’une diplomatie de posture. Elle a besoin de stratèges, pas de commentateurs de crise.
🌐 Une grosse semaine en Asie : le pivot est déjà une réalité
Il suffit de regarder le calendrier diplomatique de cette semaine pour mesurer à quel point le centre de gravité des relations internationales se déplace vers l’Asie.
En quelques jours, trois rendez-vous majeurs se succèdent dans trois capitales de la région : l’ASEAN à Manille, la Francophonie à Phnom Penh et l’APEC à Shenzhen. Trois organisations, trois agendas différents, mais un même espace géopolitique au cœur des échanges diplomatiques, économiques et stratégiques du moment.
Ce n’est pas simplement une accumulation de sommets internationaux. C’est une illustration concrète d’une transformation plus profonde : l’Asie n’est plus seulement un terrain où les grandes puissances viennent défendre leurs intérêts. Elle est devenue l’un des lieux où se définissent les nouvelles règles du jeu international.
L’ASEAN incarne cette volonté des pays d’Asie du Sud-Est de préserver leur autonomie stratégique tout en composant avec les grandes puissances. La Francophonie, avec Phnom Penh comme point de rencontre, rappelle que les réseaux d’influence internationaux dépassent largement leurs ancrages géographiques traditionnels. Quant à l’APEC, elle place au premier plan les échanges commerciaux, les investissements, les chaînes d’approvisionnement, l’innovation et les rapports économiques entre les deux rives du Pacifique.
Le fait que ces trois rendez-vous se déroulent presque simultanément est particulièrement révélateur. Les diplomaties occidentales, asiatiques et celles des puissances émergentes se croisent désormais dans une région qui concentre une part croissante de la production mondiale, des échanges commerciaux, des investissements et des enjeux de sécurité.
Et il faut regarder au-delà de Washington et Pékin. L’Indonésie, le Vietnam, les Philippines, Singapour, la Malaisie, la Thaïlande et leurs voisins ne sont pas de simples spectateurs de la rivalité sino-américaine. Ils cherchent à préserver leurs marges de manœuvre, à diversifier leurs partenariats et à tirer parti de la compétition entre les grandes puissances.
Pour l’Europe, l’Amérique du Nord et particulièrement la France, le message mérite d’être entendu. Être présent en Asie ne peut plus se limiter à quelques visites officielles, à des déclarations de principe ou à des accords commerciaux ponctuels. Il faut une présence diplomatique durable, une stratégie économique cohérente et une compréhension beaucoup plus fine des priorités locales.
Le véritable pivot vers l’Asie ne se mesure donc pas seulement aux discours des dirigeants ou aux stratégies publiées dans les capitales occidentales. Il se mesure à l’endroit où se tiennent les sommets, où se négocient les partenariats, où circulent les capitaux et où se construisent les interdépendances de demain.
Pour ceux qui en doutaient encore, cette semaine en apporte une illustration particulièrement éloquente : l’Asie n’est plus le prochain centre de gravité du monde. Elle en est déjà l’un des principaux.
🌐 The Pivot to Asia: Power Is Being Redistributed, Not Transferred
The centre of gravity of the international system is moving. For centuries, global power sat in Europe, then across the Atlantic. Today that configuration is being tested by Asia's economic, technological, demographic and strategic rise. This is not simply an Asian century in the making. It is a broader redistribution of influence, ambition and geopolitical relevance.
The shift is structural, not cyclical. China has become a global economic and strategic power, unsettling the assumptions on which the post-Cold War order was built. India is asserting itself, combining demographic weight, economic ambition and strategic autonomy. Japan and South Korea remain indispensable technological and industrial powers, while Southeast Asia has become a major arena for investment, manufacturing, trade and diplomatic competition.
Yet the pivot is not only about China, and it does not imply an inevitable Western decline. It reflects a world where interdependence, technological rivalry, energy security and military influence are increasingly organised around the Indo-Pacific. Supply chains are being diversified, trade corridors redesigned, critical minerals elevated to strategic assets, and maritime routes placed at the centre of national security calculations.
Western allies are adjusting accordingly. Washington's Indo-Pacific strategy, Europe's deepening engagement with Asian partners and the growth of regional security arrangements all acknowledge that the future balance of power will be settled, to a considerable extent, in Asia.
The effects reach well beyond the region. The Middle East is no longer read solely through Western security interests or regional conflicts. The UAE and Saudi Arabia are building ever more sophisticated ties with Asian economies, linking energy, infrastructure, artificial intelligence, logistics and investment. The Abraham Accords add further room for economic integration and connectivity.
For these states, diversification is not a break with the West. It is strategic autonomy in practice: close ties with Washington and Europe, widening options toward Beijing, New Delhi, Tokyo and Seoul.
The underlying reality is therefore more complex than a handoff from West to East. It is a more distributed system, in which influence is negotiated among several centres rather than exercised from a single axis.
The task for Western capitals is not to prevent Asia's rise, which is neither realistic nor desirable, but to adapt to it. Competitiveness, innovation, credible alliances and diplomatic flexibility will count for far more than nostalgia for an order that is already changing.
The pivot is not merely geographical. It is the recognition that the institutions, markets, technologies and relationships shaping tomorrow are increasingly defined beyond the traditional centres of Western power.
The question is no longer whether the world is turning toward Asia. It is whether established powers can operate in a world where they no longer set all the terms.
🧐 على صفحة الشرق الأوسط | ما وراء الخبر:
• زيارة قائد القيادة المركزية الأميركية إلى إسرائيل: لقاءات مع رئيس أركان الجيش الإسرائيلي ورئيس جهاز الموساد، في إطار التنسيق العسكري والأمني بين واشنطن وتل أبيب.
• القمة الأردنية الأوروبية للاستثمار: عمّان تستضيف قمة تجمع الأردن والاتحاد الأوروبي لبحث فرص الاستثمار والشراكة الاقتصادية، وتعزيز التعاون في قطاعات استراتيجية، في ظل التحولات الاقتصادية والجيوسياسية في المنط
🇺🇳 The Rohingya Genocide Ruling: What It Means for Israel and the @CIJ_ICJ Case Over Gaza
The ICJ’s landmark ruling that Myanmar committed genocide against the Rohingya has important implications for Israel, particularly as the court continues to examine the genocide case brought against Israel by South Africa over the war in Gaza.
The ruling does not mean that Israel will automatically face the same outcome. The two cases involve different circumstances, evidence and legal arguments. But the Myanmar judgment gives the court an important point of reference when examining how genocide can be established under international law.
The central issue in both cases is not simply the scale of civilian casualties or the destruction caused by military operations. It is the question of intent: whether there is evidence that a state acted with the specific intention of destroying, in whole or in part, a protected national, ethnic, racial or religious group.
That distinction is particularly important for Israel. Its position is that the military campaign in Gaza is directed against Hamas following the October 7 attacks, not against Palestinians as a people. South Africa, on the other hand, argues that the scale and nature of the military operations, the destruction of civilian infrastructure, the conditions imposed on Gaza's population and statements by Israeli officials must be considered together when assessing whether genocidal intent can be established.
The Myanmar case demonstrates that the court can examine a broader pattern of conduct, rather than relying exclusively on an explicit order or declaration to establish intent. It also reinforces the importance of looking at the cumulative effect of military actions, official statements and policies towards the affected population.
That said, the ruling does not establish that every military campaign involving mass civilian casualties amounts to genocide. The legal threshold remains exceptionally high, and the court must assess the evidence in each case independently.
There is also a wider diplomatic dimension. Governments that have supported Israel will face continued pressure to reconcile their strategic relationships with their obligations under international law. The Genocide Convention does not exempt states from scrutiny because of their alliances or security concerns. It also places obligations on other countries to prevent genocide when they know, or should normally know, of a serious risk.
For Israel, therefore, the Myanmar judgment is not a conviction by association. It does, however, reinforce the legal framework within which its conduct in Gaza will be examined.
The broader message is that military objectives, however legitimate a state considers them to be, do not place its actions beyond international scrutiny. The right to defend oneself does not remove the obligation to respect international humanitarian law or the Genocide Convention.
Ultimately, the Myanmar ruling is significant not because it predetermines the outcome of the case against Israel, but because it demonstrates that the ICJ is prepared to hold a state legally responsible for genocide when the evidence meets the required threshold.
The real test for Israel will be whether it can persuade the court that its actions in Gaza, despite their devastating humanitarian consequences, were not carried out with the specific intent required to establish genocide.
🇺🇳 La Haye tranche : la Birmanie a commis un génocide
Rohingya : la @CIJ_ICJ reconnaît le génocide commis par la Birmanie. Rendue jeudi à La Haye, la décision établit que la Birmanie a commis un génocide contre la minorité rohingya dans le nord de l’État de Rakhine. Pour la première fois depuis sa création, il y a près de huit décennies, la Cour attribue formellement à un État la commission d’un génocide.
« La République de l’Union de la Birmanie a commis un génocide à l’encontre du groupe rohingya », a déclaré son président, Yuji Iwasawa. Pendant près de trois heures, les juges ont détaillé la campagne militaire de 2017 : meurtres de masse, violences sexuelles systématiques, brutalités visant jusqu’aux enfants, près de 10 000 morts et quelque 750 000 personnes jetées sur la route du Bangladesh. À Cox’s Bazar, devant des écrans géants, les réfugiés ont accueilli le verdict dans l’émotion : une première victoire après des années d’exil.
Les obligations prononcées sont lourdes. La Birmanie doit garantir un retour sûr, volontaire et digne des réfugiés, enquêter sur les suspects et sanctionner les responsables, puis verser des réparations dont les modalités seront fixées plus tard. Mais la Cour ne dispose d’aucun moyen autonome de faire exécuter ses arrêts : obligatoires et sans appel, ils valent ce que valent la volonté des États et la pression de la communauté internationale.
Le contexte birman aggrave la difficulté. Min Aung Hlaing, qui commandait l’armée en 2017, a pris le pouvoir par le coup d’État de février 2021, puis la présidence au terme d’un scrutin dénoncé par les organisations pro-démocratie ; il cherche aujourd’hui à restaurer sa légitimité internationale. Les autorités militaires ont toujours rejeté l’accusation, présentant les opérations de 2017 comme une riposte sécuritaire aux attaques de groupes armés rohingya, et n’ont fait aucun commentaire immédiat.
Le jugement tombe alors que la justice internationale est scrutée sur la question du génocide, la CIJ étant aussi saisie par l’Afrique du Sud contre Israël au sujet de Gaza. Les deux dossiers sont juridiquement distincts, mais ils nourrissent le même débat sur la capacité des institutions à établir la responsabilité des États. Human Rights Watch y voit une avancée qui dépasse le cas birman et pourrait élargir les recours des victimes de crimes internationaux.
C’est la Gambie qui a saisi la Cour en 2019, au nom de la Convention de 1948. Son ministre de la Justice, Dawda Jallow, y voit avant tout la victoire des survivants, qui ont résisté, témoigné et fait reconnaître leur sort. Reste l’essentiel : un verdict ne ramène personne chez lui, ne juge personne et ne répare rien tout seul. Le droit a parlé ; il lui faut désormais des bras.
🔗 Communiqué de presse
https://t.co/sUzPKzEChy
🔗 Press release
https://t.co/AdVNiIhEVu
🔗 Arrêt du 19 novembre 2026 | Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Gambie c. Myanmar ; 11 États intervenants)
https://t.co/2xY7YI3JUe
🔗 Judgment of 19 November 2026 | Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar: 11 States intervening)
https://t.co/imokA1TPWF
🇺🇳 La Haye tranche : la Birmanie a commis un génocide
Rohingya : la @CIJ_ICJ reconnaît le génocide commis par la Birmanie. Rendue jeudi à La Haye, la décision établit que la Birmanie a commis un génocide contre la minorité rohingya dans le nord de l’État de Rakhine. Pour la première fois depuis sa création, il y a près de huit décennies, la Cour attribue formellement à un État la commission d’un génocide.
« La République de l’Union de la Birmanie a commis un génocide à l’encontre du groupe rohingya », a déclaré son président, Yuji Iwasawa. Pendant près de trois heures, les juges ont détaillé la campagne militaire de 2017 : meurtres de masse, violences sexuelles systématiques, brutalités visant jusqu’aux enfants, près de 10 000 morts et quelque 750 000 personnes jetées sur la route du Bangladesh. À Cox’s Bazar, devant des écrans géants, les réfugiés ont accueilli le verdict dans l’émotion : une première victoire après des années d’exil.
Les obligations prononcées sont lourdes. La Birmanie doit garantir un retour sûr, volontaire et digne des réfugiés, enquêter sur les suspects et sanctionner les responsables, puis verser des réparations dont les modalités seront fixées plus tard. Mais la Cour ne dispose d’aucun moyen autonome de faire exécuter ses arrêts : obligatoires et sans appel, ils valent ce que valent la volonté des États et la pression de la communauté internationale.
Le contexte birman aggrave la difficulté. Min Aung Hlaing, qui commandait l’armée en 2017, a pris le pouvoir par le coup d’État de février 2021, puis la présidence au terme d’un scrutin dénoncé par les organisations pro-démocratie ; il cherche aujourd’hui à restaurer sa légitimité internationale. Les autorités militaires ont toujours rejeté l’accusation, présentant les opérations de 2017 comme une riposte sécuritaire aux attaques de groupes armés rohingya, et n’ont fait aucun commentaire immédiat.
Le jugement tombe alors que la justice internationale est scrutée sur la question du génocide, la CIJ étant aussi saisie par l’Afrique du Sud contre Israël au sujet de Gaza. Les deux dossiers sont juridiquement distincts, mais ils nourrissent le même débat sur la capacité des institutions à établir la responsabilité des États. Human Rights Watch y voit une avancée qui dépasse le cas birman et pourrait élargir les recours des victimes de crimes internationaux.
C’est la Gambie qui a saisi la Cour en 2019, au nom de la Convention de 1948. Son ministre de la Justice, Dawda Jallow, y voit avant tout la victoire des survivants, qui ont résisté, témoigné et fait reconnaître leur sort. Reste l’essentiel : un verdict ne ramène personne chez lui, ne juge personne et ne répare rien tout seul. Le droit a parlé ; il lui faut désormais des bras.
🔗 Communiqué de presse
https://t.co/sUzPKzEChy
🔗 Press release
https://t.co/AdVNiIhEVu
🔗 Arrêt du 19 novembre 2026 | Application de la convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide (Gambie c. Myanmar ; 11 États intervenants)
https://t.co/2xY7YI3JUe
🔗 Judgment of 19 November 2026 | Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (The Gambia v. Myanmar: 11 States intervening)
https://t.co/imokA1TPWF
🇺🇸 Business as Usual: Wall Street Is Betting on AI, Not Waiting for Humanity to Catch Up
Wall Street isn’t losing sleep over the existential risks artificial intelligence may pose to humanity. That’s a problem for tomorrow. Today, there is money to be made.
The latest illustration is Anthropic’s extraordinary IPO. The company reportedly raised approximately $81.35 billion after pricing 980 million shares at $83 apiece, substantially exceeding its original plan to offer 825 million shares at between $70 and $78. What began as an already ambitious public offering turned into an even larger demonstration of investor appetite for the AI industry.
The numbers tell their own story. Investors were not simply willing to participate; demand was sufficiently strong for the company to expand the offering and price it above its initial range. Whatever the uncertainties surrounding the future of artificial intelligence, the market appears convinced that the commercial opportunity is too significant to ignore.
And therein lies the contradiction at the heart of the AI revolution.
Across the world, governments are discussing safeguards, researchers are warning about increasingly autonomous systems, and ethicists are raising questions about employment, accountability, misinformation, concentration of power and the possibility of losing meaningful human control over advanced technologies. The language is often existential. The concerns are not necessarily theoretical.
Yet financial markets operate on a different timetable.
Wall Street is not in the business of resolving humanity’s long-term dilemmas. It is in the business of identifying opportunities, assessing risk, allocating capital and generating returns. If artificial intelligence promises to transform industries, increase productivity, reshape labour markets and create entirely new sources of wealth, investors want exposure now, not after society has finished debating the consequences.
This is not necessarily hypocrisy. It is capitalism functioning according to its own incentives.
The problem is that the financial system can reward technological acceleration without necessarily accounting for its broader social costs. The companies that move fastest, capture market share and establish dominant positions may become extraordinarily valuable long before regulators, institutions and democratic societies understand the full implications of their products.
There is also a deeper question about who ultimately benefits from this transformation. The enormous valuations and capital flows surrounding AI may create substantial wealth for investors, founders and technology companies. But will the productivity gains translate into better living standards for the wider population? Or will they further concentrate economic power among a relatively small group of corporations and capital owners?
For now, those questions remain secondary to the investment opportunity.
Anthropic’s offering is therefore more than a financial milestone. It is a snapshot of the prevailing mood in the technology economy: confidence in commercial potential, appetite for scale and a willingness to invest heavily in a future whose risks remain only partially understood.
Humanity may still be debating whether it can control the technology it is creating. Wall Street has already decided that it wants a stake in it.
The existential debate can continue. The trading floor has business to do.